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i 
Abstract 
This thesis describes a new approach to lightning protection components design by 
incorporating the use of multiple data sources, aircraft environmental threats models 
and component characteristics to determine if the component design meets the 
continued airworthiness requirements. This innovative aircraft lightning protection 
component design methodology examines critical component characteristics and 
evaluates these characteristics for long term survivability given known environmental 
design data. Use of in-service data, test data, material sciences and detailed 
component construction produces predictive results and provides inputs for the 
design community. 
 
A simple case of non-active lightning protection components was used to validate this 
methodology, concluding that certain design degradation mitigations are necessary to 
improve the continued airworthiness performance. 
 
Following this validation, the methodology was exercised by several case studies using 
actual design data from a large transport aircraft. The case studies provide for 
understanding how the methodology can be applied and showed that value was 
produced in creating design optimizations for the protection components. The case 
studies also proved that the methodology could be applied to different lightning 
protection designs spanning from structural design protection components to systems 
infrastructure transport elements and wiring. For this work, analysis sheets were 
designed to provide the necessary design assessments to apply the methodology. 
 
Finally, the thesis concludes that application of this design methodology worked well 
for evaluation and optimization of lightning protection components and may work 
well for other aircraft system components. Future work associated with this study 
suggests that the methodology could more effectively deployed by use of an 
integrated computing system with the ability to share data efficiently between key 
design groups including electrical wiring design, electrical earthing engineering, 
electrical standards engineering, structural protection engineering and maintenance 
engineering departments. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction and Objectives 
1.1 General Description of Issues 
Aircraft components that protect against the potentially adverse effects of lightning 
must be designed in compliance with identified aviation regulations. Aviation 
regulations must be interpreted in order to certify a new aircraft design for 
commercial applications. Methodologies for satisfaction of regulations rely on 
interpretation and negotiated mutual understandings of what is prudent and 
necessary to meet the intent of the regulations. The safety of flight is crucial to the 
ongoing success of commercial aircraft operations and a reliable worldwide 
transportation system. Both new and existing lightning protection technologies must 
be evaluated rigorously during a new aircraft development program. 
 
Aircraft are typically designed to reach a particular Design Service Objective (DSO). 
This DSO refers to the flight cycle, flight hours, and calendar time goals used as a 
design parameter for the aircraft. The DSO assists engineers in the selection of 
materials and structural components. A typical goal for an aircraft economic life is 20 
years but the flight cycle and flight hours will vary depending on whether the aircraft 
is designed for long distance or short distance applications. A wide body aircraft may 
be designed for a service objective of 20,000 flight cycles and 60,000 flight hours in 
20 years. The aircraft DSO goals should be considered when selecting and evaluating 
lightning protection designs. This proposal leads one to also consider the continued 
airworthiness of lightning protection throughout the expected aircraft life. 
 
The United States Federal Aviation Regulation, FAR 25.1529 states that, “the 
applicant must prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness in accordance with 
appendix H to this part that are acceptable to the Administrator.”  It is the 
interpretation of what may be acceptable to the administrator that drives a 
manufacturer to continue to investigate new ideas associated with how to 
determine and manage the continued airworthiness of aircraft structures and 
systems including lightning protection. As advancements in aircraft designs bring 
opportunity to evaluate new technologies and old technologies in an aircraft 
development program, both new and old designs must be evaluated for the 
continued value of a particular design solution including the continued airworthiness 
of the systems. As past designs for lightning protection have required basic lightning 
current flow solutions in part, because of the use of metallic structures, little 
emphasis has been on the continued availability of these design features until just 
recently. Recent designs using advanced materials such as composite structures and 
highly integrated systems require more critical electrical bonding designs which also 
raise the awareness of the long-term effectiveness of these new designs. 
 
The beginning of this thesis exercise will evaluate related regulations and the 
certification processes for lightning protective systems as a platform for further 
evaluation of a potential new design methodology. Part of the certification 
requirements is to submit “Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA)”. Past 
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aircraft certification programs relied on the development of these ICAs in part 
through an industry Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) organized under the US Air 
Transport Association (ATA) in the 1970s. This MSG process uses logic that relies on 
the inherent reliability and safety of each system design as required by FAR 25.1309.  
In performing MSG analysis, scheduled maintenance recommendations are created 
that take full advantage of the design intent and maintains the inherent reliability 
designed into the aircraft systems.  
 
The standards for incorporation of sophisticated protective systems that ensure no 
single event can result in a catastrophic condition are directly applicable to lightning 
protection features. Though the MSG process for development of large transport 
category aircraft maintenance programs has been in existence since the early 1970’s, 
it is only recently that this process has been applied to lightning protection. Past 
continued airworthiness of lightning protection was provided by non-scheduled 
maintenance of aircraft protective systems such as lightning diverter strips on an 
aircraft radome and careful return-to-service procedures including ensuring 
electrical bond are functional. The use of metallic structure and low-tech avionics 
gives reason not to have been concerned with a more sophisticated approach to 
continued airworthiness development.  
 
Compounding the clear way forward to certification is the application of already 
developed regulations like FAR 25.1309 that ensures all aircraft systems are 
evaluated for appropriate levels of aircraft safety. What is of interest is the lack of 
clearly written applicability to lightning protection systems within the guidance for 
the failure hazard assessment criteria written in FAR 25.1309 used to assist in 
designing robust and safe systems. One argument for this may be that the lightning 
protection is typically not determined to be a system. Further investigation to the 
impact of this definition of systems is researched in detail later in this thesis.  
1.2 Research Focus and Background 
This thesis recommends a new design methodology that will improve performance, 
optimize lightning protection design, and deliver Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness solutions that are acceptable to the administrator. This is achieved by 
establishing a target for the life of the lightning protection and understanding in 
detail, the expectations of the administrator through careful assessment of the 
regulations that result in acceptable certification plans which drive the final design.  
Current research leading to this body of work builds on the new methodology for 
lightning protection maintenance determination implemented in 2007 through the 
US Air Transport Association (ATA). The ATA recommendations contained in the 
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG-3) document guidelines were revised in 2007 to 
more effectively address development of lightning protection initial minimum 
schedule maintenance programs. In these new guidelines, the concept of lightning 
protection component degradation within the component installed location is used 
to estimate the robustness of a lightning protection component over the life of the 
aircraft. This concept of design degradation evaluation is central to the new design 
methodology proposed within the body of work and captured within this thesis. 
Aircraft electrical and electronic systems are designed such that no single lightning 
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event can cause or contribute to a catastrophic condition as directed by FAR 
25.1316. Aircraft structures have a similar requirement to ensure that no single 
lightning event can result in a catastrophic condition as defined in FAR 25.581. Past 
airplane programs have designed redundancy within the lightning protection, but 
have not achieved full credit for this redundancy due to the threat of the “common 
mode failure”. Without an accepted methodology for minimizing the catastrophic 
implications of a common-mode failure, ICAs must be developed without critical 
analysis of the design degradation modes resulting in maintenance of redundant 
systems simply because these lightning protection components protect against the 
potentially adverse effects to a critical aircraft system. The reason for needing a 
more advanced lightning protection design methodology stems partially from the 
advancement of integrated aircraft systems and use of less electrically conductive 
aircraft structures. Starting with the advancement of full electronic controlled 
aircraft such as the Boeing 777, a best guess method combined with statistically 
insignificant in-service testing was used to satisfy the FAR 25.1529 requirements for 
continued airworthiness. 
 
In-service testing by the aircraft manufacturer was instituted in the late 1990s as a 
measure to address redundant lightning protection components that protect 
multiple systems, due to the highly integrated nature of the systems which may 
allow a single lightning strike to affect multiple critical systems simultaneously, if not 
maintained per the type design. The lack of an effective methodology to ensure that 
these lightning protection components would not degrade to a point of exposing the 
aircraft to the potentially adverse effects during a lightning strike led to a quandary 
of inefficient and overly conservative lightning protection maintenance programs in 
the 1990s. Even though it is understood that aircraft systems have common mode 
failures for which redundancy minimizes maintenance, the industry found itself 
unable to manage effective selection of particular lightning protection maintenance. 
This body of work examines a potential solution to designing lightning protection 
systems by including the continued airworthiness discipline at the front of the design 
cycle.  This results in more manageable and effective lightning protection product 
while producing an equally effective set of instructions for continued airworthiness.    
1.3 Research Objective 
Research objectives summary: 
1. Identify, discuss and apply regulations guidance for lightning protection design 
and continued airworthiness 
2. Define lightning protection systems, components and devices and the lightning 
phenomenon 
3. Research lightning events and impacts on aircraft airworthiness 
4. Prove gap in design methodology to address continued airworthiness 
5. Establish new design methodology to address continued airworthiness 
6. Technically evaluate a variety of lightning protection systems 
7. Test the methodology 
8. Create practical method to develop large scale lightning protection systems 
continued airworthiness designs 
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9. Expand test case to include actual design data on multiple and varied existing 
aircraft lightning protection systems 
10. Assess outcome of design methodology to the benefits of aircraft designs 
11. Identify future development opportunities and future work that supports this 
body of work 
 
The body of work conducts several necessary design evaluations in order to evaluate 
a new industry methodology to address new and existing lightning protection 
technology. The definition of a “system” is explored to assess if lightning protection 
“systems” are (or should be) treated differently than current critical and essential 
systems. Different lightning protection components were selected and evaluated 
with the design methodology to determine the methodologies viability across 
different types of protection. Actual data was used and is contained in an Appendix 
to exercise the methodology and produce valuable knowledge about the design 
methodology while also protecting the proprietary nature of the data. Application of 
design requirements for structure, without concern for lightning protection 
continued airworthiness is contrasted against lightning protection requirements that 
are integral to structural component design processes. Having assessed the proper 
application of lightning protection design assessment in the certification of new 
aircraft technologies, this research and development will also assess regulatory 
accountability as applied to lightning protection across both systems and structures, 
thus developing a “basic understanding” of how lightning protection is viewed by the 
regulations. Feedback from regulators will be included in the studies where 
appropriate. Once a lightning protection design is evaluated for its specific make-up 
and installation of the protection, these studies will define a new methodology to 
develop systems and structures designs that optimize compliance to regulations for 
the continued airworthiness of lightning protection and produce superior design 
solutions in comparison to past methods. Failure modes for lightning protection are 
not the same as the failure modes of the systems in which they protect, given that 
failure of the lightning protection in combination with a lightning event can affect 
the system but not necessarily affect the lightning protection. Lightning protection, 
for the most part, is passive (though some new technologies are deploying active 
lightning protection systems). In that case, it is not reasonable to manage lightning 
protection continued airworthiness by associating the effects of system failure to the 
lightning protection degradation or failure, since the system failure does not 
necessarily imply a lightning protection failure has occurred. In fact, it may be 
difficult to determine the definition of a failed lightning protection component since 
degradation may be present, but the result to the system it is protecting when a 
lightning event occurs may have no impact to system performance.  
 
In short, lightning protection has been incorporated on classic and advanced 
technology aircraft in compliance with regulations. New expertise for this area of 
study is appropriate to improve both the designs and continued safe and economic 
operation of lightning protection. 
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1.4 Research Method 
Initially, regulations were to be researched to determine the intent of the lightning 
protection design functions. This will require further investigation of lightning 
impacts on aircraft and lightning phenomenon. The thesis contains a chapter that 
describes lightning creation and lightning attachment to aircraft. This section will 
also provide data gathered from this research on the environment in which lightning 
is created and the altitude, weather conditions, time of year and temperatures in 
which lightning strike to aircraft has been reported. 
 
The initial methodology was to be drafted with focus on the lightning protection 
design component characteristics. The later version of the methodology will be 
contained in this thesis to include the use of test data and installation location 
environments to determine environmental threats to the lightning protection 
survival index. The idea that is leveraged in this design methodology includes 
understanding of the lightning current electrical conductive paths and brings focus to 
the long-term survivability of the lightning protection path given the elements that 
cause degradation within that installed environment. 
 
The new design methodology was to be developed to provide guidance to aircraft 
designers on how to design lightning protection components to perform effectively 
over the life of the aircraft. To do this, design goals were to be created and inputs 
and outputs to the design methodology developed as the methodology matured. 
Once the methodology reaches maturity, the methodology will be exercised through 
use of an assessment sheet that will be developed by the student specifically to test 
the design method practicality. In this approach, an assessment sheet is raised for 
each lightning protection component. In practical application, this assessment sheet 
could be implemented by a computing system that integrates different design 
expertise into a single collaborative tool. 
 
Validation of the methodology was to be gained by use of actual design data from a 
lightning protection component manufacturer. Though this data was not quite as 
detailed as that data used in the case studies, the data should provide validation that 
this methodology could be practically applied to lightning protection designs. The 
validation could also provide a means to exercise the assessment sheets and 
improve on the data required to perform a useful assessment. 
 
An extensive series of case studies should be created to test the application of the 
methodology to real design implementations. The case studies will be developed 
with proprietary information under contract between the University and the aircraft 
manufacturer and will be held in a Proprietary Appendix to this thesis.  
 
The discussion to be included in the case studies will evaluate the results and provide 
detailed comments on the findings. This includes the association of the assessment 
sheets to the methodology and the connection of the methodology to the aircraft 
lightning protection design activity.  
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Finally, the body of work summarized in this thesis will provide conclusions and 
recommendations for the design assurance of aircraft lightning protection systems 
continued airworthiness. In this section, the evidence of newly gained knowledge 
will be presented and follow-on to further work is described. 
 
The chapters used to document the body of work to be included in this thesis will be 
as follows: 
1. Introduction - Provide the outline of the work to be conducted, the research 
method to be used, and the objectives of the works including a problem 
statement, the regulatory environment, and scope of the studies 
2. What is Lightning - Describe the phenomenon of lightning, how lightning 
attaches to aircraft, lightning statistics, aircraft strike data, and how an aircraft is 
protected from lightning 
3.  Methodology - Develop a design methodology to address the declared need for 
a new methodology, distinguish the proposed methodology from current 
methods, meet the research objectives, and provide an implementation solution 
for the new methodology 
4. Validation - create a test case to validate the methodology, create and exercise 
design assessment sheets, and adjust the methodology based on findings 
5. Case Studies -  Exercise the methodology using actual aircraft design data and 
recommend revised design practices 
6. Lessons of the Case Studies and Revised Methodology – Provide a critical 
evaluation of the case studies findings, its practical application and recommend 
methodology revisions as applicable 
7. Discussion – Provide a comparison of the objectives to the outcome of the case 
studies, identify what gaps are filled by use of new methodology and who and 
how it should be used 
8. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Work – Provide summary of key 
findings in discussion section and future work that should be performed. 
1.5 Conclusion of the Problem Statement 
The problem statement for this work points to a complex design methodology that is 
focused on lightning protection. As continued airworthiness requirements for 
lightning protection are highly interpreted during the time a new aircraft is 
developed, the use of a methodology to address the need for lightning protection 
continued airworthiness designs is required to move the industry forward. The use of 
the methodology will be tested with a validation, evaluated by direct use 
demonstrated by several case studies, matured through the body of work 
development process over five years and finally concluded by identifying future 
work. The methodology developed for these studies has been recognized as valuable 
work to the manufacturer who has supported this work and has submitted the 
methodology as a new invention idea to the US Patent Office which  is in status 
“Patent Pending” as of the completion date of this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Lightning Characteristics and Impacts on Aircraft 
2.1Regulations and Guiding Documents 
One of the early objectives was to understand the regulations and guiding principles 
involved in the creation of current lightning protection continued airworthiness 
designs. In order to achieve an initial understanding, it was determined to be 
prudent to evaluate and summarize the Federal Aviation Regulations related to 
lightning. This section of the introduction chapter proceeds to provide as best 
possible, an overview of regulations. Also note that during the time this body of 
work was in development (2005-2010) new guidelines for maintenance 
determinations of lightning protection systems were published in MSG-3 ATA 
guidelines document and also HIRF SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARPs) 
were developed and published through an SAE subcommittee. These changes 
demonstrate the dynamics of this subject. 
 
Since the application of the regulations is part of the driver that creates impetuous 
for lightning protection continued airworthiness designs, it is considered appropriate 
to perform regulation research. Before the technical review was initiated, extensive 
research into the regulations and existing guidelines was performed starting in 2005. 
Since then, in 2007 MSG-3 guidelines for the development of lightning protection 
scheduled maintenance were published having a significant impact on the premise of 
this work. Key to successful development of Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
for lightning protection is the understanding of regulations and industry guideline 
developments. This contemporary progression in regulation and guideline 
development during the development of this methodology translated into significant 
relevance for this body of work. More about regulations and certification processes 
will be included in the case studies. In the following paragraphs, the research results 
of regulation and other guiding document are documented to in order to set the 
scene for this body of work.  
 
Assessment of the regulations and guiding documents are made in order to provide 
a view of the state of the industry and its impact with regards to appropriate 
direction for designers to implement safe and economic lightning protection designs 
including design optimization. 
2.1.1 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) and FAR 25.1529 
The purpose of ICAs is to provide assurance as required by the regulating authorities 
that the inherent safety of operation determined through type certification of the 
aircraft will remain in place throughout the life of the aircraft. Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness are a critical element of the Certification Plans. This is 
accomplished through development and delivery of maintenance and operational 
documents. Demonstrating compliance with these regulations is a requirement for 
successful airplane certification and delivery. Regulation 14 CFR 21.50(b) states that 
the holder of design approval, including either the type certificate or supplemental 
type certificate for an aircraft shall furnish at least one set of complete Instructions 
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for Continued Airworthiness, prepared in accordance with Sections 25.1529 of the 
regulations. This is required to be supplied to each owner of each type aircraft upon 
its delivery, or upon issuance of the first standard airworthiness certificate for the 
affected aircraft.  
 
As aircraft are designed and system safety analyses are developed, the ICA required 
for successful type certification of an aircraft are also created. In 1980 the final rule 
for FAR 25.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness was approved by Docket 
Number(s) 14779 and 14324 in the US Federal Register on September 11, 1980. The 
purpose of ICA is to ensure that the inherent safety and reliability of the original 
design is maintained throughout the life of the aircraft.  
 
One of the lists of documents that make up the Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness (ICA) is the scheduled maintenance requirements delivered to 
regulators in a Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR). Unscheduled 
maintenance instructions are provided in technical manuals and also submitted for 
the certification of the aircraft type design. In order to develop the initial minimum 
scheduled maintenance requirements, working groups are established under an ATA 
process called MSG-3 (Maintenance Steering Group) that include experts from 
operators, manufacturers and regulatory authorities to evaluate lightning protection 
designs and recommend appropriate maintenance requirements. This process is 
detailed in Advisory Circular AC 121-22A Maintenance Review Board Procedures. 
 
In order to gain the type certification sought aircraft manufacturers must establish 
how compliance with FAR 25.1529 is achieved at the time of aircraft type 
certification. The Federal Aviation Regulation Section 25.1529, titled Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness states: “The applicant must prepare Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness in accordance with Appendix H to this part that are 
acceptable to the Administrator. The instructions may be incomplete at type 
certification if a program exists to ensure their completion prior to delivery of the 
first airplane or issuance of a standard certificate of airworthiness, whichever occurs 
later.” [Amdt. 25-54, 45 FR 60173, Sept. 11, 1980]. 
This FAR 25.1529 as applied to lightning protection features must be interpreted by 
the aircraft manufacturer and compliance is negotiated between the manufacturer 
and the approving authority for how compliance will be achieved. 
 
In order to establish these instructions, electromagnetic effects engineers and 
maintenance engineers collaborate to develop appropriate maintenance tasks and 
maintenance requirements to ensure that the continued airworthiness of the 
protective systems are maintained throughout the aircrafts operating life. Past 
lightning protection certification programs have focused on the protection of wire 
shields, connector grounding, and electrical bonding. New generation aircraft 
composed primarily of composite materials include additional protection schemes 
that may require maintenance to ensure that the continued airworthiness of the 
lightning protection components is maintained. With this evolution of protection 
design, a methodology associated with the evaluation of maintenance requirements 
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for these new protection designs also evolved as the new MSG-3 guidelines were 
implemented in 2007. 
 
Certification plans are developed by the manufacturers engineering representatives 
and delivered to the regulator to certify the aircraft type design. The certification 
plan provides information on the specific areas of protection required by the 
regulations and identify the associated means for compliance to the regulations 
cited. Certification deliverables can also be listed in the Certification Plan that might 
include references to other document deliverables for lightning protection designs 
such as test plans, test reports, and a protection assurance plans. More details on 
protection assurance plans are included later in this thesis. Evidence of compliance 
to FAR 25.1529 “Instructions for Continued Airworthiness” may also be included in 
the certification plan to ensure that the lightning protection is adequately 
maintained. This approach ensures that the aircraft meets its certification basis 
throughout the life of the aircraft.  
2.1.2 Design Regulations FAR/JAR 
The following regulations affect the design of lightning protection. Compliance to 
these regulations can be achieved through many different means and can involve as 
many different design solutions. Requirements are created on an aircraft 
development program partially by observance of these regulations. Once negotiated 
with the certificating authority, the requirements stabilize and focus is then applied 
to the design solutions.  
 
Some regulations are specific to lightning protection while others such as FAR 
25.1309 directs the designer to comply with many different potential events that 
may impact safety, including lightning as a potential cause of the event. Tables 2-1, 
2-2 and 2-3 contain a collection of regulations that may impact lightning protection 
design. This data is part of the literature research. 
 
In addition, other guiding documents such as Advisory Circulars, ARINC 
specifications, Military specifications and SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices all 
may play a role in the design of lightning protection. In past years the use of Special 
Conditions (I.E. Issue Papers) also drove requirements to meet certain safety criteria 
where the current regulations at the time were considered inadequate to address 
new and novel aircraft designs.  
 
The question of new and novel designs has been the center of debate and activity 
between aircraft manufacturers and the regulatory authorities. Administrators will 
issue special conditions in cases where sufficient guidance is not provided in 
currently approved regulations and the need for a specific direction with regard to 
new or novel designs is deemed by the certifying authority to be prudent.  
 
In the Federal Register: September 11, 1980 (Volume 45, No. 178)][Page 60154] 
several commenter’s objected to proposed Sec. 21.16(a) which would delete 
reference to a "novel and unusual design feature" as a necessary condition for the 
Administrator to issue special conditions. Special conditions become a part of the 
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designated applicable regulations for type certification of a particular product 
(aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller). One commenter indicated that the proposed 
revision is unjustified and would lead to indiscriminate rule making and that instead 
of simplifying the administration of the requirements it would introduce complexity. 
Another commenter claims that adoption of proposed Sec. 21.16(a) would introduce 
uncertainty into design requirements. 
 
It was pointed out in this register by a commenter that if Sec. 21.21(b)(2) were to 
continue to be used to issue special conditions to cover an unsafe design feature or 
characteristic that is not "novel or unusual," it must be equally applicable to a 
condition that exists on more than one (earlier certificated) product, further stating 
that the other products must then have been type certificated using existing rules 
which did not adequately cover the unsafe design feature or characteristic. 
 
These comments and questions caused the FAA to completely reevaluate its 
practices in designating the applicable regulations for type certification under Sec. 
21.17(a), commonly referred to as defining a "type certification basis."  For lightning 
protection of advanced and highly integrated aircraft, special conditions have been 
drafted against several aircraft manufacturer aircraft designs to address gaps in the 
regulations. As this work investigates a design methodology associated with lightning 
protection, further consideration is prudent regarding the position of the regulating 
authorities going forward with regard to new and highly integrated aircraft designs. 
 
From the US federal register, Sections 21.16, 21.17, and 21.21, taken together with 
FAA policy in designating the applicable regulations must recognize and balance four 
important considerations: (1) the FAA has an obligation under Section 601 of the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to keep the airworthiness standards of this subchapter 
(i.e., FARs 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35) as current as practicable; (2) the type 
certificate applicant has a right and a need to know, in very specific terms, what the 
applicable airworthiness standards will be in order to finalize the detail design of its 
product and to enable the applicant to make reasonable performance guarantees to 
its potential customers; (3) in the interests of safety, rapid technological advances 
presently being made by the civil aircraft industry require that the FAA be able to 
issue special conditions to address truly novel or unusual design features that it has, 
as yet, not had an adequate opportunity to envisage in the airworthiness standards 
through the general rulemaking process; and (4) because the airworthiness 
standards of this subchapter are intentionally objective in nature to allow flexibility 
in design, the FAA must retain the prerogatives both to make equivalent safety 
findings and to deny a type certificate whenever an unsafe design feature or 
characteristic is found during the type certification process.  
 
It must be recognized that in some areas which will vary from time to time the state 
of the regulations may somewhat lag the state of the art in new design because of 
the rapidity in which the state of the art is advancing in civil aeronautical design and 
because of the time required to develop the experience base needed by the FAA to 
proceed with general rule making. Applicants for type certification of a new design 
have the opportunity to mitigate the impact of not knowing the precise 
  
11 
airworthiness standards to be applied for "novel or unusual design features" by 
consulting with the FAA early in their certification planning when such features are 
suspected or known by the applicant to exist. Because of the intentional objective 
nature of the airworthiness standards, many new design features which might be 
thought of as "novel or unusual design features" may already be adequately covered 
by existing regulations, thus obviating the need to issue special conditions. 
 
Since the development of new highly integrated aircraft and with extensive use of 
composite materials in transport category aircraft, it is important to note at the 
beginning of this body of work that the design criteria to meet the intent of the 
administrators are very dynamic as interpretation of what is required is provided in 
real time during the certification program. The methodology proposed by this body 
of work calls for integration of design requirements that should not be considered in 
isolation from the changing regulatory environments, especially in cases where the 
new aircraft design may be considered novel. 
 
The regulations within the following tables were determined to have a bearing on 
the proposed methodology but not in a way that would result in changing the 
proposal at this time. The interpretation of regulations at the time of the design 
development may result in changes to the methodology, therefore the methodology 
proposed is considered general in its application. 
 
FAR/JAR 
reference 
Title Issue  
Date 
Subject 
25.581 Lightning 
Protection 
04/01/70 The airplane, including metallic and non-
metallic components, must be protected 
against the catastrophic effects from 
lightning 
25.1316 System 
Lightning 
Protection 
04/20/94 The electrical and electronic systems whose 
failure can contribute to or cause a 
condition that would prevent or reduce 
continued safe flight and landing must be 
protected against the effects of lightning. 
25.981 Fuel Tank 
[Ignition 
Prevention] 
Amdt. 25-
102, Eff. 
6/6/2001 
No ignition source may be present at each 
point in the fuel tank or fuel tank system 
where catastrophic failure could occur due 
to ignition of fuel or vapors. 
25.954 Fuel System 
Lightning 
Protection 
9/10/67 The fuel system must be designed and 
arranged to prevent the ignition of fuel 
vapor within the system due to lightning. 
25.1529 
Appendix 
H* 
Airworthiness 
Standards, 
Instructions for 
Continued 
Airworthiness 
Amend 
9/11/80 
The manufacturer must provide instructions 
for continued airworthiness that area 
acceptable to the regulator. 
*FAR/JAR 25.1529 is not restricted to 
lightning and HIRF but is interpreted to be 
applied across the entire aircraft. 
Table 2-1 Regulatory References Affecting Lightning Protection 
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ARP 
Reference 
Title Issue  
Date 
Subject 
ARP5583 HIRF Users 
Guide 
03/01/01 Instructions on how to design and maintain 
HIRF protection. 
ARP5577 Aircraft 
Lightning Direct 
Effects 
Certification 
2002-09 Guidance for a means to show compliance 
with regulations for protection against 
lightning direct effects for aircraft of 
conventional design and advanced 
composites. 
ARP5412 Aircraft 
Lightning 
Environment 
and Related 
Test 
Waveforms 
1999-11, 
Revised 
2005-02 
Provides waveform and environmental data 
and analysis currently available. 
ARP 5413 Certification of 
Aircraft 
Electrical/Electr
onic Systems 
for the Indirect 
Effects of 
Lightning 
1999-11 Guidance for showing compliance with the 
regulations for hazards caused by lightning 
environment to electrical and electronic 
systems. 
ARP5414 Aircraft 
Lightning 
Zoning 
1999-12 
2005-02 
Defines lightning strike zones and provides 
guidelines for locating them on particular 
aircraft and also provides examples. 
ARP 5415 User’s Manual 
for Certification 
of Aircraft 
Electrical/Electr
onic Systems 
for the  Indirect 
Effects of 
Lightning 
2001-08 
2002-04 
Provides information for 1) Acceptance 
criteria for indirect effects of lightning 2) 
verification analysis and test methods 3) 
recommended design options to optimize 
needed system immunity to indirect 
effects. 
ARP 5416 Aircraft 
Lightning Test 
Methods 
2005-03 Describes how to conduct lightning direct 
effects tests and indirect system upset 
effects tests. 
Table 2-2 SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices affecting lightning designs 
 
Advisory 
Circular 
Reference 
Title Issue  
Date 
Subject 
AC20-136 Protection of 
Aircraft 
Electrical/Electr
onic Systems 
Against the 
Indirect Effects 
3/5/90 Provides guidance on how to comply with 
the requirements of FAR/JARs relating to 
protection of aircraft electrical/electronic 
systems installed either on or within an 
aircraft from the effects of lightning. 
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Advisory 
Circular 
Reference 
Title Issue  
Date 
Subject 
of Lightning 
AC20-53A Protection of 
Aircraft Fuel 
Systems Against 
Fuel Vapor 
Ignition Due To 
Lightning 
4/12/85 Provides guidance to means but not only 
means for compliance to FAR/JARs 
applicable to the prevention of fuel vapor 
due to lightning. 
AC20-
107A 
Composite 
Aircraft 
Structure 
4/25/84 Provides guidance to demonstrate that 
composite structure provides an acceptable 
means for diverting electrical current as a 
result of a lightning strike so as not to 
endanger the aircraft. 
AC25-981-
1B 
Fuel Tank 
Ignition Source 
Guidelines 
4/18/01 Provides guidance for demonstrating 
compliance with certification requirements 
for prevention of ignition sources within 
the fuel tank including guidance on 
lightning as an ignition source. 
AC25-981-
2 
Tank 
Flammability 
Minimization 
4/18/01 Provides guidance for compliance to 
airworthiness standards pertaining to 
minimization of hazards from flammable 
fuel air mixtures within fuel tanks. 
AC121-
22A 
Maintenance 
review Board 
Procedures 
3/7/97 Provides guidance that can be used during 
development and revision of the initial 
minimum scheduled 
maintenance/inspection requirements for a 
derivative or newly type-certified transport 
category aircraft for submittal to the FAA 
for approval 
Table 2-3 Advisory Circulars impacting lightning design and maintenance 
2.2 What is Lightning? 
Lightning is the dissipation of static energy stored in cloud clusters. Scientists believe 
that the static energy stored in clouds comes from the relative motion of 
precipitation within the clouds that generate free electrons resulting in stored 
charges collected within the cloud. Positive charge in the cloud will seek negative 
charges on the earths’ surface. While in the same manner, negative charges in the 
cloud will seek positive charges on the ground. Lightning begins to move away from 
the cloud filled with static energy in what is called leaders. Leaders are electrical 
energy moving out to seek ground or an object of opposite charge. Leaders stem 
from what is called a lightning channel. Lightning energy moves from the lightning 
channel in leader streams. As the leaders find nowhere to transfer energy in an 
opposite charge or “ground” the leader is drawn back into the channel and the 
channel stores the leader charge which increases the energy in the leader channel. 
Again leaders stream away from the lightning channel seeking an opposite charge. 
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This process continues while the lightning channel grows until a leader finds an 
oppositely charged object and quickly discharges the energy built up in the channel. 
This transfer of channel energy can be dramatic since the stored plasma often 
reaches incredible levels of electrical power beyond 1 million volts and reach 
temperatures of 50,000 degrees Fahrenheit. From the picture in Figure 2-1 below, 
lightning channels can be easily identified by the thick white lines while the leaders 
are recognized by the thinner less bold lines attached to the channel.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Lightning channels and lightning leaders 
 
As demonstrated in the Figure 2-2, lightning can strike from the ground to the cloud 
or from the cloud to the ground. Lightning also strikes between clouds, from the 
cloud top up and from the cloud in a parallel direction to the earth. Energy stored in 
lightning clouds can be amazingly large. According to Fisher, Perala and Plumer [2.2], 
lightning clouds may store energy with a potential relative to the earth of 10E8 to 
10E9 volts. For more physics of lightning, see “Lightning” by M.A. Uman [2.1]. 
Aircraft are struck by lightning through different means, often initiating the lightning 
attachment to the aircraft extremities. What we know about lightning strikes to 
aircraft and the models for lightning energy and waveforms used in aircraft design 
comes from tests on one aircraft in the 1960’s and 3 aircraft in the 1980’s using 
aircraft instrumented with electrical measurement devices. Lightning has the 
potential for serious impact on aircraft operations. According to some aircraft 
manufacturers, damage to aircraft struck by lightning can create down time for 
repair of 1-3 days for common lightning strikes. In order to understand the issues 
associated with the interaction of lightning and aircraft it is important to explore 
how aircraft get struck by lightning. 
 
  
15 
 
Figure 2-2 Lightning Phenomenon 
2.3 How do Aircraft get Struck by Lightning? 
Lightning strikes aircraft on the ground and in the air. It has been recorded that 
aircraft can get struck by lightning even when not in obvious storm conditions. 
Aircraft lightning attachment experts note that aircraft are struck by both moving 
through a lightning strike already in progress and also by triggering lightning. In the 
1980’s, with extensive testing (sponsored by NASA) of lightning strike to aircraft 
phenomenon, it was demonstrated that a vast majority of lightning strikes to aircraft 
are initiated by the aircraft. It is estimated that well over 90 percent of aircraft 
lightning strikes are “triggered”. Prior to completion of more detailed studies, it was 
believed that aircraft were struck by lightning by flying through and intercepting a 
discharge that was already in motion. During this time, pilots would argue that 
lightning was caused by moving aircraft since their observations revealed that 
lightning strikes the aircraft near clouds even when there are no visible lightning 
events observed in the nearby cloud clusters. It is a known fact that lightning can 
strike miles away from a thunderstorm. 
 
Aircraft get struck by lightning by simply flying through electromagnetic fields and 
creating the right conditions for breakdown. Research shows that it is the saturation 
of electromagnetic fields in airspace that create the opportunity for breakdown 
voltages to occur. At sea level, voltages that are maintained long enough at an 
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average voltage gradient of 500kV/m almost always result in breakdown of an 
electrode gap. At 6000m altitude voltages of 250 kV/m cause breakdown of the air 
gap. Thus aircraft flying in conditions of 250 kV/m or more are at risk of becoming a 
part of the lightning strike event. Researchers of lightning phenomenon have 
confirmed through several means that fields of between 250 to 500 kV/m occur in 
clouds naturally. Earlier writing identifies that aircraft flying through a moderately 
strong E-field region can trigger lightning. For small aircraft (20m long), ambient 
fields of at least 50kV/m are required and less for larger aircraft [2.6]. As an aircraft 
travels through electromagnetic fields, studies by NASA revealed that the fields at 
the nose of the aircraft were enhanced by a factor of about ten, fields at the tips of 
wings are enhanced by a factor of seven, and fields at the tip of the stabilizer are 
enhanced by a factor of three. With the combination of increased field densities 
around extremities of the aircraft and relatively strong existing field densities in the 
region, lightning can be triggered by the aircraft when the enhanced field exceeds 
the minimum breakdown strength of the air.  
 
To illustrate a lightning strike to an aircraft the following steps occur. Figure 2-3 
illustrates these steps.  
1. Aircraft flies directly towards a positive charge center 
2. The aircraft becomes polarized in response to the ambient field with one end of 
the aircraft having a negative charge and the other having a positive charge 
3. The ambient field is enhanced by the presence of the aircraft 
4. As the aircraft approaches an atmospherically charged region, the fields increase 
on the surface of the aircraft and compression of adjacent equipotentials occurs. 
5. Coronas occur at the aircraft nose and leading edges of the aircraft where 
ionization of the air takes place due to enhance electrical fields. (Coronas are 
ionized air space that represent an impending electrical discharge) 
6. With a corona now emerging from the aircraft and with sufficiently increasing 
field strengths, leaders extend form from the nose and tail of the aircraft in 
opposite directions as the aircraft positive and negative polarities at opposite 
ends of the aircraft interact with the atmospheric charge. 
7. Leaders from the aircraft extremities grow larger as the process continues  
8. leaders also emerge from charged cloud centers creating more excitement on 
the aircraft, increasing the leader extensions more 
9. Stepped lightning leaders from the cloud continue to approach the emerging 
leaders emanating from the aircraft and finally meet the leader extending from 
the aircraft at the switching point 
10. A strike to the aircraft occurs 
11. Energy is transferred through the aircraft with potential damage to the entry and 
exit points (Direct Effects Lightning) and potential interruption of electronic 
equipment due to induced voltage and current flow on aircraft wires and other 
metal transport elements e.g. ducts and tubes. 
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Figure 2-3 Illustration of steps for lightning strike to aircraft 
 
2.4 How often and under what Conditions is an Aircraft Struck by Lightning? 
Using data on lightning strikes imaged from a the Optical Transient Detector (OTD) 
satellite as shown in Figure 2-4, recent research has produced estimates that about 
1.2 billion lightning flashes occur around the world per year [2.9]. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Optical Transient Detector satellite data depicting lightning flashes 
 
For aircraft operations in the United States, it is estimated that on average, each 
airplane in the U.S. commercial fleet is struck about once per year. This figure has 
been confirmed through research as sited in several articles referenced in this thesis 
but does not seem to be substantiated since the early 1980s when Lightning 
Technologies Inc. conducted a specific survey [2.2]. Route structures for commercial 
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aircraft often require aircraft to fly into charged cells activity, raising the probabilities 
of a strike to occur. In most instances, the lightning flash originates at the airplane 
and is often visually experienced by the flight crew or passengers. Records of the 
strike may include maintenance log entries made by pilots after the flight. Although 
record keeping on lightning strikes is poor, smaller business and private airplanes are 
thought to be struck less frequently because they usually do not adhere to rigid 
schedules and flight patterns of large commercial transport aircraft. In a combined 
data set within Table 2-4 adapted from Fisher, Parala and Plummer [2.2] representing 
recorded lightning strikes to commercial aircraft from 1950 to 1974, it is noted that 
lightning strikes occur approximately every 3000 hours of aircraft operation. 
 
 
Aircraft type Strikes Hours No. Hours per strike 
Piston 808 2,000,000 2475 
Turboprop 389 1,291,000 3320 
Jet 521 1,741,000 3340 
All 1718 5,032,000 2930 
Table 2-4 Number of lightning strikes to aircraft 
 
Industry research reviewed by the author during research for these studies 
continues to reference the “one-strike-per-year” criteria. The value of one strike per 
year extracted from the table is presented with actual data. It is hard to determine in 
this research whether further studies of actual lightning strike events to aircraft will 
conclude the same frequency of strikes. Certainly there is an implied difference in 
aircraft that may fly in more abundant lightning strike regions of the world 
referenced on Figure 2-4 
 
In reviewing the data, one notes that the number of lightning strikes to aircraft 
correlates indirectly to the seasons of the year through the presence of precipitation 
and cloud activity. Most strikes occur at approximately 5000m altitude though it is 
not unusual to hear about strikes occurring at 12, 000m altitude.  
 
Knowledge of the flight and weather conditions during which aircraft are most likely 
to encounter strikes are most important to pilots whose interest is in operating 
safely throughout a flight regime. The following tables describe interesting 
correlations between aircraft lightning attachments and other meteorological and 
physical phenomenon. The first correlation in Table 2-5 shows that more aircraft 
strikes occur during the aircraft climb phase of operation than any other operating 
phase [2.8]. 
 
Aircraft operating 
mode 
Number of Strikes Percentage of 
Strikes 
Departure   
Climb 260 36% 
Level 190 26% 
Descent 110 15% 
Approach 160 22% 
Table 2-5 Lightning strikes as a function of aircraft operating segment (adapted from Fisher, Perala, Plumer) 
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Lightning has also been correlated to presence of precipitation. In a detailed study 
performed by Lightning Technologies Inc. it was determined that most lightning 
strikes were noted during presence of rain representing seventy percent of all 
lightning strikes occurrences in the studies [2.8]. All other forms of precipitation in 
Figure 2-5 (adapted from Fisher, Parala, Plumer)are shown to be between 1 and 5 
percent of all lightning strike in the reported data.. 
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Figure 2-5 Precipitation correlations to aircraft lightning strikes  
 
Lightning strike occurrences in the Plumer study identified approximate strike 
distribution in accordance with Table 2-6 (adapted from Fisher, Parala, Plumer). This 
data is also drawn from the aircraft lightning strike study performed by Lightning 
Technologies Inc. in 2001 [2.8]. The data in Table 2-6 (adapted from Fisher, Parala, 
Plumer)shows that most strikes occur while aircraft are within clouds. 
 
Cloud Orientation Percent of total 
reported  
Above < 1% 
Within 96% 
Below 3% 
Between < 1% 
Beside < 1% 
Table 2-6 Aircraft location during lightning strike event 
 
Lightning strike correlation to altitude depicts that most lightning occurs below 
25,000 feet altitude. From the research, the author notes that different data sets 
describe different distributions with regard to percentage of strikes at specified 
altitudes. With the data provided adapted from Fisher, Parala and Plummer [2.2], the 
following distribution is found in strike survey taken on US commercial jets, Figure 2-
6 (adapted from Fisher, Parala, Plumer) 
. 
  
20 
Distribution of Strikes as a Function of Altitude
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Figure 2-6 Distribution of Lightning Strikes as a Function of Altitude 
 
In further research, the author notes an article in the Lockheed Airline Pilot 
magazine in November of 1964 that the understanding at this time was that statistics 
on lightning strikes to aircraft seem to show that altitude plays a minor role as far as 
determining the likelihood of being struck. About the only conclusion that can be 
drawn from this source is, “the probability of lightning strike to aircraft drops 
sharply above 20,000 feet.”  Information gathered in this section would indicate that 
lightning strike probability does decline above 20,0000 feet however that a more 
current survey is not available for modeling lightning strike probability.  
 
Temperature has also a relationship to lightning strikes. With data adapted from 
Fisher, Parala, Plumer [2.2] the following Figure 2-7 is derived based on a study 
called the Lightning Strike Survey Report for the period of January 1965 through 
December of 1966 [2.11]. The chart concludes that there is a strong relationship 
between temperatures around 0 Degrees C and lightning strikes to aircraft. This 
relationship may coincide with the theory that static energy is built up within clouds 
as a result of freezing and melting precipitation. 
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Figure 2-7 Distribution of Lightning Strikes as a Function of Temperature  
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In order to determine general meteorological conditions that have been noted to 
coincide with lightning strike frequency, the following data found in Table 2-7 was 
also collected from meteorological conditions prevailing during 99 United Air Lines 
lightning strike incidents between July 1963 and June of 1964 [2.10]. 
 
 
Synoptic Type Percentage of Discharges 
Airmass Instability 27 
Stationary Front 18 
Cold Front 17 
Warm Front 9 
Squall line or instability line 9 
Orographic 6 
Cold Low or Filling Low 5 
Warm Sector Apex 3 
Complex or Intense Low 3 
Occluded Front 1 
Pacific Surge 1 
Table 2-7 Synoptic Types Involved with 99 electrical discharges on United Air Lines Lightning Incident Reports 
 
In summary of the United Air Lines 99 strike report, Harrison points out that any 
conditions that cause precipitation, may also be expected to cause electrical 
discharges, although he adds that no strikes were reported in the middle of warm 
front winter snowstorms. It would appear that spring and summer months are the 
most likely to create lightning attachments to aircraft. With regard to the United 
Airline 99 strike data set, is important to note that forty two percent of the strike 
incidents were reported where no thunderstorms had been reported by the pilots. 
Thirty three percent of the remaining strikes were reported near thunderstorms and 
twenty four percent were reported in the general area of thunderstorms. 
 
To corroborate the entire data set, we see that most aircraft lightning strikes occur 
during takeoff, with raining conditions and clouds surrounding the aircraft most 
probably at 12,000 feet within an air mass of high instability and at temperatures 
close to 0 degree Celsius. Research performed by the author to identify weather 
conditions and orientation during a lightning strike concluded that a central data 
base does not exist and certain data sets available are quite dated. 
2.5 Where Does Lightning Strike? 
In order to understand how to defend against the potentially catastrophic effects of 
lightning strike to an aircraft, one must understand where an aircraft is most likely to 
be struck by lightning. Lightning strikes are most likely to occur at the aircraft nose, 
leading edge, tail or wing tips. Typically, lightning energy will move along the aircraft 
fuselage and exit aft of the initial attachment. It is common to see holes at entry 
points in the aircraft radome and obvious burn marks along the aircraft rudder 
where the lightning exited the aircraft. Lightning strikes to aircraft usually occur at 
transition altitudes either in takeoff or in landing. According to Fisher and Plumer 
[2.2], only 25% of the aircraft strikes occur during level flight. Plumer and Fisher [2.2] 
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also point out that 75% of all strikes occur between 5000 and 15000 feet altitude. 
Techniques for modeling lightning strike zones on aircraft have been developed and 
can be found in SAE Aviation Recommended Practice (ARP) 5414A [2.3]. Aircraft zone 
definitions are used by EME engineers to assist in defining the lightning threat 
pattern and are assessed using modeling tools. Different aircraft have different zone 
maps. “Lightning Zoning” as it is called by engineers, is a fundamental exercise that 
usually occurs early in an aircraft development program. Guidance for determination 
of lightning zones is found in the SAE ARP 5414 [2.3]. Lightning strikes can enter and 
exit at different locations such as wing-to-wing, wing-to-empennage, wing-to rudder, 
nose cone-to-wing etc. Figure 2-8 (adapted from SAE ARP 5414, Revision A) provides 
an example of a lightning strike taken on the radome of the aircraft and then swept 
back by the motion of the aircraft in the air (called “Swept Stroke”) resulting in 
several other attachments along the fuselage and finally, an exit through the aircraft 
wing tip and empennage. 
 
 
Figure 2-8 Lightning Entry and Exit Points and Swept Stroke Lightning  
 
In order to determine lightning zones on aircraft, ARP 5414 [2.3] defines lightning 
intensity and areas of most probability as “zones” in accordance with Table 2-8 
Zone 
Designation 
Description Definition 
1A First return stroke 
zone 
All areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first 
return is likely during lightning channel 
attachment with a low expectation of flash 
hang on. 
1B First return stroke 
zone with a long 
hang on 
All areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first 
return is likely during lightning channel 
attachment with a low expectation of flash 
hang on 
1C Transition zone for 
first return stroke 
All areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first 
return stroke of reduced amplitude is likely 
during lightning channel attachment with a 
low expectation of flash hang on. 
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Zone 
Designation 
Description Definition 
2A Swept stroke zone All areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first 
return of reduced amplitude is likely during 
lightning channel attachment with a low 
expectation of flash hang on. 
2B Swept stroke zone 
with long hang on 
All areas of the aircraft surfaces into which a 
lightning channel carry subsequent return 
stroke is likely to be swept with a high 
expectation of flash hang on. 
3 Strike locations 
other than Zone 1 
and Zone 2 
Those surfaces not in Zone 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, or 
2B, where any attachment of the lightning 
channel is unlikely, and those portions of the 
aircraft that lies beneath or between the 
other zones and/or conduct substantial 
amount of electrical current between direct 
or swept stroke attachment points. 
Table 2-8 Lightning Zone Definitions (in accordance with SAE ARP 5414 [3]) 
 
The first return stroke of a lightning strike on an aircraft is that the initial attachment 
to an aircraft surface that creates a closed circuit between the charge center in the 
cloud and an opposite charge center which is often the earth. Attachment locations 
on the aircraft are driven primarily by dimensions and shapes of the surfaces. As 
each aircraft is slightly different in shape, different zones are defined through 
analysis and test by electromagnetic engineers. 
 
Lightning strike zones are then drawn into the aircraft surface design similar to the 
example found in Figure 2-9. The map of the aircraft lightning zones created by the 
aircraft designer is used widely by the entire aircraft design team during an aircraft 
development or modification program to understand the lightning threat levels and 
establishes the protection schemes that will be appropriate to protect the aircraft 
from a catastrophic condition due to lightning. 
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Figure 2-9 Lightning Zones (from SAE ARP 5414, Chapter 2 ref [3]) 
 
Calculations within lightning zoning mathematical models developed by the aircraft 
manufacturers or consultants are one source to identify where lightning strikes an 
aircraft and how severe the lightning energy transfer is that might be expected. In 
addition, scale models of the aircraft are exposed to simulated lightning strokes in 
the laboratory to verify estimates for lightning zones. Similarity to other aircraft 
geometries are also referenced to develop lightning zones in cases where geometric 
designs can be declared the same. Though lightning zone determination is a very 
important part of the design process, aircraft are rarely flown into lightning 
conditions to “test” the validity of the lightning zones established by the designers.  
 
The chart in Figure 2-10 depicts lightning strikes locations and adapted from “The 
Airline Pilot” in Nov., 1964 and demonstrates an early understanding of lightning 
strike locations [2.5]. This early data corroborates data found in the SAE ARP 5414 
[2.3] and is verified by experience in the industry with lightning strikes on aircraft. 
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Approximate Distribution of Lighting Strike Points on Aircraft
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Figure 2-10 Approximate distribution points of aircraft strike locations  
 
Lightning attaches to aircraft most often in the outer extremities of the aircraft with 
fewer strikes occurring along the fuselage and wing root. These attachment points 
are also the location of the highest energy transfer. Models have also been created 
through the SAE committee and are captured in SAE ARP 5412 [2.12] with associated 
waveforms and lightning threat levels. Typically, a Zone 1 lightning current is 200KA, 
a Zone 2 lightning current is 100 KA, and Zone 3 lightning current is 30KA. 
2.6 What Happens when an Aircraft is Struck by Lightning? 
Problems can occur when lightning strikes an aircraft. Unless cloud activity is entirely 
avoided, lightning strikes to aircraft will occur. Although passengers and crew may 
see a flash and hear a loud noise, often, nothing serious happens because of the 
careful lightning protection engineered into the aircraft and its sensitive 
components. The key to successfully surviving a lightning strike without upset to the 
aircraft or equipment is to manage the flow of the energy safely around the control 
electronics or structure and design the lightning conducted energy path such that 
the effects on the electronics or structure does not compromise continued safe 
flight. Lightning strikes on aircraft raise the aircraft voltage levels to equal the 
lightning potential.  When the lightning strike ends, the aircraft voltage level falls 
again to the previous steady state before the strike event. When lightning strikes an 
airplane, an attachment to external aircraft extremities occurs such as the nose or 
wing tip. One common occurrence is the sweeping of the lightning across the aircraft 
fuselage as the aircraft moves through the air. This is called “swept Stroke” lightning. 
Since jet aircrafts move at speeds beyond their length during a lightning event, entry 
points may reoccur along the top of the aircraft creating multiple entries. This 
reattachment is commonly called a “swept stroke”, usually occurring across the top 
of the aircraft and creating pin holes as the lightning channel continues to reattach 
to the aircraft in flight. Within this process the swept lightning strokes along the 
fuselage attach randomly to the fuselage. Once a lightning leader is attached, several 
things can occur to the aircraft as the energy is dissipated. Entry points are not 
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always obvious, however as the energy discharges from the lightning channel, the 
energy moves through the aircraft and exits in a different location. This means that 
lightning currents will flow through the aircraft and are known to take varied paths 
such as moving along wiring or structural components in the path of the current. The 
key to good protection design is to make sure that the lightning energy is conducted 
through the aircraft as efficiently and safely as possible. Differences of potential 
within the aircraft structure may cause sparking and should be considered during the 
design of the airframe. Since lightning energy paths cannot be predicted, good 
lightning protection design includes shielding of critical systems wiring, transport 
elements that move in and out of the fuel tanks and structural elements where 
sparks may occur in flammable leakage zones. From a pilots’ perspective, occasional 
reports are written about temporary flickering of lights or short-lived interference 
with instruments during a lightning event. Sometimes static interference is noted on 
the communications devices but this is not always related to lightning strikes. 
Lightning might also attach to a wing tip and exit out a rudder or the other wing tip. 
These paths need to be understood in order to establish appropriate protection 
without compromising any performance or safety. 
 
For a long time, the physical damage at the point of lightning attachment was of 
primary concern. This included holes in the metallic skins, puncture or splintering of 
non-metallic structures and welding or roughening of moveable hinges and bearings 
[2.13]. If attachment points are wing tip lights or antenna, the possibility of some 
lightning current conducting into the aircraft electrical circuits was also considered a 
concern. Today these physical damages caused by lightning attachments are called 
direct effects of lightning. Figure 2-11 shows examples of damage to aircraft caused 
by the direct effects lightning. 
 
  
Figure 2-11 Aircraft direct effect damage due to lightning strike in Zone 1A 
 
2.7 Does Lightning Cause Aircraft to Crash? 
Edward J. Rupke, senior engineer at Lightning Technologies in Pittsfield, Mass., 
provides the following explanation: On average, each airplane in the U.S. commercial 
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fleet is struck lightly by lightning more than once a year. In fact, aircraft often trigger 
lightning when flying through a heavily charged region of a cloud. Business and 
private airplanes are thought to be struck less frequently because of their smaller 
size and because they often can avoid weather conducive to lightning strikes [2.14]. 
 
The last confirmed commercial plane crash in the U.S. directly attributed to lightning 
occurred in 1967 [2.14]. Research on this statement could not be verified by the 
author. Today airplanes receive a rigorous set of lightning certification tests to verify 
the safety of their designs. Although passengers and crew may see a flash and hear a 
loud noise if lightning strikes their plane, nothing serious should happen, because of 
the careful protection engineered into the aircraft. 
 
Aircraft crashes and near crashes are the worst possible outcome for aircraft with 
inadequate lightning protection. Considering the number of aircraft flying around the 
world with an estimated 2000 to 3000 thunderstorms taking place at any time 
somewhere in the world, lightning attachment to aircraft is an unavoidable situation. 
Most lightning strikes attach to aircraft extremities such as the rudder, nose cone, 
wing tips and engine inlets. With proper protection, these attachments will not 
result in an aircraft crash. However, history proves that aircraft crashes do occur 
resulting from a lightning strike.  Lightning related crashes can stem from loss of 
aircraft control, fuel tank ignition, or pilot blinding during a critical landing phase.  
 
One clear example of a loss of aircraft was in 1963 when a Pan American World 
Airways 707 was struck by lightning and burst into flames. Seventy passengers and 8 
crew members were killed in the crash. Investigation of the crash revealed that the 
aircraft fuel tanks had exploded. Evidence of lightning was found on the wing tip.  
The exact mechanism for how the fuel tanks were ignited was not determined [2.7]. 
 
In an article written by Michael Cherington M.D. [2.4] data from the National 
Transport Safety Board (www.ntsb.gov) comprised of 26 years of data (1963 to 1989) 
identified injuries due to lightning strike on aircraft. In that period, 40 lightning 
related accidents occurred, 10 involving commercial flights and 30 involving private 
aircraft, causing 290 fatalities. Of these flights, 4 commercial plane accidents 
accounted for 260 of the fatalities, and 14 non-commercial plane accidents 
accounted for the remaining 30 fatalities. Significant accidents are as follows: 
1. Pan American World Airlines Boeing 707 plane exploded over Elkton MD on 
August 12, 1963. The cause of the crash was a fuel tank explosion killing all 86 
passengers on board. The NTSB report identifies that lightning was not a 
probable cause [2.30].  
2. Delta Airlines Lockheed L-1011 plane crashed on landing approach to Dallas/Fort 
Worth International Airport on August 2, 1985. The accident resulted in 135 
fatalities and 28 injuries. Though several observers reported seeing lightning hit 
the airplane, investigators were unable to confirm lightning as the cause of the 
crash. Lightning is listed as a major factor in the NTSB accident report. 
3. US Air McDonnell-Douglas DC9-31 plane was damaged due to a lightning strike. A 
ground mechanic was fatally injured when he touched the exterior of the aircraft 
during the lightning strike. 
  
28 
4. Ozark Airlines Fairchild FH227B plane flying over St. Louis, Mo. sustained a direct 
lightning strike killing all 38 passengers on July 23, 1973. 
 
Since the realization of the potential devastating effects of lightning, much has been 
learned about how lightning can affect airplanes, and protection techniques have 
improved. Airplanes receive a rigorous set of lightning qualification tests to verify the 
safety of their designs and allow for acceptable compliance to lightning certification 
requirements.  Comparable requirements for general aviation aircraft are correlated 
to commercial transport federal regulations in Table 2-9. 
 
  General Aviation Commercial Transport 
Airframe FAR 23.867 FAR 25.581 
Fuels System FAR 23.954 FAR 25.954 and FAR 25.981 
Other Systems FAR 23.1309(c) FAR 25.1309 
Electrical and Avionic  FAR 25.1316 
Table 2-9 Certification regulations pertaining to lightning protection 
2.8 How is an Aircraft Protected from Lightning? 
Aircraft are designed with well-developed protection systems. Most aircraft skins are 
made primarily of aluminum, which is a very good conductor of electricity. By making 
sure that there are no gaps in this conductive path, the engineer can assure that 
most of the lightning current will remain on the exterior skin of the aircraft. Some 
modern aircraft are made of advanced composite materials, which are significantly 
less conductive than aluminum at low lightning frequencies. In this case, the 
composites are made with an embedded layer of conductive fibers or screens 
designed to carry or disseminate lightning currents during a strike event. Damage to 
structure at the location in which lightning attachment occurs is called direct effects. 
Lightning protection designs are thoroughly tested before incorporation to aircraft. 
Some examples of lightning protection: 
1. Expanded Aluminum Foil (EAF): used to protect aircraft structure from direct 
lightning strikes 
2. Lightning Insulators (sometimes called Isolators): used to help rout lightning 
strikes through safe areas of aircraft structures; they are typically used within 
conventional metal fuel lines and conduits and consist of non-metallic insulator 
attached either directly onto tube or onto a separable coupling. 
3. Lightning Diverters: used to divert lightning from penetrating radome 
4. Conductive Metallic Wire Screen: incorporated into prepreg composite layers for 
lightning strike dispersion 
5. Lightning arrestors: used to eliminate spark at fuel tank overflow valves 
6. Bond straps and ground points along installations 
 
Lightning direct and indirect effects will be discussed in more depth in the case 
studies conducted as part of this work. Modern passenger jets have miles of wires 
and dozens of computers and other instruments that control everything from the 
engines to the passengers' music headsets. These computers, like all computers, are 
sometimes susceptible to upset from power surges. In addition to the design of the 
exterior of the aircraft, the lightning protection engineer must assure that no 
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damaging surges or transients can be induced into the sensitive equipment inside of 
the aircraft. Lightning traveling on the exterior skin of an aircraft has the potential to 
induce transients into wires or equipment beneath the skin. These transients are 
called lightning indirect effects. Problems caused by indirect effects in cables and 
equipment are averted by careful shielding, grounding and the application of surge 
suppression devices when necessary. Every circuit and piece of equipment that is 
critical or essential to the safe flight and landing of an aircraft must be verified by the 
manufacturers to be protected against lightning in accordance with regulations of 
the FAA or a similar authority in the country of the aircraft's origin.  
 
Aircraft made of primarily composite materials require designs for increased threats 
related to the larger resistance of the composite material. This requires careful 
examination of transport elements such as tubes and ducts that carry more current 
due to the aircraft skin resistance increase. Another constraint that may change 
aircraft designs may be the need for the aircraft to carry directed lightning currents 
that do not easily travel through the composite skins or composite structural 
components. This engineering challenge may result in addition of “metal” within the 
aircraft to carry lightning currents safely through the aircraft and out the extremities. 
 
Another area of concern is the fuel system where even a tiny spark could be 
disastrous. Extreme precautions are taken to assure that lightning currents cannot 
cause sparks in any portion of an aircraft's fuel system or fuel vapor locations. 
Composite aircraft skin around the fuel tanks must be thick enough to withstand a 
burn through. All the structural joints and fasteners must be tightly designed to 
prevent sparks as lightning current passes from one section to another. Access 
doors, fuel filler caps and any vents must be designed and tested to withstand 
lightning. All the pipes and fuel lines that carry fuel to the engines, and the engines 
themselves, must be verified to be protected against lightning. In addition, new fuels 
that produce less explosive vapors are now widely used. 
 
A radome is the nose cone of aircraft that contain radar and other flight instruments. 
The radome is an area of special concern for lightning protection engineers. In order 
to function, radar cannot be contained within a conductive enclosure. Protection is 
afforded by the application of lightning diverter strips along the outer surface of the 
radome. These strips can be solid metal bars or a series of closely spaced buttons of 
conductive material affixed to a plastic strip that is bonded adhesively to the 
radome. These strips are sized and spaced carefully according to simulated lightning 
attachment tests as shown in Figure 2-12 while also not significantly interfering with 
the radar. In many ways, diverter strips function like a lightning rod on a building. 
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Figure 2-12 A typical lightning strike to radome protected by diverter strips 
2.8.1 The Use of Qualification Testing in Determining Continued Airworthiness 
The use of engineering data can be used to assist in determining the continued 
airworthiness of lightning/HIRF protection components such as critical wire bundle 
shielding. Integration of the continued airworthiness maintenance program 
development process and engineering test results will enhance aircraft operations.  
In the past, Aircraft compliance to FAR/JAR 25.1529 “Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness” does not take full advantage of component qualification testing as a 
source of information used to establish a scheduled maintenance program. The 
premise of this paper is that some advantage can be gained through use of 
component qualification testing results to determine continued airworthiness 
maintenance requirements once equipment is in service.  
2.8.1.1 Past Practices 
Past techniques used to certify aircraft systems to specified lightning indirect effects 
may not include continued airworthiness compliance criteria [2.19] such as that 
required by FAR/JAR 25.1529. Without adequate continued airworthiness criteria 
established during the design phase, many aircraft system design firms have no 
choice but to establish continued airworthiness instructions after the design is 
complete. This approach to aircraft design is typical, where designs are developed 
through the design cycle and continued airworthiness evaluations are conducted 
later, even sometimes after the aircraft is certified and in operation. One early 
design criteria that can be addressed as part of the continued airworthiness might be 
a galvanic assessment of components that rely on conduction as a lightning 
protection measure. Galvanic assessments can be done as part of the continued 
airworthiness evaluation but may be initiated after design decisions are completed. 
For electromagnetic compatibility, qualification methods exist for establishment of 
transient level “margin” that accounts for uncertainties in verification methods 
[2.27]. Once aircraft installed system threat levels are determined – by test or 
analysis – they are extrapolated to external threat waveforms and levels. After this is 
completed, these threat levels are used to demonstrate “margin” [2.19]. Threat level 
margins and management of the design requirements are discussed in greater detail 
in paragraph 2.8.1.2. It is apparent within the industry that component design 
margins cannot be used to substantiate continued airworthiness however; use of 
test results may be insightful towards assessing performance in service. 
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2.8.1.2 Testing Requirements and Guidelines 
To better understand the impact of establishing threat levels without consideration 
for continued airworthiness, this paper provides insights as to the practical 
application of the transient level margins for aircraft equipment. It needs to be clear 
that component qualification data cannot be used to predict continued 
airworthiness and the effect on EMC margins. Because it is rarely practical to 
perform full threat tests on fully configured aircraft, the key to successful protection 
will be the degree to which the system and subsystem tests simulate actual internal 
lightning environment in the complete aircraft with all its components 
interconnected and operational. These tests will depend in turn upon the accuracy of 
the airframe manufacturer’s or system integrator’s prediction of Transient Control 
Level (TCLs), the accuracy of Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) verification as 
tested by the system suppliers, and the sufficiency of the margins to account for any 
uncertainties in these conditions. In order to establish transient level design criteria 
for each system to be qualified, manufacturers will determine the lightning induced 
voltage and current waveforms and Actual Transient Levels (ATL) that can appear at 
the electrical/electronic equipment interfaces. In many cases, the induced transients 
will be defined in terms of the open circuit voltage and the short circuit current 
appearing at the wiring/equipment interfaces. The “v” and “i” will be related by the 
source impedances (i.e. loop impedance) of interconnecting wiring and there may be 
different levels determined for different circuit functions or operating voltages. 
 
In addition, manufacturers need to establish Transient Control Levels (TCL) and 
Equipment Transient Design Levels (ETDL). The ETDLs represent the amplitude of 
voltage and/or current that the equipment is required to withstand or tolerate and 
remain operational (e.g. no damage or system, function upset). The TCLs, in turn, are 
set to equal to or higher that the maximum ATL. The difference between the ETDL 
and the TCL is the margin. The Equipment Transient Susceptibility Level (ETSL) is the 
amplitude of the voltage or current which, when applied to the equipment, will 
result in damage to components or upset such that the equipment can no longer 
perform its intended function. The relationship between ATLs, TCLs, ETDLs, and 
ESTLs is illustrated in Figure 2-13. The ETDL is usually stated in the specifications for 
the electrical/electronic equipment and constitutes a qualification test level for this 
equipment. Since ETDLs are typically represented by these standardized 
requirements, their use greatly simplifies compliance evaluation. Normally the TCLs 
and ETDLs will be established by the airframe manufacturer or system integrator, 
who will compare the penalties of vehicle or interconnecting wiring protection or 
equipment hardening to establish the most logical combination of TCLs and ETDLs. 
To verify compliance, testing engineers demonstrate that the ATLs appearing at the 
wiring/equipment interfaces do not exceed the established TCLs, and that the 
equipment can tolerate the ETDLs. Verification may be accomplished by 
demonstrating similarity with previously installed systems and/or equipment, by 
tests, or by analysis. Appropriate margins to account for uncertainties in the 
verification techniques may be required. More specifically, margins are incorporated 
to account for the uncertainties involved in the verification process. The magnitude 
of the margin is 6 db for critical systems with all others qualified to the ETDL. . The 
magnitude of the margin is also directly proportional to the degree that the system 
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contributes to continued safe flight and landing as determined by the aircraft safety 
analysis. An acceptable margin is an essential element in the compliance process. 
Developmental test data may be used for certification when properly documented 
and coordinated with the responsible aviation certification authority [2.27]. 
 
For components being qualified, test set ups and applications of environmental 
threats are designed to evaluate any component effects observed during the 
qualification tests. These tests however, do not necessarily simulate multiple 
environmental threats simultaneously.  
 
For determination of margin, the certification requirement for critical systems is 6db 
between ETDL and TCL Figure 2-13. Transient threat models such as the generalized 
model are typically established by Electromagnetic Effects (EME) engineers for a new 
aircraft development program as outlined in FAA AC 20-136 [2.21]. In the recent 
past, newer guidelines have been developed by committees under the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (SAE) and produced as Aerospace Recommended Practices 
(ARP). Since equipment is usually not tested to failure (destructive test), actual 
margin to failure (referred to as equipment transient susceptibility level) is often not 
known. Sometimes several tests of the same kind are needed to validate the TCL and 
margin. Continued airworthiness engineers do not use this data, as a clear 
correlation between the testing and the in-service performance is not predictable. 
Exposure intervals are dependent on being able to predict how aggressively a 
component will age. Thus far, the industry has not been able to reliably predict such 
trends at the component level without empirical data from in service experience. 
Historical “reliability” data may be used to provide guidance in cases where it exists. 
Without performance data from past aircraft operating experience or certification 
testing results, Lightning/HIRF maintenance program engineers must rely on past 
precedence of judgment from responsible design groups or conservative intervals 
that are led by the gathering of empirical data. Extension of these concerns by the 
FAA for lightning/HIRF protection performance over the life of the installation has 
driven Issue Papers requesting manufacturers to incorporate engineering validation 
programs to assure validate assumptions during the maintenance analysis process 
and potentially detect any early signs of lightning/HIRF protection degradation. Said 
another way, where the minimum scheduled maintenance program instructions may 
be inadequate to readily identify degradation beyond the established qualified 
margins (ETDL-TCL), the FAA has requested supplemental evaluation of the 
protection systems in service through an engineering validation program. Though 
this testing is valuable, the addition of in-service testing may extend from lack of 
confidence in the scheduled maintenance program development process (short of 
starting with extremely conservative intervals and then extending as operators 
provide feedback). After all, scheduled maintenance programs are developed to 
provide for continued safe and economic aircraft operation. For new equipment, 
with knowledge of the margin or test results along with expected aging of 
components over time (i.e. empirical in-service data), one can provide a very 
effective maintenance program with an engineering validation. Data can be supplied 
by suppliers or vendors with appropriate knowledge of in-service performance of the 
components key characteristics. 
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For this discussion, one must separate margins within the design transients and 
margins for component continued airworthiness. In comparing these concepts, an 
interesting problem emerges. Transient design margins do not model the aging 
associated with establishment of continued airworthiness margins. However, 
manufacturers can use margins from certification and design in support of MRB 
releases. With this approach in place, practically speaking, engineers use a tightly 
controlled process to determine which lightning/HIRF protection schemes to 
maintain and how often to impose maintenance action. In addition, in-service 
maintenance activities may test certification margins to ensure continued 
airworthiness is maintained. Creation of more effective maintenance programs can 
be enhanced if the component qualification data gathering process were to include 
continued airworthiness realities such as final installed environment as compared to 
the test environment results in the report. This is however not achievable and in 
order to establish a test interval in service, one has to be able to quantify failure 
trends from this data which has also not been achievable in the industry. Though 
some recent investigation identify simplistic comparisons between equipment 
qualification test data and aircraft measured induced responses to the effects of 
lightning as a thing of the past [2.23], current practices remain relatively unchanged 
for qualifying components to standards such as the DO-160E Section 22 [2.15] and 
MIL-STD-1757A [2.16]. More recent guidelines have been developed by SAE 
committees such as the SAE ARP 5412 [2.28] and SAE ARP 5416 [2.29]. Deterioration 
of protection over time still remains uncalculated and generates the need for the 
maintenance engineers to include in-service evaluations to assist in determining 
initial maintenance intervals for new protection systems, or substantiate the reliance 
on non-quantitative means for maintaining the aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-13 Relationships Between Transient Levels 
2.8.1.3 Submitting Test Results 
Modern lightning and HIRF qualification testing involves techniques for replicating 
electromagnetic effects including electromagnetic compatibility and lightning 
induced transients within singular environmental test arrangements. Test setups 
mimic aircraft installations but rarely replicate actual installation configurations and 
environment. Qualification testing on systems is not done on a full airplane level 
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electromagnetic threat however, is accomplished with low or reduced level threat 
tests. These tests are performed on new hardware installations that are part of the 
system airplane qualifications. Because it is rarely practical to perform full threat 
tests on fully configured aircraft, the key for successful protection will be the degree 
to which the system and subsystem tests simulate actual internal lightning 
environment in the complete aircraft with all its components interconnected and 
operational [2.22]. For example, in-service “experience” cannot be replicated in a lab 
due to complications associated with application of simultaneous electromagnetic 
and environmental threats such as moisture, vibration, temperature, and pressure 
cycles applied to certified systems during operation on-wing. Other physical 
constraints also challenge testers to replicate actual installations such as the 
application of vibration, heat and moisture applied at the same time. A simple 
example of simulation challenges are cable length restrictions on the test unit due to 
lab size constraints. The RTCA DO-160 document [2.15] sets standards for emissions 
and susceptibility, lightning, electrostatic discharge (ESD), and other requirements 
such as vibration, temperature and humidity. These tests are typically run 
independent of each other on multiple units. Test results reflect only the test 
condition applied at the time of the test. Although the test procedures and methods 
are standardized by industry documents such as the RTCA DO-160 specification, 
suppliers have the responsibility for demonstrating that the performance of each 
Equipment Under Test (EUT) unit is tested and exercised with the hardware, 
interfaces, software and modes of operation representative of the test guidelines. 
 
Qualification testing of components is limited to conducting separate environmental 
tests for each potential physical environmental threat. With this in mind, how can 
the testing ensure good performance once a lightning/HIRF protected component is 
deployed into service?  Inability to simulate the airplane environment also 
contributes to the inability to predict degradation. In some cases an end of life 
values for components are validated for characteristics that provide for (resistance 
or transfer impedance) lightning protection. These values will help provide for 
consideration of component aging. In cases where these are included in the test 
results found in the qualification test report, one can consider the comments on the 
continued airworthiness of a tested component within the aging tests results. 
Revision to the design methodology might be considered to include criteria for 
establishing successful compliance with the continued airworthiness requirements 
that should be met during test. An example of how this can be accomplished is 
demonstrated in the practical application in 2.8.1.6. 
2.8.1.4 The Qualification Test Report 
Qualification test reports vary in the detail provided for specific testing. Typical 
information contained in qualification test reports includes: 
1. Abstract 
2. Scope 
3. Conformity 
4. Test Procedures and Setup 
5. Conclusion 
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The key to providing successful test results are appropriate setup and simulation of 
the aircraft system under test. Conclusions of testing usually involve simple 
statements of pass or fail in tabular form along with individual testing results such as 
equipment measurements to demonstrate acceptable data points [2.24]. 
Incorporation of testing for the continued airworthiness is not part of current 
qualification processes. However, for new components, “end of life” values can be 
found as considerations during aging tests and may be embedded in the specification 
control documentation. Test report reviews sometimes include checks for significant 
technical contents similar to that provided below. 
 
Test Report Content Checklist 
1. Provide an adequate explanation of Equipment Under Test (EUT) 
2. Provide an adequate description of equipment used and calibration dates  
3.  Supply a list of compliance, susceptibility, or emission outages per test mode 
4.  Ensure that the conclusion agrees with each test result 
5.  Ensure that the test is performed to a fully accepted test procedure  
6.  Provide list of any changes made to test procedure  
8.  Ensure that conformity is established  
9.  Ensure that where and when test was performed is in the report 
10.  Provide all photographs of each test setup in the report as well as any drawings  
11.  Provide data sheets stating equipment responses in each operating mode 
12.  Provide the level at which susceptibility no longer exists  
13.  Provide a list of all emission outages and plots 
14.  Provide any correction factors and bandwidths used in data analysis 
15.  Provide all susceptibility measures  
16.  Provide all emission measures 
2.8.1.5 The Continued Airworthiness Evaluation 
As we enter the age of advanced aircraft design, past methods for determining the 
continued airworthiness of lightning/HIRF protection are inadequate [2.18] to ensure 
robust and economical aircraft operations. As new methodologies are created [2.20] 
to handle evaluation of advanced lightning/HIRF protection systems, new ways to 
view qualification of lightning/HIRF protection components must be integrated into 
the design methodology. Use of the following mechanisms can assist in gaining 
better continued airworthiness programs: 
1. In-service data collected from HIRF/lightning protection assurance testing 
2.  Qualification test data gathered during component qualification testing 
3.  Developmental test data captured during stress testing of new designs 
 
As these processes are usually segregated, this paper suggests that the design 
methodology needs further consideration to include extension of data evaluations 
that include the continued airworthiness design criteria. Evaluations of the 
continued airworthiness can be gathered by way of test reports, in-service 
measurements, and developmental testing summaries. This integration of 
information must be applied within the constraints of practicality since work 
statements for such an effort can become quite large. This due to past practices 
within the industry of evaluating continued airworthiness after the design has 
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matured. Engineers supporting this approach would be responsible for predicting 
aging trends that can conclude the robustness of the design based on a combination 
of the gathered test reports and data gathered in service. 
 
With recent ATA Task Force development of a new methodology for determining 
scheduled maintenance of lightning/HIRF protection components [2.25], the use of 
performance data such as that gathered during qualification and developmental 
testing or in-service data gathered during maintenance checks has been accepted by 
the industry (Ref. Figure 2-14, Step 2 and Step 3) as a way to assist in determining 
appropriate scheduled maintenance requirements for lightning/HIRF protected 
equipment. This is a step in the right direction. In the absence of predictability 
revised processes for determining continued airworthiness and correlating efforts in 
testing to expected performance in service, a new design methodology evolves. 
Implementation of this approach requires early establishment of design 
requirements and a method for incorporating estimated robustness into the decision 
making for required scheduled maintenance. As this new methodology is 
implemented, analysis sheets can be generated that provide the maintenance 
engineer an assessment of the performance extrapolated for protection components 
under maintenance evaluation. This will require significant changes in both the 
maintenance evaluation process and in the design assessment of components.  
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Figure 2-14 ATA Task Force Methodology for Lightning/HIRF MSG-3 Analysis 
 
The new direction for the aviation industry begins the process of more closely 
integrating design methodologies with the continued airworthiness assessment 
process identified in AC 121-22A [2.25] that is required for aircraft type certification. 
While challenges using data such as this need further exploration and examination; 
how this new methodology will utilize test results is still under consideration. 
Implementation of the methodology requires manufacturers to design ways to 
include applicable accelerated aging testing information in the maintenance program 
analysis. This can be achieved through careful design of a maintenance program 
analysis technique that guides analysts using appropriate data when available. 
Specific implementation of the data may be achieved by providing engineering 
ratings of the data that is used to assess design robustness. Analysis sheets provide 
engineers a way to bring data together with reason and experience in determining 
continued airworthiness maintenance requirements. 
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2.8.1.6 Practical Application of Test Data 
In order to model use of the test data coming from qualification testing, a practical 
application is created here to identify potential options for achieving the required 
engineering integration with maintenance programs analysis. Often, qualification 
reports simply provide the test results (data) and in some cases only provide data 
packages without specific interpretation [2.24] of things such as the transient margin 
described earlier in this paper. It is important to clarify that transient margins are not 
part of the component qualification and therefore do not reflect the ultimate 
application of the component. For this reason, transient margin is not correlated to 
the continued airworthiness assessment. 
  
A high-level process flow for qualification testing (Figure 2-15) shows the focus of the 
test process as data collection and test arrangements (step 1, 2,and 3). Step 4 in the 
process is where potential engineering design methodology can be revised.  
 
3. Perform System Test 4. Prepare and SubmitReport2. Generate Test Procedure
1. Estimate Operating
Environment
 
Figure 2-15 The Qualification Process 
 
As it is the intent for the Equipment Under Test (EUT) arrangement and setup to 
simulate the airplane installation, the actual in-service environment presents a 
complex combination of effects that are most likely not achievable within the lab 
environment. Within the lab, simulation of interfacing equipment, loads, and 
interconnecting cable assemblies are typically quite readily achieved except during 
accelerated aging tests where they are typically not achieved. Often, experience 
shows that test arrangements can expose circuitry of EUT to inadequate levels of RF 
or transient energy, despite achieving the required test levels at the harness or 
equipment chassis [2.17]. The challenge for designers, testers, and qualification 
engineers is that the combination of environmental effects along with the simulated 
interconnections and electromagnetic environments simultaneously applied within a 
single test are not achievable since entire system installations are not subjected to 
accelerated aging tests. This challenge is a source for making predictability difficult. 
With a change in standards for developing data, the maintenance engineer can apply 
a more robust logic fed into the new methodology to determining long-term 
maintenance requirements. With processes in place to develop data that can be 
used in the continued airworthiness evaluation, continued airworthiness engineers 
can assimilate information into the MSG-3 analysis [2.20]. To implement this change, 
a means by which you can gather and develop data for continued airworthiness must 
be developed. After this is in place, two things can be done. 1) Addition of a 
paragraph to the Qualification Test Report that addresses the test engineers’ 
assessments of the application of the EUT in service given the test results included in 
the report. 2) Incorporation of test report conclusions into analysis sheets for the 
required continued airworthiness MSG-3 analysis.  
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From this description, one sees both sides of the equation; the airworthiness process 
needed to develop a maintenance program contained in the FAA Advisory Circular 
AC 121-22A [2.26] and the qualification process outlined in DO-160E [2.15], 
supporting more robust recommendations that meet both safety and economic 
goals established within the design criteria.  
2.8.1.7. Recommendations for Use of Test Data within a Design Methodology 
Advantages of modifying the design methodology include: 
• Improved technical evaluation of potential in-service degradation modes 
• More effective maintenance programs 
• Better performance of the lightning/HIRF protection components 
• Improved operational economics 
 
Final conclusions suggest that adoption of the continued airworthiness criteria 
within the engineering methodology outlined in this chapter will produce better 
performing designs by optimizing known performance information and in-service 
maintenance requirements. This expansion of scope should be well integrated and 
not negatively impact certification testing. It is expected that creation of the revised 
engineering process proposed above will more fully integrate continued 
airworthiness criteria into the design solutions at earlier stages in the design life 
cycle. This will be accomplished by modifying how tests are reported and how 
maintenance analysis is performed. 
2.9 Conclusion of “What is Lightning?” 
Based on the findings of research referenced in this chapter, the following is a list of 
the most important lightning strike characteristics impacting lightning protection 
continued airworthiness: 
• Lightning attaches to aircraft most often in the outer extremities of the 
aircraft such as wing tip nose and rudder with fewer strikes occurring along 
the fuselage and wing root. 
• Aircraft strikes occur most often during the aircraft climb 
• Seventy percent of all lightning strikes occur during the presence of rain 
• The probability of lightning strike to aircraft drops sharply above 20,000 feet 
• There is a strong relationship between temperatures around 0 Degrees C and 
lightning strikes to aircraft 
• Conditions that cause precipitation, may also cause electrical discharges 
• Spring and Summer months are the most likely to create lightning 
attachments to aircraft 
• Forty two percent of the strike incidents were reported where no 
thunderstorms had been reported by the pilots 
• Lightning testing can be integrated into the protection design process 
 
Lightning affects aircraft operations sometimes creating potential for a catastrophic 
outcome. For this reason, much has been accomplished in understanding natural 
lightning, its waveforms, attachment to aircraft and appropriate lab testing. Current 
FAA/EASA regulations address design considerations for lightning. Designers use 
simulation testing and idealized waveforms to establish the threat to safe flight and 
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then implement protection within the aircraft design to minimize the effects of 
lightning. There is currently no design that will eliminate the attachment of lightning 
to aircraft. Because of this, lightning remains a major consideration in the 
certification of aircraft protection schemes. For the continued airworthiness of the 
lightning protection components, much is required to be established in the aviation 
industry to advance the new concepts in the maintenance and design methodologies 
affecting these critical protection systems. This includes development of new 
continued airworthiness criteria addressed by this research that advances concepts 
used within the design community today and theorizes a new methodology for 
lightning protection design continued airworthiness design. 
Chapter 3  Lightning/HIRF Protection Continued Airworthiness Design 
Methodology 
3.1 Reason for a New Methodology 
The current methodology for development of Lightning/HIRF (L/HIRF) protection 
designs contained in Figure 3-1 can be improved to address continued airworthiness 
design decision functions. The steps included in Figure 3-1 do not include Step 
4,5,7,8, and 9 since these steps are added as part of the improvements introduced 
later in this chapter. The revised methodology proposed in this body of work revises 
current aircraft design processes for implementation of protection designs with an 
augmentation of the design process to include continued airworthiness 
considerations. Supporting the adaptation of this new design methodology is the 
integration with the newly adopted MSG-3 maintenance program development 
methodology which will be discussed within this chapter. The proposed 
methodology also considers incorporation of MSG-3 as a step into the design process 
which creates a feedback loop for design revisions not previously performed for 
lightning protection continued airworthiness in the design of aircraft. As new 
composite aircraft structures drive new and more exotic bonding and ground 
designs, it is important to properly assess these new designs to ensure that the 
advantages of the new designs are not inappropriately burdened with maintenance 
and to ensure that the protection is available at all times. Without a methodology to 
address these design features early in the design process, new technology is exposed 
to potentially burdensome maintenance requirements in service. Application of this 
methodology can also benefit supplemental design revisions on older technology 
aircraft. Since the case studies performed in this PhD research utilized an aircraft 
designed in the late 1990’s, evidence of the adaptability of the design methodology 
is provided later in the thesis. 
3.2 Value of Proposed Methodology 
Adoption of the proposed aircraft design methodology in Figure 3-2 is hypothesized 
to result in more efficient L/HIRF protection designs which require less scheduled 
maintenance and to improve redesign costs while optimizing design decisions during 
development of a new transport category aircraft. Creation of a component 
assessment sheet including detailed assessments of engineering robustness within 
installed environments using test data, and a galvanic junction rating scale is 
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expected to reduce demands for more maintenance tasks. This methodology is also 
proposed to result in valuable design improvements, such as:  improved bonding 
installations, improved material and fastener selections, electrically robust structural 
attach points, and more maintainable ground strap routing. If properly applied, the 
methodology will also increase visibility of continued airworthiness within the design 
process and drive bonding design performance issues required for the life of the 
aircraft that may, prior to incorporation of this methodology, have been taken for 
granted and subsequently, not implemented. 
 
In recent evaluations of maintenance programs, it has been noted that a new MSG-3 
analysis methodology was necessary to improve the decision making logic. The value 
of the design methodology captured within this thesis goes beyond theoretical as 
this methodology is intended to provide better connection to the initial scheduled 
maintenance program development process.  
 
Lightning protection in an aircraft zone may contain different types of protection 
which requires different methods of inspection. As discussed within this thesis, the 
minimum initial scheduled maintenance inspection requirements, which are used as 
the basis for the operator’s maintenance program, are developed through the MSG-
3 analysis process and provided in the manufacturers Maintenance Review Board 
Report (MRBR) approved by the regulatory authorities. [3.1] 
The MRB procedures are developed according to the following documents: 
1. JAA Administrative & Guidance Material (AGM) Section Two: Maintenance Part 
Two: Procedures Chapter 16: Procedure for Maintenance Review Board [3.2] 
2. FAA Advisory Circular 121-22A: Maintenance Review Board Procedures [3.3] 
3. ATA MSG3-rev 2002.1  
 
Within the MSG-3 analysis process, a specific working group is in charge of making 
analysis of lightning protection designs. The type of data which are necessary to 
follow MSG-3 procedures to fulfill the MSG-3 method requirement specifically 
applicable to lightning protections is also in-part, the data necessary to develop the 
design of lightning protection components presented in this body of work. The type 
of analysis which is conducted for providing the information required by the MSG3 
methodology with the surveillance methods related to each protection type followed 
by the validation of these surveillance methods forms a new basis for lightning 
protection maintenance program development. Thus, the design methodology 
proposed by this body of work is a logical next step in the development of new 
methodologies associated with more complex aircraft designs. 
Each step in the methodology is a process for which more detailed discussions can 
be provided. The purpose of the methodology is not to create more detailed 
discussions of these individual processes. In the descriptions below, the minimum 
amount of discussion is provided to gain understanding of the purpose of each 
process in order to understand the purpose of the proposed methodology. 
3.3 The Current Design Methodology for Lightning Protection Development 
Current design practices include steps that address the lightning and HIRF threats for 
to ensure the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft after a lightning or 
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HIRF event. This methodology is driven by electromagnetic requirements that are 
imposed on the design process. Electromagnetic design engineers are engaged 
during the aircraft development to ensure that other design groups are aware of 
critical design criteria when making design implementation decisions. Test data plays 
a role in determining if certain design implementations meet the requirements. For 
instance, a fastener may be required to carry current during a lightning strike event 
without causing a spark within an ignition zone. Engineering testing may be required 
to assess different alternatives to the fastener installation and location. The use of 
sealant may also be tested for its ability to contain a spark during a lightning strike. 
The typical design considerations focus on solving problems such as the following: 
a) Identification of Lightning/HIRF environmental threat. This is normally 
accomplished by use of common industry guidance found in design text books.   
Continued availability of lightning protection over the life of an aircraft can be 
affected by environmental conditions such as moisture, vibration and 
temperature or each lightning protection component installation. These 
conditions need to be evaluated for issues that arise such as loose fasteners, 
gaps in bonding paths, and corrosion or heat damage. 
b) Aircraft lightning zoning. During the design of an aircraft, zones are determined 
by models used by designers that take into account the geometry of the aircraft 
and assert areas on the aircraft that have the highest lightning strike threats on 
down to the least threatening lightning strike. An example is found in chapter 2. 
This zone exercise would not normally evaluate the installed lightning protection 
within the lightning zone to determine the significance of the zone. Threats for 
composite aircraft can be as much as 1000 times greater than threats for 
aluminum aircraft. For composite aircraft the zone definitions may be similar 
than non-composite aircraft, however, the amount of aircraft system standoff 
voltage may be increased in order to further protect the aircraft from these 
higher voltages. 
c) Classification of Lightning/HIRF protection systems criticality associated with 
the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. As aircraft are designed, 
systems failures are classified as critical or essential to the safety of the 
continued operation of the aircraft. Loss of the protection in combination with a 
lightning/HIRF event is used as a way to determine certain protection criticality. 
In the past, this involved simply listing all the Level A (Critical) and Level B 
(Essential) equipment on the aircraft. Today, this terminology has been 
eliminated as a harmonization of the regulatory definitions of catastrophic, 
hazardous, and hazardous-major are now in place. Generalization of this 
definition called out by the International MRB policy Board in February of 2007, 
have allowed for broader inclusion of structural and mechanical system 
components into the list of protection systems that require evaluation for 
continued airworthiness. Current practices for lightning protection classification 
integrate the systems safety analysis classifications with the EMC function Design 
Assurance Level classifications. 
d) Bonding and Grounding techniques that meet a minimum joint resistance 
throughout the wire/loom designs. This also includes wire terminations for 
electrical bonds. The importance of metal compatibility and sealant applications 
is applied by design teams. For composite materials, there may be more 
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challenging criteria to address associated with driving current into composite 
material and ensuring sparks are not encouraged by the larger voltages 
generated from the less conductive materials. 
 
The current design methodology referenced in Figure 3-1 shows the design 
processes that are contained in current practices. Within the engineering analysis 
and design development portion of the figure, design activities are iterative. These 
iterative steps affect the processes of establishing design requirements. Some of the 
design requirements are revised after certain tests are completed. Criticality of the 
equipment can also change as the design matures and test results are evaluated. 
This approach to aircraft lightning protection design is focused on the development 
of systems and components that meet the protection requirements. Practical 
implementations of the designs that meet these requirements are not required to be 
subjected to further analysis for long term maintenance of the initial design. The 
focus at the time of the design is to meet requirements for successful certification of 
the aircraft. The following is a description of each design process included in Figure 
3-1 and the association of each design step to the aircraft final definition. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Process for Lightning Protection Continued Airworthiness MSG-3 Analysis  
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Step 1 - Establish Design Service Life Goals 
During the conceptual design phase of the aircraft development project, the design 
goals are defined as design requirements and objectives. At this design stage, 
engineering designers input design service goals for aircraft continued airworthiness. 
Outside this design function is a parallel study of protection systems design 
performance conducted through feedback from aircraft operators. This process is 
better understood by service engineering personnel that may not be an integral part 
of the new aircraft design, though more recent design programs have included this 
input with various approaches. Service and support engineering can be very helpful 
towards creating the needed designs service goals since these engineers typically 
maintain expertise in aircraft operations support. The design service life objectives 
development process uses inputs from service experience but may not be an 
integrated part of the design team function depicted in Figure 3-1 as a group of 
engineers labeled “Design Activities”. This design guidance for the Service Life Goals 
usually incorporates improvements from past aircraft products that reduce 
maintenance and improve availability, thus increasing the aircraft ability to generate 
revenue. Typically, this guide establishes: 
a. Number of years’ service life 
b. Scheduled maintenance goals (maintenance intervals and time out of service for 
maintenance and repairs) 
c. Accessibility and maintainability 
 
These “Design Service Life” goals are input to aircraft designers as part of the initial 
conceptual stages of the aircraft design process. This process includes aircraft 
mission goals such as 20 years of service, 60,000 flight hours and 40,000 flight cycles. 
During this phase of an aircraft design program, materials are selected, physical 
geometry is determined, and performance is continuously calculated to guide 
multiple engineering disciplines to a logical final configuration. The new 
methodology presented in this work suggests that lightning protection design be 
part of the earliest stages of the design process to ensure that the most optimal 
lightning protection design is defined within the boundaries of the established 
design goals. For composite aircraft this will include significant design decision inputs 
in the area of composite structures protection such as imbedded foils and mesh 
application decisions. Areas that have the highest probability of a lightning strike and 
where the greatest electrical current may be transferred to the aircraft, called 
Lightning Zone 1, should be examined for protection design optimizations at this 
stage in the aircraft design. As design decisions become firm, lightning protection of 
composite structure must ensure that any potential maintenance action to maintain 
the continued airworthiness of the aircraft is achievable within the aircraft operator 
environment. Designs where continued airworthiness actions are not possible should 
be revised, lest maintenance is determined necessary later in the development 
program (after Step 11 in the methodology) and more severe consequences are 
realized such as exotic testing or protection component replacements (Hard Time) 
are imposed to ensure that the continued airworthiness is maintained. Part of this 
input to the methodology includes awareness of accessibility to protection devices 
and components. It is often the case that poor accessibility leads to more intense 
ground time and lost revenues. One very important aspect of Step 1 is to remember 
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to include composite structure lightning protection in the maintainability study that 
marks this stage of most aircraft design processes. It is imperative at this stage of the 
design that the aircraft manufacturer involves engineers with service experience to 
add another level of reasoning to the early design implementation decisions. 
 
Step 2 - Identify Critical/Essential lightning components/installation and 
environmental threats 
During the preliminary design phase, aircraft lightning protection is determined with 
the specific outcome to provide adequate conductive paths so that lightning currents 
do not create a hazardous or catastrophic condition. It is important to note early in a 
design program that conductive paths are provided by systems control wiring, 
structure and transport elements such as hydraulic and fuel system tubes. For this 
reason, designers are careful to ensure that adequate current paths are provided 
given the lightning current model created by the lightning zone determination 
process and the associated calculated lightning currents. Suppression of dangerous 
surges may be necessary through use of suppression devices or adequate current 
paths provided by bonding and grounding techniques. Engineering efforts are guided 
by experience, industry standards and regulatory guidance. 
Some of the sources for regulatory guidance associated with lightning threats are: 
a. Systems safety analysis (Catastrophic and Hazardous) 
b. Structural elements direct effects (FAR 25.581) 
c. Ignition prevention protection (FAR 25.981) 
d. System upset due to Lightning/HIRF (FAR 25.1316) 
 
Identification of L/HIRF protection components is made during the preliminary 
design phase of the aircraft development program after the lightning current threats 
are defined. Significant lightning protection components are those installations and 
devices whose failure can result in a potential catastrophic or hazardous condition 
[3.4]. Once a protection scheme is established during the aircraft preliminary design 
and is determined to provide protection against the potential for a catastrophic or 
hazardous condition, documentation of the component should be established and in 
particular, the installed environment should be identified. 
 
Component Condition Environment Design Threat 
Hydraulic transport 
element protector 
Catastrophic Moisture Corrosion of 
installation fittings 
Current path 
conducting joint in 
aircraft structure 
Catastrophic Temperature and 
Vibrations 
Looseness of joint 
due to expansions 
and vibrations 
Wing skin conducting 
path 
Catastrophic Low and high 
frequency vibrations 
from wing deflection 
and engines 
mounted on 
underside of wing 
Loss of conducting 
path continuity to 
ground plane 
Table 3-1 Identification of Lightning/HIRF Significant Protective Components 
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A matrix such as the example in Table 3-1 below might be used for this engineering 
analysis to determine specific requirements for installation and evaluation of the 
components. To meet the requirements for continued airworthiness, these 
components and associated environmental threats should be evaluated during the 
preliminary design stage of the aircraft development program. The reason that it is 
important to examine the designs at this stage for continued airworthiness 
performance is if changes proposed due to the continued airworthiness evaluation 
may be more easily implemented at this preliminary design stage. At this stage, the 
list of components such as the example shown in Table 3-1 can be gathered by and 
engineering integrator and continuously evaluated for impact as more specific 
design decisions are made heading towards the detailed design stage. 
 
As the design of the aircraft matures, the list of significant protection items will 
stabilize. This list may be managed by an electromagnetic continued airworthiness 
engineer and considered by those engineering departments responsible for the 
protection design implementation. Formal identification and documentation of the 
protection components will ensure smooth transmission of the significant 
components to the MSG-3 analysis. However, as depicted in the Figure 3-1, the MSG-
3 analysis is not included within the Engineering Analysis and Design Development 
process where design activities are conducted. This arrangement may generate 
unwanted maintenance since MSG-3 analysis will occur later in the design process 
when design changes become more costly. As the configuration of these protection 
designs are firmed up, consideration for the continued airworthiness of the 
installations can be performed by the identification of critical characteristics and 
environmental threats that may be present as the aircraft enters its service life. If 
this assessment concludes that the subsequent MSG-3 analysis will find required 
maintenance for the design developed in the preliminary design phase, then 
feedback through the design activities process would be beneficial at that point. 
With the current design process, this feedback is not conducted formally however; 
clever designers may realize the impacts of certain decisions and contact appropriate 
counterparts to affect beneficial changes. 
 
Step 3 - Establish critical characteristics of each component 
Critical characteristics are those design features that enable a component to perform 
its lightning protection function. Some characteristics might be galvanic protection 
coatings on lightning shields, sealants used to avoid moisture ingress, and other 
installation details that ensure a component can perform its lightning protection 
function without degrading to a point where the component is no longer effective. 
An Air Transport Association (ATA) Task Force was conducted from 2005 to 2007 
with the purpose to address improvements needed to the Lightning/HIRF MSG-3 
Methodology.  In the MSG-3 document rewrite, the newly adopted industry 
definitions of a component and component characteristics [3.5] are as follows: 
Terms: 
L/HIRF Protection Systems are comprised of components that avoid, 
eliminate, or reduce the consequences of an L/HIRF event. 
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L/HIRF Protection Component is any self-contained part, combination of 
parts, subassemblies, units, or structures that perform a distinctive function 
necessary to provide L/HIRF protection. 
Characteristics are those properties of L/HIRF protection components that 
are necessary to perform their intended L/HIRF protection function(s). 
 
Key to assessing the continued airworthiness of a particular design is the 
identification of component characteristics. These characteristics may be susceptible 
to degradation from environmental factors over time. 
Properties that may degrade over time can include: 
a. Materials and galvanic junctions. This can include both conductive and non-
conductive materials. Designs that require the interface of incompatible 
materials such as stainless steel fasteners through carbon composite structure 
may require mitigation by a non-conductive material. If conduction of the joint is 
needed to reduce the threat of damage due to lightning, then more careful 
examination of the design is needed. 
b. Bond path components. In some cases, electrical bond paths may be created by 
incorporating bond wires from a component to the aircraft electrical ground. It is 
important to ensure that the bond wire fasteners and material are free from 
potential corrosion or if this is not possible, that the potential for corrosion is 
mitigated by appropriate installation techniques. Bond paths can also be secured 
through the use of fayed surface bonds produced with use of high torque 
fasteners. Though the fasteners may not always be in the bond path, it is still 
important to evaluate the continued airworthiness of the fayed surface is cases 
where the fasteners may break or loosen and subsequently cause the interface 
to become a high resistance joint. 
c. Installation design materials and hardware in specific locations. An installation of 
a component can be quite eloquent. Bond paths, isolation and insulation may all 
work together to provide the appropriate lightning transient mitigation against 
damage to equipment from the lightning strike. Details of the installations such 
as brackets, structural mounting and isolating materials require identification for 
a continued airworthiness assessment to ensure a long term availability of the 
component protection function. Consideration of whether a component is 
installed inside or outside of the pressure vessel provides insight to the 
continued airworthiness challenge for that particular component. 
d. Wire looms and hardware. Connectors and associated electromagnetic shielding 
require specific material choices and secure installation solutions. Disconnect 
brackets for continuance of wire bundles through aircraft structural production 
breaks are also equally important to include in the characteristics evaluation. 
 
Step 6 – Collect test data 
Step six in Figure 3-1 is marked with a dashed line around the box that represents a 
current data collection process that is slightly different than the one that is proposed 
by step six in the methodology central to these studies found in Figure 3-2. As 
designs are developed, past design approaches are heavily leveraged into new 
aircraft engineering choices to reduce costs and create fewer new spare part 
requirements. In the case of lightning protection, most designs are not active 
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systems that can provide reliability data based on system upsets recorded while the 
aircraft is operating. In this case, the use of past system performance records is not 
effective to determine if a bond jumper or lightning protective strip on an aircraft 
wing tip has performed well over the years of operation. In this case, the current 
lightning protection data collection in step six may come from examination of pilot 
reports of system upsets after a lightning strike or accidental findings of damage 
caused by a lightning strike that is found in the post lightning strike aircraft walk 
around inspection. Some of this data is available but much of it is not. It is difficult to 
correlate lightning strike events to aircraft system upsets especially since these 
correlations would be best performed at the airline with complete access to both the 
pilot reports and the aircraft itself. An aircraft manufacturer often does not have 
such access and finds it difficult to collect this kind of evidence correlating 
performance of the components over time to the initial expected design standards 
designed into lightning strike protection components. For this step, lab results may 
be used during the early design phase of the aircraft development. These lab tests 
are typically not performed to prove that the design will meet continued 
airworthiness requirements; rather they are typically conducted when a new design 
is desired such as revised fasteners, new materials or new structural components 
that have not been used in conjunction with the proposed installed components. 
 
Step 10 – Establish final optimized design 
In the current view of the design development captured in Figure 3-1 the step six 
feeds directly into step ten. This is because the steps between step six and step ten 
are added steps found in Figure 3-2 which are part of the revised methodology that 
do not exist in the current representation of the design process depicted in Figure 
3.1 above. As the design alternatives are reduced to an optimum implementation, 
final design decision for L/HIRF protection components are established. Once these 
designs are completed within the process outlined in previous steps, final 
configuration is established and full scale production of the first article can begin. At 
this point, final conclusions regarding the expected in-service performance and 
assumptions used in making the design decisions are recorded. Final design 
characteristics, test performance and expected performance while deployed in 
service can be included as additional detail in the continued airworthiness document 
mentioned in Step six of the new methodology detailed in Figure 3-2. This 
documentation of design requirements and test data collection will be important as 
a communication tool between design and continued airworthiness engineers during 
the early phases of the aircraft development program. Some of the key expected 
activities associated with step ten include: 
a. Stabilize configuration 
b. Summarize key required design features 
c. Revise characteristics for final release 
d. Document expected service performance  
e. Complete tests for determining effective design configurations 
 
At this point in the design process, the aircraft can begin initial construction. 
Drawings, diagrams, and specifications are sufficiently mature in this phase of the 
aircraft development program to begin production. 
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Step 11 – Perform MSG-3 on the final design configuration 
In order for the maintenance program to be created in the current development 
method, sufficient design completion is required. At this point in the development 
program, final configuration is fixed and aircraft production begins. Concurrent with 
these activities is the initiation of the MSG-3 process. For MSG-3 analysis to be 
effective, sufficient design details are required. As such, this is an appropriate place 
in time to conduct the MSG-3 analysis. If an MSG-3 analysis determines a design is 
not robust enough to last the life of the aircraft, maintenance will be applied to the 
design for the life of the aircraft. At this point in the design phase, revising the design 
is impossible without a negative impact to cost and schedule. At this point, the 
opportunity to revise designs has past. If diligence is used in the design decisions 
made earlier in the program, MSG-3 analysis should expect to find excellent 
performing designs that require little maintenance. In Figure 3-1, step eleven is the 
final step of the continued airworthiness design development. Within step eleven 
the process is initiated to create a maintenance program for the aircraft. In the new 
methodology this step remains at the end of the design process but the expected 
outcome is different and is explored in greater detail below as part of the Figure 3-2 
methodology discussion. With this process reflecting current practices for design 
development two significant outcomes will result in less desirable outcomes: 
1. Additional Maintenance - Without the ability to input continued airworthiness 
criteria within the current design development flow shown in Figure 3-1, those 
lightning protection systems that protect critical and essential aircraft functions 
are more likely to require additional maintenance to ensure continued 
operational effectiveness. An example may be a fastener hardware combination 
that meets the required resistance values at initial installation, and has passed 
the 500 hour certification tests without significant degradation of the resistance. 
This component may be installed in the aircraft wheel-well where additional 
threats exist over a much longer period of time could prove to have a worse 
effect on the long-term provisions for low resistance within the hardware 
interfacing joints. 
2. Lower performing lightning protection designs – Many designs for lightning 
protection are not subjected to a design revision study if the initial testing 
provides good results. If the testing that was competed was to meet certification 
requirements, the test may not have explored environmental threats that more 
closely represent the aircraft condition such as air pressure cycling. Air pressure 
cycling can have an effect on filet seals that are not installed well. For instance, a 
filet seal that has an unexpected gap or pin hole in the sealant may actually draw 
moisture in and out of the gap due to pressure cycles as the aircraft moves 
through changing altitudes. For this reason, filet seals may not be the best 
alternative outside the pressure vessel. In a certification test, a filet seal may 
perform very well in the 500 hours salt spray exposure to complete the moisture 
testing. A gap in the sealant may not generate any problem in allowing moisture 
to enter into the hardware joints. 
3.4 Proposed Methodology 
To understand the methodology proposed by the author, each step within the new 
design methodology is described below. As the first steps in the process are very 
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similar to steps already performed by aircraft designers, a note is made in those step 
explanations to direct the reader to the current methodology included in Figure 3-1 
above. The key to successful deployment of this methodology is the provision for an 
integration of engineering talent within the aircraft design community. This 
integrated design community will also include a function that will act as a 
“gatekeeper” of issues related to continued airworthiness. For lightning protection, 
this may be a new concept in aircraft design programs since the continued 
airworthiness of lightning protection is relatively new criteria imposed by regulatory 
agencies in the wake of more integrated aircraft systems that can be impacted in a 
common way by a single lightning strike. Along with this integration of talent is the 
integration of information. An example of this information integration may be the 
use of in-service performance data as part of the data collection used to assist in 
design decision making. In service performance data for lightning protection is less 
prevalent and does not have the deep information-rich characteristics as does many 
of the other more common airplane functional designs. The first step in any 
development program is to determine the goals that will drive the solutions. 
 
1. Establish 
Design Service 
Life Goals
2. Identify Critical/
Essential lightning 
components 
installations and 
environmental 
threats
3. Establish critical 
characteristics for 
each component
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installed 
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test plan and aging 
test criteria
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Figure 3-2 Design Methodology for Lightning Protection Continued Airworthiness and MSG-3 Analysis 
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Step 1 of New Methodology - Establish Design Service Life Goals 
Definition of this step is included in Section 3.3 of this chapter. The step description 
and expectations are similar for the new methodology. Consideration of the long 
term availability of lightning protection may be a new design service life goal that 
was not included in past aircraft design programs at this stage. 
 
Step 2 of New Methodology - Identify Critical/Essential lightning 
components/installation and environmental threats 
Definition of this step is included in Section 3.3 of this chapter. The step description 
and expectations are similar for the new methodology. Consideration of the long 
term availability of lightning protection may be a new additional consideration 
during selection of critical and essential lightning components installations and 
environmental threats. It is important for an aircraft development program at this 
stage to determine the way forward for certification. In this stage, lightning 
protection continued airworthiness may require re-assessment of the choices made 
for the lightning protection components that are required. 
 
Step 3 of New Methodology - Establish critical characteristics of each component 
In the currently proposed design method shown in Figure 3-1, critical component 
characteristics are determined at the beginning of the detailed design phase of the 
aircraft design process in the same way proposed in Figure 3-2 with differences to 
the inputs and outputs. The proposed new methodology has the establishment of 
critical characteristics of each component in the same step three of the methodology 
in Figure 3-1 above however have different interfaces that improve the design 
methodology. With the step three timing being conducted at the beginning of the 
detailed design phase there may result a negative impact on the outcome of the 
design and generate more maintenance as described in step eleven within section 
3.3 above if design characteristics are chosen to meet impedance requirements and 
not to include continued airworthiness criteria as shown in the interfaces to step 
three that were not part of the previous design process. One example is the use of 
tin-plated copper shields used in looms to protect against lightning. These shields 
may provide excellent impedance performance and may have been qualified to meet 
moisture exposure with a 500 hour salt spray. However, use of service experience 
shows that these tin plated shields do not perform well outside the pressure vessel. 
In this case, the effect of this information is brought into step three by the feedback 
loop from step nine where a design revision studies are performed to determine if 
the design should be chosen as the final optimized solution. The service experience 
would be included in the design evaluation. This feedback is a major improvement 
over the past methodology described in Figure 3-1 where final characteristics are 
declared as a matter of fact at the beginning of the detailed design phase based on 
the ability of the component to pass certification without detailed consideration of 
the continued airworthiness aspect of the characteristics within the installed 
environment. The next major improvement proposed by this new methodology is 
the revision of practices to pass the established critical characteristics to a new 
design process listed as step four that will evaluate the characteristics for potential 
degradation within the installed environment. This evaluation is new to the design 
methodology used in the past explained in step four below. 
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Step 4 of New Methodology - Identify potential for degradation of characteristics 
within installed environment 
Once the key characteristics are established for lightning protection components, a 
dedicated effort to identify all possible degradations imposed by the environment 
over time is necessary. Degradations are most probably due to environments in 
which the protection is installed and the ability of the design to eliminate 
degradation potential through good design techniques. Some of the leading 
degradation modes are listed below. 
a. Galvanic junctions (corrosion). For those Lightning/HIRF protection components 
that can corrode when interfaced directly, note should be taken with regards to 
the potential degradation given the installation location and materials corrosion 
mitigation design.  
b. Fatigue. Loss of conductive path can be a degradation mode for Lightning/HIRF 
components if anticipated vibrations or other environmental conditions cause 
material fatigue that leads to loss of material continuity or interfacing. 
c. Mechanical malfunction or wear. Duty cycles of aircraft equipment and 
structure should be identified where appropriate as potential degradations of 
conductive paths. An example of this might be the extension and retraction of 
control surfaces that contain specific bond path designs such as bond wires or 
specific structural current path designs through structural components.  
d. Heat damage. Heat can cause negative effects on sealants and isolation devices 
such as gaskets. Degradation modes contributed to heat should be considered 
when developing the degradation mode identification. 
e. Extreme temperature cycles. Extreme temperature cycles can cause lightning 
protection components to expand and contract. Use of different materials in 
bonding and grounding designs, expansion and contraction can cause interfaces 
to loosen or loose the required intimate contact. 
f. Delamination or disbonding. Some composite structures provide lightning 
protection by use of Expanded Aluminum Foils (EAF) or Bonded Aluminum Foils. 
Water ingress into composite honeycomb structure can freeze and cause 
damage to the underlying structural integrity of the composite panel. This can 
also lead to degradation of the protection provided by the imbedded metals as 
moisture introduces corrosion potential for the embedded metal. 
 
To capture the specific degradation modes and impact of the environment on the 
protection designs, a table is included in an assessment sheet that is used to grade 
the effectiveness of the designs when exposed to longer term elements present 
within the installed zone. The combination of these threats is also important to 
consider. An example of a combination of threats that impact a protection scheme is 
one where nickel plated aluminum connectors are deployed in moisture prone areas 
that experience sever temperature cycles. These connectors perform very well in 
moist areas where temperature cycles are not extreme. However, if temperature 
cycling and moisture are present at the same time, the performance is degraded 
considerably. This is because the aluminum coating on the connector surface and the 
aluminum material expand at different rates when exposed to extreme temperature 
cycles. With these different expansion rates, the aluminum finish sustains small 
fissure cracks that expose small amounts of the underlying aluminum. When 
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exposed to moisture, this combination of dissimilar materials causes aggressive 
corrosion on the exterior of the connector and ultimately degrade the performance 
of the connector exterior as a good bond path for lightning current to travel. 
 
Step 5 of New Methodology - Provide input to test plan and aging test criteria 
With installed environment knowledge, the design features and the potential 
degradations modes, one can make valuable input into the lightning protection 
testing plans. Use of design influencing mechanisms can assist in gaining better 
continued airworthiness programs within the Engineering Detailed Design phase 
[3.6]. The tests that may be influenced through use of this methodology are: 
1. Qualification test data gathered during component qualification testing 
2. Developmental test data captured during stress testing of new designs 
 
As electromagnetic environments are defined by aircraft development engineers and 
qualification test requirements are established, consideration for the nature of the 
installed environment can provide further insight to the continued airworthiness of 
components under test. Though the challenge with qualification testing is that true 
degradation profiles cannot be reproduced in the laboratory environment, 
developmental testing of components can provide some indication of a components 
ability to continue functioning under extreme environments. 
Inputs to the test plans should include establishing the aging test criteria in step five 
provided in the following list: 
A. Design service life objective comparison to test profile simulations. This 
information can determine how close to design life the different tests are 
conducted.  
a. Flight Cycles 
b. Flight hours 
c. Years 
B. Installed location. With this information one can estimate the severity of the 
environmental exposure anticipated during aircraft operations. 
a. Inside Pressure Vessel 
b. Outside Pressure Vessel Protected 
c. Outside Pressure Vessel Exposed 
C. Test to failure required – Yes or No. With this information one can gain 
additional information to derive the end of life values for predicable degradation. 
For unpredictable degradation, testing to failure may be the only choice as the 
gain from testing to failure will not be applicable in normal operations. In order 
to determine the value of testing to failure a test engineering may consider use 
of test scenarios through: 
a. Information gathering regarding probable aging profile based on 
application of component within its installed configuration 
b. Information gathering regarding maximum failed condition values and 
appropriate margins 
D. Aircraft worst case environment comparison to test standard. With this 
information one can conclude the potential operating margin between the worst 
case operating environments and the testing conditions established for 
laboratory simulations. Though these may not be directly comparable, it may be 
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wise to re-examine the design if the operational margins run too close to those 
simulated environments. 
a. Temperature 
b. Moisture 
c. Chemical threats 
d. Vibration 
E. Galvanic junction assessments. With this information on intentional and non-
intentional galvanic junctions like those that might be used in aircraft component 
grounding to structure, one can ensure that the testing would provide resistance 
increases throughout the test. Large resistance changes due to aging of 
component parts are often a threat to continued availability of adequate 
lightning protection. Mitigations against corrosion of galvanic junctions such as 
sealants should also be included in the testing if possible. This will provide the 
continued airworthiness engineer with a better idea of the design robustness 
when subjected to the different tests. 
F. Test Setup Criteria. When comparing the aircraft system installations to 
laboratory setup it is often impractical to simulate the exact configuration of the 
aircraft installation and provide the exact combination of threats over a large 
period of time. Because the location of the installation, geometry, and combined 
environmental threats may together establish a unique challenge for test 
engineers, the test findings must be scrutinized closely. Making the mistake of 
accepting laboratory results without consideration for the test set-up simulation 
might result in erroneous continued airworthiness conclusions  
G. Effects of fatigue on electrical properties. Flight cycles and vibrations can have 
an effect on the longevity of the electrical connection. Some examples might 
include bond straps on control surfaces that fatigue to failure in service, broken 
or loose connector back shells that interrupt adequate bond path, and hydraulic 
line clamps that are conductive and assist with transferring large lightning 
currents during a lightning strike event. Stress and fatigues tests effect on 
electrical conduction may not normally be part of the test plan. Inputs from the 
continued airworthiness engineer can ensure that the fatigue tests include 
follow-up measurement of the conductive joints. 
 
Step 6 of New Methodology - Collect test data 
Step six is slightly revised in the proposed methodology and depicted in Figure 3-2 as 
a solid line around the box. To support this proposed new methodology, Step six 
recommends that a survey is devised to collect the data that reflects the interests of 
the inputs made in Step five which investigate the performance of components both 
based on certification tests and based on subsequent tests. In the development of a 
new aircraft design, the primary focus of testing is certification of the aircraft type 
design. It is up to the continued airworthiness engineer to establish the vehicle in 
which the data will be collected for continued airworthiness design inputs. A 
continued airworthiness document may be the best way for an aircraft OEM to 
centralize this information and refer specific information into the MSG-3 process at a 
later time. Certain hardware should have historical information regarding its ability 
to maintain its function over time. One could investigate these components by 
testing the hardware on retired aircraft or performing a survey of these components 
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at airline sites. Additional information should be available within the product support 
division of the aircraft manufacturer. Since much of this information may be 
collected as part of service investigations for system failures on aircraft in operation, 
the details required for this new methodology may not be gathered as part of the 
investigations. Data collection is an important factor in successful use of this 
methodology. Many aircraft designed after 1995 have an FAA requirement to 
perform in service testing of lightning protection. Results of this testing is a possible 
source for the needed data and should be aligned with the new methodology. 
 
Step 7 of New Methodology - Supply test results to engineering staff for potential 
design revision or design validation 
Once the test results have been assessed for continued airworthiness, the engineer 
concerned with the continued airworthiness of the design will provide guidance 
regarding the test results associated with the test itself and aging simulation 
discussed in Step 5 of this new methodology. It is well known to some test engineers 
that components pass qualification tests in the laboratory and fail to perform in 
service for the life of the aircraft. It may be beneficial at this stage in Step 7 to take 
developmental testing results into account as well if they are available. This 
developmental testing usually explores breaking points in the design and abuse 
characteristics beyond that which is required for qualification testing though 
developmental testing may not be as controlled as qualification testing. A 
combination of evaluations associated with these two test results is proposed to 
draw a better conclusion as to whether the design will meet the design goals set 
earlier in this methodology. Continued airworthiness engineers will provide 
assessments of the expected performance of components based on experience with 
similar designs or in-service testing performed by airline maintenance crews. Other 
sources of data may be exploratory testing where aircraft that are no longer in 
service may be destructively tested to determine the amount of degradation in a 
particular bond scheme. Aircraft manufacturers may be well served to create 
databases for L/HIRF protection component performance data and utilize this data 
to affect design development and improvement. Though it is rare to see these 
lightning protection components within the reliability databases where system 
performance is retained, this may also be an opportunity to improve data collection 
and utilization. Gaps that may exist between service engineering knowledge and 
system designers can be bridged if data is collected and retained for lightning 
protection. In cases where the test results show serious lack of robustness in the 
design to continue good performance in the installed environment, a request for an 
engineering trade study is made. This engineering trade study can be designed 
further for specific application to lightning protection design within the proposed 
new methodology. Part of Step 7 includes an agreement that the design engineer, 
the test engineer, and the continued airworthiness engineer evaluate the design 
configurations from each specialty identified in the trade study survey for redesign 
or improvement. This Step 7 is a place in the methodology where great advantages 
can be gained within the design process by evaluating the component performance 
beyond the qualification test results before the configuration is final.  At this point, 
critical design reviews should be underway in the aircraft development project. 
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Evaluation of the design should follow in the same manner as the rest of the design 
reviews already under way. 
 
Step 8 of New Methodology - Assess continued airworthiness against goals 
With the results from the lab testing and feedback provided to the test engineer, the 
continued airworthiness engineer will lead a series of collaborative sessions between 
the test engineer and design engineer. The structure of this assessment will be 
provided by the continued airworthiness engineer working within the engineering 
project team. Some of the key elements to considered during these discussions are: 
a. Identify key measures of continued airworthiness (Note that at this level of 
examination, the inclusion of maintenance errors is not part of the continued 
airworthiness evaluation). For the continued airworthiness evaluation of this 
type, it is assumed that the aircraft is restored to its certified configuration at 
every maintenance inspection. This ensures that maintenance is not applied on 
an aircraft simply to address lack of training or proper instructions for continued 
airworthiness. Maintenance should not be applied to increase the level of 
capabilities that is represented in the type certification. 
b. Corrosion level identification and associated rating of the severity. For this a 
method shall be developed to determine corrosion severity. 
c. Electrical conductivity decay over time 
d. Security of installations and potential for accidental damage to affect the 
ongoing performance of the Lightning/HIRF protection. This is a challenge when 
considering lab set ups that are not representative of the true installed 
environment. 
e. Detection of degradation – link to MSG-3.  This includes key indicators of 
degradation verified by measurement. 
f. Comparison to similar parts in service 
g. Assessment of installed locations on the aircraft and an evaluation of the actual 
installed environment against the simulated environment. Along with this input 
will be the consideration for multiple environmental effects occurring 
simultaneously and different material interfaces within the particular 
environmental threat. This information will be passed along by the test data 
gathering performed earlier in the methodology and contained in the assessment 
sheets to collaborate the information. 
h. Performance of the components under degraded conditions (adequate/not-
adequate.)  Along with this decision, will be a technical reason for the concern. 
To improve this determination, additional information regarding the relationship 
between the installed protection material and finish and the environmental 
threats is required.  
i. Recommendations for revisions. These recommendations will be made based on 
evaluation of the expected performance, test results and in-service experience. 
Some key measures of improvement might include: 
i. Hardware improvements 
ii. Material changes 
iii. Installation restrictions 
iv. Sealant additions or revisions 
v. Location changes 
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Evaluation of the expected performance will also include a measure of whether the 
design will meet its intended continued airworthiness goals under conditions 
imposed by the installed environment. One approach is to establish whether the 
component will be able to perform its duty within the defined maintenance program 
level goals set by the project. For example, if it is expected that the component may 
require test every 100 flight hours, this may be found to be incompatible with the 
goal for tests to begin no sooner than 3000 flight hours. In this case the program 
goals will require alignment with the component performance capabilities. 
 
Step 9 of New Methodology - Perform design revision studies. Design Change?  
The goal of the design option studies proposed within this methodology is to 
determine if a particular lightning protection design should be revised or improved 
to meet long-term performance goals. Evaluation of the design alternatives is not a 
new process for most aircraft manufacturers. However, at this stage in the 
methodology, the lightning protection components have been selected based on 
past experience or based on earlier decisions regarding new technology deployment. 
Evaluations of design optimization have recently included more sophisticated ways 
to model maintenance cost impacts. Though aircraft system performance (Mean 
Time Between Failure), operating costs (Fuel, Crew, Landing and Navigation Fees) 
and ownership costs (the cost of financing money) are well known factors in 
designing leading edge aircraft, maintenance costs are much more challenging to 
quantify. Some of the variables involved in calculating maintenance costs include 
aircraft duty cycles, maintenance skills, technician salaries and union structures, 
general overhaul and repair philosophy within the airline operations. These factors 
can create a wide variance in maintenance cost calculations. As manufacturer’s 
maintenance cost models have become more sophisticated, cost studies that include 
the impact of continued airworthiness into the final trade equation have become a 
reality. Designs that do not age gracefully impact maintenance cost burden. Thus, 
the equation for determining preferred design alternatives shall focus on the cost of 
a revised design in comparison to the life cycle cost of the increased maintenance. A 
recommended change in the design can be proven to gain value for the future 
operator and the aircraft manufacturer, provided the assessment includes the 
expenses associated with the alternative designs. It is not the intention of this 
research to further expand on the cost analysis within these studies, rather depend 
on a reliable design alternative tool that considers maintenance costs associated 
with specific system design alternatives. Further details associated with aircraft 
maintenance costs and incorporation of equipment trade studies is a separate field 
of work that is required to support this step in the methodology. Aircraft 
maintenance represents approximately eleven percent of an airline’s operating costs 
and is therefore a key area in which sufficient thought should be given to by airlines, 
aircraft manufacturers and maintenance providers alike. However, the maintenance 
industry is not only a relatively complicated one to understand, but is also one in 
which determining such costs poses much of a mystery to many. [3.7]  
Some of the factors to consider in the alternative design trade studies are: 
a. Availability  
b. Price 
c. Complexity 
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d. Test data 
e. Similarity to current technology or components 
 
For designs that are changed as a result of the trade studies, the process of 
redefining critical characteristics and test criteria is repeated in Step Three. 
 
Step 10 of New Methodology - Establish final optimized design 
Definition of this step is included in Section 3.3 of this chapter. The step description 
and expectations are unaltered for the improved methodology. 
 
Step 11 of New Methodology - Pass design and test details onto MSG-3 analysis 
process 
The proposed methodology in that is central to this research and development 
creates a critical link between design and continued airworthiness evaluation. It is 
most critical to leverage the advantages of including testing and known in-service 
performance details to the MSG-3 process after the design has been optimized. With 
this methodology, components that make up the aircraft L/HIRF protection will have 
gone through an analysis similar to MSG-3 analysis as part of the design evaluation 
that is developed within the work that produced this thesis. Early continued 
airworthiness evaluation of component design features provides a great advantage 
to the design process since conclusions within the MSG-3 analysis will be aligned 
with the early design review identified in the methodology as Step 4 through Step 9. 
Key elements within the newly revised L/HIRF MSG-3 methodology [3.5] include 
identification of L/HIRF protection components, component characteristics, 
degradation modes expected within the installed environment, and maintenance 
decision logic for designs that are not considered robust enough to maintain the 
certification level for the life of the aircraft within its installed environment. The 
improvement to past practices lies in the early identification of design susceptibility 
to degradation before final design is established. This is equivalent to conducting a 
‘mini-MSG-3’ analysis within the design cycle as identified in the methodology as an 
Engineering Detailed Design Tool. The final conclusion of Step 11 for components 
that are susceptible to degradation is to apply recommendations for applicable and 
effective maintenance where a design change was not the optimal solution. In cases 
where the methodology concludes that excellent continued airworthiness 
performance is likely with no appreciable degradation, no maintenance is selected. 
 
Another input to Step 11 is the results from in-service developmental flying 
performance data. The input provides intelligence with regard to how components 
are performing on other aircraft. This performance data is used in MSG-3 to 
determine robustness of particular components within specified environments for 
each specific installation location.  
 
Step 12 of New Methodology - In-service and developmental flying feedback to the 
methodology 
Similar in-service performance data can be provided into the design revision studies 
that are gathered for validation of designs performed by the MSG-3 analysis. 
Developmental testing of installed components can also be beneficial to design 
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decision making efforts. Testing new equipment during flight can be a valuable 
source of information. When performing design evaluations, this information can 
have a positive effect on decisions with regard to the long term viability of designs. 
Information on bond path degradation, deteriorated conductivity, increased 
corrosion and long term security of installation is gathered during the flight tests to 
augment lab results in the decision making process for new and revised designs. 
Special conditions for HIRF protected systems developed by the regulatory agencies 
have driven certification requirements for a continued airworthiness engineering 
validation program that actively collects data on aircraft protection ground path 
degradation. Data from these programs are considered proprietary to the aircraft 
manufacturers and are not readily shared among manufacturers. The data collected 
however, is very relevant to the feedback identified in this methodology. 
3.5 Benefits of a Revised Model 
If you compare the methodology proposed within this body of work to the current 
methodology, you will note four significant advantages in the revised methodology. 
1. The revised methodology integrates the testing together with the continued 
airworthiness evaluation early in the process.  
In the current methodology, the focus of testing is typically the qualification of 
the parts under review. For new or novel components there may be an additional 
developmental testing performed but this is usually done by a supplier or test 
engineer responsible for providing alternative solutions for the components. This 
test data is used for determining the best solution for a particular component to 
pass qualification and sometimes to last through several environments. It is not 
part of the current methodology to share this information with continued 
airworthiness engineers and thus it is rarely taken into consideration when 
performing MSG-3 analysis. 
2. The revised methodology allows continued airworthiness engineers to input 
component application assumptions directly into the test plans.  
The advantage of this approach is to tie direct in-service experience to the design 
criteria. This is done through collaboration of continued airworthiness and design 
engineers. A structured interface is required in order to enable continuity of 
inputs and outputs to this portion of the methodology. 
3. Feedback test results assessments to the engineering test team.  
The revised methodology accomplishes a new feature in the design process 
which allows expansion of test result utilization. Feedback from continued 
airworthiness engineers may result in test configuration changes that add value 
to the knowledge base and improve the design. This added feature of the new 
methodology requires close working relationships between the testing 
community and the engineers responsible for the MSG-3 analysis. Again, 
appropriate structure for effective communication is required. 
4. Expand the design optimization studies to include evaluation of lightning 
protection components before commitment to the final configuration.  
The revised methodology improves the design optimization efforts by including 
trade studies for lightning protection component installations that would 
otherwise result in scheduled maintenance. The key to successful 
implementation of this methodology feature is again communication between 
  
60 
the continued airworthiness, design, and test engineer with the united goal to 
optimize the design and minimize maintenance. 
3.6 Implementation 
To implement this methodology, an assessment sheet can be drafted that includes 
the design information referenced in the above methodology. This information is 
gathered by an airworthiness engineer and analyzed for optimization of the 
component design against specific performance criteria that is also included in the 
report. It is important to understand that each L/HIRF protection component whose 
failure can affect the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft should be 
gathered in one place and included as a series of assessment sheets along with other 
design data. The design of the assessment sheets is fluid and can take on many 
different formats. For the purpose of this methodology, a format was designed for 
the assessment sheets and is applied in the case studies. 
 
Once the basic information of the component is provided, a brief description of the 
purpose and expected performance of the component is entered under “Component 
Purpose and Operational Theory”. Further in the assessment sheet, the installation 
data is gathered. This is where important design decisions with regard to lightning 
current paths and protection availability are gathered. The next general step is to 
determine the installed environment and potential degradation modes along with 
mitigations that may be included in the component and installation design. Also 
entered into the assessment sheet is an evaluation of the testing that was 
performed. Information on how the component performed under different 
environmental conditions is stored in the test report to be part of the evaluation of 
the continued airworthiness expectation. This also includes specific test results and 
comments from the test engineers. Based on the outcome of this assessment, a 
redesign of the component or its installation may be sought. Past practices in this 
regard would rely solely on a successful qualification test. Actual aging 
characteristics are difficult to model since there is often not a documented 
degradation of the lightning path electrical properties associated with the aircraft 
installed environment and duty cycle. The final conclusions of the assessment 
declare the expected performance for the component and include specific guidance 
for a design modification that will ensure the best design is in place when required. 
3.7 Assessment Sheets 
Assessment sheets have been created that correspond to the methodology 
contained in this chapter. The assessment sheet is exercised in the case studies 
contained in this thesis. Categories for the assessment sheets may look something 
like that contained in Figure 3-3 where the most critical information is listed. The use 
of engineering assessment sheets of this type are part of the new design practice 
and assist the aircraft designers in applying the method suggested by this work. 
Appropriate application of the assessment sheets should ensure a practical solution 
to correcting poor performing designs and inadequate instructions for continued 
airworthiness. A validation test case is performed in Chapter 4 using actual supplier 
data for a lightning protection device. Assessment sheets can be designed to include 
other information supplied by the design team. Prior to deploying this methodology, 
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agreement should be made on what critical information should be contained in the 
assessment sheets. These assessment sheets act to integrate information from 
several sources in order to generate good results for the overall design. Flexibility in 
determining the categories of information that is required can only be provided early 
in the design program. For this research effort, information that is considered the 
minimum required to perform the assessment is contained in the case studies. As 
the case studies were assembled, additional data elements were added to the 
assessment sheets. This improvement to the assessment sheet will be discussed as 
part of the Lessons Learned Chapter Six in this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet 
3.8 Conclusion of the Methodology Development 
The methodology developed by this body of work is proposed to improve lightning 
protection designs and improve the continued airworthiness of these lightning 
protection designs. In creating the assessment sheets and exercising the 
methodology, revisions were deemed necessary as learning took place. Actual 
collection of design details in the case studies proved that the methodology is a 
valuable consideration for aircraft lightning design development. Though there is 
flexibility in how the assessment sheets are used within the design community, it is 
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concluded that some sort of organized assessment is required to ensure that the 
most optimum solutions are implemented during the aircraft development program. 
Chapter 4 Validation of the L/HIRF Continued Airworthiness Design 
Methodology 
4.1 Abstract of the Validation Exercise 
In order to validate the design methodology presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
data was supplied by Lightning Diversion Systems Inc to test the theory that the 
methodology can be applied successfully to new technology lightning protection 
designs. In addition, the goal of this validation is to determine if indeed, use of the 
methodology results in new information that can be applied in a new way to the 
aircraft design process which would not have been previously known information. 
 
As newer aircraft generate more sophisticated L/HIRF design features such as the 
designs that one may find on an all-composite aircraft, the need to include a new 
methodology for the continued airworthiness evaluation of these designs becomes 
centric to the required design practice changes theorized in this research and 
development activity. The problem of creating L/HIRF protection designs that 
degrade over time without a method for identifying the importance of the 
degradation can be solved using this methodology. One key element in reviewing 
lightning protection designs is that most designs fail latently which means that in 
may not be known as to whether the continued airworthiness of the component is in 
place over the life of the aircraft. This creates an emerging challenge in the industry 
to maintain protection components effectively without the advantage of evident 
degradation that may be critical to the protection availability. For maintenance 
technicians, the on-going health of passive devices such as the one included in this 
validation becomes much more important as voltages generated by the relatively 
low conductivity of composites structures described in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 
Included below is an “Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet” 
mentioned in Chapter 3 containing a data set that is intended to prove the validity of 
the methodology in identifying the significance of the continued airworthiness 
design criteria to the design where past practices would have only considered 
qualification tests as adequate evidence of design performance over the life of the 
installation. Certainly, there is an inherent level of safety provided by components 
that protect against the negative effects of lightning. Unsafe conditions such as those 
caused by an inadequately protected aircraft during a lightning strike are to be 
minimized if appropriate application of the methodology is applied to new 
protection equipment designs such as that in this chapter. 
 
In this test case below, we will examine a new “segmented” diverter strip design 
manufactured by Lightning Diversion Systems Inc. This design uses individual metallic 
segments to direct lightning current away from critical systems under the radome 
such as weather radar or Inertial Landing System (ILS) antennae. The technology 
relies on ionization of the segments during the ionization phase of the strike to direct 
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the lightning channel above the segmented diverters and not through the diverters 
as you would see with solid diverter strips used on many aircraft today. 
4.2 Segment Diverter Strip Design Technology 
Segmented diverter strips are a lighter weight alternative to standard metal lightning 
diverters. Rather than conduct the lightning current through the diverters as is done 
on most lightning diverters today, Lightning Diversion Systems has developed a 
diverter strip that can redirect lightning and reduce its effects on direct effect 
lightning damage and in-direct effect lightning electromagnetic interference. 
Advantages of LDS Multi-Strike Lightning Protection System 
• Permanent, multi-strike protection.  
• Negligible effect on RF pattern characteristics.  
• Low drag aerodynamics.  
• Low maintenance eliminates possibility of catastrophic damage.  
• Conductive segments are grounded through resistance material - no arcing 
between segments during P-static charging conditions. The p-static channel 
created by the resistance material in the LDS diverter strip eliminates the 
problems inherent in the design of the foil strip, solid metal diverter bar and 
internal rod systems. 
Sophisticated technology requires congruent safety devices. Pitot boom installations 
on a nose radome increase the possibility of lightning damage. Damage from 
lightning striking this type of installation can cause malfunctions of adjacent 
instrumentation systems. Segmented diverter strips placed on the radome and 
canopy as in Figure 4-1 allow lightning to travel in an ionized channel above the strip 
without harm to vital instruments and cockpit personnel. The forces of lightning  
 
Figure 4-1 Lightning 
diverting off radome fairing 
strokes that sometimes damage conventional protective 
systems by bowing the permanent strips between attach 
screws, breaking ground bolts, and breaking diverter strips 
where right-angle turn occur, are not present when the LDS 
strip is used.    Under Air Force Materials Laboratory Contract 
F33615-71-C-1380 Project 392-0 (Brunswick Corporation, prime 
contractor and McDonnell-Douglas Company subcontractor), 
tests also compared the performance of a conventional solid 
metal strip diverter with the segmented LDS strip in conjunction 
with a low-sidelobe antenna housed in a nose cone. The 
conventional diverter raised the sidelobes typically by 10dB, 
while the LDS diverter limited sidelobe increase to 1dB - a 35:1 
improvement. Radar pattern distortion from signal degradation obstructions may 
jeopardize the accuracy of early developing airborne pulse Doppler radar systems. 
These systems rely on extremely low sidelobes to permit detection of targets and to 
prevent "clutter: in the direction of the ground. 
 
Extensive testing indicates that the LDS strips will withstand current transfer greater 
than 200,000 amperes with little or no damage. (More than 99.5% of natural 
lightning strokes measured display peak current of less than 150,000 amperes.) 
  
64 
 
Problems with other available systems: 
• Foil strip system - protects for one strike only as the foil evaporates when 
struck. Over time, the foil cracks, causing sparks during P-static conditions, 
leading to severe P-static interference on VHF Comm and NAV frequencies.  
• Solid metal diverter bar system - protects for more than one strike but at the 
cost of increased drag and weight. Bars deform during heavy strikes causing 
radome to buckle. Holes drilled for mechanical inserts often cause cracks and 
allow moisture in the radome laminate.  
• Internal rod system - connects to buttons flush with radome exterior and 
reduces drag problem, but introduces complex fastener design and testing 
problems because of the magnetic forces developed at rod/button junctures. 
Rods will bend during heavy strike and damage the radome structure.  
• All of the above systems seriously influence the radiation patterns of 
enclosed radar antennas.  
4.3 Validating an Installation 
Assumptions are made as to the installation hardware choice that might be selected 
by the aircraft OEM from previously approved configurations. Within an aircraft 
design program, this diversion strip hardware is either taken through a qualification 
test to prove that it meets the minimum certification requirements or shown to be 
similar to other hardware that is already in use on other aircraft designs and 
accepted by similarity for certification of the new aircraft. Installation hardware is 
often not tested alone but rather is tested as part of a component installation 
simulation in the laboratory. Since hardware of this nature carries the critical task of 
ensuring the availability of current paths during a lightning or HIRF event, it has 
become more important for aircraft design teams to recognize the continued 
airworthiness requirements at a new level of detail. An example of a lightning test 
setup is found in Figure 4-2. As specific instructions for test set up are left to the 
OEM lab technician’s judgment, installation components such as fasteners discussed 
in the validation may have a high likelihood of requiring specific test results. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Radome Lightning Attachment Test 
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The importance of installations that provide the continued availability of lightning 
and HIRF protection, have become much more emphasized in recent industry 
activities. Early in the 1990’s, special conditions generated by the regulatory 
authorities by way of issue papers, identified a need to recognize the highly 
integrated nature of new electrical and electronic equipment and the impact that an 
L/HIRF event could have on the continued airworthiness of those aircraft that had 
deployed such high-tech designs. At that time, the initial focus of L/HIRF protection 
was centered on the MSG-3 process and constraints were applied to aircraft that 
required a continued airworthiness “testing” program to ensure degradation of wire 
bundle shields and connector interfaces would not jeopardize the continued 
airworthiness of the aircraft during its design life expectancy. This testing was 
expected to be conducted by the design holder. Testing of other protection such as 
diverter strips has also become much more visible with the development of new 
composite aircraft. Both design practices and continued airworthiness evaluations 
have struggled to evolve in the years that followed leading up to today as a better 
understanding of L/HIRF protection is gained and new processes such as the new 
MSG-3 methodology are deployed within the industry (Ref MSG-3 2007.1). As the 
methodology for MSG-3 analysis of L/HIRF protection has progressed, so too must 
the design methodology to account for highly sophisticated L/HIRF protection 
designs and increased reliance on bonding and grounding for continued 
airworthiness of critical aircraft systems. This validation demonstrates the legitimacy 
of the methodology by applying real design data to a simulated design scenario using 
the “Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet” approach. 
4.4 An Example of a Completed Assessment Sheet 
The example in this chapter starts out with a description of the component and 
information particular to the component supplier. Data for this description and 
subsequent information regarding the Diverter Systems segmented diverter strip 
have been supplied courtesy of Diverter Systems Inc. (ref TTT). As suggested in 
Chapter 3, a degreed engineer within the design community with background in 
L/HIRF protection systems may be assigned to the task of completing the assessment 
sheets for each component that provides for continued safe flight and landing of the 
aircraft. It is not the intention of the assessment sheets to determine which 
protection components should be included in the assessments sheets as the 
certification basis and associated safety analysis are expected to provide the 
guidance required to identify the components that are important to this assessment. 
As such, the design community may consider development of a document or internal 
agreement to be used among design groups that clearly identifies those components 
whose failure in combination with an L/HIRF event affect the continued safe flight 
and landing of the aircraft. Assistance from the certification engineer or 
representative electromagnetic engineering organization is also expected as an input 
to implementation of this assessment. To aid in this assessment, the document may 
be created by the department responsible for the compliance to FAR 25.1529 
“Instructions for Continued Airworthiness” of the L/HIRF protection. For integrated 
avionics systems, this document may list all critical and essential L/HIRF protection 
components. For transport elements such as hydraulic or fuel line tubing, concerns 
about grounding in areas where a bond degradation can result in fuel ignition or fire 
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can also be considered relevant to the continued airworthiness list. For structural 
elements, bonding and isolation play significant roles in composite aircraft 
construction and can be determined to protect underlying critical or essential 
systems for which these bonds or isolation installation become part of the data 
package of L/HIRF components. Action of this type is not required by regulatory 
agencies but may serve as a good engineering practice for consolidation of 
components that require continued airworthiness instructions to meet certification 
requirements. This can also aid in identifying appropriate components that require 
an eventual MSG-3 analysis to be completed. To prove the methodology works, a 
single component is included in the example below that is verified to be on the list of 
components that provide for the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. In 
Figure 4-3, the effects of lightning are shown to have caused severe damage to the 
aircraft nose radome. With proper treatment of the fasteners and installation over 
time, the effectiveness of the radome diverters can be ensured and result in 
minimum damage to structure after a lightning strike. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Severe Radome Damage from Lightning Strike 
4.5 The Assessment Sheet Validation using Lightning Protection Supplier Data 
The following data was collected from Lightning Diversion Systems and is a 
representative data set for what a continued airworthiness engineer would collect 
on the assessment sheet outlined in Chapter 3, Figure 3-3 Engineering L/HIRF 
Protective Device Assessment Sheet. The analysis sheet has twelve headings where 
data is required from the component and installation designers. In this test case, 
engineering has identified the diverter strips as new technology that protects against 
the potential catastrophic or hazardous condition due to a lightning strike. From 
discussions with the design department, we learned that these diverter strips can fail 
latently and have a potential for common mode degradation as each strip is 
mounted in the same way using the same installation hardware. This adds a 
potential for a common mode failure to occur such as the corrosion of multiple 
diverter strip installations at the same time. With these instructions from the 
certifying engineer, we start the Assessment by gathering data from the 
manufacturer and installation designers. Below is a completed assessment sheet. 
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Validation Exercise Using Supplier Data 
Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet 
Protection Component: Radome Diverter Strip  
 
1. Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data 
Name: Segmented Diverter Strip (Segment type) 
Part Number: LDS 10-01-64-1-SR-01-B-036 
Manufacturer: Lightning Diversion Systems (LDS) Inc. 
Design Service Life Goal: Life of the installation. Removed only if in a failed 
condition with no expected periodic removals. 
2. Component description: 
The LDS™ Multi-Strike Lightning Protection System consists of a thin, flexible, 
segmented diverter strip that combines 0.10" nominal diameter metal disc 
segments with appropriate resistance material on a thin (0.005-0.010") 
laminate.  
 
Lightning Diversion Systems has developed a new and improved lightning 
protection device that diverts lightning strokes from aircraft nose radomes and 
other sensitive areas. The protection system consists of a segmented diverter 
strip which provides maximum multiple-strike protection with negligible effect 
on RF pattern characteristics. Attached to an aircraft's radome, the system allows 
a lightning stoke to travel safely and directly to ground in an ionized channel 
created in the air above the diverter strip. It combines permanent protection 
with a low drag aerodynamics and has insignificant effect on radar antenna 
radiation patterns. The electrostatic shield created by the system provides a new 
source of streamers outside the radome wall to the fuselage. The resistance 
material in the strips helps initiate the ionized channels and provides a bleed-off 
path for P-static. The small diameter of the disc segments (1/10 wavelength or 
less at X band) makes the strip compatible with radar system operation up to and 
including Ku band. If necessary, disc size can be reduced for optimum antenna 
patterns at higher frequencies. 
Segmented diverter strips are a series of metal segments connected by resistors 
on a dielectric substrate. These strips can withstand repeated lightning strikes 
and can be used on a radome having severe microwave and aerodynamic 
performance requirements. The diverter strips are normally installed in parallel 
to the air stream to minimize drag. The spacing between the strips usually will 
range from 12 to 24 inches depending on the dielectric strength of the radome 
and the shape and closeness to the radome wall of enclosed metal object.  
3. Component Purpose and Operational Theory: 
The nose and tail of an aircraft, the ideal location for radar communication 
antennas, are also the most common targets for lightning strikes. The segmented 
diverter uses electrical ionization to divert dangerous lightning currents. Radar 
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and communication antennas aboard aircraft and ground based installations are 
usually contained within a non-metallic radome or other nonmetallic fairings to 
protect them from damaging airflow and precipitation. Many of these 
installations are located at the nose or tail of an aircraft where lightning is prone 
to strike. The metal radar antenna housed within the non-conductive reinforced 
plastic radome is the main source of ionized streamers created at the nose of the 
aircraft by high stress fields. These streamers pass through an unprotected 
radome providing a path for the lightning stroke. When lightning strikes an 
unprotected nose radome, it can penetrate the radome wall and attach to 
enclosed metal structures such as a radar antenna. The resulting explosion can 
cause extensive damage to the radome installation. The installed component 
protects the aircraft against a potentially catastrophic condition. 
4. Component Schematic and Installation Details: 
The LDS diverter strips are mounted to the radome by use of adhesive. Diverter 
strips placed on the radome and canopy allow lightning to travel in an ionized 
channel above the strip without harm to vital instruments and cockpit personnel. 
Strips are easily bonded with a compatible adhesive to the outer surface of the 
radome, and are just as easily repaired or replaces. The strip is attached to the 
grounding bolt to allow smooth transfer of current. 
 
 
For bonding the diverter strip to the aircraft, use of the following recommended 
fastener is applied. The fastener is titanium with a titanium collar (nut). The head 
of the fastener is countersunk and passes through the dielectric diverter strip 
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into the fiberglass radome and through the aluminum stiffener at the radome 
base. The collar is self-locking in design to eliminate fastener loosening. 
 
 
 
5. Installation Environmental Threats: 
• Medium to High temperature swings 
• Medium to High vibration 
• Medium probability of accidental damage 
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• High moisture content location 
• Exposure to runway and aircraft de-ice chemicals and potential salt spray 
in marine environments 
• Material erosion potential due to contaminants in the air impinging on 
structure at high speed 
6. Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment: 
Characteristic Potential Failure Mode Mitigation 
Nickel plated 
copper segments 
mounted to 
dielectric via 
adhesive 
Corrosion of nickel, 
erosion of nickel, loss 
of adhesion to 
dielectric strip. 
Nickel segments are coated to 
thickness resilient to erosion, 
adhesive has been tested to exceed 
all environmental threats found in 
radome environment 
Dielectric strip 
mounted to 
radome structure 
via adhesive 
Loss of adhesion 
between dielectric 
strip and radome. 
Radome is cleaned and sanded 
during preparation for bonding to 
supply the most robust bond, heat 
blankets and pressure bag cures 
adhesive to appropriate strength for 
environment. Adhesive properties 
provide strength required at 
installation and resist strength loss 
when exposed to environmental 
threats of radome installation. 
Titanium fastener 
passed through 
dielectric material 
hole, fiberglass 
radome and 
aluminum structure 
to titanium collar 
(nut). 
Deterioration of 
dielectric material at 
fastener interface, 
tearing of dielectric, 
corrosion of fasteners, 
loosening of clamping 
forces on fasteners, 
cracking of fiberglass 
radome 
Dielectric material is manufactured 
to withstand tear or deterioration 
under stress of fastener; fasteners 
parts maintain galvanic 
compatibility with aluminum 
structure.  
7. Test Plan Input: 
Aging aspects of the Diverter Segments that require test investigation are: 
a) Nickel resistance to erosion 
b) Dielectric strip adhesive robustness 
c) Dielectric material resistance to tearing or deterioration 
d) Corrosion of fasteners 
e) Loosening of fasteners  
f) Cracking of fiberglass under fastener clamp up forces and structural loads 
g) Delaminate due to moisture ingress or erosion of surface 
Life cycle testing should be performed with the most severe environments of the 
radome installation listed in this report. It is preferred that testing be performed 
to address multiple environmental threats simultaneously. Please identify 
capabilities to perform testing in this manner and supply results in test matrix. 
8. Test Data Results: 
Overall the Segmented Diverter Strips performed well under the simulated 
environmental threats. Test points assessed by test engineer 
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1. Salt Spray – Salt spray was increased beyond qualification levels to 
simulate 20 years of service. Increased duration by 5 times and 
concentration of salt by 3 times to simulate advanced effects.  
a. Result: Special Attention Item - Advanced corrosion was identified at 
the fastener installation simulating attachment of radome to 
aluminum structure. Other diverter components attachment to 
composite radome showed little signs of corrosion. 
2. Vibration – Vibration was applied in accordance with the qualification test 
requirements with an additional 5 times the duration. This was done in 
combination with the salt spray test for simulation of true environment. 
a. Result: Good - Diverter installation remained secure in its installation. 
Torque checks on the fasteners revealed a 5% loss of clamp up force 
which is within expected range for diverter installations in service. No 
loosening of the diverter strip was noted in the installed 
configuration. Adhesive also performed well with no noted gaps in 
diverter fayed surface to radome. 
3. Temperature cycle - Temperature cycle testing was performed to 
simulate 20,000 cycles from 90 degrees Fahrenheit to minus 60 degrees 
Fahrenheit. This is expected to be the design life goal representing the 
aircraft life. 
a. Result: Good – Diverter strip remained intact without deformation.  
4. Chemical Exposure – Diverter installation was exposed to 48 hours of 
exposure to potassium formate (formic acid potassium salt) and then an 
additional 48 hours of exposure to potassium nitrate to simulate runway 
de-ice exposure. Though 48 hours exposure was required by direction of 
the qualification test, two independent cycles of 48 hours was applied to 
test early signs of corrosion to the same Equipment Under Test (EUT) with 
successful results. As the probability for runway de-ice in the vicinity of 
the radome is less probable than within the tire spray areas of the 
aircraft, this test demonstrates robustness of the installation against this 
threat. An aircraft anti-ice test was performed with 160 hours of Glycol 
with some corrosion present to simulate anti-ice formulas used to 
remove and inhibit ice from forming on aircraft structure. The test 
exceeded the qualification requirements by four times and was 
determined to simulate the aircraft life time.  
a. Result: Negative. After exposure to the chemicals as described above, 
the diverter conductivity through the component and to the structure 
showed a resistance value of 4.2 milliohms for the runway de-ice test 
and 5.4 milliohms for the aircraft anti-ice test. Both values are well 
above the 3.2 milliohm requirement imposed by the electromagnetic 
effects design requirements for this type of installation.  
9. Report from Test Engineer on Continued Airworthiness 
Test Engineer Name: Fred Friendly 
Report: (include significant findings and relevance to continued airworthiness) 
The most significant finding was the propensity of this design to corrode under 
exposure to chemicals beyond the qualification levels. After further investigation, 
it was found to result in a failure to meet the “end of life” installation resistance. 
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Though Qualification Testing may have passed using assigned qualification 
testing exposure levels, it is understood by this test that re-evaluation of the 
design may be prudent. The area most suspect for consideration of revision is the 
fastener attach point to the simulated aluminum structure where visible 
corrosion was noted. 
10. Design Revision Request 
Yes. Revise fastener from bare Ti to corrosion resistant Cadmium plated 
Aluminum fastener and collar. Conductive properties are expected to remain in 
tack and galvanic compatibility of Nickel plated copper diverter strip to bare 
aluminum structure is expected to also remain minimal. Re-test requested. 
11. Revision accepted by program 
Revision of installation fasteners considered acceptable to avoid unnecessary 
maintenance of the diverter strips. Proceed with design revision notice to the 
affected engineering organizations. 
12. Description of final optimized design  
The diverter strip installation can be optimized by inclusion of a cadmium plated 
fastener to eliminate potential maintenance of the previous design over the life 
of the aircraft. The fastener revision is expected to have a low impact on design 
costs and high impact on improved continued airworthiness performance.  
4.6 Conclusion of Validation 
From the outcome of the assessment sheets, it can be concluded that identification 
of the galvanic incompatibility of the installation fastening system would not have 
been included in the design criteria with the current design practices that are in 
place. Given that the current design practices would leave the assessment of the 
installation to the MSG-3 analysis conducted later in the development process, 
maintenance may have been applied to this design implementation and not 
considered as part of the fundamental design methodology. Without this assessment 
in place, data gathered during the testing phase and included in the Assessment 
Sheets may also have been inadequate to properly assess the continued 
airworthiness of the component in its installed environment over the life of the 
installation during a subsequent MSG-3 analysis. If the MSG-3 analysis is improperly 
informed regarding the design installation and maintenance is not applied, a 
potential degradation of the bond provided by the segmented diverter component 
could affect the ability of the aircraft to protect itself from the unfortunate effects of 
a lightning strike. This lack of appropriate connection between the design and 
continued airworthiness can be bridged using both the methodology contained in 
this body of work and the assessment sheets recommended in this chapter. The 
segmented diverter is considered new technology when compared to solid bar 
diverters. Segmented diverters are lower profile, lighter and easier to maintain. 
Though the example using a segmented diverter is quite rudimentary, more 
complicated designs such as the grounding techniques for components that 
penetrate fuel tanks through composite structure are much more challenging to 
determine an effective continued airworthiness design. It is expected that the 
assessment sheets will both: 1) enable the methodology and 2) create conclusions 
for the design of L/HIRF protection that are not currently provided in any way by the 
design practices used today. 
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Chapter 5 - Introduction Case Studies (Non-Proprietary) 
The following section represents a non-proprietary version of the case studies 
supplied to Cranfield University required for this PhD thesis. The proprietary case 
studies have been supplied to the supervising professor (Professor John P. Fielding) 
at Cranfield and developed by the student under a Proprietary Information 
Agreement between Cranfield University and the aircraft manufacturer. 
 
5.1Case Studies – Aircraft Lightning Protection Design Analysis of an Aircraft 
The case studies demonstrate how to apply the aircraft Lightning/HIRF Protection 
Continued Airworthiness Design Methodology to a derivative model of a large 
transport aircraft that is in operation and examines whether the design methodology 
could produce the expected results of reducing poorly performing designs during the 
design phase of an aircraft development project. Several case studies have been 
created in this section to test the viability of the methodology across different types 
of lightning protections. An analysis of lightning protection component designs and 
the application of integrated engineering processes are performed in these case 
studies using structured design evaluation sheets and aircraft component data. 
Results of the studies included in this chapter are intended to provide evidence that 
the methodology proposed in this work is valid for developing the lightning 
protection continued airworthiness component designs. The studies rely heavily on a 
data set consisting of lightning protection designs provided for aircraft looms, 
electrical and electronic equipment, aircraft structure and system components. 
 
The data set has been modified to protect the proprietary information and may be 
considered hypothetical data used to exercise the methodology. Actual valid design 
data was used to test the methodology and is contained in a proprietary Appendix.G. 
Results are obtained on the application of the methodology while limitations of the 
data are also discussed. Though the design data presented is associated with and 
already completed and approved design, the case studies also seeks to prove the 
application of a design methodology on a new aircraft development program. In a 
new development program, one would apply the methodology along with the 
concurrent engineering activities already in place for each phase of the development 
program. Aircraft design phases can be divided into the following distinct stages: 
1. Conceptual Design 
2. Preliminary Design 
3. Detailed Design 
 
Finally, a conclusion is provided as to the practical application of this research and 
the possible impact of the new design methodology. Continued study of this concept 
and applications of the methodology are discussed as future work in Chapters Six 
and Seven of this thesis. 
5.2 Including “Continued Airworthiness” Within the Aircraft Design Process 
In the case studies performed by the author, “continued airworthiness” is 
established as a branch of the design process which requires consideration for the 
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methodology defined in Chapter 3. Aircraft design is created using an iterative 
process using inputs such as: 
• Mission definition 
• Performance requirements  
• Initial sizing 
• Configuration layout 
• Design alternative trade studies 
• Regulation compliance and certification 
• Safety analysis 
 
Within a given aircraft development program, design phases are created that serve 
the purpose of bringing the design to a more conclusive and concrete configuration 
as it develops towards maturity [5.6]. There are a number of generally accepted 
stages in the design, development, manufacture and operation of aircraft, each with 
associated methods and data requirements. Though there are typically defined 
design phases, development of an aircraft design is an iterative process where one 
design phase sometimes flows seamlessly into another as designs are created, 
evaluated, abandoned and new design solutions created. From different designer’s 
perspectives, one receives differing views on which certain design processes lead or 
follow other design processes. Requirements are established after a team of 
engineers and technologists determine the overall goals of the program to meet the 
customers and Original Equipment Manufacturers required payback. Performance 
requirements are firmed up in this stage as the conceptual phase of the program 
dials in on a final committed mission. It is in this conceptual phase that requirements 
are developed which influence many of the early decisions. Within the requirements 
development activity, the design process should consider the continued 
airworthiness of the airplane by ensuring that assessments are made along the way 
for deterioration of critical components within the installed environments. Service 
experience with component designs and materials should also play a role in the 
conceptual design creation. A major tenant of this body of work is to emphasize the 
importance of including continued airworthiness throughout each aircraft design 
phase. Figure 5-1 depicts one view of the different design phases and the specific 
activities that are typically conducted in each phase [5.7]. Historically, the necessary 
aircraft support and initial minimum required maintenance program is established 
after the detailed design is complete as shown in Figure 5-1 and after initial aircraft 
fabrication is complete. Newer generation aircraft development programs have 
found great value however, by including maintainability and reliability as part of the 
concurrent design teams efforts within all the phases of the design process. It is 
important to note the iterative nature of aircraft design; where design concepts are 
generated and then evaluated from many design perspectives, including cost and 
produce-ability, creates opportunities to establish the “right fit” design to the final 
configuration. This opportunity within the design process to create better operating 
and longer lasting designs also applies to designs for lightning protection. The 
important thing to the lightning protection engineer during the conceptual design 
phase is the decisions regarding general geometry of the aircraft and material 
selections. For example, if it is determined within the conceptual design phase that 
the aircraft will use composite materials in certain specific applications and 
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locations, it then becomes important for the lightning protection engineer to include 
the appropriate lightning protection within the conceptual design evaluations. This 
decision can also potentially generate a need to test different lightning protection 
solutions. These tests and designs require certain evaluations for the continued 
airworthiness of the installed equipment within the conceptual design phase. A 
similar example can be demonstrated with the final aircraft geometry. Certain 
extremities of the aircraft are exposed to more significant lightning strikes as 
demonstrated by lightning protection design practices and models run by the 
lightning protection design engineers assigned to the project. These geometric 
decisions should include potential options for the appropriate lightning protection so 
that good preliminary designs can be achieved. As designs are submitted and the 
conceptual phase is complete, additional preliminary assessments of optional 
protection methods can be evaluated within the preliminary design phase.  
5.2.1 Conceptual Design 
In the conceptual design phase, general concepts for design are created. Materials 
may be determined at this point but attachment techniques and specific dimensions 
may not be determined. If the material is composite, the lightning engineer may 
begin the process of determining the appropriate measures that are required to 
adequately conduct electrical currents associated with a lightning strike event. This 
information is shared with others on the design team and the iterative process of 
design is put into motion. Testing may be necessary and plans for qualification need 
to be initiated. Interactions among engineers with responsibility for different 
components that rely on the design are most important at this phase. At this point in 
an aircraft development program, designs are very fluid and quick response to the 
impacts of differing designs requires support from both the engineering staff and the 
engineering design tools that are utilized. Requirements generally drive the design 
development at this stage but requirements may also be revised if it is determined 
that the original goals no longer apply or that the physical solution forces different 
constraints than originally envisaged as in the case of a composite structural 
member in place of a metallic structural member discussed in this example. The 
lightning protection continued airworthiness methodology described in Chapter 
Three of this thesis includes activity within the conceptual design phase of the 
development program where issues such as service life, scheduled maintenance 
goals and maintainability are influenced. 
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Conceptual Design
    - Requirements
     - Physical makeup
     - Tradeoffs and priorities driving design
     - Technologies to be used
     - Do the requirements produce a viable design
Preliminary Design
    - Configurations established
     - Aerodynamic surface and flight control definition
     - Cost drivers
     - Practical implementations of technology
     - Early design decisions of major designs 
Detailed Design
    - Components and parts designs
     - Tooling and fabrication designs
     - Tests, qualifications and certifications
     - Performance estimates validated
     - Design Integration 
Fabrication
AIRCRAFT OPERATING 
SERVICE
DEVELOPMENT
DESIGN
SUPPORT
 
Figure 5-1 Aircraft Design Phases and Activities 
5.2.2 Preliminary Design 
In the preliminary design phase, major changes to the design are not expected. 
Major geometry and physical arrangements have been decided at this point in the 
development program. At this stage the designs begin to mature. Major studies that 
drive major configuration changes are no longer tolerated. The goal during this 
phase of the program is to start the design freeze process in all areas of 
development. Analysis of details associated with the designs takes place that 
generate early specifications that can be reviewed by design teams and offered to 
suppliers that may play a role in the development of the aircraft components, 
systems and structures. The weight of design alternatives is now used as a measure 
of the expected design success. Performance is heavily involved as a determining 
factor for certain preliminary design decisions. In the lightning design, solutions 
begin to be created and tested. In this phase more details can be developed without 
the concern for quick changes invalidating the design on a large scale. The lightning 
specialist is active during this phase developing potential solutions for protection 
designs based on the requirements. Interfaces between performance, structural and 
systems designers are formalized during this phase as individual design experts share 
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their individual design solutions with other area experts to determine longer term 
viability of the design interfaces. In this phase testing, modeling, mock-ups and 
software simulations are created. Software design tools are shared as well that allow 
individual engineers to create studies and different design solutions for evaluation. 
Ultimately, the preliminary design creates a platform from which detailed designs 
can be created. Reaching this platform is a crucial point in a design process that may 
be measured by the number of formal and approved drawings that have been 
released. Specialists in areas such as maintenance cost, reliability and maintainability 
are heavily involved in the early part of preliminary design to ensure that the final 
product meets its business goals in availability and dispatch reliability as well as 
continued system performance. Decisions such as structural buildup, fasteners, 
fastener hole preparations, sealants required, material compatibility are not 
determined at this phase. 
5.2.3 Detailed Design 
In the detailed design phase, all the required aircraft parts and systems enter into a 
more controlled configuration environment. Changes to designs may be more formal 
and added administration ensures that the individual designs of components can 
integrate with other detailed designs that are also maturing, sometimes 
simultaneously. Actual dimensions and material makeup and component interfaces 
are decided and documented in a central engineering function using many design 
tools for structural configurations, functional specifications documents, and wiring 
databases as an example. Locations of holes that must be cut out, incorporation of 
particular fasteners for specific applications and dimensions become fixed in this 
phase. For lightning protection, specific materials are chosen to ensure conduction 
of lightning currents, wire looms may by optimized for lightning attenuation using 
design tools to determine the amount of attenuation that is required and then 
choices are made regarding the systems shields that might be routed along with the 
looms. Such things as brackets, loom clips, avionics racks, doors and window 
dimensions and locations are all relevant factors to the lightning protection designer. 
Ignition prevention is important to protection designers and specific measures to 
avoid charges than can create an ignition source are developed, tested and 
implemented. During this phase, fabrication and tooling engineers interface with the 
aircraft designers to determine the most efficient and successful way to build the 
airplane. Most of the detailed testing can now take place as the final decisions for 
parts and components are in place.  
 
For lightning protection, deterioration of components such as earthing jumpers and 
electronic looms shielding for example, can lead to lower lightning protection 
effectiveness. Ensuring that the designs last for the life of the aircraft goes beyond 
the typical reliability and maintainability focus.  
 
Lightning protection design and consideration is an important part of each of the 
three design phases describe in Figure 5-1 and should be integrated into the design 
development program. Incorporation of lightning protection design solutions within 
each of these phases can be achieved by use of integrated design teams. This 
approach embraces the teaming of functional disciplines to integrate and 
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concurrently design aircrafts with input from individuals from multiple design 
disciplines. In this way, decisions are made closer to the design community 
responsible for the ultimate design. In many integrate design teams, representation 
draws from customers, product sales, process engineering, production and test 
engineering. The organization of these design teams can be done many different 
ways however the key to a design teams’ success is the ability for an integrated 
design team to make decisions locally that meet customer and performance criteria. 
These teams may also evolve throughout the design process as different issues 
emerge that require more focus. The lightning protection engineering community 
operates across many different design disciplines and requires careful thought for 
how to organize within the design development teams to be effective. The most 
important strategic tool for designing a “well-built” product is the effectiveness of 
the communication. Within the case studies that were created as part of this body of 
work, it is suggested that the new methodology for the design of aircraft lightning 
protection components relies on communications and assessment tool such as the, 
“Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet”. With the proper 
organizational structure in place, these lightning protection device assessment work 
sheets can become part of the design tools used to develop a product that meets the 
design criteria listed in the original requirements. Within this structure, the lightning 
protection engineer will have access to experienced aircraft designers within many 
disciplines such as electrical design, propulsion design, avionics, systems, wire 
installation, electrical standards, structures and electrical power. This allows team 
members to learn from each other and develop a collective knowledge on the most 
effective design solutions to incorporate. The use of a concurrent design process will 
aid in the success of the new design methodology proposed by this work. Concurrent 
design activities create long lasting relationships among designers throughout each 
of the design phases. The concept of creating a concurrent design organizational 
structure crosses design phase boundaries and includes some of the same design 
experts in all of the design phases. Within the concurrent design organizational 
structure, it is important to consider lightning protection continued airworthiness 
within each design process phase. It has only been in recent years that the continued 
airworthiness of lightning protection became a significant part of the design and 
certification processes. With the lightning protection designers brought into the 
earliest stages of the design process, benefits are realized including, reduced 
manufacturing costs, better product quality and fewer late design changes. 
 
Using the new design methodology, assessment of the aircraft design may generate 
different results than the already certified design in the case studies. Comments on 
the findings regarding design decisions will be made to the best of the authors ability 
with the understanding that the data set used is already certified where appropriate 
action has been taken to address the design issues to the satisfaction of the 
designers and the regulatory authorities as part of previous certifications. 
 
It is understood that the airplane was designed to the best standards at the time of 
its original production and certification. Using the new methodology and design data 
in the case studies is expected to demonstrate differences in the outcome of the 
design process that may have a positive impact on the final design implementation. 
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5.2.4 Revolutionary Designs 
Revolutionary designs are higher risks, requiring testing to prove technology. This 
may include rig tests, ground tests, and so on. Composite primary structures are a 
good example of revolutionary designs being put into practice. The direct effects of 
lightning may cause the industry to adapt to new and revolutionary repair 
procedures that address composite structures. For composite aircraft, fuel tank 
protection may be a major departure from past aluminum designs. Higher voltages 
caused by higher resistance in the composite structure need special attention and 
designs. Wireless flight controls within an airplane would be a revolutionary 
approach to past fly by wire or cable and bell crank designs. These revolutionary 
design concepts would require special consideration of the effects of 
electromagnetic threats and possibly generate revolutionary protection. Fiber optics 
is also a revolutionary way to transmit and control aircraft flight. The methodology 
proposed in this work would cope with these revolutionary design approaches by 
ensuring that bond paths and components put in place to ensure the continued safe 
flight and landing after a lightning event are robust for the life of the aircraft. The 
methodology will demonstrate its application to a revolutionary design by 
addressing the composite structures as an example in the data sheets. This will 
exercise the methodology in search for any possible improvements required. 
 
Specifically, this work proposes the new methodology for determination of improved 
designs during the design phase of an aircraft development program [5.9]. The new 
methodology for which these case studies demonstrate application has also been 
submitted to the US patent office for potential patent protection under the title, 
“Methods and Systems for Evaluating a Design of an Aircraft”. Whether the designs 
created through use of the methodology theorized in this body of work are 
revolutionary or evolutionary, the application of the new design approach for which 
the case studies are developed can be applied in either case. Creation of 
revolutionary designs is driven by the need to create innovations that bring benefit. 
Evolutionary designs are step improvements to existing designs that also bring value 
to the final product. Both evolutionary and revolutionary designs are driven by the 
need to solve a problem. The case studies conducted in this body of work seek to 
solve the problem of including the constraints of continued airworthiness for 
lightning protection components within the design process for those components. As 
described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the increased use of “fly-by-wire” technology 
for communication between aircraft avionics and flight control systems brings 
greater concern for the accurate transmission of control signals between systems on 
airborne aircraft. Industry standard [5.3] RTCA/DO160 “Environmental Conditions 
and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment” which defines suggested means for 
testing the electromagnetic effects on aircraft systems and appropriate test levels 
addresses early concerns regarding the safe operation of aircraft that rely on digital 
communication methods for aircraft control. ARINC (Aircraft Radio Inc.) has created 
a protocol for avionic equipment communication called ARINC 429 which is a signal 
protocol used to transmit data between critical avionic equipment [5.4]. Failures of 
fly-by-wire systems data signal interfaces are unacceptable. Surges associated with 
lightning strikes require protection at signal line interfaces to provide reliable 
continued performance from damaging voltage spikes. In aircraft systems, ARINC 
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429 signals are widely used to transfer critical data including airspeed, temperatures, 
tire pressure, center of gravity, fuel weight, engine operating performance and other 
critical functions. Interconnections of twisted pair wires are shielded by use of a 
conductive wire incorporated into the wire loom to reduce the effects of both 
communication noise and induced lightning effects. Designers refer to RTCA-DO160 
in order to acquire the proper waveforms for lightning threats that drive out 
appropriate protection designs such as wire shielding and current suppression. 
 
The creation of “manned flight” vehicles revolutionized transportation. In this 
respect, an aircraft could be called a disruptive technology [5.8]. Disruptive 
technologies change the way an industry works. The term disruptive technology was 
coined by Clayton M. Christensen and introduced in his 1995 article, “Disruptive 
Technologies: Catching the Wave”, which he co-wrote with Joseph Bower. Disruptive 
technology could be manifested through an innovation that improves a product or 
service in ways that the market does not expect, typically resulting in some benefit 
to the market, the environment, or the system in which the product operates. 
Disruptive technologies spring from innovations that create a new market by 
applying a different set of values. 
 
"Low-end disruption" occurs when the rate at which products improve exceeds the 
rate at which customers can adopt the new performance. Therefore, at some point 
the performance of the product overshoots the needs of certain customer segments. 
At this point, a disruptive technology may enter the market and provide a product 
which has lower performance than the incumbent but which exceeds the 
requirements of certain segments, thereby gaining a foothold in the market. In 
Figure 5-2 this is demonstrated by innovations that enter markets and offer 
increased value that moves a Low quality user demand to a Medium quality user 
demand and over time ultimately drives markets and performance to higher levels 
creating more demand for the innovation. Composites used in aircraft designs have 
moved along this type of curve as early applications show value for designs such as 
lighter rudders, more durable wing tips and control surface panels. This led to more 
widespread applications in propulsion nacelles and fuselage sections. 
In commercial flight business, many customers are happy to board the plane and get 
to their destination at the lowest price, even if the comforts of other types of 
transportation such as a train or long haul bus which may offer wider seating that is 
typically not part of the flight experience. This type of customer is not willing to pay 
a premium for enhancements in product functionality. Perhaps this is one of the 
underlying factors that have driven the standards for the fight experience. Once the 
disruptor has gained foot hold in this customer segment, it seeks to improve the 
profit margin. This may drive aircraft manufacturers to develop more efficient 
aircraft that cost less to maintain while also creating design improvements in the 
passenger experience. The methodology proposed in this thesis seeks to create a 
better product by improving lightning protection designs during all design phases of 
the project. To get higher profit margins, a disruptor needs to enter the segment 
where the customer is willing to pay a little more for higher quality. New aircraft 
features such as larger windows, reduce cabin pressure driven by the advantages of 
composite structures may drive a revision to passenger willingness to pay more for a 
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flight on this newer designed aircraft as compared to metal aircraft designed and 
developed in the 1990s. To ensure quality in its product, the disruptor needs to be 
innovative. Widespread use of composites can be considered an innovation but is 
probably not a revolution for the airline industry. The incumbent aluminum aircrafts 
will not do much to retain its share in a not so profitable segment. Aluminum aircraft 
products however will have to move up-market and focus on its more attractive 
customers by offering more cost effective features such as removing fees for 
luggage. Without the disruptive technology offered by the composite aircraft, 
aluminum aircraft designs may find that it cannot deliver an entirely similar 
experience to its customers and will not be able to move up the disruptive 
technology curve shown in Figure 5-2 as effectively as a composite technology 
product. After a number of such encounters, the incumbent will be squeezed into 
smaller markets than it was previously serving in lower performance level markets. 
At that point, finally the disruptive technology meets the demands of the most 
profitable segment and drives the established product out of the market rendering 
all new aircraft designs with similar composite applications. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Disruptive Technology – Used to Create Increasing Value Over Time 
5.3 Case Studies Description 
It is intended that the methodology and results of this design analysis will be applied 
to new aircraft designs. The data used in the case studies is gathered from already 
determined designs, however, in a new aircraft development case, data would be 
gathered concurrently with the design development process. The data set used in 
the studies includes lightning protection device information that protects against 
either direct effects or in-direct effects of lightning strike and is representative of 
most airline aircrafts. Included in the data set is information regarding the lightning 
protection physical characteristics and installation information for systems or 
structural protection installed on the aircraft. As described in Chapter One of this 
thesis, lightning protection is provided to eliminate the potential harmful effects of 
lightning due to direct attachment of lightning “direct effects” and indirect effects 
associated with electromagnetic coupling or “indirect effects”. 
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5.3.1 Assumptions 
Lightning protection design and certification relies heavily on past successful design 
measures and certification documentation. In the case of the large transport aircraft 
used in the case studies, references to past designs and past certification 
assumptions are made during the new design development project in order to 
establish the baseline from which to develop the new aircraft. It is important during 
a new aircraft design process to remain cognizant of the past assumptions and in 
some cases such as the large transport aircraft used in these studies, reference past 
certification documentation to better understand the design decision making 
process. In many aircraft design development programs, designs and certifications 
for previous unrelated aircraft may also be used due to the successful performance 
and certification of those designs. The case studies will include design information 
that may be new design concepts or past designs that have successfully been 
incorporated into other aircraft designs. 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, lightning strokes are electric arcs between 
oppositely polarized charge centers. The centers may be contained within a single 
cloud, within widely separated clouds, or within a cloud and the ground below. For 
airplane protection, it is recognized that cloud-to-cloud and cloud-to-ground strokes 
occur and that an airplane may form a portion of the discharge path. Furthermore, 
the discharge may approach the airplane from any direction.  
 
The presence of an airplane in the electric field between charge centers has little 
effect upon the onset of lightning. Between closely spaced intra-cloud charge 
centers, an airplane may distort the field sufficiently to induce lightning, but 
generally the physical size and electrical capacitance of an airplane are small 
compared to the geometry of a thunderstorm. As a result, the airplane generally will 
have no effect on the cloud charge. The discharge path may be altered slightly by the 
presence of an airplane because of the airplanes conductive skin, but it does not 
measurably influence the charge transferred or the maximum stroke current. 
 
Conversely, virtually nothing can be done to prevent 1ightning from striking an 
airplane short of diverting from the known weather patterns containing lightning 
activity. If an airplane enters the intense field between charge centers, it is 
impossible to charge the-airplane sufficiently to repel a lightning stroke or to prevent 
the discharge from occurring. Likewise, efforts to avoid thunderstorm activity are 
rather futile as the opposite charge centers may be widely separated and the-
probable discharge path is not obvious. One must accept that if a commercial 
airplane service is to continue during periods of inclement weather, that the chance 
of lightning strikes to an airplane must be accepted. In general, it is accepted that 
large transport commercial aircraft are struck by lightning approximately once per 
year or once every 3000 flight hours as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
In early days of commercial flight when the lightning strike to aircraft phenomenon 
was less understood, it was first thought that jet transports would not suffer as many 
strikes since they would normally fly above lightning activity. While jet airplanes do 
spend the majority of their flight time above normal lightning activity, a sufficient 
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number of strikes occur during ascent and descent so that the average number of 
strikes for jet airplanes is nearly the same as that for propeller airplanes that spend 
most of the operating time at lower altitudes. In assessing the lightning strike 
susceptibility of the large transport aircraft in these studies used to drive lightning 
protection design, it is anticipated that the aircraft will experience the same strike 
rate as that of the other aircraft produced by the manufacturer of the aircraft used 
in the case studies. With this in mind, early experience with these other large 
transport aircraft may drive some lightning protection designs known to be effective 
using the earlier model aircraft experience. 
5.3.2 Strike Locations for the Aircraft in these Case Studies and Probabilities 
Certain portions of an airplane are more likely to be struck by lightning than other 
areas. Those regions of small radius of curvature, particularly near the extremities 
where maximum electric field distortion occurs, are the most probable attachment 
points. Experience gained with other airplanes has shown that the probable strike 
points can be accurately predicted. The distribution of strokes to the aircraft under 
study is expected to be nearly the same as that experienced on the previous aircraft 
designed by this manufacturer since wing mounted engines are used along with a 
conventional tail assembly group. This assumption is part of the driving factors that 
assist in creating the new aircraft lightning protection schemes. 
 
Lightning swept strokes occur as a result of airplane motion with respect to the 
ionized stroke path. This phenomenon is described in more detail in Chapter Two of 
this thesis. Swept strokes create multiple lightning strike attachments to the aircraft, 
usually seen as burn marks along the fuselage where the lightning temporarily 
attaches to the structure as it is “swept” along the body of the aircraft while the 
aircraft moves through the lightning event. Most lightning strokes consist of more 
than one discharge through the same path. The ionized path remains nearly 
stationary as the airplane moves forward; hence, the subsequent discharge within 
the original channel strikes the airplane aft of the initial attachment point. Most 
airplane lightning strikes are swept aft, with pit or burn marks along the skin defining 
the track the stroke has taken during the swept event. The Federal Aviation Agency 
has defined those surfaces where initial attachment is likely as lightning Zone 1 
surfaces; where swept strokes are likely as Lightning Zone 2; and those surfaces 
where strikes are not apt to occur as Lightning Zone 3. Applying the FAA description 
of Lightning Zone 1 surfaces to the large transport aircraft in these case studies, the 
areas of highest probable stroke attachment are in lightning Zone 1. This is 
consistent with the findings of the report demonstrated in Figure 5-3 (chapter 2 
Reference [2]). The nose, up to the junction between the radome and body; wing 
tips; forward and aft projections of the engine nacelles; flap track fairings; and tail 
group extremities are Zone 1 surfaces. The Zone 2 surfaces, where swept strokes are 
1ikely, include the entire fuselage; along the wing to a specific number of inches 
either side of the engine forward projection and another specific number of inches 
inboard of the forward projection of the outboard end of the leading edge slats. It is 
unlikely that lightning will strike either the inboard edge of slats or the leading edge 
flaps as they are shielded by the engine nacelle and the fuselage. The remaining 
surface areas are classified as Zone 3 as they are not likely to be struck. 
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The probable stroke distribution in on the aircraft in these case studies is based upon 
Figure 5-3 representing aircraft experience gathered by manufacturer experience 
and data obtained from text book (chapter 2 Reference [2]) as shown. This 
distribution was determined from model studies conducted by the manufacturer as 
well as from actual service experience. It should be noted that the stroke distribution 
shown in Figure 5-3 indicates only the probable initial attachment point. Areas aft of 
the initial attachment point may be subjected to swept stroke lightning. 
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Figure 5-3 Probability of a lightning stroke attachment to a transport aircraft 
5.3.3 Aircraft Design and Certification Approach Affecting Case Studies 
Though these case studies use a certified aircraft design basis for demonstrating the 
design methodology presented in this body of work, some of the certified designs 
were approved through use of other similar designs on either the previous earlier 
model aircraft or through use of similar design aircraft on other earlier certified 
model aircraft. In other cases, even more modern aircraft design certification is 
referenced for approval of some portions of the aircraft lightning protection 
contained on the aircraft in the case studies. Understanding this method of certifying 
aircraft systems and lightning protection components, it can be concluded that the 
use of the lightning protection continued airworthiness design methodology 
presented in the case studies can bring benefit to both new designs and older 
already certified designs.  
 
The aircraft in the case studies was designed to incorporate all necessary lightning 
direct effects protection measures. This hypothetical aircraft is a derivative aircraft, 
and so many of the components of the aircraft have been previously certified for 
direct lightning attachment on earlier models of this aircraft. In cases where the 
protection design within these case studies refers to previously certified 
components, data will be included for the earlier aircraft design data. In the original 
certification proposal for the aircraft in the case studies, a lightning protection 
certification document was supplied to the regulatory authorities. This document is 
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referenced in later certification documentation as the foundation for the design 
selected and is used to generate pertinent assumptions for lightning protection 
components certification. 
 
The large transport aircraft design in the case studies will re-certify existing 
components with similar installation by test or suitable service history justification 
which will also be included within the case studies when appropriate. Verification of 
new or significantly modified components, or ones that are significantly affected by 
modification, will be completed by analysis and/or test. In addition to direct effects 
protection incorporated as essential to maintain safety-of-flight, there may be 
features incorporated to achieve design objectives developed by the manufacturer 
for minimizing the frequency of minor repairs. 
 
Any new or significantly modified component, or one that is significantly affected by 
modification, that could be affected or influenced by direct lightning attachment, 
including structural members, components, or surfaces, is addressed in the 
certification reports and was also addressed in the design development.  
 
Any new or significantly modified system, or one that is significantly affected by 
modification, whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure or function that 
would prevent continued safe flight and landing or whose failure would reduce the 
capability of the airplane or ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating 
conditions that could be affected or influenced by induced lightning transients is 
covered in the lightning protection certification. The referenced manufacturer 
document titled, "New and Significantly Modified Systems, Equipment, and 
Components” [5.21], contains a list of all systems that are new, significantly changed, 
or significantly affected by change. Note that all LRUs within a new or significantly 
modified system need not necessarily be new or significantly modified; a system can 
be modified and still retain some unchanged components. Also note that a given LRU 
may be a component of multiple systems.  
 
The following definitions were used in arriving at a list of systems that are new or 
significantly modified System, or are significantly affected by change, together with a 
summary of the LRUs that comprise that system (the System Boundary).  
 
New or Significantly Modified System - A "new" or "significantly modified" system is 
one that performs a new function, or that performs a function comparable to one on 
the existing transport aircraft but whose implementation has changed enough to 
negate the validity of extrapolation or use of analyses or tests that were used to 
show compliance of the previously certified system.  
System Significantly Affected by Change - A system that is significantly affected by 
change is one that, although not new or significantly modified itself, can no longer 
rely on extrapolation or use of analyses or tests that were used to show compliance 
of the original or previously certified system due to changes in other systems. The 
significance of a Significantly Affected system drives the design community to either 
perform more testing of a different nature than that which was originally conducted 
and/or drive out new certification plans which modify the original certification basis 
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for the system. This approach is often used when an aircraft design is an 
improvement (or derivative) of a previously produced and certified aircraft.   
 
The following definitions were used in arriving at the list of New, Significantly 
Modified Major Structural Components. 
  
New or Significantly Modified Structure - "New" or "significantly modified" 
structure are structural components that either do not exist on current aircraft of 
this type, uses a new type of material for primary structure, or otherwise appreciably 
affects the characteristics of the primary load bearing structure. 
 
Protection designs, whether new or previously used on past derivative designs, shall 
be subjected to the continued airworthiness analysis proposed by this body of work 
as part of the design development of the aircraft, since such an evaluation process 
would not have existed in the early aircraft development program. The presumption 
for this work is that the aircraft design process has not already been completed.  
5.3.4 Indirect Effects Protection General Description for the Case Studies 
For induced lightning protection (i.e. indirect effects), special attention is given to 
protection and verification of flight control systems, displays, and engine control 
systems. To comply with FAA and JAA requirements for indirect effects lightning 
protection (FAR 25.1316 and CRI F-03), airplane systems that perform critical and 
essential functions must be demonstrated to operate safely in the defined lightning 
environment. The accepted approach to compliance is based on qualification of 
subsystems in laboratory tests at pre-selected Equipment Transient Design Levels 
(ETDLs), followed by airplane tests to confirm that Actual Transient Levels (ATLs) 
experienced by airplane systems, when exposed to lightning, are no greater than the 
ETDLs minus the appropriate factor of safety. Appendix C and Appendix D 
(Proprietary Appendices) of the case studies contains a list of all electrical and 
electronic equipment on the aircraft whose failure would cause or contribute to a 
failure or function that would affect the continued safe flight and landing of the 
aircraft or would reduce the capability of the airplane or ability of the crew to cope 
with adverse operating conditions.  
5.3.5 Direct Effect Protection General Description for the Case Studies 
For lightning direct effects protection, special attention is given to aircraft strike 
zones and associate structure within these defined areas [5.53].  
 
The aircraft in these case studies will comply with FAR 25.581 [5.42] and FAR 25.954 
[5.43] for lightning direct effects protection. Structure, components, and surfaces 
will be protected against lightning direct effects in accordance with AC 20-53A, 
"Protection of Airplane Fuel Systems Against Fuel Vapor Ignition due to Lightning”. 
 
To comply with FAA and JAA requirements for the direct effects lightning and fuel 
tank ignition regulations listed here, aircraft structure exposed to lightning or other 
ignition sources must be shown to be immune to the defined environment. 
1. FAR 25.581 “Lightning Protection”  
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2. FAR 25.954 “Fuel System Lightning Protection”  
3. FAR 25.981 “Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines” 
4. FAR 25.863 “Flammable Fluid Fire Protection”  
 
The basic protection for the aircraft in the case studies is derived from the metallic 
primary structure; however specific areas such as non-metallic structures and 
components, the fuel systems, and antenna installations require special attention. 
The protection of these areas is described in each of the case studies. Figure 5-4 
demonstrates the areas of the aircraft where direct effects of lightning strike 
protection are applied. For purposes of exercising the proposed methodology, 
certain selected structures will be used as examples to exercise the methodology for 
both metallic and composite structural protection schemes.  
 
Note that FAR 25.981 [44] also addresses the effects of ignition sources other than 
lightning. These ignition sources come from fault currents, precipitation static and 
static energy build up caused by fuel flow across surfaces, for example [5]. Aircraft 
charging due to p-static results from two atmospheric conditions: 1) the vehicle’s 
presence in a thunderstorm, and 2) the triboelectric charging (frictional) caused by 
neutral snow, rain, or dust particle bombardment of the vehicle frontal surface. Both 
charging mechanisms can lead to p-static interference by corona discharges from 
sharp-edged extremities, streamer discharges on dielectric surfaces, and arc over 
between electrically isolated or intermittently grounded metallic sections.  
 
The intent of this direct effects protection is to eliminate possible penetration 
through to fuel cells or damage to structure that can result in a safety event. Direct 
effects lightning events can result in burning, eroding and blasting of aircraft 
structure. Direct attachment of lightning to aircraft systems is also a threat requiring 
design solutions and should be eliminated by modifying the design to provide for 
appropriate bonding or “shadowing” where an aircraft structure is used to provide 
for a Faraday Effect “around” the installed equipment or provide adequate structural 
thickness to avoid lightning penetration to underlying systems equipment. 
 
Figure 5-4 Direct Effects Lightning Protection on Engines, Struts, Wings & Empennage 
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There are two main areas of concentration with regard to protecting the aircraft 
when from direct lightning effects. The first is wing skin burn through. When a 
lightning strike attaches to an external structure, all sections of the aircraft must be 
able to withstand the energy transferred during the strike without burning through 
the structure. One of the most important parameters is the thickness of the section 
being struck. This applies to both metal and composite aircraft. Airplanes' with 
aluminum construction have shown that external structure (wing skins) in excess of 
0.08" thickness can withstand lightning strikes with 200 kAmp peak strikes [5.10].  
 
The second area of concentration pertains to the direct attachment of a lightning 
strike to the head of a structural fastener. It must be shown that given the fastener's 
location, the fastener can be shown to be struck with lightning and not create an 
ignition source. Aircraft manufacturers retain experts on this subject which is an 
entire area of study onto itself. Current practices to obtain additional layers of 
protection against this threat entails applying a sealant over the base of the fastener 
to contain any sparking that may occur under fattener installation failure conditions 
such as an unintentional gap created by an improperly installed fastener. 
 
The aircraft in the case studies uses structural design approaches to prevent direct 
lightning attachment to underlying systems and their associated components and to 
prevent significant (in this case significant is referred to as damage that would affect 
the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft) structural damage to control 
surfaces and exterior skins are as follows: 
1. Application of a conductive coating (expanded aluminum foil) over composite 
skins covering equipment and wiring in lightning strike zones 1 and 2. 
2. Application of diverter strips or aluminum picture frame to prevent puncture to 
underlying equipment and minimize damage to composite structure in lightning 
strike zones 1 and 2. 
3. Bonding and grounding or earthing of exterior skins and control surfaces to 
primary structure using controlled methods in all lightning strike zones. 
4. Inherent protection from surrounding metal or conductive composite exterior 
skins and structure in all lightning strike zones. 
5. Location within a zone 3 lightning strike area verified by no history of significant 
damage to control surfaces, exterior skins or direct lightning attachment to 
underlying equipment for the aircraft. 
 
For lightning protection of structural designs the FAR 25.981 regulation [5.42] 
requires the following: 
1. The airplane must be protected against catastrophic effects from lightning.  
2. For metallic components, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section may be 
shown by: 
(1) Bonding the components properly to the airframe; or  
(2) Designing the components so that a strike will not endanger the airplane.  
3. For nonmetallic components, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section may 
be shown by: 
(1) Designing the components to minimize the effect of a strike; or  
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(2) Incorporating acceptable means of diverting the resulting electrical 
current so as not to endanger the airplane.  
 
The aircraft in the case studies uses fuel system designs that provide protection 
against sparking and arcing associated with a lightning event and/or electrostatic 
charge dissipation associated with fluids in motion within the fuel tank system. The 
design goal is achieved using the following design approaches: 
1. Bonding and grounding provisions for fuel tank penetrations, fuel tank access 
doors, plumbing and equipment within the fuel tank area and fuel tubing outside 
the tank. 
2. Prevention of direct lightning attachment to fuel equipment, wiring and 
plumbing outside of the fuel tank within lightning strike zones 1 and 2. 
3. Prevention of hot spot ignition within the fuel tank area. 
4. Inherent protection from surrounding structure. 
5. Location in a zone 3 lightning strike area and no history of direct lightning 
attachment to specific fuel components. 
 
For lightning protection designs for fuel systems, the FAR 25.954 regulation [5.43] 
requires the following: 
 
The fuel system must be designed and arranged to prevent the ignition of fuel vapor 
within the system by: 
(1) Direct lightning strikes to areas having a high probability of stroke attachment 
(2) Swept lightning strokes to areas where swept strokes are highly probable; and 
(3) Corona and streamering at fuel vent outlets. 
5.3.6 Ignition of Flammable Fluids 
These case studies will take into account the presence of flammable fluids as a threat 
to continued airworthiness. In locations where flammable fluids may be present, a 
rating will be provided in the environmental threats rating sheet for the presence of 
flammable fluids. This rating is used to assess the protection design in its installed 
environment. For the aircraft used in these case studies, precautions have been 
taken to safeguard against the ignition of flammable fluids in accordance with FAR 
25.863 titled: “Flammable Fluid Fire Protection” [5.45]. Prior to the emergence of 
Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88), designers assumed that fuel tanks 
perform similar to a Faraday Cage minimizing the induction of electromagnetic fields 
onto components within the fuel tank. [5.13]  
Aircraft Fire Zone  
A fire zone is an area where a fire is possible. In a fire zone, an ignition source or a 
flammable liquid or a flammable vapor is present during normal operation, and the 
possibility of having both an ignition source and a flammable liquid or vapor present 
after a single failure cannot be absolutely excluded. Fire zones must be equipped 
with fire detection, containment or control, and extinguishing equipment. 
 
The following special design requirements apply to fire zones: 
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A. All electrical equipment in the fire zone shall be explosion proof when tested 
according to Procedure II of MIL-STD-810B, Method 511 [5.39] or if not normally 
exposed to a spark source, shall receive special treatment, such as potting or 
mounting in a vapor-tight area or within a sealed flame barrier or shall be 
designed so that it will not produce an arc or spark within a fire zone having an 
energy level greater than a specified number of joules (value can be found in the 
reserved proprietary version of these case studies). 
B. All electrical terminations shall be protected to prevent arcing or sparking. (FAR 
25.863) [5.45] 
C. Firewall connectors and the passage of all wiring through the firewall shall be as 
fireproof as the firewall itself: capable of withstanding 2000°F for 15 minutes. 
(FAR 25.1203) [5.46] 
D. For all critical safety circuits, fire resistant wiring shall be used in the fire zone. All 
other circuits in the fire zone shall use high temperature wire. 
Aircraft Flammable Zone 
Flammable zones are areas where flammable liquids or vapors are present during 
normal operation. 
 
The following special design requirements are applicable in flammable zones: 
A. As installed, all electrical equipment in the flammable zone shall have all 
electrical equipment, wiring, and terminations housed in a case that is explosion 
proof when tested according to Procedure II of MIL-STD-810B, Method 511 
[5.39]. The integrity of the explosion proof case shall be maintained under any 
condition of equipment or system malfunction or shall be designed so that it will 
not produce an arc or spark within a flammable zone with an energy level greater 
than a specified number of joules (value can be found in the reserved proprietary 
withheld version of these case studies). This requirement must be met during 
both normal operation and when there is a failure in any part of the circuit, 
either inside or outside of the flammable zone or shall be hermetically sealed. 
B. The surface temperature of equipment, components, and wiring that is exposed 
to flammable fluids or vapors shall not exceed 390°F during normal operation or 
under failure conditions. 
C. Equipment in flammable zones shall be installed with dual grounds. 
Aircraft Flammable Leakage Zone (Combustible Zone) 
Flammable leakage zones are areas in the unpressurized portions of the airplane 
where flammable liquid or vapor can be expected to be present because of a single 
failure or from leakage during normal operation. 
 
The following design requirements are applicable in flammable leakage zones: 
A. As installed, all electrical equipment in the flammable leakage zone shall be 
explosion proof when tested according to Procedure II of MIL-STD-810B, Method 
511 [5.39] or if not normally a spark source, shall receive special treatment, such 
as potting or mounting in a vapor-tight area or within a sealed flame barrier, or 
shall be designed so that it will not produce an arc or spark within a flammable 
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leakage zone with an energy level greater than a specified number of Joules. 
(FAR 25.863 (b) (3)) [5.45] 
B. All electrical terminations shall be protected to prevent arcing sparking. (FAR 
25.863 (b) (3)) [5.45] 
C. The equipment surface temperature and wiring shall not exceed 450°F during 
normal operation or under failure conditions. (FAR 25.863 (b) (3)) [5.45] 
D. Equipment in flammable leakage zones shall be installed with dual grounds. 
Aircraft Ignition Zone 
Ignition zones are portions of the airplane zone from which flammable liquids and 
vapors shall be excluded because ignition sources may be present during normal 
operation. Wire looms shall be designed for temperature resistance in accordance to 
the zone in which they are installed. The following wire loom grades are used as a 
guide for determining appropriate design decision making when selecting wire looms 
to install within specified locations. 
5.3.7 Temperature 
To minimize the degradation of parts and materials, both maximum ambient and 
loom operating temperature is considered when selecting electrical components. 
The maximum ambient temperature varies throughout the aircraft. 
Maximum Operating Temperature 
Electrical components and materials have a maximum temperature rating. This 
rating must exceed the wire loom continuous operating temperature, which includes 
the airplane ambient temperature and the loom operating temperature. 
Localized Temperatures 
Localized continuous temperatures must be considered when selecting electrical 
components and materials. A wire loom assembly installed in close proximity to the 
following components may be subjected to temperatures that are significantly 
higher than the designated ambient temperature of an environmental area. 
• Bleed air ducts  
• High power electrical equipment  
• Electronic boxes  
• Lights  
• Air conditioning packs and ducts  
• Other heat sources  
Excursion Temperatures 
A wiring installation or assembly may be subjected to high temperatures for short 
periods of time, a condition referred to as an excursion temperature. (An example is 
an oxygen generator.)  For such installations, component and material selections 
must consider the excursion temperature. Approval by the Airworthiness 
Representative (AR) may be required if the excursion temperature exceeds the 
maximum rating of the component or material. 
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Wire Loom Temperature Grade 
The design system uses wire loom temperature grades to indicate the rating of the 
processing materials (labels, ties, sleeves, and so forth) used in the wire loom 
assembly and as general parameters for the selection of some types of parts. 
 
Wire loom temperature grades are designated by letters as shown in Table 5-1. Each 
letter grade corresponds to a continuous temperature rating for the wire loom 
processing materials only. The wire loom temperature grade is not the maximum 
temperature rating of the wire, cable, and other the components used in the wire 
loom assembly. Refer to the wire, cable, and component detail drawings and 
specifications for the ratings of these materials. 
 
Wire Loom Temperature Grades Table included in Proprietary Appendix. 
Wire Loom Temperature Grades 
Grade Allowable Temp (°C) 
A Proprietary data 
B Proprietary data 
C Proprietary data 
D Proprietary data 
Table 5-1 Wire Loom Temperature Grades 
5.3.8 Vibration 
For the design and installation of wire loom assemblies, areas of the airplane are 
classified into three vibration categories as shown in Table 5-2. 
Category 1: Locations on aircraft included in Proprietary Appendix 
Category 2: Locations on aircraft included in Proprietary Appendix 
Category 3: Locations on aircraft included in Proprietary Appendix 
Each category corresponds to the severity of the vibration that occurs in the 
indicated area of the aircraft. The part selection tables either directly or indirectly 
account for these vibration levels. The vibration category also governs the selection 
and spacing of wire loom clamps and ties. 
The following design requirements apply to the vibration categories: 
Category Requirement 
1 Wire loom tie spacing requirements included in Proprietary Appendix 
2 Wire loom tie spacing requirements included in Proprietary Appendix 
3 Wire loom tie spacing requirements included in Proprietary Appendix 
Table 5-2 Vibration Category Design Requirements 
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5.3.9 Fluid and Moisture Protection 
Numerous fluids throughout the aircraft can contribute to the degradation of 
components and materials that come into contact with those fluids. In addition, 
moisture protection zones in the pressurized cabin can be subjected to large 
amounts of water during landing cycles. 
Fluid Exposure 
Fluids that may affect part selection and installation include the following: 
• Hydraulic fluid  
• Jet fuel  
• Lubricating oils  
• Alkaline detergents  
With the exception of hydraulic fluid and jet fuel, the numerous fluids used on the 
airplane are tolerated by most components and materials. Tolerance to specific 
fluids may be acquired by the design engineer responsible for the component. 
For example, hydraulic fluid and jet fuel can degrade nonmetallic materials such as 
connector grommets, clamp cushions, and rubber seals. Components and materials 
classified for use in unpressurized areas typically provide some resistance to 
hydraulic fluid and jet fuel. Prolonged exposure to hydraulic fluid may require 
specialized components and materials that provide improved resistance to this fluid. 
Wire looms are classified as to whether or not they are exposed to hydraulic fluids. 
This designation ensures that the materials used in wire loom fabrication are 
resistant to hydraulic fluids. 
Moisture Protection Aircraft Zones 
Near the airplane's doors, warm humid air can condense on the cold structure, and 
then moisture can drain through the insulation blankets onto electrical components 
and wire looms. Moisture and associated contaminants may intrude into non-sealed 
electrical components and cause internal shorting between circuits. 
Equipment supplied by the buyer presents a special concern when the equipment 
contains connectors that do not have seals to mitigate water ingress into the 
connector interface with other equipment on the aircraft. In such cases, the designer 
must know the design limits of the connector and use methods to prevent the 
ingress of moisture into the connector. Such methods for mitigating moisture may 
include the following: 
• Drip loops (wire looms with intentional loops to wick moisture away ) 
• Drip shields (covers over critical wire connections) 
• Circuit types and layouts.  
• Protective means to prevent water from dripping through insulation blankets 
such as water egress paths.  
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Special Wind and Moisture Protection Zones 
These areas are locations on the aircraft where wire looms are frequently or 
continuously exposed to moisture and most airplane fluids. 
Fuselage Top View 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Legend Airplane Area 
Fire  
Protection 
Zone  
Wire Loom  
Temperature 
Grade 
Vibration 
Level 
Hydraulic 
Fluids 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Radome 
Ignition B 2 No 
 
Pressurized Area: 
Cabin 
Ignition A 1 No 
 
Pressurized Area: 
Cargo area, 
Electronic 
Equipment  
Compartments & 
Equipment bays 
Ignition A 1 No 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wind area, wheel 
wells 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Environmental 
Control System 
(ECS) bay 
Flammable  
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Center fuel tank 
Flammable B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wind area, wheel 
wells 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
Table 5-3 Airplane Environmental Attributes associated with aircraft fuselage locations.  
Wing Top View 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
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Legend Airplane Area 
Fire  
Protection 
Zone  
Wire Loom  
Temperature 
Grade 
Vibration 
Level 
Hydraulic 
Fluids 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wing leading edge 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wing to body fairing 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Landing lights 
Ignition B 2 No 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wing fuel tank 
Flammable B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wind area, 
trailing edge 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Wingtip lights 
Ignition B 2 No 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Strut 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 3 Yes 
 Table 5-4 Airplane Environmental Attributes associated with the Wing locations 
Tail Top View 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Legend Airplane Area 
Fire  
Protection 
Zone  
Wire Loom  
Temperature 
Grade 
Vibration 
Level 
Hydraulic 
Fluids 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Empennage 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) 
Fire B 3 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Fuselage Aft of 
Pressure bulkhead 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
Table 5-5 Airplane Environmental Attributes associated with the Tail locations 
Fuselage Side View 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
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Engine Area and Landing Gear 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Legend Airplane Area 
Fire  
Protection 
Zone  
Wire Loom  
Temperature 
Grade 
Vibration 
Level 
Hydraulic 
Fluids 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Engine Core 
Fire D 3 Yes 
 
Unpressurized Area: 
Engine fan 
compartment 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 3 Yes 
Table 5-6 Airplane Environmental Attributes associated with the Engine Area and Landing Gear 
Tail—Side View 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
 
Legend Airplane Area 
Fire  
Protection 
Zone  
Wire Loom  
Temperature 
Grade 
Vibration 
Level 
Hydraulic 
Fluids 
 
Unpressurized 
Area: Rudder 
Flammable 
Leakage 
B 2 Yes 
Table 5-7 Airplane Environmental Attributes associated with the Tail Side View 
5.4 Design Approach using “As Installed” Threats 
For the design of electrical and mechanical components within lightning strike zones, 
care is taken to ensure that the designs are robust enough to withstand normal 
operational wear while at the same time, maintaining availability against the adverse 
effects of lightning. Use of a comprehensive method for design criteria goes beyond 
establishing design requirements and into the realm of practical applications. 
Qualification testing may provide some insight as to the ability of any component to 
withstand environmental threats such as vibration, moisture and temperature 
cycling however; it is often difficult to create such combined environmental threats 
while also performing the intended function under test.  
 
Aircraft designs are certified for appropriate application of requirements, design and 
qualification. Current industry practices do not require qualification tests to 
substantiate component aging trends and compounded environmental threats. The 
challenge for system designers is to find useful information to support the proposed 
methodology from the qualification test results as currently implemented. A process 
by which one might develop quantitative data from qualification testing is not 
defined. It is generally accepted that qualification testing does not directly represent 
the installed environment for components over time. Without a model that can 
process qualification test results into data that represents combined threats within 
installed environments one cannot predict component performance in-service, and 
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the association with the component performance effects on EMC qualification 
margins. To develop this process requires significant resources from those 
responsible for qualification of components. If the quantitative data was made 
available during the qualification testing, designers would then perform an in-depth 
system by system analysis to establish levels of margin.  
 
Past techniques used to certify aircraft systems to specified lightning indirect effects 
require application of continued airworthiness compliance criteria [5.19]. Without 
adequate continued airworthiness criteria during the design phase, many aircraft 
system design firms have no choice but to establish continued airworthiness 
instructions after the design is firm. This approach to aircraft design is typical today. 
The proposal made by this work recommends a more integrated approach to design 
that uses test data in a progressive manner to substantiate continued airworthiness 
designs. One early design criteria that can be addressed as part of the continued 
airworthiness evaluation might be a galvanic assessment of components that rely on 
good earthing systems and techniques to protect against the potentially adverse 
effects of lightning. Galvanic assessments can be done as part of the continued 
airworthiness evaluation but are typically initiated after design decisions are 
completed. For electromagnetic compatibility, qualification methods exist for 
establishment of transient level “margin” that accounts for uncertainties in 
verification methods [5.20]. Once aircraft installed system threat levels are 
determined – by test or analysis – they are extrapolated to external threat 
waveforms and levels. After this is completed, these threat levels are then compared 
and used to demonstrate “margin” [5.19]. As discussed in Chapter 2, these design 
margins have been found to be inadequate as design criteria for continued 
airworthiness and are used to establish the initial certification basis for the systems. 
 
It is apparent within the industry that component design margins cannot be used to 
substantiate continued airworthiness however; use of test results may be insightful 
towards assessing performance in service. An analysis of test data may be reliant on 
sampled test points and worst case applications of the established criteria that 
would modify the current use of margins. The challenge is to predict component 
aging trends using qualification data as it is currently collected. Degradation trends 
may be linear, non-linear, or remain unchanged depending on the environmental 
threats presented by the installed environment. As components are tested for 
general performance under the environmental threats created in the laboratory, it is 
necessary to take results of these tests and evaluate each design under a more 
specific installed environment application. This is necessary as some components are 
installed outside the pressure vessel and some are installed inside the pressure 
vessel while the same laboratory test may be used for both applications. Further 
complicating use of unaltered qualification test results is the interaction of 
components that make up the earthing plan for a system such as earthing jumpers, 
wire loom shields and connector material and finish. One component of a shielding 
‘system’ can simply eliminate the margin established in test. 
 
Though testing of equipment and lightning protection components is an important 
part of the airworthiness equation, use of any test results to conclude continued 
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airworthiness is in its infancy. The proposed methodology for determining continued 
airworthiness through use of the engineering assessments forms presented in this 
thesis is a beginning point for taking this design process one step further. Future 
investigations and modeling of in-service degradation can enhance the methodology 
proposed in this work. 
5.5 Path Through to Certification 
The following design processes in Figure 5-5 are presented in relation to each other 
in order to demonstrate the path to certification drawing attention to how the 
continued airworthiness methodology affects the design process. Most often, design 
processes such as the ones identified in the Figure 5-5 are performed in parallel and 
associate across different design disciplines within the larger design process. For this 
reason, many of the design processes feed back into each other as solutions are 
identified and proposed. Electromagnetic protection design requires calculations, 
estimates, and testing to determine an optimum protection design. Aircraft 
manufacturers have implemented different solutions to the integration of these 
design processes. For the purpose of these case studies, the integration of the 
methodology will be accomplished by use of examples and are demonstrated in 
principle through these examples. The continued airworthiness of lightning 
protection is an engineering process that requires certain physical properties 
associated with the lightning protection component to be determined in order to 
perform the proper evaluation. Compatibility of materials and threats associated 
with the installed environment should be collected along with other design data to 
exercise the methodology as demonstrated by these case studies. 
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assessed for 
lightning protection 
design
Determine lightning 
strike zones
Establish lightning 
current paths for 
zones and current 
levels
Determine the 
aircraft internal 
lightning transient 
environment and 
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Interacting Aircraft Lightning Protection Design Processes  
Figure 5-5 Route through Design Process 
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5.6 Possible Routes through Design Process 
As the design process moves through Conceptual, Preliminary and Detailed Design 
stages, several possible requirements for design evaluations are generated by the 
interacting design processes shown in Figure 5-6. 
 
Identify systems 
and structure to be 
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lightning protection 
design
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strike zones
Establish current 
lightning current 
paths for zones 
and current levels
Determine the 
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lightning transient 
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external lightning 
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Control Levels 
(TCL) and 
Equipment 
Transient Design 
Levels (ETDL)
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with regulatory 
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Test aircraft using 
low level drive 
approach for 
validation of current 
threats
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Figure 5-6 Lightning Threat Determination Resulting In Protection Designs 
 
An example of one possible route through the design process could be shown in 
Figure 5-6 where lightning threat determinations result in lightning protection 
designs that require a continued airworthiness evaluation. As shown in Figure 5-6, 
once the lightning threat is determined, the electromagnetic engineering team may 
provide options for appropriate protection of the systems and structure within the 
determined lightning threat location. As these options are evaluated in the 
laboratory and developmental testing scenarios for effectiveness in protecting the 
aircraft is concluded, the continued airworthiness “Engineering L/HIRF Protective 
Device Assessment Sheet” developed as an implementation of a new concept for this 
work can be completed with findings that are relevant to the designs under test. This 
will provide the selection team with additional information on the long term 
performance of the protection schemes to optimize a better design alternative. 
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Figure 5-7 Lightning Current Levels Resulting in Loom Shielding Design 
 
Another possible route through the design process could be as shown in Figure 5-7 
where avionics boxes are designed to sustain continued safe operation through 
lightning transient events that comply with regulatory requirements governing the 
design selection [5.2] and resulting in a specific selection of loom shields. These loom 
shields and associated connectors plugs and connector back shells make up a 
significant portion of the lightning indirect effects protection. Note that protection 
within avionic equipment also provides protection from indirect effects. Once the 
shield designs are selected, the process of evaluating continued airworthiness 
effectiveness using the “Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet” 
can begin. Assessments of qualification testing and laboratory testing for new shield 
and connector types will result in appropriate feedback into the design process 
necessary to result in an optimized lightning in-direct effect protection design. 
 
In Figure 5-8, the route to certification describes the design process where the 
aircraft lightning zones and threats have been defined, the aircraft design has been 
established and coordinated with the regulators within preliminary certification 
plans and the first completed aircraft is tested using a simulated Low Level Direct 
Drive test using appropriate current waveforms to determine the aircraft lightning 
protection performance and support certification. The approach to compliance is 
based on qualification of subsystems in laboratory tests at preselected levels, 
followed by airplane tests to confirm that actual levels experienced by airplane 
systems when exposed to lightning are no greater than laboratory test levels. If 
findings of the these low level simulated lightning tests show that additional 
shielding may be required for a certain part of the aircraft for example, then the 
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continued airworthiness of the additional protection will require assessment using 
the “Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet”. Documenting the 
equipment wiring voltages and currents, and airplane skin currents that result from 
the tests immediately after acquisition of the data will allow the comparison of the 
airplane level test data to the equipment qualification test data. As part of the path 
to certification, these comparisons are summarized and evaluated to ensure 
adequate protection is provided to meet the required qualification levels set by the 
early design. Determining the lightning paths and current levels assists design 
engineers to create a comparison to qualification levels. This is provided to the 
certifying office for confirmation of the appropriate lightning design protection. 
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Figure 5-8 Aircraft Testing Resulting in Modifications to L/HIRF Protection  
 
During the early part of the design development process, as the aircraft shape and 
lightning threats are defined, systems and structures that are affected by lightning 
threats are identified. The structural components in lightning threat zones may 
require protection on such structural elements as: wing tips, rudder trailing edges 
and other structural components listed in these case studies. As these structural 
components are identified, the physical implementation is also detailed such as 
required sealants that protect interfaces between the protection and the structure, 
fasteners and structural assembly components that become part of the critical 
current carrying path. Figure 5-9 emphasizes the importance of the physical 
characteristics of lightning protection installations. Structural protection component 
installation details are transmitted to the continued airworthiness evaluation 
process as part of the design methodology proposed in this work. Also part of this 
path to certification is the determination of shielding on critical and essential aircraft 
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system looms. Part of this shielding design may be earthing cables or other earthing 
elements associated with the loom connectors or equipment earthing techniques 
such as connector shield terminations. Specific interfaces such as receptacle to 
equipment surface galvanic compatibility or earthing cables attaching hardware 
galvanic interfaces are processed through the “Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device 
Assessment Sheet” to determine appropriate protection selection. 
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Figure 5-9 Significant Structural and Systems Protection Physical Characteristics 
5.6.1 Lightning Protection Design Features and Aircraft Installations 
Understanding the lightning strike zones for an aircraft is an important first step in 
the aircraft lightning protection design process. Figure 5-10 provides the lightning 
zones for the large transport category aircraft in these case studies (the actual 
aircraft zoning diagram is included in the Proprietary Appendix of this thesis to 
protect the proprietary nature of the information. As an aircraft designer estimates 
the strike impact and distribution, protection against estimated lightning effects is 
also determined. In Chapter 2 of this thesis is was stated that most direct lightning 
strike attachments will be to the nose, wing tip, vertical stabilizer, engine inlets and 
nacelles, horizontal stabilizer and other installations within lightning Zone 1. 
Historical data and testing show that lightning strikes are more likely to attach in 
these parts of the aircraft. Areas where the initial strike is less likely to occur are the 
drain masts, pilot probes, blade antennas, the extended ends of leading edge slats, 
trailing edge flap track fairing tips and the landing gear. Figure 5-10 details the three 
lightning zones and the probability of a strike in each of these aircraft locations. 
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Figure 5-10 Aircraft Lightning Strike Zones Probability  
5.6.2 Effects of Lightning Protection Design on Aircraft Operations 
As discussed in previous sections of this thesis, lightning strikes can cause two types 
of damage: 
• Damage due to “Direct Effects” of lightning  
• Damage or operational interrupt due to “In-Direct Effects” of lightning 
 
1. Direct Effects can result in damage at strike location and is described as follows: 
a. Metallic surfaces are burned, melted or show signs of metal distortion. 
b. Non-metallic surfaces are burned, punctured or delaminated. 
 
Direct damage on metal structures will usually show as small circular melt marks 
approximately 1/8 inch in diameter. The melt marks can be in a small area along the 
fuselage while on a trailing edge surface, the melt marks can be along a larger 
surface area. Holes in the structure with a 1/4 inch diameter or greater are possible 
if a high intensity lightning strike occurs on the aircraft structure. In these areas, 
additional protection may be provided as part of the protection features as 
discussed within these case studies. Other signs of direct damage might be burned or 
discolored skins and fasteners.  Cases have occurred where ferrous components 
have become strongly magnetic after a lightning strike due to heavy lightning 
currents that are nearby. 
 
2. Indirect Effects can result in system upset and is described as follows: 
Indirect effects are identified as damaged or upset electrical/electronic systems 
equipment, wire shielding and shield terminations. This is caused by large electrical 
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transients on the aircraft wiring. High intensity lightning strikes can cause problems 
to the electrical/electronic equipment. While electrical systems are generally 
protected by surrounding structure from a possibility of direct lightning strike 
attachment to electrical/electronic wires and cables, damage can occur to 
equipment from induced currents. A high intensity lightning strike can produce 
electromagnetic fields within the unpressurized areas that are large enough to cause 
possible damage to the electrical system components. Specifically, problems to 
components which are located external to the pressurized fuselage may experience 
greater lightning threats due to the installed location. Wire shielding may also be 
disturbed or degraded during the life of the aircraft. The methodology created within 
this body of work was created to ensure the long term availability of lightning 
protection for both direct and indirect lightning strike threats through the 
development and implementation of a design methodology dedicated to the 
continued airworthiness of lightning protection. 
 
Lightning indirect effects are difficult to measure during aircraft operation. Often 
during a lightning strike event, a pilot may notice static on the communication radios 
but little else in terms of flight equipment malfunction. At other times the effect can 
be quite dramatic including loud noise, the glow from corona effects on the radome 
and a bright flash that sometimes can even temporarily blind the pilot. After a 
lightning strike is identified by a pilot, a decision is made in real time to either 
continue the flight or return to the base in which the aircraft was dispatched for an 
inspection of potential damage caused by the strike. Sometimes the decision to 
return to the airport or continue on to the destination is made based on the ability of 
the airline to do a proper inspection with the proper support and tools required to 
repair or inspect damage caused by lightning at the departure point. At times airlines 
may direct the airplane to continue on with the flight as planned to ensure that the 
proper equipment is available for conducting the post-lightning strike inspection. 
5.6.2.1 Instructions for Inspections of Lightning Protection Designs 
Lightning strike inspections are conducted after a known lightning strike event to 
determine what repairs may be needed before dispatching the aircraft. In general, 
the procedure for conducting the lightning strike conditional inspection has two 
tasks that are typical of all lightning strike inspections. 
1. Examination of the external and internal areas of the aircraft to identify lightning 
strike damage. 
2. Operational checks of communication and navigation systems. 
5.6.2.2 General Guidance for Post Lightning Strike Inspections 
Examination of external and internal areas for lightning strike damage: 
 
The following guidance is typical for accommodating the Instructions for Continued 
Airworthiness in an aircraft maintenance manual. The purpose of including this 
guidance within these case studies is to provide the framework for what is 
considered important to the continued airworthiness of airplane systems and 
structures for maintaining appropriate and safe flying configuration. Although it is 
not suggested that the methodology proposed use these instructions as a guide for 
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defining the most critical lightning protection components, it is important to 
understand the operational aspects of aircraft and impacts to the operations when 
lightning protection or aircraft systems and structures are affected after a strike. 
 
After the airplane is struck by lightning, a general inspection of the airplane is done 
to find the areas of the strike. There are always at least two strike points at different 
areas of the airplane surface; an entrance point, and exit point. A careful inspection 
of the strike area is done to find the type and amount of damage which has 
occurred. As discussed in this chapter regarding the presence of the Faraday Cage 
effect, the basic protection for fuel and for critical electronic systems is the metal 
fuselage and wing structure. Necessary protection is also supplied for the non-metal 
structure by aluminum mesh (the rudder is typically protected with metallic strips in 
a square configuration on top of the control surface). Technicians performing the 
inspection need to remain aware of these types of protection features in order to 
perform a thorough evaluation of the damage during the inspection. The external 
structure prevents fuel ignition and electrical/electronic system damage. Critical 
electronic systems also rely on wire shields and proper shield terminations for 
indirect effects protection. When lightning initially strikes on the forward fuselage or 
engine nacelles, it will move aft over the fuselage surface or over the wing surface. 
On the wing surface, the lightning will move aft of the nacelle or aft of the extended 
ends of the leading edge slats. This is important to know so that inspections can be 
done that follow the typical path of the lightning strike as it sweeps across the 
aircraft structure. When lightning initially strikes the aft area of the empennage or 
wing surface, it will remain until the lightning current stops. This is called “hang-on” 
and can cause significant damage at the location where the hang-on occurs. 
Technicians can use Figure 5-10 to assist in determining the likelihood of strike 
locations on the aircraft and also provide the appropriate focus for the inspection. 
 
The areas that initial lightning strikes will most occur are as follows:  
a. nose section and radome 
b. engine nacelles 
c. wing tips 
d. horizontal stabilizer tips and elevator tips 
e. vertical fin tip and rudder tip. 
 
The areas that initial lightning strikes do not normally occur are as follows: 
a. drain masts 
b. pitot probes 
c. blade antennas 
d. extended ends of leading edge slats 
e. trailing edge flap track fairing tips 
f. landing gear 
 
Inspect for two types of damage, Direct and In-Direct: 
Direct Damage is defined as follows: 
• Metallic surfaces are burned, melted or show signs of metal distortion. 
• Non-metallic surfaces are burned, punctured or delaminated. 
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For direct damage, look for damage on metal structures that will usually show as 
small circular melt marks approximately 1/8 inch in diameter. 
NOTE: The melt marks can be in a small area. 
a. On a trailing edge surface, the melt marks can be along a larger surface area. 
b. Holes with a 1/4 inch diameter or greater are possible if a high intensity lightning 
strike occurs. 
c. Other signs of direct damage might be burned or discolored skins and fasteners. 
d. Cases have occurred where ferrous components have become strongly magnetic 
because of heavy lightning currents that are nearby. 
 
Indirect Damage is defined as follows: 
• damaged or upset electrical/electronic systems equipment 
• damaged wire shielding and shield terminations.  
 
For indirect damage, look for equipment that does not operate properly. High 
intensity lightning strikes can cause problems to the electrical/electronic equipment. 
NOTE: While the electrical system is protected from a possibility of direct lightning 
strike to electrical/electronic wires and cables, damage can occur. A high intensity 
lightning strike can produce electromagnetic fields within the unpressurized areas 
that are large enough to cause possible damage to the electrical system 
components. 
a. Specifically, problems to components which are located external to the 
pressurized fuselage. 
b. Wire shielding may also be disturbed or degraded. 
 
When evaluating the pilot report, frequently a lightning strike is referred to as a 
static discharge. This incorrect reference sometimes causes confusion about the 
purpose of static dischargers (small rod devices) installed on the tips and trailing 
edges of airfoils. These devices do not prevent the lightning strikes on the airplane. 
They can however, be severely damaged during a lightning strike and should be 
included in the inspection. The primary function of the static dischargers is to bleed 
off the static charge on the airplane during operation. This is to prevent static radio 
interference in the airplane avionics receivers (e.g. VHF Communication, ADF, and 
VOR). The static dischargers are frequently hit and damaged by lightning. Some of 
them are installed at a specified point as protection to a light or other system 
component. This is an added function beyond their normal function of static bleed 
off. 
 
To perform the evaluation of the aircraft after a lightning strike has been reported, 
do the following; 
A. Lightning Strike Inspection- Examine the Airplane External Surfaces 
1. Examine the areas where the lightning strike occurred for signs of damage. 
a. Examine the Zone 1 surface for signs of a lightning strike (Figure 5-10). 
i. Examine the external surfaces of the nose radome. 
a) Look at non-metallic structure for burns, punctures, and holes. 
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ii. If damage is found on the external surface of the nose radome, 
examine the internal surfaces of the nose radome. 
a) Look at non-metallic structure for burns, punctures, and holes. 
iii. Examine the metal structure for holes or pits. 
a) Look for burned or unusual colored skin or rivets. 
iv. Examine the external surfaces of the non-metallic components. 
a) Look for discolored paint and burned, punctured, or 
delaminated skin plies. 
2. Repair or seal the damaged areas. 
3. Examine the Zone 2 surface for signs of a lightning strike (Figure 5-10) 
a. Examine the Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors. 
b. Examine the pitot probes, static ports, and the areas near for damage. 
Look for burns, punctures, discolored paint, and general skin distortion. 
i. If damage is found, refer to the structural repair manual for 
appropriate repair instruction. 
c. Examine the metal structure for holes or pits. 
i. Look for burned or discolored skin or rivets 
d. Examine external surfaces of composite honeycomb components. 
i. Look for discolored paint, burned, punctured, or delaminated skin. 
4. Repair or seal the damaged areas. 
5. If the entrance and exit points are not found during the examination of Zones 
1 and 2 areas, examine Zone 3 (Figure 5-10) surface areas for signs of 
lightning strike damage. 
a. Do the examination that follows: 
i. Examine the external surfaces carefully to find the entrance and exit 
points of lightning strike. 
ii. Examine areas where one surface stops and another surface starts. 
iii. Examine the metallic structure for holes, pits, burned or discolored 
skin and rivets. 
iv. Examine the external surfaces of the composite components for 
discolored paint, burned, punctured, or delaminated skin plies. 
v. You need to use instrumental Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) 
methods or tap tests to find composite structure damage that you 
cannot see.  Damage you cannot see, such as delamination, can 
extend to the area you can see. Delamination can be detected by 
instrumental NDI methods or by a tap test.  For a tap test, use a solid 
metal disk and tap the area adjacent to the damaged area lightly. If 
there is delamination, you will hear a sound that is different than the 
sound of a solid bonded area. Refer to the appropriate 
Nondestructive Test Manual. 
6. Examine the composite structure around the area where a lightning strike 
may have occurred. 
a. Do the NDI procedures or the tap test. 
7. Repair or seal the damaged areas. 
8. Examine all of the external lights. 
a. If you find damaged lights, check the items that follow: 
i. the wires at the damaged light 
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ii. the wires from the light that connect the light to the circuit breaker. 
9. Do a test of the lights that follow: 
a. Do this task: Anti-Collision Lights - Operational Test,  
b. Do this task: Emergency Lights - Operational Test 
10. Examine the flight controls that follow: 
a. If the rudder shows signs of a lightning strike, examine these items: 
i. The surface hinges 
ii. The bearings 
iii. The bonding 
b. If the elevators show signs of a lightning strike, examine these items: 
i. The surface hinges 
ii. The bearings 
iii. The bonding 
c. If the ailerons show signs of a lightning strike, examine these items: 
i. The surface hinges 
ii. The bearings 
iii. The bonding 
d. If no damage is found, do a basic operational check of the flight controls: 
i. If the flight controls operate correctly after you do these steps, no 
more inspections are necessary. 
ii. Move rudder, control wheel and control column in both directions. 
iii. Make sure that there is full travel and the flight controls move freely.  
Hold the nose wheel during the rudder check to prevent nose wheel 
movement. You can hold the nose wheel if you put in the steering 
lockout pin or remove the torsion link pin. 
11. Do a functional test of the rudder system if it did not operate correctly during 
the operational check of the flight controls steps above. 
12. Do a functional test of the elevator system if it did not operate correctly in 
the test of the flight controls, as performed in the steps above. 
13. Do a functional test of the ailerons if they did not operate correctly in the 
tests the flight controls steps above. 
14. If the wingtips show signs of a lightning strike, examine the wingtips carefully. 
a. Also look at the fuel vent outlet and surge tanks for signs of damage. 
15. If the winglets show signs of a lightning strike, do a close visual examination 
on the winglets. 
B. Lightning Strike Inspection - Examine the Static Dischargers 
1. Do the inspections that follow: 
a. Ensure static dischargers are attached and not broken. 
b. Examine the dischargers for the following: 
i. Burns 
ii. Rough coating 
iii. Pitted metal discharger retainers 
c. Examine the dischargers for the following: 
i. Broken pins 
ii. Bent pins (Bent pins must be made straight) 
iii. Blunted tungsten pins 
d. Look at the discharger for the following: 
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i. Erosion of the discharger coating 
2. Do a resistance test if there is a damaged static discharger 
C. Lightning Strike Inspection - Examine External Wire Shields 
1. If there is not an identified entrance or exit point for the lightning strike, a 
visual check is not required. If there is no shield termination(s) in the area of 
an entrance and/or exit point, then no further visual check is required. 
2. In the area of the entrance and exit, check damage to shield terminations 
3. If damage is found at shield termination(s), check the wire loom run 
4. Repair any damage found. 
D. Lightning Strike Inspection - Airplane Internal Test 
1. If a lightning strike caused a system malfunction, do a full test of the 
defective system. 
a. Use the applicable instructions for that system. 
2. Do a check of the standby magnetic compass system only if the flight crew 
found a deviation that is more than is permitted 
3. Make sure that the fuel quantity system is accurate. 
a. Do the operational test for the FQIS type on your airplane 
b. If the FQIS test shows any problems, check the Fuel Quantity Indicating 
System (FQIS) with the Fuel Measuring Sticks 
4. This may be done as an alternative to above. 
a. The center tank must be emptied (by transferring fuel to the left and right 
tanks), and the empty indication would be verified to be correct. 
b. The fuel from the left and right tanks will transfer to the center tank. 
c. The left and right tank empty indication would be verified. 
d. Fuel would be added as necessary to fill the center tank to capacity, and 
the indication would be verified. 
e. Fuel would be transferred to fill the left tank to capacity, and the 
indication would be verified. 
f. Fuel would be transferred to fill the right tank to capacity, and the 
indication would be verified. 
 
After a lightning strike event, the operating airline uses both written inspection 
procedures and good judgment to determine the amount of inspection that is 
appropriate. The number of inspections and nature of the inspection after a lightning 
strike to the airplane is determined by evaluation of the flight crew information and 
the airplane condition after the incident. For example, if all the NAV/COM systems 
are exercised by the flight crew in flight after the lightning strike and no anomalies 
are found, then checks to the exercised systems would not normally be required. For 
systems not exercised by the flight crew in flight or systems where anomalies were 
found during the lightning strike internal and external inspection, additional checks 
to that system may be required once the aircraft reaches the ground. In addition, 
even if a system was exercised in flight after the lightning strike and no anomalies 
were found, but subsequent inspections showed lightning damage near that system 
antenna, additional checks of that system will be required. The level of the 
inspections and operation tests will come from flight crew information and the 
airplane conditions during, and after the incident. 
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From this point in the post-lightning strike inspection, a non-routine test may be 
required depending on the findings on the inspections and tests performed.  It is not 
necessary to examine the coaxial cables and the connectors if the:  
(a) Radio system had no problems during and after the incident, and the system 
antenna was not damaged; or (b) Operational checks were done without problems. 
5.6.3 Understanding Impacts of Lightning Strikes on Aircraft Designs 
Lightning not only impacts aircraft systems but also imposes sometimes significant 
impacts on airline operations. The ability to predict lightning is one way to begin the 
difficult task of reducing the impact of lightning on aircraft systems and airline 
operations. As discussed in Chapter 2, the mechanism of lightning strikes to aircraft 
were not well understood until the 1980s when tests convincingly demonstrated 
that the vast majority of lightning strikes to aircraft are initiated by the aircraft, as 
opposed to the aircraft’s intercepting a discharge already in progress.  
 
In August of 2004, a final report was delivered for a study of actual lightning strike 
effects on general aviation aircraft. The study was sponsored by U.S. Department of 
Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Office of Aviation Research 
Washington, DC 20591 and is titled, “General Aviation Lightning Strike Report and 
Protection Level Study” [5.14]. This report analyzed 95 lightning strike reports from 
general aviation business jet aircraft that occurred over a 5-year period. The analysis 
was conducted to determine which variables most affect the severity of indirect 
lightning effects damage of in-service aircraft and their systems and to assess the 
effect of the level of lightning and High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) protection 
design and implementation. The study found that fully protected aircraft had a 
significantly lower percentage of electrical failure and interference due to lightning 
strikes when compared to aircraft with no protection or only avionics protection. The 
number of electrical failures reported did not increase over the age of the aircraft. 
 
The lightning strike data analysis for the Federal Aviation Administration and the 
National Institute of Aviation Research [5.14] was conducted to study and review 
lightning strike reports from incidents involving general aviation business jet aircraft. 
A lightning strike database was compiled during this study from forms filled out by 
pilots and maintenance personnel along with the corresponding maintenance history 
of that aircraft. The general purpose of the study was to develop a better 
understanding of the factors that are most influential in affecting the probability of 
electrical damage of in-service aircraft and their systems due to a lightning strike, to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of design changes, and to improve reporting and data 
collection procedures. There were 95 incident reports on various aircraft models in 
the database that were used in the study. After validating the data, three variables 
were studied with respect to lightning damage: aircraft age, aircraft flight hours, and 
the level of High-Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) protection. In this study evaluation, a 
correlation to HIRF and lightning protection is not directly made but in many cases 
studied and except for specific HIRF protection circuit components within avionic 
equipment, many lightning protection components also provide HIRF protection. The 
level of HIRF protection for each aircraft model in the database was categorized as 
full protection, avionics protection, or no protection. Reporting of lightning strike 
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incidents has drastically improved over the last 5 years, indicating the effectiveness 
of lightning strike incident-gathering procedures. Also, aircraft delivered over the last 
10 years have been increasingly equipped with HIRF-protected systems. The data 
revealed that aircraft were most vulnerable to a lightning strike when flying in clouds 
and rain. This is consistent with the theory presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis 
regarding the nature of lightning strike development in the atmosphere. The study 
also found that the amount of HIRF protection in an aircraft had a significant impact 
on the extent of damage resulting from a lightning strike. Compared to unprotected 
aircraft, HIRF-protected aircraft had a significantly lower percentage of electrical 
failures or electrical interference events due to lightning strikes. The study indicated 
that the age of the aircraft had no observable impact on the percentage of electrical 
failures due to lightning strikes. This data may be held suspect since it is not 
consistent with specific findings of lightning protection degradation resulting in 
lower protection levels observed by industry OEM lightning protection engineers. 
The study however concluded that the percentage of electrical failures from 
lightning strikes increased for those aircraft with more flight hours. 
 
Another data source refers to the impact of lightning strikes by evaluating lightning 
strike data [5.48] from five United States Commercial airlines. The purpose of the 
project was to obtain information on the conditions under which aircraft are most 
likely to receive lightning strikes in flight, and document the effects that these strikes 
have upon the aircraft. For this purpose, the airlines were provided with 
questionnaire-type reporting forms for use by pilots and maintenance personnel in 
documenting lightning strike events and effects on the aircraft. The motivation for 
the project stemmed from a need to obtain a better understanding of the conditions 
under which aircraft are struck, the places on the aircraft where strikes are most 
likely, and the effect of these strikes on the airframe as well as onboard electrical 
and avionics systems. Initial results from the project were published by General 
Electric in 1974. At that time, a total of 214 strike reports had been received. The 
data was useful to designers of lightning protection. For example, the strike reports 
helped clarify the locations of lightning strike zones on transport category aircraft, 
and alerted designers to potential lightning-induced voltage problems. 
 
Strike reports continued to be received by General Electric at the time, but no 
further data summaries were published, and in 1977, the project was taken over by 
Lightning Technologies, Inc.; a lightning test and evaluation company in Pittsfield 
Massachusetts. By early 1984, nearly 800 lightning strike reports had been 
accumulated and Lightning Technologies, Inc. invited the Federal Aviation 
Administration Technical Center to participate in the project by computerizing each 
of the strike reports and processing the data. With the data in computer memory, it 
is possible to provide correlation among various reported conditions and effects.  
 
The data collection program began with five participating airlines provided in a 
public report [5.48]: American, Braniff, Continental, Eastern and United. Economic 
factors at the time however, made it necessary for Braniff, Continental, and Eastern 
to cease participation. Thus, from 1980 to 1985, data was furnished only by United 
and American. These airlines, however, provide a large geographic data base at the 
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time. The data from this early effort included lightning strike information from 10 
different transport type aircraft from the aforementioned air carriers. The aircraft 
type included Boeing B707, B727, B737, B747, and the B757 and B767 aircraft. Also 
included were Douglas DC-B, DC-9, DC-10 and Lockheed L10ll aircraft. 
 
The reported effects of the lightning strike were tabulated under the following 
headings; attachment points, interference/outage, effects on personnel, and 
electrical/electronic damage. For the attachment points, the exact location of 
1ightning attachment points are generally observed during the post-lightning strike 
ground inspection. Due to the size of transport type aircraft 1 and the complexity of 
locating the exact attachment points, many times the attachment points are often 
not located and reported. This was evident .in analyzing the data, as a total of 672 
did not indicate the attachment points. Of the total 253 attachment points recorded, 
28 percent were to the nose of the aircraft, with approximately 50 percent reported 
to the fuselage at some point. The remainders of the attachments were divided 
equally between the wings and tail.  
 
For the interference or system outage, from the total 783 reports, 87 reported 
outages. This is also referred to as the indirect effects of lightning. These outages 
required ground crew maintenance (either repair or replacement). The navigation 
systems had 30 instrument outages with only six communication systems impacted. 
Engine instruments had a total of 39 outages. More recent work on the study of 
lightning threats, locations and effects has addressed these types of indirect effects. 
This protection requires attention to the design for continued airworthiness. 
 
In this work, a few cases of lightning strikes that have documented effects on the 
aircraft are included to provide a framework for why it is important to consider 
continued airworthiness of lightning protection within the design process. It is 
known that lightning protection can deteriorate over the life of an aircraft. An 
example might be a bond jumper use for earthing aircraft systems during a lightning 
strike event that corrodes over the years of use within corrosive environments 
exposed to runway chemicals and multiple weather changes. 
5.7 Aircraft Lightning Strike Events and Case Studies for Direct Lightning 
5.7.1 Results from Literature Search 
The following events highlight the importance of maintaining the continued 
airworthiness of lightning strike protection. Each case report has been produced by 
government officials from the country in which the accident occurred. These 
examples demonstrate the results of direct and indirect effects that lightning strike 
events impose on aircraft and aircraft operations.  
Event 1: Lightning Strike - SA 227, Metro III, February 8, 1988 on flight from 
Hanover to Düsseldorf, Germany 
In 1988, a Fairchild Metro III commuter turboprop crashed on approach to 
Dusseldorf after a lightning strike had "apparently disconnected all batteries and 
generators from the aircraft's electrical system, also terminating the cockpit voice 
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recorder record," according to an academic review [5.16]. The crash came after 
several attempts to land, and was blamed on "a combination of poor pilot judgment 
or skill and the lightning-caused electrical failure."  Twenty-one people died. 
 
The following are excerpts of a crash associated with lightning strike found in the 
German Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA) Accident Investigation Bureau report [5.16]. 
 
Accident Details: 
Date: February 08, 1988  
Time: 07:58  
Location: Near Mulheim, Germany  
Operator: NFD - Nurnberger Flugdienst  
Flight #: 108  
Route: Hannover - Dusseldorf  
AC Type: Swearingen SA.227AC Metro III  
Registration: D-CABB  
Aircraft production cn / ln: AC-500  
Aboard: 21   (passengers:19  crew:2)  
Fatalities: 21   (passengers:19  crew:2)  
Ground: 0  
 
Summary: The plane was struck by lightning and suffered a complete electrical 
failure after which the right wing broke off during an uncontrollable descent.  
 
Reporting Agency: The Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA) 
The LBA (German for Federal Agency of Aviation) was established as the supreme 
Federal Authority to fulfill tasks in the field of civil aviation. It is subordinated to the 
Federal Minister of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs. The LBA consists of the 
Headquarters in Braunschweig and the Regional Offices in Düsseldorf, 
Frankfurt/Main, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart and Berlin. The tasks of the Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt are laid down in the LBA Act (Gesetz über das Luftfahrt-Bundesamt). The 
most important goal of the LBA is to avert hazards to the safety of aviation as well as 
to public safety and order. 
 
[5.16] The most serious aircraft accident, which occurred in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the last 20 years, has to be attributed to the effects of lightning strike. 
On February 8, 1988 a SA 227-AC, Metro III, was on a scheduled flight from Hanover 
to Dusseldorf, with 19 passengers and 2 crewmembers on board, when in initial 
approach approximately 7 miles (NM) from the threshold, the electrical power 
supply failed in a thunderstorm after the airplane that been struck into uncontrolled 
descent and after two minutes' flying through the thunderstorm region disintegrated 
in the air. In the following impact all occupants were killed and the airplane was 
destroyed. In the concluding investigation report the investigation commission 
established that an electrical failure caused by lightning strike under instrument 
landing conditions, which also resulted in the failure of the cockpit and instrument 
lightning and made an actuation of the landing flaps and horizontal stabilizer trim 
impossible, has mainly contributed to the accident. An especially dramatic factor was 
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that the damage caused to the diodes in the electrical system probably made the 
crew unable to restore the power supply. 
 
Explanation of the activities leading to the Metro III accident: 
During the climb of an SA 227, Metro III, from FL 140 under instrument flight 
conditions, the airplane was struck by lightning. According to the report of the crew, 
the total electrical power supply system failed suddenly. The pilot-in-command 
immediately took over the controls as provided for in the air carrier's Flight 
Operating Manual (FOM) in such cases. With the switches for the operation of the 
electrical power supply system located directly in front of the pilot on the left seat, 
he had immediately after that, let the co-pilot take over the controls again, who 
managed to continue the flight by means of the built-in third artificial horizon. The 
pilot on the left seat was then able to concern himself with the restoration of the 
electrical system for which a certain order in the operation of the battery and 
generator switches was required to be strictly observed (see also "Total Electrical 
Failure" in the Airplane Flight Manual, Metro III Emergency Procedures). 
 
In this case, according to the report, an accident could be prevented. The pilot was 
familiar with the procedure "Total Electrical Failure", which after a recent accident 
had been incorporated in the Airplane Flight Manual based on a safety 
recommendation. The "Crew Coordination" in the cockpit worked well. The diodes in 
the electrical power supply system, which probably prevented the restoration of the 
electrical supply, have been removed in accordance with a safety recommendation 
issued by the Accident Investigation at LBA (FUS) resulting in an AD. 
 
According to the report, due to the constructional characteristics of the electrical 
power supply system it cannot be excluded for the types SA 226 AT and SA 226 TC 
and its models, including the SA 227 AC, Metro III, that the danger of a total 
electrical failure as a result of lightning strike continues to exist. For this reason the 
FUS recommends all pilots flying these types: 
(1) to observe the procedure "Total Electrical Failure" in the Airplane Flight Manual 
and practice the required actions in the simulator or in a ground training on the 
airplane. 
(2) to be prepared for a failure of the electrical power supply system in weather 
situations with the danger of lightning. That means, among other things, that o 
torch should be at hand, ready for use. 
(3) to take off the headphone after a lightning strike with total electrical failure.  A 
communication by the Intercom System is no longer possible then. 
(4) to observe the position of installation of the third artificial horizon. The 
location in the cockpit panel can differ from airplane to airplane. 
 
Significant aircraft findings regarding effects of lightning strike: 
Though the investigation did not directly identify a failure of lightning protection as 
the cause for the Metro III incident, it has correlated the lightning event with the 
electrical system failure and subsequent crash. Emergency procedures have been 
revised in the Airplane Flight Manual section under, “Total Electrical Failure” to 
include direction to investigate lightning strike damage after the event. The update 
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includes the following text, “If total electrical failure occurred as a result of lightning 
strike or discharge, the aircraft should be thoroughly inspected for evidence of 
lightning damage. See the SA227 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 05 and the TPE 331 
Maintenance Manual, Chapter 72. FAA approved May 22, 1989. 
 
In normal operations, aircraft inspections are required after lightning strike events. 
This work recognizes the need for a design methodology for the continued 
airworthiness of lightning protection. The new design methodology proposed, will 
reduce the number of events resulting in catastrophic conditions. 
Event 2: Lightning Strike - SA 227, Dornier DO 228-202, December 4, 2003 on flight 
KAT603 from Rost Airport (ENRS) to Bodo Airport (ENBO), Norway operated by 
Kato Airlines AS 
On Thursday, 4 December 2003 at time 0915, the Head of Air Traffic Control at Bodø 
control tower telephoned the duty Inspector of accidents at the Accident 
Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) to notify about an accident involving a Dornier 
DO 228 aircraft. The notification stated that a Dornier 228 belonging to Kato Airline 
had crashed just east of the threshold of runway 25 at Bodø Airport, and that the 
status with regard to the four people onboard was unclear. Shortly after, the AIBN 
received similar notification from the Police's operation centre and from Kato Airline.  
 
Because of poor weather conditions in Bodø and the fact that the east part of the 
runway was closed, it was for a time uncertain whether the AIBNs scheduled flight 
would be able to land at Bodø airport. The AIBN managed to turn out with three 
accident inspectors, who arrived at the accident site at 14:50 on the same day. 
 
The following are excerpts of the crash associated with lightning strike found in an 
official accident investigation report [5.17] within the (AIBN).  
 
Accident Details: 
Date: 4 December, 2003 
Time: 0909 local time (UTC + 1) 
Location: Bodo Airport, Norway  
Operator: Kato Airline AS 
Flight Number: Kato Airline flight KAT603 
Route: From Røst airport (ENRS) to Bodø airport (ENBO) 
Aircraft Type: Dornier DO 228-202 
Registration: LN-HTA 
Accident site: Bodø airport (ENBO), threshold of runway 25 
(67°16’2’’N 014°24’0’’E) 
Aboard: 4   (passengers: 2  crew: 2)  
Aircraft Production:  S/N 8127 Manufactured in 1987 
Fatalities: 0   
Ground: 0  
Injuries: 2 Serious and 2 minor 
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Summary: The plane was struck by lightning and suffered a broken control rod in the 
horizontal stabilizer due to large amounts of current present during the strike 
making the aircraft difficult to control in pitch direction. 
 
Reporting Agency: Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) 
The Norwegian Accident Investigation Board is a government-funded investigation 
board, whose task is to investigate accidents and incidents within the aviation, 
marine, road and railway sectors (including underground railways and tramways). 
 
The activities of the Accident Investigation Board are based upon the Norwegian Air 
Navigation Act of 1923. At that time, the board was under the administration of the  
Ministry of Defense and accidents were investigated by ad hoc boards.  
 
In 1944, the Convention on International Aviation was ratified and a special 
organization under the aegis of the UN was created - the ICAO, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. A total of 187 countries, including Norway, are members of 
this organization. The international agreements are collected in 18 annexes. Annex 
13 concerns investigation of aviation accidents and incidents, and the board bases its 
work on this annex which describes the methods of aviation accident investigation. 
 
A new regulation was introduced in 1988 for the investigation of aviation accidents, 
and on 1 January 1989 a permanent board, under the administration of the Ministry 
of Transport, was established. This board became autonomous on 1 July 1999.  
 
The regulation concerning official investigations states that the investigation has as 
its goal clarification of the sequence of events and causes, as well as discussing other 
significant conditions that could prevent accidents and incidents in order to improve 
aviation safety. The purpose of the investigation is not to apportion liability. 
 
The Investigation Board itself decides the scope of the investigations that are to be 
conducted, including the assessment of the expected safety benefit from an 
investigation in relation to the resources expended. 
 
Explanation of the activities leading to the DO 228-202 accident: 
Kato Airline flight KAT603, an aircraft of the type Dornier 228-202 with registration 
LN-HTA, was to fly a regular scheduled flight from Røst airport (ENRS) to Bodø 
airport (ENBO). There were two passengers and two pilots on board. There was a 
strong westerly wind, and when the plane approached Bodø extensive lightning 
activity developed quickly. The aircraft was struck by lightning. The lightning struck 
the aircraft’s nose area and passed to the tail. Earthing wires between the fuselage 
and tail surface and a wire between the tail surface and the elevator were burned 
off. A powerful electric energy passed through the elevator rod in the tail section. A 
rod end came loose, resulting in a breach in the control rod. Thus the only 
connection between the control column in the cockpit and the elevator was lost. 
After a period, the pilots regained limited control of the aircraft’s nose position by 
using the aircraft electric pitch trim which adjusts the tail surface angle of attack. 
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When the lightning struck the aircraft, the pilots were blinded for approximately 30 
seconds. They lost control of the aircraft for a period and the aircraft came very close 
to stalling. The pilots declared an emergency. The aircraft’s remaining systems were 
intact and the pilots succeeded in bringing the plane in for landing. During the first 
landing attempt the airspeed was somewhat high. The aircraft hit the ground in an 
approximate three-point position and bounced into the air. The pilots concluded that 
the landing was uncontrollable because the elevator was not working. The landing 
was aborted and the aircraft circled for a new attempt. Wind conditions were 
difficult and the next attempt was also unstable in terms of height and speed. At 
short final the aircraft nosed down and the pilots barely managed to flare a little 
before the aircraft hit the ground. The point of impact was a few meters before the 
runway and the aircraft slid onto the runway. 
 
Emergency services quickly arrived at the scene. The two pilots were seriously 
injured while both passengers suffered only minor physical injuries. No fuel leakage 
or fire occurred. The aircraft was written off. There is reason to believe that the total 
amount of energy in the lightning exceeded the values of the construction 
specifications. The investigation has uncovered that up to 30% of the wiring in 
essential earthing wires in the tail may have been defective before lightning struck. 
Other relevant safety issues that are discussed in the report are the need for 
increased focus on maintenance and the optimum use of airborne weather radars. 
The investigation has further uncovered a need for better presentation of 
information from ground-based weather radars by the air traffic control service.  
 
Significant DO 228-202 aircraft findings regarding effects of lightning strike and 
lightning strike protection airworthiness: 
The specific aircraft involved in this crash was registered according to regulations 
and had a valid airworthiness certificate. As part of the investigation result, nothing 
was discovered to indicate that the aircraft was not maintained in accordance with 
approved inspection procedures. The lightning strike caused severe damage shown 
in Figure 5-11 to the horizontal stabilizer. However, operations of the rod between 
the cockpit and elevator after the lightning strike was found to be impaired though 
the rod is not required to function as a designed current path to carry lightning 
currents during a lightning strike.  
 
 
Figure 5-11 Lightning strike damage to the DO 228 right elevator 
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The transfer rod to the elevator was broken when the lightning travelled through the 
aircraft. This made it no longer possible to control the elevator. The control rod 
depicted in Figure 5-12 was an alternate path to carry the large current form a 
lightning strike. It is common in lightning strike events to have large current from the 
strike transfer between the nose of the aircraft and exit out the tail of the aircraft. As 
many lightning strike events contain a large variance of current, any single lightning 
strike may not result in any effect on the aircraft. This is why the design 
requirements use the worst likely case in each location of the aircraft to determine 
the potential voltages and lightning current that may be present during a strike. At 
the time of the design, tools are used to demonstrate the potential lightning threat 
in each aircraft location and in cases where lightning current and voltage are 
undesirably high, additional protection of the aircraft and equipment may be 
recommended to add to the final design. These lightning protection techniques need 
to remain available throughout the life of the aircraft to ensure that any lightning 
strike event would not result in a potentially catastrophic condition. In the case of 
this Dornier DO 228, bond straps (earthing wires) were included in the horizontal 
stabilizer to reduce unwanted high levels of current and voltage. 
 
 
Figure 5-12 Broken Elevator Control Rod on DO228 
 
Fortunately in this case, it was possible to use electric trim to control the aircraft’s 
horizontal stabilizer and therefore, to a certain extent, the aircraft’s pitch after the 
lightning strike current broke the control rod. According to the aircraft crew, the 
aircraft’s weather radar did not indicate the precipitation cells. This is an indication 
that the weather radar was not functioning correctly.  
 
Noted as an investigation finding, up to 30% of the wires on individual earthing 
between the fuselage, horizontal stabilizer and elevator may have been broken 
before the lightning struck the aircraft. It is also estimated by examination of the 
direct effects damage that the aircraft was hit by lightning containing a very large 
amount of energy. Conclusions in the investigation determined that the aircraft’s 
earthing wires were not able to conduct the electric energy from the lightning and 
the transfer rod from the cockpit to the elevator was broken. Examination of the 
earthing wires in the horizontal stabilizer shown in Figure 5-13 point to several 
breaks in the bonding connections between the elevator and the fuselage. 
 
  
119 
 
Figure 5-13 Broken, burn and damages earthing wire from horizontal stabilizer structure to fuselage 
 
In the design of the DO 228 aircraft lightning protection, bond jumpers are installed 
in six locations on the empennage to assist in diminishing the effects of a lightning 
strike event. Figure 5-14 shows the approximate location of the bond jumpers in that 
design where two bond jumpers are installed between the stabilizer and the 
empennage and 4 bond wires are installed between the stabilizer and the elevators.  
 
 
Figure 5-14 Lightning protection bond wires in the horizontal stabilizer 
 
The strike path in this event was most likely initiated at the nose of the aircraft and 
transmitted along the fuselage to the stabilizer through these two bond jumpers and 
then from the stabilizer to the elevators and then continued to depart the aircraft. 
After further investigation of the hull, it was noted that high on the nose left side of 
aircraft there were two small burn marks. Figure 5-15 shows burn marks on the 
aircraft nose near the nose radome attach point to the aircraft, burn marks on the 
pitot tube fastener and another burn mark on the baggage handling door hinge just 
behind the nose radome. Burn marks are common after a lightning strike. Upon each 
lightning strike, a procedure to inspect the burn marks, potential lightning entry 
point and exit point is necessary to minimize the impact of potential further 
degradation of lightning protection and exposure to a potentially catastrophic 
condition. In the case of this DO228 accident investigation [5.17], no damage was 
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found inside the aircraft. It was found upon deeper evaluation of the control rods in 
the cockpit that several bolts and bearings in the elevator mechanism had suffered 
heat damage when the current passed through. 
 
 
Figure 5-15 Burn marks on the nose, pitot tube & baggage handling door hinges 
 
As a result of the reduced control of the aircraft’s pitch and difficult wind conditions, 
the sink rate was not sufficiently stabilized on short final. The crew was unable to 
prevent the aircraft from hitting the ground. 
 
It can be determined from the investigation that broken or missing earthing wires 
resulted in this potentially catastrophic event. From the inspection of the hull after 
the lightning strike event, it was determined that bond jumpers were missing and 
the remaining bond jumpers were severely damaged. During the dismantling of the 
elevator, damage to one of the four bolts holding the two halves of the right elevator 
together was also discovered. The bolt which also holds the corner where the 
elevator rod was fixed had gradually melted. 
 
Impact of carbon fiber composite structural components used as an alternative to 
aluminum or other metallic structural components has a significant impact on 
lightning protection designs, the inclusion of lightning protection, and the long term 
availability of good bond paths. Upon inspection and as can be seen in Figure 5-11, 
the right elevator structure in this accident was missing approximately half of its 
fabric covering. About half of the carbon fiber cover on the end of the horizontal tip 
was also missing, including the elevator’s outer static discharger. The outer right 
corner of the elevator’s aluminum structure was also burnt off. 
 
With the help of an ohmmeter, a break in the electric connection between the 
elevator and the fuselage was discovered. Closer examination revealed several 
breaks in the bonding connections between the elevator and the fuselage as noted 
by the bond jumper damage. It is noted that with the bond jumpers missing, almost 
the entire bonding on the outer bonding connection to the right elevator is not in 
place. During a lightning strike event with the reduced available current conduction 
path and in addition, a higher resistance material for outer structure (composite), a 
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greater current will flow in the remaining conductive path through the available 
bond jumpers and the elevator control rod. In addition, both fasteners holding the 
bracket to the bonding jumper had melted leaving the bracket loose in the space 
between the elevator and the horizontal tail surface. Figure 5-16 shows the damaged 
bond jumpers and bracket contributing to the reduced lightning protection.  
 
 
Figure 5-16 Damaged bond jumpers (earthing wires) loose and damaged bracket 
 
The lightning protection design for the DO228 and many other transport category 
aircraft is very simple but also critical in providing continued safe flight and landing 
of the aircraft. In this DO228 design, upon further inspection, it was noticed that the 
braided bond jumpers were frayed, broken and corroded as shown in Figure 5-17. 
The use of materials that contain corrosion resistive coatings, compatible materials, 
and appropriate sealants in aircraft locations where environments are considered in 
detail, have to be weighed against the requirements for adequate conductive 
properties and long lasting solutions. When designing the conductive path for 
lightning protection, redundancy is important but also the understanding of 
common-mode degradation that may reduce the lightning protection simultaneously 
is also critical to mitigate these reduced protection conditions.  
 
 
Figure 5-17 Bond jumpers damaged due to environmental effect degradation  
 
The known degradation of the bond jumpers prior to the lightning strike reinforces 
the practice of lightning strike inspections for all lightning protection after each 
strike. Also involved in the continued airworthiness of the lightning protection is the 
scheduled maintenance program guidance. Bond jumpers are critical elements in the 
protection scheme and should be evaluated at the time of design for the need to 
maintain the protection with periodic inspections. In experience with other bond 
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jumpers on other aircraft, degradation of the braided bond jumper design is 
experienced and should be evaluated when determining the environment of each 
bond jumper installation as proposed by this work.  
 
In the investigation of the DO228 aircraft crash, it was discovered that there was no 
electric connection between the horizontal tail surface and the fuselage. The reason 
for this was found to be that the tail surface was fixed by means of bearings with 
Teflon coating. Consequently, the horizontal tail surfaces became electrically isolated 
from the fuselage when the bonding connections broke. The use of a bind path 
analysis is necessary to ensure that alternate bond paths are well understood in 
cases where the primary design bond path is compromised. Lightning currents are 
not forced to follow the designed conduction paths and may find alternative 
conductive routes through the aircraft structure. In these cases, and especially when 
using composites as the primary structural element in the design, the larger voltages 
caused by the failure of the primary conduction path can cause unwanted currents 
across otherwise non-current carrying paths such as bearings and flight control 
surface hinges. In case of failures to lightning protection, a good design methodology 
such as proposed in this work will evaluate the long-term availability of protection 
within a given installation environment. 
 
Subsequent to the event and investigation, the Accident Investigation Board Norway 
issued three safety recommendations. 
 
1. Safety Recommendation SL no. 2007/22T: 
A functional airborne weather radar system and optimal use of such a system are 
important in localizing precipitation cells and thereby avoiding flying into areas with 
hazardous flying conditions. The AIBN recommends that the Norwegian Civil Aviation 
Authority and Kato Airline assess the best way of focusing on maintenance of 
airborne weather radars and training in their optimal use. 
2. Safety Recommendation SL no. 2007/23T: 
Presentation of weather on the air traffic control service’s radar displays is important 
in avoiding aircraft being radar vectored into areas with hazardous flying conditions. 
The AIBN recommends that Avinor assess integrated presentation of information 
from weather radars on the air traffic control service’s radar displays. 
3. Safety Recommendation SL no. 2007/24T:  
Up to 30% of the wires on individual earthing wires between the fuselage, horizontal 
stabilizer and elevator may have been broken before the lightning struck. For 
example, the maintenance requirements issued by Dornier Luftfahrt GmbH are not 
specific with regard to the condition of the aircraft’s earthing wires. The AIBN 
therefore recommends that the Norwegian Civil Aviation Authority consider issuing 
additional maintenance requirements for aircraft type DO 228 with regard to the 
capacity to withstand lightning. 
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5.7.2 Conclusions from Literature Search 
The Importance of Lightning Strike Protection Continued Airworthiness Design  
The previous two accident cases demonstrate the potential impact of a lightning 
strike protection design that is not adequate to for the continued airworthiness of 
the aircraft during its life expectancy. This event validates the reasoning for a new 
design method associated with the continued airworthiness of lightning strike 
protection. From the two case investigations above, it is clear that designs require 
evaluation as to the continued availability of the protection during the entire 
operating life of the aircraft at the time of the design decision. With the inclusion of 
proper maintenance procedures combined with appropriate designs that recognize 
operating environments as a threat to the continued airworthiness of these designs, 
one can derive the methodology proposed in this work to modify current design 
practices that combine both maintenance procedures and design features into one 
robust lightning protection result. Given successful implementation of the design 
methodology proposed in this work, more robust design results are expected that 
will improve performance of systems and structures before, during, and after 
lightning strikes to the aircraft. Though the proposed methodology will not reduce 
the amount of damage found after a lightning strike, increased continued availability 
of lightning protection that will maintain appropriate safety levels and perform as 
designed throughout the life of the aircraft is an expected outcome for aircraft 
designers that use the design methodology proposed in this body of work.  
5.7.3 Case Studies Conducted within Body of Work 
The following case studies will use existing aircraft data to exercise the proposed 
methodology. Multiple case studies are conducted to test the methodology using 
several very different lightning protection types. For these case studies, lightning 
protection for the airplane is in four major areas: 
1. Aircraft Structure 
2. Fuel Systems and Ignition Prevention 
3. Antenna protection due to direct lightning attachment 
4. System wiring, bonding and grounding protection due to magnetic and electric 
field coupling 
 
In order to start the case studies, the following text will provide technical details 
necessary with regard to the specific airplane lightning protection design.  
5.7.3.1 Lightning Protection Design Zones for the Aircraft in the Case Studies  
Frequently, a lightning strike is referred to as a static discharge. This incorrect 
reference sometimes causes confusion about the purpose of static dischargers (small 
rod devices) installed on the tips and trailing edges of airfoils shown in Figure 5-10. 
These devices do not prevent the lightning strikes on the airplane. The primary 
function of the static dischargers is to bleed off the static charge on the airplane. This 
is to prevent static radio interference in the airplane avionics receivers such as the 
VHF communication radios, automatic direction finding system (ADF), and Very High 
Frequency Omni-directional Range (VOR) systems. The static dischargers are 
frequently hit and damaged by lightning. Some of them are installed at a specified 
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point as protection to a light or other system component. This is an added function 
beyond their normal function of static bleed off. Static discharges are not part of the 
lightning protection case studies. 
 
Lightning strike zones for the aircraft in the case studies have been determined 
through a process of assessment for probabilities of attachment and locations where 
lightning strike occurs. Using the relationship between aircraft lightning 
environment, lightning zone, and testing, the aircraft designers determined the 
lightning zones for the aircraft in the case studies as shown in Figures 5-18 and 5-19 
to be used in design of the associated lightning protection. The lightning zones 
within the aircraft under study and the associated threats of lightning current were 
determined using the following guidance for lightning zones. There are three major 
zone divisions as described in Figure 5-18 and Figure 5-19 representing: 
1. Likely regions for initial lightning attachment and first return strokes.  
2. Regions which are unlikely to experience first return strokes but which are likely 
to experience subsequent return strokes. This will happen where the aircraft is in 
motion relative to a lightning channel causing sweeping of the channel 
backwards from a forward initial attachment point. 
 
Regions which are unlikely to experience an arc attachment, but which conduct 
lightning current between attachment points are included in the region explanation. 
Regions 1 and 2 are subdivided into specific lightning attachment zones as follows: 
• Zones 1A and 2A, where long hang-on of a lightning channel is unlikely 
because the motion of the aircraft with respect to the channel causes the 
attachment point to move across the surface of the aircraft in the opposite 
direction from the direction of motion. 
• Zones 1B and 2B, where the lightning channel attachment point is unlikely to 
move during the remainder of the flash because the location is a trailing edge 
or a large promontory from which the relative motion of the aircraft and 
channel cannot sweep the attachment point further.  
Specific zone definitions for the Aircraft in these Case Studies 
• Zone 1A - First return stroke zone:  All the areas of the aircraft surfaces where 
a first return stroke is likely during lightning channel attachment with a low 
expectation of flash hang on. 
• Zone 1B - First return stroke zone with long hang-on:  All the areas of the 
aircraft surfaces where a first return stroke is likely during lightning channel 
attachment with a high expectation of flash hang-on. 
• Zone 2A - Swept stroke zone:  Aircraft surfaces where subsequent return 
stroke is likely to be swept with a low expectation of flash hang-on. 
• Zone 2B - Swept stroke zone with long hang-on:  All the areas of the aircraft 
surfaces into which a lightning channel carrying a subsequent return stroke is 
likely to be swept with a high expectation of flash hang-on. 
• Zone 3 - Those surfaces not in Zones 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, or 2B, where any 
attachment of the lightning channel is unlikely, and portions of the aircraft 
beneath or between the other zones and/or conduct substantial amount of 
electrical current between direct or swept stroke attachment points. 
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The location of these zones on the aircraft is agreed between the applicant and the 
certification authority as proposed in Figure 5-18 and 5-19. As described in Chapter 2 
of this thesis, the specific electrical threats associated with lightning in each of the 
aircraft lightning zones were determined in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular 
AC 20-53A [5.1] and guidance from both SAE ARP 5414 [5.47] and SAE ARP 5412 
[5.28].   Table 5-8 provides typical current values for each lightning strike type. 
 
Zone  Lightning Attachment 
Mechanism 
Location Typical 
Current 
1 Initial Strike, first 
return stroke 
Wing tips, wing leading edge, wing 
trailing edge, rudder tips, engine 
leading edge, radome 
200kA 
2 Swept stroke Fuselage, wing surface behind engines 100kA 
3 Current Conduction Wing surface, rudder surface, 
horizontal stabilizer surface 
30kA 
Table 5-8 General description of defined lightning threats 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-18 Aircraft Lightning Zones Locations (Top View) 
 
Note: Details of aircraft lightning zone schematics are contained in the Proprietary 
Appendix to protect the proprietary nature of the information. 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-19 Aircraft Lightning Zones Locations (Side View) 
 
Note: Details of aircraft lightning zone schematics are contained in the Proprietary 
Appendix to protect the proprietary nature of the information. 
 
In order to determine the lightning zones, a relationship between the lightning 
phenomenon and the physical configuration of the aircraft in these case studies was 
determined. Lightning zoning is a functional step in demonstrating that the aircraft is 
adequately protected from both direct and indirect effects of lightning. The purpose 
of lightning zoning is to determine the surfaces of the aircraft which are likely to 
experience lightning channel attachment and the structures which may experience 
lightning current conduction between pairs of entry/exit points. 
 
Zoning of the aircraft in these case studies was determined along with the aircraft 
hazard assessment to determine the appropriate protection for a given aircraft part 
or location. To determine the appropriate protection for parts and structure on the 
aircraft, in a particular lightning zone, the criticality of the systems or structure in the 
zone was considered. The method of development that led to the aircraft lightning 
strike zone map is described in Figure 5-20 which provides graphic representations 
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between design and test practices that led to the direct effects protection 
configuration examined within this research.  
 
 
Figure 5-20 Determination of the aircraft lightning strike zones 
 
External radome and antenna installations also receive a larger number of direct 
attachments for which the aircraft requires protection. When assessing lightning 
protection continued airworthiness, it is important to create a list of all lightning 
direct and indirect effects protection.  
 
Table 5-9 provides a comprehensive list of aircraft lightning protection for the 
aircraft under evaluation in these case studies. As part of demonstrating the 
methodology contained in this work, certain lightning protection components will be 
selected from the installed list and evaluated for continued airworthiness using the 
design evaluation sheets proposed in the methodology validation section of this 
thesis. During an aircraft design project, the collection of protection planned for each 
part of the aircraft is an important initial step to the deployment of this 
methodology. Though the systems contained in Table 5-9 are already designed, the 
case studies will evaluate each design as if it were part of the design process as 
shown in Figure 5-1 as “Lightning protection continued airworthiness and 
maintenance requirements”. Appendix E contains terms and definitions of terms 
used in the design and determination of aircraft Zones and the establishment of 
direct effects lightning threats for those lightning zones.  
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Direct or 
Indirect 
Protection 
Protection Type Aircraft Location System/Structure 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Wing Flight Controls 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Engine Engine Controls 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Strut Fuel & Engine 
Controls 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Fuel Tanks Fuel System 
measuring and 
indication 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Vertical Stabilizer Flight Control 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Wing to body Fairing ECS 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Horizontal Stabilizer Flight Control 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Empennage Auxiliary Power Unit 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Fuselage Internal Multiple Avionics & 
Electrical 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Flight Deck Avionics control & 
indication 
Indirect Wire Loom Shielding Electrical & Avionic 
Equipment Bay 
Avionics & electrical 
control 
Direct Structural Bond – 
Antenna 
installations 
Antenna penetrations 
through structure and 
radome protection 
Communication and 
navigation 
installations 
Direct Structural Bond – 
Bond jumpers 
Flight control surfaces, 
access panels 
Flight control 
mechanical 
equipment 
Strut fairing 
composite structure 
Direct Structural Bond – 
Picture frames 
(added conductive 
materials to aircraft 
surfaces) 
Wing Tips, rudder tip 
and rudder upper 
trailing edge 
Wing composite 
structure 
Direct Structural Bond – 
conductive mesh 
Wing leading and 
trailing edge 
Wing composite 
structure 
Direct Structural Bond – 
Expanded Aluminum 
Foil 
Nacelle and strut skin Nacelle and strut 
composite structure 
Direct Structural Bond – 
aluminum skin 
thickness 
Fuselage and wing 
metallic structure 
Fuselage, wing and 
fairings 
Direct Structural Bond – 
Flame Spray 
Keel Beam Antenna ground 
paths 
Direct Structural Bond – 
Diverter strips 
Fuselage installed 
antennas, nose radome 
VOR, ILD, glideslope 
Table 5-9 Aircraft Lightning Protection and locations for the aircraft in these case studies 
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Lightning zoning of the aircraft examined in these case studies is a fundamental 
design development step in determining appropriate lightning protection for the 
aircraft. Guidance on lightning zoning is currently contained in US Federal Aviation 
Regulations pertaining to fuel and electrical or electronic systems protection, 
however, because of the general application of lightning zoning to protection of all 
parts of an aircraft, the zoning development information has been updated, and 
presented in the SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices ARP5414 [5.47]. The 
ARP5414 includes clarification of the original zone definitions, introduction of a 
transition zone between Zones 1A and 2A, consideration of the effects of swept 
lightning leaders, and clarification of the influence of small protrusions on zoning. All 
of these design criteria were used in the development of the aircraft lightning zones 
and associated protection designs against the direct effects of lightning. 
 
Aircraft lightning zones are created to assist with lightning protection design criteria 
in different locations of the aircraft. These techniques have been developed by the 
SAE ARP 5414 [5.47] to assist designers with creating the lightning zone map. The 
reason for this guide is to provide aircraft designers an actionable technique for the 
development of lightning protection designs within the different lightning strike 
zones. Key to deployment of the guidelines in SAE ARP 5414 is the definition of 
lightning strike probabilities correlated to different aircraft lightning strike zones. 
Over many years of experience and testing the probabilities of lightning strike 
attachments in different locations has been observed. This SAE guide provides a way 
forward to differentiate different locations of the aircraft that are likely to 
experience different threats from lightning energy. In a study conducted by the 
national Institute of Aviation Research conducted at Wichita State University on 95 
business jet aircraft over a period of 5 years, information was gathered on damage 
caused by lightning strikes [5.14].  In this report a survey was taken from the 
Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Group (EEHWG) Document WG-46 that 
resulted in a general description of the zone strike percentages from different 
contributors within the industry. The early development of this data generated Table 
5-10 which was used as one source of information in the determination of lightning 
zone methodology. As can be determined from Table 5-10 (taken from General 
Aviation Lightning Strike NASA report), the leading aerospace companies in the 
industry have provided data that shows Zone 1 to experience strikes between 55 and 
87 percent of the time, zone 2 12 to 41 percent of the time and zone 3 from zero to 
23 percent of the lightning strikes. In general, the data, demonstrates the industry 
general agreements that Zone 1 including the radome and wing tips is more 
threatened by lightning strike attachment while zone 2 including areas on the 
bottom of the fuselage and wing tips and zone 3 which includes large areas under 
the wings are much less likely to be threatened by lightning strike attachments. 
 
 
Company Zone 1 (%) Zone 2 (%) Zone 3 (%) 
Boeing Data 87 12 1 
Airbus Data 66 34 0 
Dessault Data 55 22 23 
Fokker Data (jets) 53 41 6 
McDonnell Douglas Data 69 27 4 
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Company Zone 1 (%) Zone 2 (%) Zone 3 (%) 
Lightning Strike Database 77 20 3 
Table 5-10 Lightning strike distribution of aircraft manufacturers  
 
For the case studies in this body of work, the author has examined the lightning zone 
maps for the aircraft under study. Representative maps have been included within 
the case studies.  Data from the lightning strike studies generally confirms that the 
lightning zoning map in these case studies is consistent with other industry data. For 
the purpose of demonstrating the design methodology, a general understanding of 
the lightning zoning and lightning attachments threats in each part of the aircraft is 
helpful. The assessment sheets used within the case studies include a reference to 
the lightning strike zone within which the protection is installed. The methodology 
however, does not perform special assessments for different aircraft lightning zones 
since all the lightning protection is considered equally important, regardless of the 
lightning threat in the specific area where the lightning protection is deployed. 
Aircraft Structural Protection for the Case Studies  
The aircraft in these case studies has inherent lightning attenuation characteristics 
provided by the primary and secondary structure of the airframe, the details of 
which are discussed below. Structures and systems installations similar to those on 
certified airplanes produced by the manufacturer of the aircraft in these case studies 
have been verified for direct effects lightning certification by similarity. Non-metallic 
structures covering flight critical control components and cabling have been verified 
by analysis and/or engineering tests to prevent puncture by lightning. Engineering 
tests will use waveforms of [5.1] Advisory Circular (AC) 20-53A applicable to the 
location of the non-metallic structure. 
 
The basic metallic and carbon composite structure acts as a shield which protects the 
internal areas from lightning strikes. The primary structure protects the electrical 
systems and wiring from lightning and electromagnetic interference. Conductive 
coatings on the flight deck windows for window heat provide lightning attenuation 
with no additional modifications required to protect the aircraft and crew. 
Non-Metallic Structural Components Description 
Non-metallic surfaces will be designed to meet the lightning environment for the 
zone in which they are located. The non-metallic surfaces will prevent a direct 
lightning attachment to any underlying electrical/electronic, or fuel wiring or aircraft 
components performing functions that are safety-related. During design of the 
aircraft, the structural protection requirements and designs develop through a 
process of test, determinations of past installation techniques that may be also 
effective for the new design, and development of the lightning zones. Structural 
lightning protection for the aircraft in these case studies consists of the following: 
1. Structure surrounding antenna penetrations and bonding antennas use 
equipment shielding on connectors and direct grounding to structure. Direct 
grounding to structure can be accomplished by fay surface bonds between 
structural elements and the component shell or via bond jumpers. 
2. Radome lightning diverters  
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a. Include surface mounted diverter strips 
b. Bonding clips attached to the edge of the radome bonds each diverter strip to 
structure 
3. Structural component bond straps (or earthing cables) 
a. Access panels 
b. Spoilers 
c. Flaps 
d. Ailerons 
4. Wing tip structure 
a. Metallic strips mounted to the wing tips act as two dimensional faraday cage 
on composite structure to minimize damage after lightning strike 
5. Wing Leading Edge and Trailing Edge 
a. Protection mesh or metallic coating on outer layer of composite skin 
6. Nacelle and Strut Fairing 
a. Expanded Aluminum Mesh (EAF) on strut skins 
b. Bonding straps 
c. Other metallic materials such as Aluminum and Corrosion Resistant Steel 
used in the cowl and strut areas are both tested and proven to be inherently 
resistant to lightning puncture. 
7. Fuselage protection 
a. Aluminum fuselage skins are designed with adequate thickness to prevent 
puncture and unwanted attachment to underlying systems 
8. Wing to body fairing 
a. Expanded Aluminum Foil (EAF) mesh embedded in the wing to body structure  
9. Keel beam panel 
a. Flame Spray used to provide additional protection from puncture and 
attachment to underlying systems and also to provide a ground path for 
externally attached antenna 
10. Wing to body fairing environmental control system door 
a. Aluminum 
11. Empennage control surface and antenna protection 
a. Diverter strip for VOR navigation antenna cover on centerline of cap 
b. Aluminum picture frame to CFRP on Rudder Tip and upper trailing edge 
bonded to structure using bonding jumpers 
12. Tailcone 
a. Inherent protection provided by surrounding metallic aluminum structure 
13. Rudder  
a. Metallic strips on upper and lower surfaces of the composite structure to 
minimize damage after lightning strike 
b. Expanded aluminum mesh on forward section of rudder tip to minimize 
damage due to lightning strike 
c. Bonding straps for some external skins and control surfaces that attach to 
surrounding structure 
14. Horizontal Stabilizer 
a. Metallic strips on upper and lower surfaces of the composite structure to 
minimize damage after lightning strike 
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b. Expanded aluminum mesh on horizontal stabilizer tip to minimize damage 
due to lightning strike 
c. Bonding straps for some external skins and control surfaces that attach to 
surrounding structure 
 
Additional protection, separate from the structural protection system, has been 
added to specific communication and navigation antennas to prevent significant 
damage and adverse effects to the system components. The following methods were 
used to protect the communication and navigation systems: 
1. Inherent "shielding" of the antennas from direct attachment by virtue of their 
location with respect to surrounding structure or conformal configuration. 
2. System architecture to stand off unwanted voltage 
3. Prevention of direct lightning attachment to underlying antennas 
4. Bonding of antennas to surrounding structure 
5. Use of in-service history to show the low likelihood of significant damage to an 
antenna and/or an upset or failure to the system caused by direct lightning 
attachment to the specified antenna or its associated parts 
6. Use of anti-static coatings. 
 
Antenna components are protected against the potential adverse effects from 
lightning attachment in several ways. Ineffective protection can result in damaged 
antenna components. Antennas have different roles in providing information, 
location and communication links for the aircraft. Not all antennas are treated with 
equal emphasis in the design of an aircraft integrated system. Some antennas are 
not critical to the mission and some are critical. For the criticality assessment, the 
designer is required to discuss the potential of an antenna failure with the 
certification leadership on the aircraft development project. Though it may be more 
effective to impose the same continued airworthiness requirements on all antennas, 
it may not be necessary. Careful observation of the antenna design process and 
specific installation criteria for transferring lightning current from antenna to the 
aircraft is necessary to prepare for the continued airworthiness design assessment.  
 
 
Figure 5-21 Antenna Direct Lightning Attachment Effect 
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Antennas can be adversely affected when lightning attachment occurs. Figure 5-21 
shows an antenna disassembled after simulated lightning strike was applied to the 
antenna cover. The antenna shape and physical installation details are part of the 
lightning protection design. Protection methods used in these case study designs is 
one or more of the following methods: 
A. Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning attachment by virtue of their 
location and geometry. The manufacturer in-service history has shown that low 
profile antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood of direct 
lightning attachment 
B. The antenna covering is able to withstand a zone 1A direct lightning strike with 
only minimal damage 
C. The antenna covering is able to withstand a zone 2A direct lightning strike with 
only minimal damage and be able to function to its specified parameters 
D. Antennas located in the nose and fin radome are protected from direct lightning 
attachment by metal diverter strips that divert direct lightning currents to 
structure. Segmented diverter strips are used on certain antennas to prevent 
lightning attachment to underlying antenna components. 
E. Select antennas, those that are mounted on the fuselage, may be electrically 
bonded to structure to reduce the amount of conducted currents on the outer 
coax shield to an acceptable level in the event of a direct lightning attachment to 
the antenna. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or through the 
mounting fasteners. 
F. Inherent protection from surrounding metal structure 
G. As an option for customers to select, the SATCOM low and high gain antennas 
incorporate segmented button diverter strips to prevent puncture to the 
underlying antenna elements. 
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The following Table 5-11 and Table 5-12 describe the navigation and communication installations and associated protection methods. 
 
Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
Very High 
Frequency 
Comm. 
Blade Foot print area 
(retained sq. 
inches. Blade 
(retained inches 
from skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
The antenna shell proven to be adequate. 
Antenna’s mounted on the fuselage area electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
thorough the mounting fasteners. 
Glideslope, 
Weather 
Radar, 
Localizer 
Structurally 
mounted array 
and loop inside 
radome 
Inside Radome Antennas 
attached to 
structure 
Antennas located in the nose and fin radome are protected 
from direct lightning attachment by metal diverter strips that 
divert direct lightning currents to structure. Segmented 
diverter strips are also used on certain antennas to prevent 
lightning attachment to underlying antenna components. 
Traffic Alert 
and 
Collision 
Avoidance 
System 
Blister shaped Food print area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inch 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
Air Traffic 
Control 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antenna covering is able to withstand a direct lightning strike 
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Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
with only minimal damage and be able to function to its 
specified parameters. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
Radio 
Altimeter 
Conformal 
patch slightly 
above skin 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
Distance 
Measuring 
Equipment 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to keel 
beam panel 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antenna covering is able to withstand a direct lightning strike 
with only minimal damage and be able to function to its 
specified parameters. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
Table 5-11 Antenna physical installation design protection methods 
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Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
SATCOM Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, low 
profile blade, 
height (retained) 
inches from 
fuselage skin 
with segmented 
diverted strips 
on crown of 
antenna placed 
perpendicular to 
the centerline 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
with the 
segmented 
strips bonded to 
structure. 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
As an option, antenna incorporates segmented button diverter 
strips to prevent puncture to the underlying antenna elements. 
Global 
Positioning 
System 
Conformal 
panel slightly 
above skin 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, low 
profile blade, 
height (retained) 
inches from 
fuselage skin. 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in use 
on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes lightning strike history was used to validate similar 
lightning protection design methods for both structural and 
fuel components implemented on this design. 
Emergency 
Locator 
Transmitter 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, low 
profile blade, 
height (retained) 
inches from 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin. 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
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Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
fuselage skin. structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
High 
Frequency 
Radio 
Slot antenna 
with fiberglass 
window 
Installed within 
surrounding 
metal structure. 
Leading edge is 
inherently 
bonded to 
airplane 
structure. 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Inherent protection from surrounding metal structure. 
VHF Omni-
range (VOR) 
Navigation 
System 
Fiberglass 
Radome 
Mounted under 
a fiberglass 
radome with 
aluminum 
diverter strip 
mounted on the 
centerline. 
Diverter strip 
bonded at both 
ends to 
structure. 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Marker 
Beacon 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, low 
profile blade, 
height (retained) 
inches from 
fuselage skin. 
Antenna base is 
fay surface 
bonded to keel 
beam panel 
Antennas inherently protected from direct lightning 
attachment by virtue of their location and geometry. Aircraft 
manufacturer in-service history has shown that low profile 
antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood 
of direct lightning attachment. 
Antennas mounted on the fuselage are electrically bonded to 
structure. The bond is achieved either by a fay surface bond or 
through the mounting fasteners. 
Table 5-12 Antenna physical installation design protection methods 
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The antenna testing is part of the lightning protection design and certification. Means of compliance is gained in one or more of three different 
ways. 
1. Qualification on production parts 
2. Similarity to past qualification testing conducted on past production airplane 
3. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified airplanes in-
service lightning strike history was used to validate similar lightning protection design methods for both structural and fuel components 
implemented on the this design. 
 
The following Tables 5-13 and 5-14 describe the navigation and communication antenna installation test methods. 
Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
Very High 
Frequency 
Communica
tion 
Blade Foot print area 
(retained) inches, 
Blade (retained) 
from skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
1. Similarity to past qualification testing conducted on past 
production airplane. 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Glideslope, 
Weather 
Radar, 
Localizer 
Structurally 
mounted 
array and loop 
inside radome 
Inside radome Antennas 
attached to 
structure 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Traffic Alert 
and 
Collision 
Avoidance 
System 
Blister shaped Foot print area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inch 
from fuselage 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
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Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
skin 
Air Traffic 
Control 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot print area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
1. Similarity to past qualification testing conducted on past 
production airplane. 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Radio 
Altimeter 
Conformal 
patch slightly 
above skin 
Foot print area 
(retained) sq.. 
inches, height 
(retained) inch 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Distance 
Measuring 
Equipment 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot print area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to keel 
beam panel 
1. Similarity to past qualification testing conducted on past 
production airplane. 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Table 5-13 Antenna physical installation design test methods (specific tests, dates, and aircraft models removed from this table) 
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Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
SATCOM Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot print area 
(retained) sq., 
inches, low 
profile blade, 
height (retained) 
inches from 
fuselage skin with 
segmented 
diverter strips on 
crown of antenna 
placed 
perpendicular to 
the centerline 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
with the 
segmented 
strips bonded to 
structure 
1. Similarity to past qualification testing conducted on past 
production airplane. 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Global 
Positioning 
System 
Conformal 
panel slightly 
above skin 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Emergency 
Locator 
Transmitter 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base 
fay surface 
bonded to 
fuselage skin 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
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Antenna Antenna Type Antenna 
Geometry 
Lightning 
Provisions 
Protection Methods 
High 
Frequency 
Radio 
Slot antenna 
with 
fiberglass 
window 
Installed within 
surrounding 
metal structure 
Leading edge is 
inherently 
bonded to 
airplane 
structure 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
VHF Omni-
range 
Navigation 
System 
Fiberglass 
radome 
Mounted under a 
fiberglass radome 
with aluminum 
diverter strip 
mounted on the 
centerline 
Diverter strip 
bonded at both 
ends to 
structure 
1. Similarity to past qualification testing conducted on past 
production airplane. 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Marker 
Beacon 
Low Profile 
Blade 
Foot prints area 
(retained) sq. 
inches, height 
(retained) inches 
from fuselage 
skin 
Antenna base is 
fay surface 
bonded to keel 
beam panel 
2. Similarity to existing lightning protection design method in 
use on existing OEM airplanes. Note: A review of specified 
airplanes in-service lightning strike history was used to validate 
similar lightning protection design methods for both structural 
and fuel components implemented on this design. 
Table 5-14 Antenna physical installation design test methods (specific tests, dates, and aircraft models removed from this table) 
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Lightning Protection of Antennas 
Lightning protection components that protect antennas from the potentially adverse 
effects of lightning strikes are listed in the following paragraphs. Specific protection 
features for antenna components have been added to various antennas droning the 
design phase to prevent damage to communication and navigation systems, 
minimize damage to the antennas and eliminate any safety hazards associated with 
lightning currents on the antenna's wiring.  
 
Communication and Navigation Systems Protection - The acceptable loss or upset of 
these systems in the event of exposure to direct lightning attachment is dependent 
on its critical failure mode during a direct lightning event. For the (aircraft types 
retained) aircrafts the ILS (Glideslope and Localizer) and RA systems have a critical 
failure mode of undetectable erroneous data to the flight crew generated from the 
system in the event of a direct lightning attachment to the system's antennas. 
Whether the system receives erroneous data is dependent on the architecture and 
the damage to the antenna. For example, complete destruction of the antenna (ILS 
case) or set of antennas (RA case) would disable the system and would not pose a 
threat to the airplane. The concern is if the functionality of the ILS antenna or set of 
RA antennas is degraded to a point where the antennas corrupt the received signals 
and the system interprets these signals as valid data. For this to happen, the 
following sequence of events would have to occur (unique for each system). 
 
The Radio Altimeter lightning event- A direct lightning attachment occurs to the nose 
and sweeps back in the vicinity of the RA set of antennas. Since all RA antennas are 
in-line (fore to aft) it is remotely possible for lightning to attach to all four antennas 
in a single event. Direct attachment would have to occur to the antenna element 
itself. The antenna element is a printed circuit board with (thickness retained) of 
copper on top covered with primer and environmental paint cover. In order for 
direct attachment to occur, the voltage between the heel of the sweeping lightning 
arc and the antenna element would have to be high enough to puncture the paint 
cover. Since the RA antenna dimension is approximately (retained measure) inches 
long, the likelihood of puncture of multiple antennas during a single event is remote. 
 
The amount of energy in the direct lightning attachment to the antenna element 
would have to be small enough to degrade the receive antennas, not completely 
destroy the element. Based on statistical data reported in [1] AC20-53A, “Protection 
of Airplane Fuel Systems Against Fuel Vapor Ignition Due to Lightning, dated 4-12-85 
and (document reference retained), (aircraft type reference applicability retained) 
Fuel System Description and Analysis Document", 99% of lightning strokes in the 
continuing stroke phase are above 30 amps. With the minimum dwell time of a 
sweeping arc on painted aluminum being about 5ms (industry accepted value, non-
proprietary), the energy deposited into the antenna element exceeds the amount of 
energy required to vaporize the entire RA antenna element, rendering the antenna 
useless. The likelihood of a direct attachment depositing these low energy levels is 
remote. This is assuming a re-attachment to the antenna element would occur 
during the low-level continuing current phase which again is unlikely. 
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The ILS (Glideslope and Localizer) Lightning Event 
A protection system for the ILS antennas has been implemented but is only an 
option. However, due to nose radome interchangeability and reduced risk of damage 
to the weather radar, all (aircraft type’s reference retained) radomes will have 
diverter strips installed. Since the ILS protection system (i.e. diverter strips) is only an 
option the following scenario is presented to describe the inherent protection 
without the diverter strips on the radome causing a direct attachment to either the 
Glideslope or Localizer antenna. Based on past history, radomes without diverter 
strips have an increased rate of damage associated with lightning puncturing the 
radome and attaching to the weather radar. The position and geometry of the 
weather radar with respect to the ILS antennas "shadows" these antennas from 
direct lightning attachment. This concept is proven based on the lack of damage or 
upset in-service reports (for the entire manufacturer’s fleet) to the Glideslope or 
Localizer antennas or the system associated with direct lightning attachment. A 
direct lightning attachment to either of these antennas is considered remote. As in 
the RA scenario, the energy level deposited to the antenna would have to be low 
enough to just cripple the antenna, not completely destroy it. The likelihood of this is 
unknown but considered very low. 
 
Based on this analysis, the likelihood of undetectable erroneous data from both 
Radio Altimeter and ILS systems associated with the direct effects of lightning is 
acceptably small as determined by the design. 
 
Communication and navigation systems performing essential or nonessential 
functions have no critical failure modes. Therefore, the upset or failure of these 
systems or a subset of these systems when the antennas are exposed to the direct 
effects of lightning is acceptable. Various protection measures for these systems 
have been implemented to reduce damage and maintenance to these systems.  
Antennas are protected so that lightning damage to associated electronic equipment 
is minimized. One or more of the following approaches to antenna protection is used 
to protect the antennas (each approach has successful in-service records). 
a.  Location in a shielded area 
b.  Direct grounding of the antenna element to structure 
c.  Diverter strips that conduct stroke currents to ground. 
 
Verification of antenna protection is performed during the certification of each 
design by comparison to previous designs, test, and/or analysis. Table’s 5-11, 5-12, 5-
13, and 5-14 detail the location of antennas, protection method, and verification 
method. The testing associated with direct effects of the lightning protection for the 
antennas is listed below. The design methods used on the (specific aircraft reference 
retained) for direct effects lightning protection of antennas include one or a 
combination thereof of several lightning protection techniques such as diverter 
strips, antenna attachment conductive gaskets and bond straps strategically placed 
to provide a bond path from the antenna radome to the aircraft structure. 
 
Some antennas are inherently protected from direct lightning attachment by virtue 
of their location and geometry. OEM in-service history has shown that low profile 
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antennas mounted on the fuselage have a very low likelihood of direct lightning 
attachment. For antennas deployed in lightning Zone 1, the antennas are equipped 
with protective covering that is able to withstand a Zone 1A direct lightning strike 
with only minimal damage. For antennas deployed in lightning Zone 2, the antennas 
are equipped with a protective that is able to withstand a Zone 2A direct lightning 
strike with only minimal damage and be able to function to its specified parameters. 
For antennas located in the nose and fin radome, protection is provided to withstand 
a direct lightning attachment by metal diverter strips that divert direct lightning 
currents to structure. Segmented diverter strips are also used on certain antennas to 
prevent lightning attachment to underlying antenna components. Select antennas, 
those that are mounted on the fuselage, are electrically bonded to structure to 
reduce the amount of conducted currents on the outer coax shield to an acceptable 
level in the event of a direct lightning attachment to the antenna. The bond is 
achieved either by a fay surface bond or through the mounting fasteners. Most 
antennas use the inherent protection from surrounding metal structure. As an 
option, the SATCOM low and high gain antennas incorporate segmented button 
diverter strips to prevent puncture to the underlying antenna elements. 
5.7.4 Case Studies for Structures Direct Effects Protection 
These case study exercises will utilize assessment sheets to demonstrate the 
methodology. The structural lightning protection components that have been 
selected to demonstrate the methodology contained in this thesis are as follows:  
1. Nose Radome lightning protection - Diverter Strips 
2. Empennage VOR Antenna lightning protection - antenna cap diverters 
3. Rudder lightning protection – rudder tip and trailing edge diverter strips 
Case Studies for Structural Lightning Protection Components  
This selection of mechanical protection to aircraft structure covers the most 
common lightning protection schemes used in the industry.  
Part 1: Structural protection of Nose Radome General Description  
Protection of antenna radomes are often accomplished with both diverter strips of 
metallic material mounted to the outside of the radome and also earthing wires used 
as a path for lightning current to travel safely without damaging installations during 
a lightning strike event. Protection is also provided to structural extremities where 
lightning strikes may cause damage to the control surface. For the example 
demonstrated in this work, the rudder tip and trailing edges were examined. Often 
the trailing edges of structural control surfaces are made of composite materials. 
These examples provide a way forward for testing the methodology in a test case 
associated with composite structure protection. Composite structural components in 
Figure 5-22 and Figure 5-23 require specific protection designs that are tested, 
qualified and approved for application to the aircraft in these studies. Data was 
gathered from these tests to exercise the methodology and demonstrate how the 
methodology would work if used in an aircraft design program. The shaded areas 
depicted in Figure 5-22 and Figure 5-23 represents the composite structures 
applications on the aircraft under study. 
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Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-22 Composite Structural Members (Top View) 
 
Note: Details of aircraft composite structural applications Proprietary Appendix to 
protect the proprietary nature of the information. 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-23 Composite Structural Members (Top View) 
 
Note: Details of aircraft composite structural applications Proprietary Appendix to 
protect the proprietary nature of the information. 
Case Study 1 Structural Protection – Nose Radome Case Study and Assessment 
Sheet 
Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet 
Protection Component Name 
Nose Radome Lightning Diverter Strips 
    
Section 1. Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data 
Assessment Sheet Number STR001 
(STR=Structures, FUL=Fuel, SYS=Systems, ANT=Antenna) 
Engineer Name: Bill Wright 
Part Number:  P/N XYZ (part number retained to protect proprietary data) 
Manufacturer: Lightning Diverter Inc. 
Lightning Zone Zone 1 
Design Service Life Goal: Design for life of aircraft. No overhaul required. 
Date:  September 12, 2009 
Section 2. Component Description 
System Criticality: Critical 
Description: 
Lightning diverter strips are installed on the aircraft nose radome. The airplane shall be designed 
so that direct attachment to antennas, control surfaces, radomes, or any other exposed systems 
will not result in a failure due to a lightning strike leading to a potentially Catastrophic condition. 
The nose radome shall have protection against a lightning strike per the aircraft Lightning Zoning 
Diagram so that a lightning strike will not cause damage to the nose radome or systems that it 
protects. The diverter strips are installed to minimize the possibility of punch through the radome 
structure or create debris which could adversely affect the safety of the aircraft.  Bonding clips 
attached to the edge of the radome are used to bond each diverter strip to the aircraft structure.  
Design requirement:  The nose radome shall have externally mounted lightning diverter strips or 
bus bars that are electrically grounded to the bulkhead through clips with a bonding resistance 
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value of less-than-or-equal-to (<=) XYZ milliohms (impedance value retained).  
Assumption and Rationale for the specification of this protection (manufacturer specification 
number retained to protect proprietary data): This provides lightning protection to systems 
underneath the radome (such as the Weather Radar Antenna Unit and landing system) 
Section 3. Component Purpose and Operational Theory 
An installation of permanent lightning diverter rods is available for the aircraft nose radome.  At 
the customers’ option, diverter rods may be installed which will prevent radome lightning damage 
from a large majority of strikes to the nose radome area. Without the diverter rods, the high 
potential and large current associated with a stroke can cause penetration of the fiberglass 
radome with possible severe damage to the radome and to the antennas within It. 
Although the airplane can fly with a damaged radome, the diverter rods can reduce maintenance 
cost. A high percentage of strokes to the aircraft will be to the nose. Without the diverter rods the 
radome will be damaged by most of the nose-strikes. The radome will be protected from strokes 
up to 200,000 amperes (common industry accepted value) when the diverter rods are used.  
The lightning protection system for the aircraft nose radome is similar to that used on two other 
previously deigned aircraft (aircraft types retained to protect proprietary data). Damage from 
strikes on the nose should be confined to locally burn decorative paint and slight erosion of metal 
from the diverter rod. 
Section 4. Component Schematic and Installation Details 
Installation Details:  
A group of several diverter rods are located about the radome exterior so that regardless of the 
orientation of the radar antenna, the lightning discharge will flash over the radome surface without 
puncturing It. The diverter rods are constructed of a specified material (material specification 
retained to protect proprietary data) of approximately XYZ circular mils cross-section (material 
size retained to protect proprietary data), so that they are capable of withstanding several strokes.  
Bond Path Providing Protection: 
The bond path for the diverter strips is from initial lightning attachment to the diverter, through 
fastening hardware on the diverter to the surround band on the radome to an earthing ground 
strap from the surround band to the aircraft primary structure. 
The radome diverter strips protect against the attachment of lightning to underlying components. 
The lightning protection consists of metal diverter strips attached to metal conductor straps of the 
same type material; with the metal conductor straps (actual material for each component 
mentioned is retained to protect proprietary data) cemented to the composite radome with all- 
purpose epoxy. This is a controlled interface that requires no more than XYZ ohms (impedance 
requirement retained to protect proprietary data) between diverter strips and the conductor straps.  
The solid metal bus bars (diverter strips) with a prepared finish (material and finish retained to 
protect proprietary data) are mounted to a composite domed structure. The diverter strips are 
attached with multiple fasteners. The fastening system includes metal screws and nylon threaded 
  
146 
potted inserts (material and finish of screws retained to protect proprietary data). 
The most aft fastener on the diverter strips electrically bonds the diverter strips to the metal 
ground band (mounted on the radome); the bond path from the diverter strips to the ground band 
consists of a metal screw, with a prepared finish metal grounding bushing and doubler, a metal 
washer, and metal nut. After installation, the joint is sealed with a specified sealant (or 
equivalent). Note: Material, finish and specific sealant used on mounting hardware is retained to 
protect proprietary data. 
The first metal ground band (on the solid laminate skin on the aft edge of the composite dome) is 
mounted using a metal bolt with a corrosion protective finish (metal and finish retained to protect 
proprietary data) to mate assemblies and metal self-locking nut per manufacturer specification 
which are wet installed with a specified sealant. These fasteners are only conductive when 
installed in a controlled interference fit (~ XYZ inches) environment where the corrosion protective 
coating is expected to shear off and provide an adequate electrical bond. Note: all finish, material 
and sealant call outs along with specification numbers retained to protection proprietary data. 
The composite domed structure is attached to the forward metallic pressure ground band with 
eight metallic latches mounted to the radome and eight keepers mounted to the forward pressure 
bulkhead ground band. The latches and keepers are mounted with metal bolts, metal washers, 
and metal nuts using specific manufacturer specified (or equivalent) sealant. Note: specific 
material and finish of hardware and sealants retained to protect proprietary data. 
The metal bulkhead brackets create a bond path between the forward pressure bulkhead ground 
band and primary structure; they are installed using sealant with multiple metal rivets per the 
specific manufacturer bonding and earthing requirements, using specified sealant (or equivalent). 
The installation is fillet sealed with a specified sealant (or equivalent). Note all specification and 
materials retained to protect proprietary data. 
The metal radome brackets are wet installed using a manufacturer specified process and material 
surface bond and mounted to the ground band of the composite domed structure with metal bolts 
and metal collars using a specified manufacturer sealant (or equivalent). Note all specification 
and materials retained to protect proprietary data. 
The metal spring clips are wet installed using a manufacturer specified process surface bond and 
mounted to the primary structure on the metal forward pressure dome ground band with metal 
bolts and metal collars using a specific manufacturer proposed sealant (or equivalent). Note: all 
specification and materials retained to protect proprietary data. 
A typical radome configuration includes a radome attached to the aircraft with hinges like the one 
in the picture below. Many radome installation designs do not rely on the hinges to transfer the 
lightning current since the current is large and can weld the hinges in place if the hinges are the 
only path for the current to transfer to the aircraft primary structure during a lightning event. In this 
aircraft design spring clips are used to attach the radome diverter strips to primary structure 
through the ground band in multiple places circumferentially around the dome. 
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Bond Path Description: 
1. Diverter strip to multiple radome ground bands  
2. Radome ground bands are glued to the radome  
Note: Fasteners attach the diverter strips to ground bands 
3. Most aft ground band is electrically connected to the diverter strip through a fastener  
4. Forward ground band is attached to eight latches mounted to the radome  
5. Eight latches on the radome attach to eight keepers 
6. Eight keepers are mounted on the forward pressure bulkhead ground band  
7. Forward pressure bulkhead ground band is attached to eight brackets  
8. Eight brackets are attached to the forward pressure bulkhead 
9. Forward pressure bulkhead is attached to primary structure of the aircraft fuselage 
A detailed review of the material and finish interfaces was completed. Mounting hardware 
associated with bond path is found to be compatible and properly sealed by this analysis sheet 
evaluation of material and finish compatibilities. 
Section 5. Installation Environmental Threats 
The diverter strip installations are outside the aircraft pressure vessel and exposed to multiple 
environmental threats. To protect against these threats and ensure availability of a continued 
adequate bond path without undesirable impedance degradation, appropriate protection of 
materials and installations is applied as reviewed by this assessment. 
Description of installed environment: 
This installation is outside pressure vessel and exposed to severe temperature changes, 
contamination, and erosion from particulates, damage from hail or other objects impinging on the 
nose of the aircraft during flight. 
Flammable Leakage Zone Description and Protection: 
This installation of lightning protection is not mounted in a flammable leakage zone. 
Ratings of environmental threats: 
Location: Nose Radome Exterior 
Threat Type Rating of threat Installation resistance to 
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severity in this 
location 
(High, Medium, Low) 
degradation 
(High Medium, Low) 
System Operating Fluids (oil, 
hydraulic fluid, Grease and 
Lubricants) 
Low High 
Chemicals and Applied Fluids 
(cleaning fluids, fire retardants, de-
icing, wing anti-ice fluids, liquid 
cooling) 
Medium High 
Natural Occurring Fluids 
(condensation, precipitation,  
humidity, ice, rain, snow) 
High High 
Temperature Exposure (swings in 
temperature, and extensive exposure 
to extreme high or low temperatures) 
Medium High 
Vibration (low or high frequency 
vibration) 
Medium High 
Fuel (Exposure to fuel) None High 
Flammable Leakage Zone (Yes/No) None High 
 
Section 6. Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment 
The continued airworthiness of associated components within the lightning protection designed 
bond path is expected to last the life of the installation on the aircraft. The radome has been 
designed to withstand accidental impact damage. Damage will only occur as a result of accidental 
physical impact or severe lightning strike that would be evident to the operating crew. Service 
experience is expected to be similar to other aircraft radome installation designs. All fasteners are 
installed with sealant and interfaces between fay surface components such as the bulkhead 
brackets and ground bands also include sealants in the interfaces that prevent moisture ingress 
and potential subsequent corrosion. Fasteners are coated with corrosion inhibiting compound to 
prevent unexpected corrosion and resulting impedance increases within the lightning electrical 
bond path. Fastener installations are similar to installations in many designs previously installed 
on other models by this manufacturer and have proven successful performance. 
Section 7. Test Plan Input 
The effectiveness of the radome protection system and its effect on antenna efficiency has been 
checked in the laboratory. Qualification testing included specific lightning diverter placement to 
ensure most effective lightning damage mitigation while also maintaining good antenna 
communication capability behind the radome installation. In addition, the radome was struck by 
simulated lightning after a specified number of hours (number of hours retained to protect 
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proprietary data) exposure to salt spray (the minimum required by Specification DO-160). 
Radomes with metal diverter strips perform well in-service to protect the underlying systems from 
damage. The radome and diverter strips perform their intended function well, but can be 
damaged when struck by lightning. Post lightning strike inspections ensure the diverter strips are 
intact and functional. It is expected that the laboratory testing for the specific radome 
configuration under test include adequate environmental threat applied to the radome with 
diverters installed to prove the radome protection will be adequately available throughout the life 
of the installed parts. If additional input is required for the continued airworthiness engineer, 
please contact the lead engineer noted at the top of this assessment for clarification. 
Section 8. Test Data Results 
The effectiveness of the radome protection system and its effect on antenna efficiency has been 
checked in the laboratory. 
Tests with simulated lightning have shown that the aircraft radome which is the same size and 
shape as two other aircraft designed and produced by this manufacturer, is adequately protected 
with four diverters as shown in previous designs on another aircraft produced by this 
manufacture. A number of rods are used to allow for possible deterioration of radome dielectric 
strength. The permanent diverter strips do not degrade the radome performance below that 
recommended for Radomes. 
Qualification testing included: 
1. Qualification testing to validate the lightning performance of the radome to include peak kA, 
number of strips, and placement of strips 
2. The structural qualification test procedure covers bird strike, hail, chemicals, salt spray, etc. 
3. Electrical qualification testing. 
All qualification testing was completed to the satisfaction of the test lab and the radome is 
expected to be certifiable upon review by regulatory authorities of the qualification test results and 
threat levels. 
Section 9. Report from Test Engineer Regarding on Continued Airworthiness 
Test Engineer Name: Robert Crumb 
Report: (include significant findings 
and relevance to continued 
airworthiness) 
Lightning strike diversion effectiveness and diverter 
security of attachment to Radome:  Investigation was 
conducted to prevent moisture ingression into the aircraft 
nose radome. Moisture may enter the honeycomb core 
either through the multiple ply fiberglass/epoxy face sheet, 
fastener penetrations for the lightning diverter strips or in-
service repairs. The subject of this evaluation is the current 
and alternative methods of preventing moisture at the 
fastener locations. The lightning diverter strips are fastened 
to the exterior of the radome by fastening to a non-
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conductive material. The non-conductive inserts are sealed 
and bonded per the aircraft manufacturer specification 
(specification retained to protect proprietary data). The 
manufacturer specification states that the drawing must 
specify a primer for it to be a required part of the fabrication 
procedure. The specified primer enhances the bond of the 
sealant to many substrates.  
Conclusion for diverter strip attachment: 
1. The sealant that provides the best bond to the non-
conductive insert was a manufacturer specification sealant 
and primer. High torque loads relative to the other methods 
and cohesive failure modes were achieved. This 
performance was significantly degraded by not applying the 
specified primer. 
2. The manufacturer specified sealant did not adhere to the 
non-conductive insert with either of the conditions evaluated. 
The failure torque load was low and highly variable. 
3. Because the manufacturer specified process bonds to the 
non-conductive material, it provides a barrier to moisture 
penetration after the sealant that is bonded to the core. The 
relative quality of the manufacturer specified sealant seal 
versus another manufacturer specified sealant type seal is 
unknown under production conditions. In the production 
environment, both sealants are vulnerable to incomplete 
filling due to operator workmanship. However, the lower 
viscosity of the sealant may help ensure uniformity. 
4. A possible feature of the poor adhesion of alternative 
sealant specification is that it makes it easier for airlines to 
remove and replace the lightning diverter strips. 
Section 10. Design Revision Request 
None 
Section 11. Revision accepted by Program 
N/A 
Section 12. Description of Final Optimized Design 
Action Taken: Report posted with change to specified sealant and process. 
The design of the radome lightning protection diverters has been determined to be acceptable for 
installation on the aircraft with one specific revision to the tested design. The use of sealant in the 
fastener interface to the radome diverter to ensure that moisture does not ingress into the 
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radome-to-diverter interface and cause an increase of the lightning bond path resistance is highly 
recommended to be the manufacturer recommendations for this test using a specific referenced 
primer. This sealant has been shown to perform best for the application. Deviations within the 
design from this recommendation are requested to be sent to the attention of the lightning 
protection continued airworthiness assessment engineering group. 
Approval: 
Mr. G. Sweers, Lightning Protection Analyst Original Signed 
Mr. Keith Smith, Lightning Protection Designer Original Signed 
Mr. Jacob Owen, Bonding and Earthing Engineer Original Signed 
Mr. John Taylor, Chief Engineer Original Signed 
 
Figures attached to Assessment Sheet for Nose Radome Installation 
The following graphics are collected for use in the assessment of the lightning 
protection. These graphics were used to identify key component attributes 
contained within the assessment sheets. 
 
 
Figure 5-24 Radome 3-D View and general orientation 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
 Figure 5-25 Radome dimensions and diverter strip locator 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-26 Radome diverter strip fastener locations 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-27 Radome bond jumper installation detail and location 
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Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-28 Radome diverter strip installation detail and specifications 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-29 Radome diverter strip length and part number 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-30 Radome diverter strip blind fastener installation 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-31 Radome diverter strip length and part number 
Structural Protection of Empennage General Description 
The aircraft empennage contains several varieties of lightning protection 
components, all of which are in place to protect against the direct effects of lightning 
on the empennage structure with the exception of the VOR fin cap protection which 
is provided to protect the structural aspects of the VOR cap. The lightning protection 
is necessary to protect composite structural components used in the empennage 
control surfaces. Lightning protection consists of components listed in Figure 5-32 to 
protect the rudder, rudder tip and horizontal stabilizer tip. 
 
 
Figure 5-32 Empennage Structural Protection Components 
 
A - Aluminum Mesh Protection on tips 
B - Aluminum Strip Protection on rudder 
C - Aluminum Mesh Protection on forward portion of rudder tip for VOR antenna 
D - Aluminum Strip Protection on horizontal stabilizer  
 
With the protection identified in Figure 5-32 in place, severe damage to structural 
components that make up the empennage flight control surfaces will minimize 
negative impact on the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. 
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Part 2: Structural Protection of Empennage  VOR Antenna General Description 
The VOR system has two VOR/marker beacon (VOR/MB) receivers. The receivers 
have VOR and marker beacon functions. The location of the VOR antenna installation 
is contained in Figure 5-33 depicted at the top of the rudder. The navigation (NAV) 
control panels give manual tune inputs to the VOR/MB receivers. There are two NAV 
control panels, one for the captain and one for the first officer. RF signals from the 
VOR/LOC antenna go to the VOR/MB receivers. The VOR/MB receivers use the RF 
signals to calculate station bearing and decode the Morse code station identifier 
signal and station audio. The receivers send VOR bearing to the remote magnetic 
indicator (RMI). You can select the RMI bearing pointers to show VOR or ADF station 
bearing with the RMI bearing pointer selectors. The receivers send VOR bearing data 
to the displays in the flight deck for display. The switches in the flight deck allow the 
crew to select VOR/MB receiver 1 or VOR/MB receiver 2 as the source for the 
captain and first officer displays.  
Case Study 2 Structural Protection - Empennage VOR Antenna and Assessment 
Sheet 
The VOR/LOC antenna is on the top of the vertical stabilizer. VOR/MB receiver 1 is on 
the aircraft equipment bay A shelf and VOR/MB receiver 2 is on the B shelf. The 
VOR/LOC antenna assembly is a fin cap type installed on top of the vertical stabilizer. 
The fin cap in Figure 5-34 shows the VOR antenna cap and Figure 5-35 shows the 
location of the diverter strip protection on the VOR fin cap. The antenna consists of 
two balanced half loops with a hybrid coupler added for increased reliability under 
fault conditions. The hybrid coupler is composed of two quarter wavelength lines 
with the dual outputs to the receivers shunted by a resistor. In addition, a tuning 
stub is connected to each half loop. 
 
Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet 
Protection Component Name 
VHF Omni-directional Ranging (VOR) System Antenna, VOR Fin 
Cap Antenna TYPE NO. DX 
    
Section 1. Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data 
Assessment Sheet Number ANT001 
(STR=Structures, FUL=Fuel, SYS=Systems, ANT=Antenna) 
Engineer Name: Bill Preston 
Part Number:  NAC2123 
Manufacturer: Antenna Products and Technologies of New Jersey 
Lightning Zone Zone 1 
Design Service Life Goal: Design for life of aircraft. No overhaul required. 
Date: November 12 2009  
Section 2. Component Description 
System Criticality: Critical 
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Description: 
The VHF Omni-directional Ranging (VOR) system is a navigation aid that gives magnetic bearing 
data from a VOR ground station to the airplane. The VOR/LOC antenna sends RF signals to the 
VOR/MB receivers inside the aircraft. The antenna installation is made up of an antenna radome 
mounted to the tip of the rudder using a number of leading edge fin type mounting screws. Under 
the radome are 2 RF type connectors attached to the antenna. Along the base of the antenna are 
a number of mounting screws. Several of the screws secure the trailing edge fin to the antenna. 
All mounting screws (Part number retained) are cadmium plated alloy steel self-locking. Screws 
are mounted using Cadmium plated alloy steel self-locking nut plates (Part number retained). The 
antenna mount is electrically bonded to the antenna. This interface is cleaned and prepared for 
an electrical bond upon installation of the antenna. The maximum resistance of the fay surface 
bond interface at the time of installation is X (resistance retained) ohms. A protective coating of 
corrosion preventive compound (Specification number retained) is applied to the mating surfaces 
of the airplane and the antenna structure. One manufacturer of this compound is produced by 
(Manufacturer information retained). The electrical bond is checked upon installation between 
antenna and airplane structure per (reference check retained). Resistance should not exceed 
(resistance value retained) ohms. 
Section 3. Component Purpose and Operational Theory 
Antenna Type (Part number retained) is intended for use with a VOR omni-range navigation 
receiver and localizer for instrument landings. It is designed to be installed as a tail fin cap for the 
aircraft. The (antenna type number retained) is approved under the manufacturer’s part number 
(part number retained). The antenna installation consists of metallic leading and trailing edge fin 
tips mounted on a fiberglass shell to provide an aerodynamic surface for the fin cap. 
The outline dimensions are shown in attached figures to this assessment. 
Section 4. Component Schematic and Installation Details 
For schematics, see drawings contained in the attached figures of this assessment. 
Installation Details:  
No repairs, other than replacement of the leading and trailing edges, can be made on the 
antenna. If damage or failure is noted, the antenna must be replaced. A damaged antenna may 
be returned to the manufacturer (Manufacturer name retained) for inspection and evaluation. 
The antenna connectors and coaxial cables should be visually inspected for damage or unusual 
wear. All mating surfaces, including those between the antenna, the leading, and the trailing 
edges must be carefully fitted. Assemble the antenna by replacing the leading edge or trailing 
edge antenna cover, as applicable, on antenna assembly. Replace screws and tighten. The 
mounting screws (part numbers retained) are Cadmium-Plated alloy steel recessed head screws. 
Bond Path Providing Protection: 
1. The aluminum diverter strip is electrically connected to the aluminum sub-structure with two 
cadmium plated CRES fasteners and self-locking cadmium plated CRES nut plates. 
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2. The aluminum diverter strip is attached to the fiberglass radome with multiple sets of cadmium 
plated titanium bolts and cadmium plated CRES collars 
3. VOR Radome is attached to the aircraft structure with cadmium coated titanium bolts and 
Cadmium plated Nut-plates 
Mounting hardware is sealed upon installation.  
Installation comment by reviewing engineer: 
According to a review by this Assessment Sheet engineer the interface between the mounting 
hardware and the aluminum structure is completed with compatible metals. 
Mounting hardware associated with bond path is found to be compatible and properly sealed. 
Section 5. Installation Environmental Threats 
The VOR antenna installation is outside the pressure vessel and exposed to multiple 
environmental threats. 
Description of installed environment: 
Installation is outside pressure vessel and exposed to severe temperature changes, 
contamination from airborne elements, and erosion from particulates, damage from hail or other 
objects impinging on the nose of the aircraft during flight. 
Flammable Leakage Zone Description and Protection: 
N/A 
Ratings of environmental threats: 
Location: Nose Radome Exterior 
Threat Type Rating of threat 
severity in this 
location  
(High, Medium, Low) 
Installation 
resistance to 
degradation  
(High Medium, Low) 
System Operating Fluids (oil, hydraulic fluid, 
Grease and Lubricants) 
Low High 
Chemicals and Applied Fluids (cleaning 
fluids, fire retardants, de-icing, wing anti-ice 
fluids, liquid cooling) 
Medium High 
Natural Occurring Fluids (condensation, 
precipitation,  humidity, ice, rain, snow) 
High High 
Temperature Exposure (swings in 
temperature, and extensive exposure to 
extreme high or low temperatures) 
High High 
Vibration (low or high frequency vibration) Medium High 
Fuel (Exposure to fuel) N/A High 
Flammable Leakage Zone (Yes/No) N/A High 
 
Section 6. Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment 
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According to the reviewing engineer, the continued airworthiness of associated components 
within the lightning protection designed bond path in this radome design is expected to last the 
life of the installation on the aircraft. The VOR antenna has been designed to withstand accidental 
impact damage. Damage will only occur as a result of accidental physical impact or severe 
lightning strike that would be evident to the operating crew due to antenna input errors or physical 
inspection of the dome after the lightning strike. Service experience is expected to be similar to 
other aircraft VOR antenna installation designs. All fasteners are installed with sealant. The 
interface between mating surface of the antenna and the structure is cleaned and a protective 
coating of corrosion prevention compound (compound reference retained) is applied between the 
two surfaces. This installation approach will prevent moisture ingress and potential subsequent 
corrosion. Fasteners are coated with cadmium; a corrosion inhibiting material to prevent 
unexpected corrosion that would result in impedance increases within the lightning electrical bond 
path. Fastener installations are similar to installations in many other aircraft models developed by 
this manufacturer that have demonstrated successful long-term performance. 
Section 7. Test Plan Input 
Testing for the interface between the antenna and structure shall be performed using moisture to 
simulate an antenna installation in a moist environment. Salt spray is an appropriate. This 
simulation shall test the resistance to corrosion of the antenna interface. Once moisture is applied 
over a period of (number of hours retained) hours or more, a test shall be conducted to ensure 
that the interface is within the (resistance value retained) Ohm resistance value required at the 
time of the original installation. 
Section 8. Test Data Results 
Tests for this installation have been accomplished by similarity to other past aircraft radome 
installation designs developed by this manufacturer. No new testing is required. Past 
performance results show resistance to the degradation associated with environmental threats 
and associated replacements of this antenna radome after lightning strike direct effect damage. 
Continued good performance of the lightning protection associated with the VOR antenna radome 
is expected. Additional testing is not required. Certification of this design will be submitted as 
based on past experience. Aluminum diverter strips perform well in-service to protect the 
underlying parts from damage. The diverter strips perform their intended function well, but can be 
damaged when struck by lightning. Post lightning strike inspections ensure the diverter strips are 
intact and functional and are recommended to be included in the service manual. 
Section 9. Report from Test Engineer Regarding Continued Airworthiness 
Test Engineer Name: B. Buckingham 
Report: (include significant findings 
and relevance to continued 
airworthiness) 
Lightning strike diversion effectiveness:  With diverter 
strips installed on the VOR antenna outer radome case, 
experience has shown that the possibility of damage to the 
radome cap and the underlying antenna caused by lightning 
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strike can be reduced.  
Eleven aircraft operators (aircraft type retained) have 
reported a number (number retained) of instances of VOR 
antenna damage resulting from lightning strikes. Lightning 
strikes have caused varying degrees of damage from small 
pit marks on the antenna elements up to almost complete 
destruction of antenna elements, coax cables, and 
fiberglass honeycomb fin tip cap structure. The path of 
lightning penetration to the antenna is suspected to be the 
antenna access door metal fasteners as seen from the tests 
conducted on this design configuration. A sustained 
lightning strike could cause the VOR system to become 
inoperative and require repair or replacement of the fin tip 
assembly before the next flight from service experience. 
Vertical diverter strips have proven positive experience 
when bonded on each side of the cap in the region of the 
VOR antenna on another aircraft type (aircraft type 
retained).  
A Service Bulletin (number retained), issued (date retained), 
concerned reduction in the likelihood of lightning strike 
damage to the (aircraft type retained) tip cap area. The kit 
cost listed as (cost retained) and the total labor requirement 
as (number of hours retained) man hours. A consequence of 
incorporating the modification would be that the whole fin tip 
cap would need to be removed to gain access to the 
VOR/LOC antennas. This is the typical design today for 
aircraft produced by this manufacturer and is the design 
used on the aircraft. 
The modification of the (aircraft type retained) aircraft VOR 
lightning protection design was optional and the operator 
had reportedly rejected it because of the low frequency of 
lightning strike damage to the VOR/LOC antennas and fin 
tip structure. The operators also considered that, while the 
additional diverter strips may assist in reducing damage, 
they would not preclude all damage, particularly from 
powerful strikes. 
Operators today experience better performance with VOR 
antenna installations due to past experience with VOR 
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antenna cap designs that include diverter strips installed 
with compatible materials and appropriate sealants.  
Section 10. Design Revision Request 
None. The design is robust against the lightning damage and operational threats. 
Section 11. Revision accepted by Program 
No revision requested. 
Section 12. Description of Final Optimized Design 
Action Taken: None recommended. 
Approval: 
Mr. G Sweers, Lightning Protection Analyst Original Signed 
Mr. Keith Smith, Lightning Protection Designer Original Signed 
Mr. Jacob Owen, Bonding and Earthing Engineer Original Signed 
Mr. John Taylor, Chief Engineer Original Signed 
 
Figures attached to Assessment Sheet for Empennage VOR Antenna Installation 
The following graphics are collected for use in the assessment of the lightning 
protection reviewed by assessment Sheet ANT001. These graphics were used to 
identify key component attributes contained within the assessment sheets. 
 
 
Figure 5-33 VOR antenna installation location 
 
The lightning protection provided for the VOR antenna structural attachment is 
required to maintain availability of the VOR function through many operating hours 
in service. In Figure 5-33 the VOR antenna is shown on top of the rudder where 
lightning strikes can attach directly. The electrical grounding (earthing) of this 
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installation is provided through intimate contact between the rudder fin cap and the 
surrounding attachment structure. In addition, a strip of metal is provided at the top 
of the fin cap to also aid in transference of potentially damaging electrical currents 
associated with lightning strike events. 
 
 
Figure 5-34 Antenna Cap 
 
 
Figure 5-35 VOR antenna cover and lightning strike protection strip 
 
Fasteners are used to secure the fin cap to the rudder structure. The analysis in this 
case study evaluates the effectiveness of the diverter strip attachments to the 
rudder fin cap on the top of the fin cap shown in Figure 5-36. Figure 5-37 shows a 
top 3-D view and the fastener attachments through the fin cap to the rudder tip. 
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Figure 5-36 VOR antenna cover fastener orientations 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-37 VOR antenna cover side view with dimensions 
 
The electrical bond for the fin cap installation is to be measured from the mounting 
bolt head in Figure 5-38 to the airplane structure. The maximum resistance between 
the structure and the antenna cover is (resistance value retained) ohms. Certified 
personnel shall be used to perform the inspection for proper resistance 
measurement of this installation after completed. Specification (Specification 
number retained) is used as the appropriate guide for ensuring that the proper 
installation process is used to achieve the expected resistance. 
 
 
Figure 5-38 VOR fin cap attachment detail 
 
For the fin cap installation attachment to the rudder tip structure, the self-locking 
fastener is used in Figure 5-38 to secure the installation. The surfaces are cleaned 
prior to installation and the specification (specification number retained) is used to 
ensure that the bond surfaces are free from contamination. A corrosion protection is 
also applied to the surfaces to ensure long term electrical contact. Personnel that are 
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trained in the application of (specification number retained) specification are 
required to perform the installation. 
 
 
Figure 5-39 VOR fin cap side view cut away revealing VOR antenna connector 
 
 
Figure 5-40 VOR fin cap top view cut away revealing VOR antenna connector 
 
Protection of the underlying connector installed on the VOR antenna as shown in 
Figure 5-39 and Figure 5-40, is provided by applying a good bond between the fin 
cap and the rudder tip structure while also sealing out the potential for moisture 
within the antenna assembly. This bond is important to maintain during operation of 
the aircraft in order to properly transfer lightning energy without the unwanted 
effects of damage to the antenna cap and potential indirect functional effects to the 
safe operation of the VOR antenna system. 
Part 3: Rudder Structural Protection General Description 
Lightning can cause rudder damage. For this reason lightning protection is applied to 
the aircraft rudder. Lightning strikes damage control surface trailing edges. To 
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understand the process of a lightning strike to an aircraft that results in this damage, 
one must consider the nature of lightning. Lightning occurs when there is a 
significant buildup of electricity in a storm cloud relative to some nearby object or 
region. Thus, if one end of a cloud becomes negatively charged and the other 
positively charged, lightning will go between the two charged cloud regions to even 
out the charge; this is called cloud to cloud lightning. As discussed in the lightning 
phenomenon section of this thesis (reference Chapter Two), lightning will seek a 
path to ground if the nearest point that will cancel the charge is the earth. This is 
called cloud to ground lightning. As a lightning strike event begins, lightning energy 
will follow the path of least resistance. The process of seeking the least resistance to 
ground will give the lightning to a jagged, forked appearance. As the lightning passes 
through the air it encounters air of different densities and particulate matter which 
causes lightning to divert along the path that is best suited for conduction. 
 
Aircraft do not have enough mass to act as an effective final ground for lightning 
strikes. Strikes that involve aircraft in the ground path pass through the aircraft when 
the aircraft is the path of least resistance at the time of the event. Thus, lightning 
must enter the aircraft and then exit it at a different location. Electricity attaches to 
discontinuities in the aircraft structure. With many discontinuities along the trailing 
edge, aircraft must design protection against sever damage due to lightning strikes. 
Lightning seeks the path of least resistance and the greatest discontinuity. Since the 
trailing edge panels of the aircraft in these case studies are not conductive, the 
lightning strike current must be diverted to a metallic structure so it may be 
conducted to another location to exit the plane. There are two ways to direct 
lightning current away from structure that may cause damage. One is to use flame 
spray over the surface so that a strike will dissipate across the panel surface to the 
surrounding structure. The flame spray has a high conductivity so that a hole will not 
burn through the panel on impact, however, after the initial strike, the bolt will tend 
to move across the panel to the edge discontinuity where it prefers to be attached. 
Attachments to trailing edge discontinuities is called “hang on”. Lightning strikes are 
not instantaneous and they can be followed by repeat strikes following the same 
path of least resistance. Burning can result along the edge of the panel, as the cross 
sectional area of the flame spray at the edge of the panel is less than the cross 
sectional area of the lightning strike. Therefore, some energy may enter into the 
composite structure and cause a burned damage to the composite structure. 
 
The second method of protection, which is currently being used on the trailing edges 
of the aircraft rudder assessed in these case studies, eliminates the edge burning 
problem. It involves attaching a (thickness retained) inch thick aluminum strip to the 
aft edge of the panel. The fiberglass is such a poor conductor that lightning will only 
attach at the trailing edge which is protected by the strip. Even if the strike initially 
attaches to the leading edge of the panel, it will "walk over" the fiberglass on the 
way to the aft edge. 
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Case Study 3 Structural Protection – Rudder Protection Case Study and Assessment 
Sheet 
The aircraft manufacturer in these case studies makes use of an anti-static coating 
called (specification retained) on fiberglass and other plastic surfaces. This coating is 
intended to facilitate the discharging and positive grounding of static electrical 
charges to the primary structure. In the case of the rudder, this conductive coating 
must also be applied to the panel with bonding fasteners for P-static protection.  The 
conductive coating does not have enough conductivity to dissipate a lightning strike. 
The lightning current will pass through the panel until it finds metallic structure or 
exits the other side of the panel. As lightning current is known to find the least path 
of resistance, a lightning strike may go through the panel if an alternative low 
resistive path is not available. 
 
A design challenge that must be solved pertains to proper transfer of the electricity 
from the panel to the wing box for conduction to another location for safe discharge. 
Normally the design path might be from the attach point on the rudder to the 
horizontal stabilizer where there is the greatest discontinuity of any location on the 
plane. With the aid of flame spray, the vast majority of electricity passes out of the 
panel through the bonding fasteners as this is the path of least resistance. Some 
minor component of the current also passes into the other fasteners that also go 
through the flame spray. Burn marks around the bonding fasteners as they heat up 
often results from lightning strike. The presence of burns or melting damage to 
fasteners is part of the post lightning strike inspection required to be performed by 
airlines after a lightning strike event. The aluminum strip does not have any 
designated bonding fasteners; however, the fasteners that are countersunk into the 
material will have good conductivity due to metal-to-metal contact between the 
fastener and the aluminum strip. This is the designs path of conduction out of the 
panel and into the surrounding structure. The number of fasteners available for the 
conduction, either designated bonding, or countersunk in the aluminum, may need 
to be greater than that required for P-static dissipation. For the number of bonding 
fasteners required the manufacturer designers have created appropriate design 
guides used to establish the rudder aluminum strip installation. 
 
Summary of installation protection requirements for the rudder under evaluation: 
a. Protect the surface with (specification retained) conductive coating. 
b. Use bonding fasteners. Apply a minimum of (number of fasteners retained) 
fasteners per panel and no greater than (fastener installation proximity retained) 
inches between any two on a single panel. 
c. Apply a (length retained) inch aluminum strip along aft edge the panel.  
 
Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet 
Protection Component Name 
Rudder Aluminum strip “picture frame” installation on Rudder 
Trailing Edge and Earthing Jumper 
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Section 1. Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data 
Assessment Sheet Number STR003 
(STR=Structures, FUL=Fuel, SYS=Systems, ANT=Antenna) 
Engineer Name: Byron Billings 
Part Number:  Part Number retained 
Manufacturer: Manufacturer name retained 
Lightning Protection Zone Zone 1 
Design Service Life Goal: Design for protection of rudder composite structure. 
Inspections and repairs may be required after a lightning 
strike event. No overhaul required. 
Date: November 16, 2009  
Section 2. Component Description 
System Criticality: Critical 
Description: 
The rudder protection consists of two aluminum diverter frames, two rudder diverter strips, an 
aluminum lightning doubler, an aluminum static discharger base, and two (size retained) inch 
insulated bond jumpers that move +/- (number retained) degrees with the rudder motion. 
The diverter picture frames and diverter strips are installed to the outer most layers (OML) of the 
carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) rudder panels per (installation specification reference 
retained) using (adhesive specification retained) as an adhesive bond. The forward edge of the 
diverter picture frames are connected through the CFRP rudder panels to the aluminum rudder tip 
closure rib with conductive titanium bolts and collars, per (installation specification reference 
retained) with (material specification retained). A lightning doubler on the left side and the static 
discharger base on the right side, bond the diverter picture frames to the diverter strips using 
conductive titanium screws and blind passivated CRES inserts. The lightning doubler and the 
static discharger base are installed per (installation specification retained) and sealed with 
(material specification retained) sealant. 
Section 3. Component Purpose and Operational Theory 
In general, for composite structure, Zone 1 and Zone 2 areas will require additional conducive 
material on the outside surface to provide lightning protection. Zone 3 will not require lightning 
protection except honeycomb structure which uses aluminum core. However, the lightning zones 
only reflect the probability and severity of a lightning strike. The optimum protection material 
choice depends on the size, shape, construction, and underlying material of the part, allowable 
damage as related to safety of flight, environmental durability, and maintenance for the airlines. 
The materials used for lightning strike protection are either expanded aluminum foil (part 
specification retained), aluminum picture frame, or diverter strips. 
Protection for the rudder is provided by the aluminum strip “picture frame” and the earthing 
jumper shown in the drawings. 
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Aluminum picture frames are used for lightning strike protection. Aluminum picture frames are 
used in areas of flat contours with a high frequency of strikes, and they are also used for 
economic reasons to allow a part to have multiple lightning strikes without significant damage that 
would require extensive repair. They are typically implemented on composite primary flight control 
structure such as rudders, elevators, and ailerons. They are generally placed in the tip areas 
which are categorized as Zone 1. 
A typical frame is made from (material alloy reference retained) aluminum alloy per (specification 
retained), (thickness retained) inch thick by (width retained) inches wide. The frame is either 
chromic acid anodized or boric sulfuric acid anodized (preparation reference retained). This 
process protects the aluminum picture frames from degradation due to corrosion. The frame is 
then primed with (material and process specification retained). 
The aluminum picture frame is subsequently bonded to the final cured part with (sealant 
specification retained) sealant per (process specification reference retained). Narrow strips of 
aluminum which may be bonded to the trailing edge of a part are also considered in this category. 
The aluminum picture frame must be properly electrically bonded to grounded metallic structure. 
If attached to CFRP structure as in this application for the (aircraft type reference retained) 
rudder, a fiberglass isolation ply is required to prevent galvanic corrosion.  
Proper bonding and electrical continuity from the aluminum protective strips is essential to 
continued protection from the direct effects of lightning. Without the aluminum strip protection, 
potential damage to the rudder could affect the continued safe flight by removing significant 
amounts of rudder composite material that could cause a negative effect on safe flight. 
Section 4. Component Schematic and Installation Details 
Installation Details:  
The rudder lightning protection is intended to remain installed unless damaged by lightning or 
other unexpected impact. Repair of the rudder lightning protection is provided in the structural 
repair manual.  
The trailing edge of the left diverter picture frame, left diverter strip, and lightning doubler are 
joined to the trailing edge of the right diverter picture frame, right diverter strip, and static 
discharger base through the left and right rudder skin panels using conductive titanium rivets that 
are wet installed per (installation specification reference retained) with (sealant type reference 
retained) sealant. 
The aluminum rudder tip closure rib is electrically connected to the vertical fin via two insulated 
bond jumpers (bond jumper part number reference retained).  
Bond Jumper description:  Terminals are to be completely hot dipped in tin to create (tin thickness 
reference retained) inches of thickness after punching, trimming, de-burring, and flattening the 
terminal. Tin material shall be in accordance with ASTM B 339. Tin wicking into the braid is 
(wicking thickness reference retained) inch maximum to be acceptable. The hot tin dip process 
including tin composition and flux shall be documented. The bond jumper is a weave of tinned 
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copper braided wires with (number of strands reference retained) strands of number (wire size 
retained) wire equivalent to (equivalent size reference retained) circular mils. 
Two upper aluminum brackets are mounted to the rudder aluminum tip closure rib and two lower 
aluminum brackets are mounted to the aluminum aft closeout rib of the vertical fin per (installation 
process specification reference retained) fay surface bond. Each bracket has two conductive 
titanium fasteners and aluminum alloy collars with a protective conductive coating. 
The bond jumpers are composed of tin plated copper terminal lugs with a single hole crimped to 
insulated tin plated copper stranded wire, with sealant inside crimp barrel and clear sleeve over 
top of crimp barrel. Two insulated bond jumpers are attached to the brackets per (installation 
specification reference retained) fay surface bond with (sealant type reference retained) sealant. 
The insulated bond jumpers are attached with titanium screws coated with protective conductive 
material, three aluminum washers, and a self-locking cadmium plated CRES nut.  
Bond Path Providing Protection: 
A. Left and right trailing edge diverters connected through the CFRP skin panels with 
conductive titanium rivets that are wet installed per (installation specification reference 
retained) with (sealant type reference retained) sealant. 
B. The lightning doubler on the left side and a static discharger base on the right side bond 
the diverter picture frames to the diverter strips using titanium screws and passivated CRES 
inserts, per (installation specification reference retained) with (sealant type reference 
retained) sealant. 
C. The forward edge of the diverter picture frames are connected through the CFRP rudder 
panels to the aluminum rudder tip closure rib with conductive titanium bolts and collars, per 
(installation specification reference retained) with (sealant type reference retained). 
D. Two upper aluminum brackets are mounted to the aluminum rudder tip closure rib per 
(installation specification reference retained) fay surface bonds, each with two conductive k-
coded titanium fasteners and aluminum alloy collars. 
E. Two bond jumpers are attached at each end to the upper and lower aluminum brackets 
per (installation specification reference retained) fay surface bond (sealant type reference 
retained) with protective coated titanium screws, three aluminum washers, and a self-locking 
cadmium plated CRES nut. 
F. Two lower aluminum brackets are mounted to the aluminum aft closeout rib of the vertical 
fin per (installation specification reference retained) fay surface bond, each with two titanium 
aluminum pigmented coated fasteners and aluminum alloy collars. 
Mounting hardware is sealed upon installation. Interface between the mounting hardware and the 
aluminum structure is completed with compatible metals. 
Mounting hardware associated with bond path is found to be compatible and properly sealed. 
Section 5. Installation Environmental Threats 
The diverter strip and bond jumper installation is outside the pressure vessel and exposed to 
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multiple environmental threats. 
Description of installed environment: 
Installation is outside pressure vessel and exposed to severe temperature changes, 
contamination, and erosion from particulates, damage from hail or other objects impinging on the 
rudder of the aircraft during flight. 
Flammable Leakage Zone Description and Protection: 
Flammable leakage can exist in this location due to potential hydraulic leaks in combination with 
an ignition source such as lightning or fault currents. 
Ratings of environmental threats: 
Location: Nose Radome Exterior 
Threat Type Rating of threat 
severity in this 
location  
(High, Medium, Low) 
Installation 
resistance to 
degradation  
(High Medium, 
Low) 
System Operating Fluids (oil, hydraulic fluid, 
Grease and Lubricants) 
High High 
Chemicals and Applied Fluids (cleaning 
fluids, fire retardants, de-icing, wing anti-ice 
fluids, liquid cooling) 
High Medium 
Natural Occurring Fluids (condensation, 
precipitation,  humidity, ice, rain, snow) 
High Medium 
Temperature Exposure (swings in 
temperature, and extensive exposure to 
extreme high or low temperatures) 
Medium High 
Vibration (low or high frequency vibration) Medium Medium 
Fuel (Exposure to fuel) N/A High 
Flammable Leakage Zone (Yes/No) Yes High 
 
Section 6. Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment 
The continued airworthiness of associated components within the lightning protection designed 
bond path is expected to perform the function of minimizing more severe damage to the 
composite rudder if the aluminum strip were not installed. The rudder aluminum strip has been 
designed to withstand accidental impact damage. Damage will only occur as a result of accidental 
physical impact or severe lightning strike that may be evident to the operating crew due to 
antenna input errors. For lightning strike incidents that do not have an effect on operation of the 
antenna, service experience shows that installation of the aluminum strips reduces potential for 
serious damage. Many strikes to this area of the aircraft are noticed by operating crew due to 
noise while in flight and recorded in the maintenance log book upon arrival to the destination. At 
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that time, the airline operator will conduct an inspection of the rudder and determine repair 
requirements. Service experience is expected to be similar to other aircraft rudder installation 
designs. All fasteners are installed with sealant. This reduces ingress of moisture and subsequent 
degradation of the electrical bond. The interface between mating surface of the antenna and the 
structure is cleaned and a protective coating of corrosion prevention compound (compound type 
reference is retained) is applied between the two surfaces. This installation approach will also 
prevent moisture ingress and potential subsequent corrosion. Fasteners are coated with 
cadmium, a corrosion inhibiting material, to prevent unexpected corrosion and resulting 
impedance increases within the lightning electrical bond path. Fastener installations are similar to 
installations in many other models built by this manufacturer with proven successful performance. 
Section 7. Test Plan Input 
Testing for the rudder aluminum strip should ensure that all fasteners and interfacing materials 
are made of compatible material. The rudder aluminum protection strips are included in the 
rudder design to ensure that lightning strike do not cause significant damage while also providing 
an electromagnetic window from which the operating antenna below the rudder cap can function 
adequately. In this design adequate amounts of metallic material are driven by the test results. 
When the surface ply has the metallic strip attached, the use of appropriate sealants is required. 
For the metallic surface of the lightning protection strips, a corrosion protection finish is required 
such as boric sulfuric acid anodized or chromic acid anodized to the surface of the metal. In 
locations where the metal is expected to provide an electrical bond path, the use of cleaning 
methods to expose the metal to metal bond shall be used with a subsequent application of 
sealant to prevent moisture from ingression of moisture into the metal joint over time. For the test 
of these designs, it is expected that the component be exposed to moisture, salt spray, and 
temperature fluctuations to simulate as best possible, the effects of the environment over time. 
When dissimilar metal such as aluminum are attached or bonded to CFRP, an electric potential 
difference will exist. Dissimilar metals to CFRP include aluminum, steel (except CRES), cadmium 
plated steel, cadmium-titanium plated steel, zinc plated steel, and tungsten. In the presence of an 
ionic solution, e.g. water, the dissimilar metal becomes an anode and the CFRP becomes a 
cathode. When a galvanic reaction occurs, the dissimilar metal is oxidized and corrodes away. 
There are a variety of dissimilar metal components which could come in contact with CFRP.  
These include: 
. (Specification reference retained), Expanded Aluminum Foil 
. (Specification reference retained), Aluminum Foil 
. Aluminum Picture Frames 
. Aluminum Diverter Strips 
. Fittings 
. Fasteners 
When aluminum comes in contact with CFRP, a fiberglass ply must be located on the CFRP 
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surface to inhibit galvanic corrosion. The boundaries of the isolation ply must be identified on the 
drawing picture sheet, if other than a full ply. The knowledgeable engineer will choose the 
appropriate fiberglass isolation plies for each of the CFRP materials provided in the 
manufacturers design guide. 
In addition to separating dissimilar metals from the CFRP with an isolation ply, galvanic corrosion 
may occur if the CFRP cut edges are within a (distance reference retained) inch moisture path of 
the dissimilar metals. To inhibit the galvanic corrosion, the CFRP cut edges must be sealed. The 
knowledgeable engineer will seal the CFRP cut edges per (specification reference retained). 
If fasteners contact CFRP material, the fasteners are typically wet installed (coated in sealant), 
and the head of the fastener is covered in sealant. The material and process notes for the sealing 
of fasteners is addressed as an input to this test by the knowledgeable engineer because it is 
related to mechanical assembly.  Mechanical assembly is to be addressed by another 
knowledgeable engineer where coordination of the mechanical requirements must be integrated 
with the requirements to protect CFRP from contact with non-compatible metallic fasteners. 
Aerodynamic surfaces of composite parts are subject to rain erosion on all surfaces that will be 
exposed to an angle of attack of (angle reference retained) degrees. These parts, e.g. radome, 
may require special finishes. If rain erosion is an issue, the knowledgeable engineer will inform 
the designer to consult the knowledgeable engineer in Materials Technology for appropriate 
measures to protect the structure. 
Section 8. Test Data Results 
Tests for this installation have been accomplished by similarity to other past aircraft models. 
Aluminum “picture frames” and bond jumpers have been installed on other model aircraft (specific 
aircraft models retained) where the aluminum is mounted to a CFRP structural member and the 
bond jumper is used to attach the picture frame on a composite structure to primary structure. 
Past testing summarizes good results for aluminum strips to possible lightning hazards 
associated with the operation of the (specific airplane series reference retained) series airplane 
and makes certain that this airplane and its electronic equipment is adequately protected against 
lightning discharge. The test results were established by the recent increase in emphasis on 
system reliability rather than by any special vulnerability connected with the new aircraft 
configuration. For this reason additional testing was not performed for this specific aircraft type 
application but rather service experience was used to determine appropriate long term design for 
the rudder protection. Strike probabilities associated with all aircraft show that the rudder area is 
struck by lightning without known serious impact to aircraft continued safe flight and landing. Use 
of this technique has shown in the laboratory that the design will adequately reduce any existing 
hazard to an acceptable level. The laboratory work was accomplished through the cooperation of 
principle laboratory technicians with general samples of composite structure and associated 
adhesion of the aluminum strips to the sample structural member. Lightning threat of 200 amps 
was applied using the waveforms called out by the industry design standard DO160 document. 
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Damage to the composite structure was reduced and proven through test when addition of 
aluminum strips is applied to the structure. The anodized exterior of the aluminum strips reduced 
corrosion of the aluminum when exposed to (hours retained) hours of salt spray. Damage to the 
aluminum strips due to lightning were repaired in only a few of the many test cases. 
Bond jumper testing proved good before exposure to any environmental threats. After exposure 
to (number of hours retained) hours of salt spray the tin plating on the copper bond jumpers 
deteriorated slightly. Bending of the webbed jumpers proved to cause fraying and reduced the 
overall resistance of the bond jumper. The combination of salt spray and flexing of the bond 
jumpers in test resulted in broken strands and much more damage to the jumper when subjected 
to the 200 amp lightning strike current. The lightning strike current waveforms were determined 
by the DO160 document similar to the tests conducted on the entire composite structure 
composite samples. The bond jumper wire was not connected to the picture frame aluminum 
strips in a simulated fashion to the proposed installation. 
Section 9. Report from Test Engineer Regarding Continued Airworthiness 
Test Engineer Name: B. Waltmer 
Report: (include significant findings 
and relevance to continued 
airworthiness) 
Lightning strike diversion effectiveness:  With aluminum 
strips installed on the rudder trailing edge, experience has 
shown that the possibility of damage caused by lightning 
strike is reduced. Use of the tin plated bond jumpers in 
exposed areas has not proven robust in service and poor 
performance against corrosion resistance has been 
repeated in the lab. Some degradation occurred with the 
bond jumper external Tin coating after exposure to salt 
spray. Additional degradation occurred after the flex tests.  
Resistances were measured with a low resistance bond 
meter before and after the tests were conducted. Resistance 
of the bond jumper prior to exposure to the environmental 
threats was (resistance value retained) milliohms. After 
exposure to salt spray the resistance was (resistance value 
retained) milliohms, higher than the original measured value. 
The bond jumper was measured for resistance after the flex 
tests. This was measured at (value retained) average 
milliohms above the original degraded value. Bond jumpers 
that were subjected to the salt spray were not subjected to 
the flex test. The combination of these two tests is expected 
to cause more severe degradation than the sum of the two 
test result averages. The impracticality of testing the bond 
jumpers under the combined threats resulted in separate 
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test results that require a combined effects assessment. 
Use of cap seals on the bond jumper has shown in test to 
allow crevice corrosion. Moisture runs down the drip path 
into the termination point and collects at the terminal 
fastener location between the terminal and the attached 
structure. The inability of the fillet seal to keep moisture out 
of the bond jumper terminal interface contributed to the 
degradation. In disassembly of the terminal joint, it was 
found that voids caused areas within the sealant application 
to capture moisture. Wet operating environments or 
corrosive fluids contribute to the problem. In addition, stress 
corrosion was noted due to the combined stress associated 
with the flexing of the terminal, cracking of the sealant, and 
tensile stresses created in the corrosive environment. 
Section 10. Design Revision Request 
Based on results in service and duplication of the problem in the laboratory testing, it is 
recommended that the installation designer consider two potential alternatives to applications for 
bond jumpers in corrosive environments. 
1. Use of fay surface bonding. 
Design revision request suggests that the laboratory include a fay surface bond in place of the 
fillet seal bond for applications of these bond jumpers in corrosion environments. Fay seal bonds 
are more effective in eliminating moisture within fay surfaces between the fastener, washer, 
terminal and mounting structure. For these fay surface bonds, suggest the use of process 
specification (process specification reference retained). This application will ensure use of sealant 
between all faying surfaces in the fastened terminal and a torque of the fastener sufficient to 
provide the conductive surface contact while squeezing out the excess sealant and creating a 
more moisture tight bond protection. 
2. Use of compatible fasteners, washers and terminals. 
In selecting the fasteners, washers and terminals, ensure that the materials interface is as 
compatible as possible to reduce galvanic corrosion activity. Use of a tin plated jumper should 
also be evaluated to ensure that the mounting surface of the aircraft structure is of the most 
compatible material. This can be achieved by reviewing the galvanic materials chart and selecting 
material exterior finishes that are closest together within the chart. As base materials may vary, it 
is most important to ensure that the finish on the exterior of the fastening systems and mounting 
structure are both conductive in nature and represent a low probability of corrosion. 
3. Improved design alternative - Use of Nickel plated bonding jumper. 
Nickel plated copper bond jumpers offer improved protection from moisture and degradation due 
to environment. The bond jumpers are composed of nickel plated copper terminal single hole lugs 
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crimped to insulated nickel plated copper stranded wire, with sealant inside crimp barrel and clear 
sleeve over top of crimp barrel. This design is more effective in eliminating moisture ingress into 
the bond jumper wire. The tin plated bond jumpers tested in the lab do not offer the same 
protection from moisture and should be used at locations on the aircraft that have a less moisture 
prone environment. The nickel plated bond jumpers are also insulated along the entire bond 
jumper wire as compared to no insulation on the tin plated bond jumper. In order to attach these 
nickel plated bond jumpers to aluminum structure effectively, the insulated bond jumpers may be 
attached to the aluminum brackets per (installation process specification reference retained) fay 
surface bond with (Sealant type specification reference retained) sealant. The insulated bond 
jumpers should use corrosion resistant outer coating on the fastener titanium screws, aluminum 
washers, and a self-locking cadmium plated CRES nut for the best overall performance. 
Section 11. Revision accepted by Program 
The program has evaluated the results of the test, in service evidence of performance in this 
moisture-prone location, and has determined that the recommended change to a nickel plated 
and insulated copper bond jumper is acceptable for this installation application. 
Section 12. Description of Final Optimized Design 
Action Taken: Revise the drawings and design to replace the tin plated copper bond jumper with 
the insulated nickel plated copper bond jumpers attached to the aluminum bracket structure with 
the recommended hardware and sealant process referenced in this evaluation. 
Approval: 
Mr. G Sweers, Lightning Protection Analyst Original Signed 
Mr. Keith Smith, Lightning Protection Designer Original Singed 
Mr. Jacob Owen, Bonding and Earthing Engineer Original Signed 
Mr. John Taylor, Chief Engineer Original Signed 
Figures attached to Assessment Sheet for Rudder VOR  
The following graphics are collected for use in the assessment of the lightning 
protection. These graphics were used to identify key component attributes 
contained within the assessment sheets. 
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Figure 5-41 Rudder lightning protection installation locations 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-42 Rudder lightning strike locations service history 
 
 
Figure 5-43 Rudder bond jumper installation 
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The bond jumper (strap) used in protection of the rudder is made of a braided 
copper construction with a tin outer finish. The bond jumper shown in Figure 5-44 is 
flat braided and can be used in locations where the bond jumper terminal 
orientation does not exceed a twist in the jumper beyond (twist limit retained) 
degrees between terminals. The manufacturer designated part number is (part 
number retained) and is tin plated copper with a hot tin dipped thickness of 
(thickness specification retained) inches thick. 
 
 
Figure 5-44 Aircraft rudder bond jumper design detail (dimensions retained) 
5.7.5 Aircraft Systems Direct Effects Protection against Fuel Ignition 
Lightning protection to reduce fuel ignition sources caused by lightning for these 
case studies consists of the following: 
1. Fuel Tank Skins Components 
a. Minimum thickness of  (thickness value retained) inches of aluminum alloy 
b. Skin joint (including to spars) sparking eliminated through use of inherent 
metal to metal bonding, fastening and sealing techniques (uses aircraft 
(aircraft type retained) wing skin joint test samples proving no sparks)   
2. Fuels Tank Access Doors Components 
a. Traditional satellite clamp ring to fasten door to wing skin  
b. Knitted metallic mesh mounted between access door and skin 
c. Non-conductive (material retained) dielectric strip between outermost 
periphery of the door and the wing skin internal to tank to eliminate 
possibility of sparking in wing tank 
d. Door materials use either a high impact door design with (material retained) 
honeycomb door and (thickness of metal retained) aluminum face material 
on the exterior side of the door with a nylon sheet on the inside of the door 
or a cast aluminum and a minimum thickness of (thickness retained) inches to 
protect against energy penetration. 
3. Surge Tank Fuel Vent Outlet Door Assembly  Components 
a. Bolt assembly used to attach door to the wing skin is designed to transfer 
lightning currents. Fuel sealant is used to eliminate potential sparking during 
a lightning event. 
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b. Rubber gasket between door and wing skin is bonded to skin through 
multiple fasteners. The rubber gasket provides a dielectric barrier between 
the door and the wing structure to prevent plasma blowout “sparking”.  
c. The vent is shaped with curved edges to avoid sharp edges in the opening 
design where “streamering” can occur causing an unwanted ignition source. 
d. Above the scoop is an aluminum lower duct that is fay surface bonded to the 
vent door to prevent spark and provide a designed current path. 
e. A flame arrestor and aluminum vent standpipe are also installed above the 
fuel vent outlet. The flame arrestor and standpipe are bonded to the lower 
duct via a fay surface bond providing a designed resistance selected by the 
designer between the standpipe and lower duct, the lower duct and the 
door, and the flame arrestor and the lower duct. 
4. Surge Tank Pressure Relief Valve Components 
a. The Surge Tank Pressure Relief Valve - is used when the vent outlet is 
blocked. It is made of a flush mounted poppet value constructed of cast 
aluminum that is flush with the vent outlet cast aluminum door when closed. 
b. Fay surface bond - The surge tank pressure relief valve is electrically bonded 
to the door that provides a specified resistance value. The housing encasing 
the valve is fay surface bonded to the door to provide the current path for 
lightning during a strike event. 
5. Fuel Tank Measuring Sticks Components 
a. Measuring stick assembly is installed on the lower wing skin panel and fuel 
tank access doors. There are several measuring sticks mounted in the main 
and center fuel tanks. The assembly includes a base plate, only for the access 
door installation and a gauge assembly. 
b. The gauge assembly is made up of a non-conductive thermoplastic poppet 
and retainer that is attached to a metallic base. 
c. In one design, the fuel access door is made of a nylon honeycomb substrate 
to sustain potential impact with (measure retained) inches of aluminum on 
the outside. 
d. In another design, the fuel access door is made of cast aluminum and is 
(measure retained) inches thick. 
e. The third type of measuring stick is mounted with a metallic base flush to the 
lower wing skin. The base plate is mounted to the cast aluminum doors and 
wing mounting is similar to that successfully used on the (aircraft types 
retained). The base plate of the stick is mounted to both types of access 
doors with four CRES lock bolts with alodined washers and CRES collars. This 
buildup achieves a low resistance electrical path from the mounting plate to 
the door. The base plate lock bolts and internally exposed joints between the 
base plate and the door are covered with tank sealant. 
6. Fuel Tank Sump Drains Components – used to remove accumulated water from 
the fuel tanks. 
a. Sump drains are in a housing that is fay surface bonded to the wing skin. 
b. Main tank installations are located in lightning Zone 2A and are considered 
lightning proof. 
c. Center tank sump drain valves are located in lightning Zone 2A and have a 
valve cover that is are bonded to structure via a bonding jumper and meets 
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the minimum thickness requirement of (thickness value retained) inches to 
prevent lightning energy penetration into the tank. 
d. Surge tank sump drains are located in lightning Zone 3 and are not lightning 
proof. Installation is standard type 1 bolt-on drains. 
7. Fuel Quantity Indication Components 
a. Fuel Tank Compensators - are AC capacitive probes that measure the volume 
of fuel and density of fuel. The tank unit consists of two concentric metal 
tubes. The inner tube has a varying diameter so that the capacitance of the 
tank unit is proportional to the volume of fuel in which it is submerged. The 
upper and lower ends of the outside of the unit, including the ends of the 
outer tube, are covered by a non-conducting cover to ensure that 
inadvertent contact between the electrical portions of the unit and any 
grounded structure will not short out the unit. The minimum gap between 
the inner and outer tube is (gap measure retained) inches. The compensator, 
a capacitor device like the tank unit, is located at low point in the tank where 
it is normally totally submerged so that its measured capacitance varies only 
with fuel dielectric. Minimum plate spacing for the compensator is (measure 
retained) inches. Each probe is supported at two points, one near each end of 
the unit. The support structure uses a hinged clamp which closes around the 
tank unit and is locked closed by a quarter turn fastener. Electrical 
connections use different size self-locking threaded inserts for impedance 
shield with the wiring exiting the terminal downward and retained by a wire 
retention clamping feature on the terminal block. The design ensures that 
terminals cannot be rotated sufficiently to contact each other or any 
electrically conductive surface. All wire terminations are crimped and 
soldered or crimped. Shielding within the terminal block is provided to 
minimize the amount of stray capacitance between the wires. A (voltage level 
retained) VAC dielectric test is conducted on all probes to determine if the 
construction is adequate to prevent sparking internally to the probe. This test 
ensures that the probe wiring is isolated from the probe chassis. 
b. Densitometer – Inherently shielded from lightning attachment by the location 
within the fuel tank. The optional densitometer used in the other aircraft 
(aircraft retained) fuel quantity indicating systems incorporates a vibrating 
cylinder. The cylinder is an integral part of the hermetically sealed sensor 
unit. The sensor unit is mounted inside the housing of the densitometer. Fuel 
flows into the densitometer housing through port holes on the side walls of 
the housing where it comes in contact with the inside wall of the vibrating 
cylinder. The frequency of vibration of the cylinder varies with density. This 
frequency is measured and the density of fuel is then calculated using a 
frequency-to-density relationship. The densitometer housing is fay surface 
bonded through a foot on the unit to a mounting bracket that is either driven 
rivet bonded to the rib or a jumper is used and attached to a bonding clip 
that is driven rivet bonded to the rib. Also, the sensor unit is electrically 
bonded to the densitometer housing. The electrical coil internal to the sensor 
units, used to induce and measure the frequency of vibration, are electrically 
isolated from the sensor unit housing. A (voltage retained) VAC dielectric test 
is conducted on each unit to ensure this electrical isolation is maintained 
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during construction of the sensor unit. The sensor unit is identical to the unit 
that is used on other (aircraft references retained) airplanes. 
c. Spar Penetration Protection - Wiring to the tank units, compensator and 
densitometer inside the fuel tanks are routed through a spar connector which 
penetrates the fuel tank. The electrical connector flange, inside the fuel tank, 
is fay surface bonded to structure to deplete any electrostatic charge 
generated due to fuel movement. Shielding is provided for the wiring outside 
the fuel tank. The shield is grounded to structure both at the processor and at 
the forward or aft spar and any intermediate connections. 
8. Overboard Drain Mast Components 
a. Drain Mast - The (airplane references retained) airplane fuel system drains 
any leaked fuel from the shroud surrounding the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
fuel feed line via a drain mast. The mast also drains hydraulic fluid through a 
separate tube. The mast protrudes down approximately (value retained) 
inches from the fuselage just aft of the wheel well on the left hand side. It is 
made of a foam filled fiberglass shell, adhesively bonded to an aluminum 
mounting flange. The fuel line that is foamed into the mast is electrically 
bonded to structure via a bonding jumper. The metal fuel line in the mast is 
electrically isolated from the metal tubing in the shroud drain line by a hose 
with a very high electrical resistance. A flammable air/fuel mixture may exist 
inside, around and/or outside the shroud.  
b. Flame Arrestor - In the event that an ignition source exists in this area, a 
flame arrestor has been installed inline within the fuel tube to prevent the 
flame from propagating into the fuel shroud area of the airplane. The flame 
arrestor is made by (manufacturer retained) and is installed approximately 
(distance retained) inches from the exit. The arrestor is a conventional design 
identical to that used on previous aircraft (manufacturer retained) models. 
9. Fuel Feed and Refuel/Defuel System Components - The fuel feed and 
refuel/defuel systems provide for engine and APU fuel feed, tank refueling, 
defueling and fuel transfer between tanks on the ground. The system consists of 
aluminum tubing, tube fittings, pumps, valves and sensors that are mounted 
inside and outside the tanks and on the front and rear spars. All wiring to the fuel 
feed, refuel and defuel components are routed external to the fuel tanks, except 
the wiring to the fueling valves which are routed through an aluminum conduit 
to a float switch installed inside the associated tank. The external wiring is 
shielded from the component to the fuselage. The purpose of the shielding is to 
prevent excessive induced lightning voltages from entering into the fuselage. The 
following lists the details of the lightning and electrostatic discharge protection 
provided for each component. 
a. Engine Fuel Feed - The engine fuel feed supply line runs from the fuel 
distribution ring inside the engine, to a boost pump mounted on the engine, 
up and aft along the strut and then penetrates into the fuel tank at the front 
spar. The tubing from the fuel tank front spar to the engine driven pump is 
segmented with each section tied together with (ampere rating retained) 
amp bonding jumpers for fuel static relaxation. The fuel feed tube coupler 
(bulkhead fitting) at the front spar of the fuel tank is fay surface bonded to 
the front spar for lightning currents dissipation and static charge dissipation. 
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b. Fuel Tank Boost, Override and DC Pumps - The boost, override and the 
optional DC pumps are used to move fuel from the fuel tanks to the engines. 
A total of (number of pumps retained) boost pumps per main tank, (number 
of pumps retained) override pumps for the center tank and one optional DC 
pump for the left main tank are provided. These pumps are identical to those 
utilized on the (aircraft type reference retained) airplanes. The main tank 
boost pumps are the same as the (aircraft type reference retained) main tank 
boost pumps. The pump housings are mounted on the rear spar with the 
exception of the forward main tank boost pumps, which are mounted on the 
front spar. The pump housings are fay surface bonded inside the tank from 
the housing to the spar. In addition, two (ampere ratings retained) amp 
bonding jumpers are installed from the casing of the pump motor to 
structure for power fault current. The maximum resistance between pump 
motor casings to structure is (resistance rating reference retained) ohm. 
Since the pump housing and the motor casing are bonded to structure, 
induced transient on the components' wiring will not create an ignition 
source inside the fuel tank. Exposed joints between the pump housing, the 
wing skin and the bolts are covered with tank sealant. 
c. Fuel Pump Pressure Switches - A pressure switch is connected to the outlet 
line of each fuel pump. Each switch is mounted on the front/rear spar so that 
the electrical connector is outside the fuel tank. The fuel pump pressure 
switches are mounted on the front and rear spars to a bulkhead fitting. The 
bulkhead fitting is fay surface sealed from the inside of the fuel tank. The 
joints between the bulkhead fitting and the inside/outside of the wing skin 
are covered with sealant. 
d. Fuel Shutoff Float Switch - The volumetric shutoff sensor is a magnetic float 
switch that is mounted inside the fuel tank to limit the tank capacity. The 
switch is normally closed when the tank is less than full. The power to the 
fueling valve (voltage reference retained) is routed through this switch via 
wiring enclosed in an aluminum conduit. The conduits for the main tanks are 
filled with grease in order to prevent water accumulation and freezing. The 
center tank conduit opening is on the right hand wing and does not contain 
any grease due to its adequate drainage capability. The conduits are 
supported by brackets within the tank and a fitting on the front spar. The 
wires are insulated and protected by a grommet at the conduit entry. The 
wires external to the conduit on the leading edge of the front spar are 
shielded and grounded to structure prior to entry into the conduit. 
e. Fueling Valves - The fueling valves are fuel pressure actuated, commanded by 
an electrical solenoid driven pilot valve. The solenoid is located external to 
the fuel tank and is enclosed in an explosion proof chamber. The chassis of 
the solenoid is electrically bonded to the valve body. The valve body is 
mounted to a gallery type fueling manifold which is faying surface bonded to 
the front spar with a maximum resistance of (resistance value retained) 
ohms. The solenoid/valve/body installation is identical to the installation 
used on the past similar airplanes (specific reference to aircraft retained). 
f. Fueling Receptacle - The fueling receptacle provides the necessary hardware 
for connecting the ground pressure fueling equipment to the airplane 
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refuel/defuel system. There are no electrical connections to the receptacle. 
The receptacle is an integral part of the fueling manifold installed on the 
front spar of the right hand wing, which is fay surface bonded to the front 
spar. In addition, the receptacle is bonded to structure via a bonding jumper 
with a maximum resistance of (resistance value retained) ohms. 
g. Manually Operated Defuel Valve - The defuel valve body is identical to the 
engine fuel shutoff valves and the fuel cross feed valve. The valve is attached 
to the defuel valve adapter assembly which is mounted to the front spar. The 
adapter plate is faying surface bonded to the front spar with a maximum 
resistance of (resistance value retained) ohms. The adapter plate is fillet seal 
from the outside and the fasteners which mount the adapter plate to the 
spar are covered by tank sealant. The defuel valve handle is attached to the 
adapter plate using four screws. 
h. Motor Operated Valves - Cockpit switches control the motor operated valves 
in order to control fuel routing throughout the fuel system. All employ a 
mechanical valve inside the fuel tank with a shaft drive penetrating the spars. 
The valve motor is external to the fuel tanks and is encased in an explosion 
proof chassis. The main engine shutoff valves are mounted on the front spar 
whereas the APU fuel shutoff valve and the fuel cross feed valve are mounted 
on the rear spar. This design and installation has been successfully used on 
several other model aircraft designed in the past (specific reference to 
aircraft retained). A fay surface bond is achieved outside the tank between 
the spar, the adapter plate, and the motor driven actuator. 
i. Fuel Water Scavenge Jet Pumps - A system of jet pumps (one in each main 
tank and two in the center tank) supplied with motive flow from the main 
tank AFT boost pumps and the center tank override pumps are provided to 
continuously remove water from the fuel tank sumps. A fuel scavenge jet 
pump is also installed (driven by motive flow supplied from the main tank 
FWD boost pump) to reduce the center tank unusable fuel quantity. There 
are no electrical wiring associated with these pumps. The pumps are spar 
mounted via a spar fitting which is fay surface bonded to the spar. 
j. Fuel Temperature Sensor - The fuel temperature sensor is mounted through 
the rear spar into the main tank. Wiring to the sensor is routed along the rear 
spar external to the tank. The resistance sensing element is completely 
sealed from the tank exterior by an aluminum case. A fay surface bond bonds 
the sensor to the rear spar. 
k. Hydraulic Line Penetrations to Fuel Tanks - Hydraulic lines are routed into the 
main tanks for connection into hydraulic fluid heat exchangers. Protection 
from sparking inside the fuel tanks is achieved by fay surface bonding all 
hydraulic lines penetrating into the fuel tanks. The bond is made on the 
outside of the wing rear spar with the surface alodined to provide the 
required electrical conductivity. The maximum allowable resistance between 
structure and the bulkhead fitting at the fuel tank penetration interface is 
(resistance value retained) milliohm. In addition, each penetration, inside the 
tank has peripheral fillet tank sealant which will prevent sparking inside the 
tank in the unlikely event of arcing at the interface. The maximum allowable 
resistance between different tube sizes and the bulkhead fitting are called 
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out in the manufacturers bonding design specification. Hydraulic lines within 
the fuel tanks are made of aluminum or titanium and incorporate perma-
swage fittings at production breaks. The permanent swage fitting is a close 
tolerance metal to metal interface used for high pressure application. The 
fittings were subjected to a (ampere value retained) amp component B surge 
current to determine if sparking occurred outside on the fitting. From the test 
results, a permanent swaged coupler fitted on either alodine aluminum or 
titanium tubes prevents any sparking between the interfaces. The (ampere 
value retained) amp test level is twice that required by MIL-STD-1757. A 
current distribution analysis was done to determine the maximum current 
that will be conducted on the hydraulic lines inside the tank in the event of a 
direct attachment to the tubes outside the tank. The current levels calculated 
are well below the test level. The maximum allowable electrical resistance for 
tube to tube connections inside the fuel tank are called out in manufacturer 
specification (reference retained). 
5.8 Aircraft Lightning Strike Case Study for Indirect Effects 
The indirect effects of lightning arise as transients seen within the airframe and on 
the wire looms that interconnect the various sub-systems.  
 
Lightning traveling on the exterior skin of an aircraft has the potential to induce 
transients into wires or equipment beneath the skin as shown in Figure 5-45. These 
transients create lightning “indirect” effects. Careful shielding, grounding (or 
earthing) and the application of surge suppression devices avert problems caused by 
indirect effects in cables and equipment when necessary. Every circuit and piece of 
equipment that is critical or essential to the continued safe flight and landing of an 
aircraft must be verified by the manufacturers to be protected against the adverse 
effects of lightning in accordance with regulations set by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) or a similar authority in the country of the aircraft's origin. 
 
 
Figure 5-45 Typical lightning strike indirect effects current path 
 
Transients created by lightning strikes are addressed by tests and design criteria in 
Section 22 of RTCA DO160E [5.3] and are specific as to type, duration and level of 
  
181 
test. Each unit or component of a system can be tested for damage by direct 
injection of the transient onto its interconnecting pins; testing is also performed on 
systems by injection of the indirect lightning transient onto interconnecting cable 
looms. The design of the aircraft in these case studies includes protection against 
internal zone threats and appropriate protection based on the electromagnetic 
threat model. Considerable progress has been made in creating modeling tools over 
the past 15 years which has resulted in many different manufacturer solutions to 
establishing electromagnetic protection designs in practice.  
 
The interaction of lightning with the aircraft in these case studies induces voltages 
and currents in the onboard wire harnesses, which can cause critical electronic 
equipment damage or malfunction, thus compromising the flight safety. If electronic 
equipment needs to be operated in a region subject to changing electromagnetic 
fields, and if the currents generated by these fields are considered harmful, the 
recommended approach to mitigating the harmful effects is to shield and ground the 
electronic equipment and the interconnecting wiring. As a result, electrical currents 
generated by lightning or HIRF then circulate through the equipment enclosure to 
ground without affecting internal circuitry. This enclosure practice extends to 
interconnecting wiring through the use of cable shielding; that is, the shield is the 
enclosure that is grounded. Other damage mitigation considerations include the 
location of the equipment and wiring, use of effective wiring, use of good grounding 
practices, and building equipment to withstand transients. These tactics are 
incorporated into the design of the airplane within the case studies. 
 
The lightning interaction with an aircraft is modeled using industry developed 
computational tools developed for the complete analysis of the electromagnetic 
fields inside and outside the aircraft struck by lightning, and for the evaluation of the 
indirect lightning effects induced in the aircraft wiring system. The estimation of 
voltage magnitude and currents induced on shielded and unshielded wiring and the 
utilization of shields to reduce the level of these effects in sensitive circuit’s results in 
shielding and grounding solutions that require an airworthiness analysis such as the 
one developed within the methodology contained in this work. The reduction of 
magnetically induced voltages can be accomplished through Line Replaceable Unit 
Internal Protection or by using shielded cable protection or a combination of both. 
Circuit design within avionics units are part of the design solution used to minimize 
induced effects however, these protection components such as suppression devices 
located within the electrical and electronic equipment are excluded from these case 
studies to simplify the data presentation. 
 
For shielded cable protection, several methods are available which reduce the 
magnetic coupling of voltages in cables. It is possible to design circuit configurations 
in which equal and opposite self-canceling voltages are induced in the wiring circuit. 
Typically, this is accomplished using twisted pairs of wires to reduce coupling. At 
frequencies at or below 5 kHz, a twisted pair can provide over 20 DB of magnetic 
coupling reduction. At the 5 kHz frequency however, copper braid shielding will 
provide practically no electromagnetic coupling protection. As the frequency of the 
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threat is increased above 5 kHz, the effectiveness of the copper braiding for 
protection against magnetic coupling will improve.   
 
For an optimum effective decoupling solution throughout the lightning frequency 
spectrum, twisted pair conductors enclosed by a conventional copper braid shield 
are employed in this design commonly called “twisted, shielded pairs”. The 
effectiveness of twisted pair wires depends on the uniformity of the twisted wires 
and tightness of the twist employed. A shielded twisted pair with the shield 
terminated on one end is normally used to protect against low frequency 
interference. However, open shields are susceptible to arcing from the high currents 
associated with lightning. In this case, a twisted pair with the shield grounded at 
each end is the preferred wiring for reduction of magnetic and electrostatic coupling. 
The optimum circuit design for reducing magnetic coupling for a single conductor 
shielded wire is that in which the signal return is through the shield as in coax cables 
and the shield is grounded to the ground plane at one point. The principle involves 
having the shield loop area less than or equal to the circuit loop area, with the loop 
formed by an active circuit and its source return path, in order to minimize shield 
flux linkages. This circuit offers somewhat better protection than does the 
unshielded twisted pair of 20 twist/m grounded at one point. The approach is valid 
only when considering double ended or ungrounded circuits. If single ended or 
grounded circuits are being used, the shield would be effectively grounded at each 
end and a complete loop would exist. 
 
Bonding of grounds associated with indirect lightning protection can be created by 
use of existing structural bonds or addition of bond jumpers within the design. Low 
impedance structural bonds are a critical component of lightning protection 
schemes. A closed loop shield with perfect conduction completely isolates the 
volume enclosed from external magnetic sources such as lightning. The closer that a 
shield can come to a perfect enclosure, the lower that the leakage of 
electromagnetic energy from an external source will be experienced on aircraft 
systems. Since environmental degradation is common when an aircraft is exposed to 
environmental threats during operation, effort is required to ensure the long term 
effectiveness of the shields and bonds. 
 
For lightning indirect effects, an aircraft development program is required to comply 
with Federal Aviation Administration Regulation FAR 25.1316, “Systems Lightning 
Protection” [5.54]. 
 
The intent of the protection provided to comply with this regulation is as follows: 
(a) For functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a condition that 
would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane, each 
electrical and electronic system that performs these functions must be designed 
and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capabilities of the 
systems to perform these functions are not adversely affected when the airplane 
is exposed to lightning.  
(b) For functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a condition that 
would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flight crew to 
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cope with adverse operating conditions, each electrical and electronic system 
that performs these functions must be designed and installed to ensure that 
these functions can be recovered in a timely manner after the airplane is 
exposed to lightning.  
(c) Compliance with the lightning protection criteria prescribed in paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this section must be shown for exposure to a severe lightning 
environment. The applicant must design for and verify that aircraft 
electrical/electronic systems are protected against the effects of lightning by:  
(1) Determining the lightning strike zones for the airplane;  
(2) Establishing the external lightning environment for the zones;  
(3) Establishing the internal environment;  
(4) Identifying all the electrical and electronic systems that are subject to the 
requirements of this section, and their locations on or within the airplane;  
(5) Establishing the susceptibility of the systems to the internal and external 
lightning environment;  
(6) Designing protection 
(7) Verifying that the protection is adequate.  
 
Induced Currents travel along aircraft system transport components and looms. 
When lightning strikes an aircraft it travels along a path with a current magnitude 
varying with time [5.11]. The transient nature of the lightning strike's current also 
creates a transient magnetic field which can induce currents into nearby circuits 
created by grounded conductive components. Faraday's Law of Induction states "The 
Electromotive Force (EMF) induced in a circuit is directly proportional to the time 
rate of change of the magnetic flux through the circuit". The induced electromotive 
force or EMF in any closed circuit is equal to the time rate of change of the magnetic 
flux through the circuit [5.13]. 
Faraday's law of electromagnetic induction states that: 
,  
 
Figure 5-46 Faradays Law 
 
Thus: 
 
is the electromotive force (emf) in Volts  
ΦB is the magnetic flux in Webers  
 
In physics, electromotive force, or most commonly emf (seldom capitalized), is the 
external work expended per unit of charge to produce an electric potential 
difference across two open-circuited terminals [5.12]. The size of the surface in 
which the flux passes through in the circuit controls the amount of EMF induced 
along with the magnitude and transient behavior of the magnetic flux. The presence 
induced EMF combined with the resistance of the circuit creates a current within the 
circuit. 
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5.8.1 Aircraft Design Example of Induced Current Threat and Case Study 
The following demonstrates the effects of lightning current on an installed system 
infrastructure. In this example, a tube is ground in two locations on a spar and runs 
parallel to length of the wing. During a wing tip lightning strike in which the current 
travels tip-to-tip, the EMF induced onto the tubing is proportional to the length of 
the tubing run parallel to the path of the lightning strike. Currents running through 
tubing in an aircraft design must be modeled so that the appropriate earthing can be 
applied to the design. Current flow such as that shown in Figure 5-47 will rely on 
good conductive joints in the entire path and also appropriate sealants where there 
may be the potential for sparks to be created at conductive interfaces where there is 
a potential for air gaps.  
 
 
Figure 5-47 Typical bond path for current flow on transport elements at lightning strike 
Parallelism 
Parallelism is important due to the formation of the magnetic fields. Magnetic fields 
form along a path which obeys the right hand rule. Given a current traveling in the 
vertical direction the magnetic field lines will look like concentric circles centered on 
the path of the current. In an aircraft, tubing that runs parallel to the lightning 
current in a tip-to-tip conductive path will expose a circuit in which the magnetic 
field will pass through, while perpendicular tubing runs will not. Another way to view 
this is to imagine the resulting current. The resulting current induced from a 
magnetic field always travels in a path normal to the magnetic field which caused it 
(right hand rule). In parallel runs, the current can flow in a direction that will create 
its own magnetic fields in the same plane as the ones that created it. In 
perpendicular tubing runs the current will be flowing in a path that is in the same 
plane as the original magnetic field, thus creating a field which is normal to the field 
which created it and will not oppose the original field.  
Diffused 
Diffused is the term used by some aircraft manufacturers to describe induced 
currents which occur within the Fuel Tank. 
Faraday Cages 
It was once assumed that aircraft fuel tanks perform similar to a Faraday Cage, 
eliminating the induction of EMF onto in-tank components. The [15] FAA Special FAR 
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(SFAR) 88 investigations have shown that although the tanks do act as a shield, they 
are not absolute, and the EMF that can be present during a lightning strike needs to 
be considered in the ignition prevention design of a fuel system. This may because 
Faraday Cages shield against rapidly changing electromagnetic and electrostatic 
fields, but do not shield against static or slowly changing electromagnetic fields.  
Conducted Current 
After lightning strikes the aircraft, it conducts along the structure of the aircraft until 
its exit point. In aluminum aircraft, with a lightning strike on the wings, it is assumed 
that the current stays on the exterior structure and does not energize internal 
structure. The electrical current generally stays on the upper and lower wing skins 
and on the front and rear spars. 
 
Also referenced in Chapter 1 of this thesis is [5.2] AC20-136, “Protection of Aircraft 
Electrical/Electronic Systems against the Indirect Effects of Lightning”. This Advisory 
Circular is used by aircraft designers to guide the development of solutions for 
protecting electrical and electronic systems from the effects of lightning while also 
achieving successful compliance to applicable aviation regulations. 
5.8.2 Corrosion Impacts on Indirect Effects Lightning Protection Schemes 
In order to start the discussion of protection required for indirect effects lightning 
protection, it is appropriate to discuss corrosion and its effect on indirect protection. 
In most cases, dissimilar metals shall not be used in contact with each other unless 
protected against electrolytic corrosion. Electrolytic corrosion can be defined by 
several industry standards or by individual standards that are created by the design 
team assembled for creation of the aircraft systems and components. Structural 
components are often protected against corrosion in several ways including use of 
primer and Corrosion Inhibiting Compounds (CIC). The issue that needs to be 
resolved arises when the combination of corrosion protection, use of metals that 
when in contact generate, electrolytic corrosion and the need for long term current 
carrying capacity between the metals are combined into one requirement. Though 
design teams can select sources for design guidance when using different metals in 
contact with each other, MIL-STD-889 is on source for locating definitions of 
dissimilar metal electrolytic corrosion [5.31]. 
 
The most common type of corrosion which can affect electrical bonds is the 
oxidation of metallic surfaces. This kind of galvanic corrosion at the contact of two 
dissimilar metals and the degradation of materials over time used for shielding are 
important design constraints for which the methodology addresses. For good long 
term shielding, several variables should be considered. First it is important to use 
corrosion resistant metals within the design. A preferred electrical bond would be 
metal to metal bonding called a fayed surface bond. Additionally, corrosion 
protection should be provided for the metals selected. At times it may be most 
practical to interface metals of different types such as a nickel plated bond jumper to 
an aluminum structural member electrically bonding the avionic component to the 
ground plane within the aircraft. A large selection of surface finishes and corrosion 
prevention solutions are available. If the bond surface requires contact with Monel 
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metal (alloy of Nickel 60%-70% and copper 20%-35% and a small amount of iron) or 
a tin coated steel RF gasket for example, tin or cadmium plated surfaces offer the 
best finish compatibility. If the bond path is critical to the lightning protection design, 
chromate type film treatment is often recommended. Chromate films can offer good 
protection against corrosion between a connector receptacle and an avionics 
controller for instance while also providing a good electrical conduction bond path 
between the two metals. The interface of dissimilar metals should be avoided when 
possible. When dissimilar metals are in contact and exposed to a corrosive 
atmosphere, galvanic action can destroy the electromagnetic shielding and bonding 
characteristics. In this case, sealants that provide both conductive and properties 
and environmental protection may be used. Metals are active when interfacing with 
other metals or different types. The advisory circular AC43.13, starting at Par 247, 
[5.55] briefly covers several types of corrosion and corrosion protection that may be 
applied when using metals of different anodic/cathodic properties. 
 
The Galvanic Table reference 5-15 lists metals in the order of their relative activity in 
sea water environment. The list begins with the more active (anodic) metal and 
proceeds down to the least active (cathodic) metal of the galvanic series.  
A "galvanic series" applies to a particular electrolyte solution; hence for each specific 
solution which is expected to be encountered for actual use, a different order or 
series will ensue. The sea water galvanic series included in this table is a 
comprehensive galvanic series taken from MIL-STD-889 [5.31]. For any combination 
of dissimilar metals taken from the galvanic table in Table 5-15, the metal with the 
lower number will act as an anode and will corrode preferentially. 
 Active (Anodic)  Active (Anodic)  Active (Anodic) 
 1 Magnesium  32 Stainless steel 410 
(active)  
63 Monel 400  
 2 Mg alloy AZ-31B 33 Copper (plated, cast, 
or wrought)  
64 Stainless steel 201 
(active)  
 3 Mg alloy HK-31A  34 Nickel (plated)  65 Carpenter 20 
(active)  
 4 Zinc (hot-dip, die 
cast, or plated)  
35 Chromium (Plated)  66 Stainless steel 321 
(active)  
 5 Beryllium (hot 
pressed)  
36 Tantalum  67 Stainless steel 316 
(active)  
 6 Al 7072 clad on 7075  37 AM350 (active)  68 Stainless steel 309 
(active)  
 7 Al 2014-T3  38 Stainless steel 310 
(active)  
69 Stainless steel 17-
7PH (passive)  
 8 Al 1160-H14  39 Stainless steel 301 
(active)  
70 Silicone Bronze 655  
 9 Al 7079-T6  40 Stainless steel 304 
(active)  
71 Stainless steel 304 
(passive)  
10 Cadmium (plated)  41 Stainless steel 430 
(active)  
72 Stainless steel 301 
(passive)  
11 Uranium  42 Stainless steel 410 73 Stainless steel 321 
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 Active (Anodic)  Active (Anodic)  Active (Anodic) 
(active)  (passive)  
12 Al 218 (die cast)  43 Stainless steel 17-
7PH (active)  
74 Stainless steel 201 
(passive)  
13 Al 5052-0  44 Tungsten  75 Stainless steel 286 
(passive)  
14 Al 5052-H12  45 Niobium 
(columbium) 1% Zr  
76 Stainless steel 316L 
(passive)  
15 Al 5456-0, H353  46 Brass, Yellow, 268  77 AM355 (active)  
16 Al 5052-H32  47 Uranium 8% Mo.  78 Stainless steel 202 
(passive)  
17 Al 1100-0  48 Brass, Naval, 464  79 Carpenter 20 
(passive)  
18 Al 3003-H25  49 Yellow Brass  80 AM355 (passive)  
19 Al 6061-T6  50 Muntz Metal 280  81 A286 (passive)  
20 Al A360 (die cast)  51 Brass (plated)  82 Titanium 5A1, 2.5 
Sn  
21 Al 7075-T6  52 Nickel-silver (18% 
Ni)  
83 Titanium 13V, 11Cr, 
3Al (annealed)  
22 Al 6061-0  53 Stainless steel 316L 
(active)  
84 Titanium 6Al, 4V 
(solution treated 
and aged)  
23 Indium  54 Bronze 220  85 Titanium 6Al, 4V 
(anneal)  
24 Al 2014-0  55 Copper 110  86 Titanium 8Mn  
25 Al 2024-T4  56 Red Brass  87 Titanium 13V, 11Cr 
3Al (solution heat 
treated and aged)  
26 Al 5052-H16  57 Stainless steel 347 
(active)  
88 Titanium 75A  
27 Tin (plated)  58 Molybdenum, 
Commercial pure  
89 AM350 (passive)  
28 Stainless steel 430 
(active)  
59 Copper-nickel 715  90 Silver  
29 Lead  60 Admiralty brass  91 Gold  
30 Steel 1010  61 Stainless steel 202 
(active)  
92 Graphite 
31 Iron (cast)  62 Bronze, Phosphor 
534 (B-1)  
93 Noble (Less Active, 
Cathodic) 
Table 5-15 Table of Metals in Galvanic Orientation 
 
Galvanic series relationships are useful as a guide for selecting metals to be joined, 
will help the selection of metals that have the least galvanic interaction, or will 
indicate the need or degree of protection to be applied to lessen the expected 
potential interactions.  
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Generally, the closer one metal is to another in the series, the more compatible they 
will be, i.e., the galvanic effects will be minimal. Conversely, the farther one metal is 
from another, the greater the corrosion will be.  
 
Notice that graphite is at the bottom of the table. The largest amount of corrosion 
potential in this table would be created if a large amount of graphite is interfaced 
with a small piece of magnesium and introduced into the salt water catalyst. 
 
In a galvanic couple, the metal higher in the series (or the smaller the number on the 
table) represents the anode, and will corrode preferentially in the environment.  
 
Metals widely separated in the galvanic series must be protected if they are to be 
joined. Appropriate measures should be taken to avoid contact. This can be 
accomplished by several methods:  
Sacrificial - applying to the cathodic member a sacrificial coating having a potential 
similar to or near that of the anodic member. If you are designing for a sacrificial 
element, the sacrificial element should be on the anodic side and smaller. Cadmium 
plate (No. 10) on steel bolts (No. 81) holding 2024-T4 (No. 25) plates will sacrifice the 
cadmium instead of corroding the Aluminum. This is one reason for using new bolts 
that have the Cad plate intact.  
Sealing - sealing a dissimilar metal interface to insure that faying surfaces are water-
tight or free from potential moisture ingress. This technique should be used when 
designing bond jumpers made of a metal dissimilar to the attaching structure or 
grounding component in particularly harsh airplane environments outside the 
pressure vessel. 
Resistance - painting or coating all surfaces to increase the resistance of the 
electrical circuit.  Though this is a good corrosion prevention solution, it does not 
offer the best conductivity and is only used to prepare electrical bonds when a 
chemical conversion coating or a chromate (compatible metallic paint) is applied. 
 
The (Non-Aerodynamic) Area Rule 
To avoid corrosion, avoid a small anodic area relative to the cathodic area.  
Corollary I - Use LARGE ANODE AREA.  
Corollary II - The larger the relative anode area, the lower the galvanic current 
density on the anode, the lesser the attack.  
Corollary III - The amount of galvanic corrosion may be considered as 
proportional to the Cathode/Anode area ratio.  
Corollary IV - Design for a SMALL Cathodic/Anodic Ratio (CAR). (When designing, 
remember your small CAR.)  
Corollary V - The same metal or more noble (cathodic, higher number in the 
table) metals should be used for small fasteners and bolts.  
Sea Water Environments 
Metals exposed to sea water environments shall be corrosion and stress corrosion 
resistant or shall be processed to resist corrosion and stress-corrosion. Irrespective 
of metals involved, all exposed edges should be sealed with a suitable sealant 
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material conforming to MIL-S-8802. When non-compatible materials are joined, an 
interposing material compatible with each shall be used.  
Non-Metallic Materials 
Material other than true metals, i.e., non-metallic materials which must be 
considered as metallic materials, unless there is supporting evidence to the contrary. 
If these material are essentially free of corrosive agents (salts), free of acid or 
alkaline materials (neutral pH), and free of carbon or metallic particles, not subject 
to bio-deterioration or will not support fungal growth, and do not absorb or wick 
water, then these may be considered non-metallic and suitable for joining to metals. 
Many materials classed non-metallic will initiate corrosion of metals to which they 
are joined, e.g., cellulosic reinforced plastics, carbon or metal loaded resin materials, 
asbestos-cement composites.  
More Precautions for Joining 
Where it becomes necessary that relatively incompatible metals must be assembled, 
the following precautions and joining methods are provided for alleviation of 
galvanic corrosion.  
1. For Electrical Connection - Select materials which are indicated to be more 
compatible in accordance with the galvanic series.  
2. Design metal couples so that the area of the cathode is smaller (appreciably) 
than the area of the anodic metal. For example, bolts or screws of stainless steel 
for fastening aluminum sheet, but not reverse.  
3. Interpose a compatible metallic gasket or washer between the dissimilar metals 
prior to fastening.  
4. Plate the cathodic member with a metal compatible to the anode.  
5. Select an electrically conductive sealant. 
6. Not For Electrical Conductors - Interpose a non-absorbing, inert gasket material 
or washer between the dissimilar materials prior to connecting them.  
Other Approaches to Conductive Interface Assembly 
Seal all faying edges to preclude the entrance of liquids. This can be a problematic 
approach if the sealant traps moisture in the electrical bond interface. Designs of 
these type bonds need to consider alternatives when in severely moist and harsh 
environments.  
Apply corrosion-inhibiting pastes or compounds under heads of screws or bolts 
inserted into dissimilar metal surfaces whether or not the fasteners had been 
previously plated or otherwise treated. In some instances, it may be feasible to apply 
an organic coating to the faying surfaces prior to assembly. This would be applicable 
to joints which are not required to be electrically conductive.  
 
Where it will not interfere with the proposed use of the assembly, the external joint 
should be coated externally with an effective paint system.  
 
It is important to spend some time dwelling on the importance of material 
compatibility when discussing long term effectiveness of indirect lightning 
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protection. The following photos provide typical examples of connector testing 
results when exposing different connectors to a corrosive environment. 
5.8.3 Bonding for Indirect Effects Protection against Lightning Induced 
Transients   
The electromagnetic fields inside the aircraft in these case studies that occur as the 
result of a lightning strike are higher in areas of the aircraft where composite 
structures are used than in the other aluminum airframe sections. The higher 
electrical field strength requires increased protection of signal and power wiring to 
reduce the induced transients to levels compatible with Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) 
designs located underneath the composite structure panels. 
 
Wiring shields (added wire included in the wire looms for the sole purpose of 
carrying the current resulting from a lightning strike) that have been designed with 
reliable low resistance grounding at both ends provide a reduction of the induced 
current and voltage levels on the power and signal wires that will be imposed on the 
LRU inputs. This protects the LRUs by reducing the electrical transients that enter the 
equipment through the wires. Properly grounded shields reduce these transients to 
levels specified by the wire installation design group for equipment qualification. 
 
The equipment test levels specified in the aircraft design documentation assume 
that shielding is properly installed with both ends properly grounded in the airplane. 
Due to test equipment limitations, testing is typically conducted with lightning levels 
that would be present at the equipment after attenuation by shielding, therefore the 
testing is conducted with shield grounds disconnected. 
 
In the event that equipment wiring is installed without proper shield ground paths 
that remain effective for the life of the airplane, the equipment must be designed 
and qualified for much higher applied transient levels or scheduled maintenance 
would be required to insure the effectiveness of the shield grounding is maintained. 
This body of work establishes a methodology for use during design of an aircraft to 
ensure the long term availability of lightning protection has been included in the 
design decision making process. 
 
Careful design considerations must be used on the entire shield ground path for the 
aircraft and its equipment. One critical area is the grounding of the connector 
receptacle to its mounting surface on either a bracket used at production breaks or 
an LRU or sensor. The interface between the connector and LRU or bracket or panel 
surface on which it is mounted must meet all requirements for cleaning and 
conductivity that are needed for a fayed surface electrical bond. Depending on the 
environment of the installation, protection of the joint must be provided to insure 
the joint electrical conductivity does not degrade over time with exposure to the 
environment. The OEM approved process for mounting bonding connector 
receptacles is (specification number retained) which is described in by the OEM 
electrical design documentation. While this specification is usually not directly 
imposed on LRUs manufactured by outside suppliers, similar robust designs with 
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attention to proper surface galvanic compatibility, preparation, and protection must 
be employed in the manufacture of their equipment.  
 
The best approach for wiring shielding used for lightning, HIRF, and EMI is 
terminated either circumferentially or "zero length" meaning no use of a bonding 
lead (extension wire) on the backshell of the connector. It is very important that the 
ground or earthing path that provides for the protection including the shielding is 
not compromised. To insure robust installation that is effective for the life of the 
airplane, all electrical connector interfaces in a lightning path are identified in the 
design documentation as a “designated bond” or “designated ground”, measured for 
compliance upon installation and have a resistance value called out on model based 
definition or controlled by approved process specification.  
5.8.4 Connectors and Bonding for Indirect Effects Protection 
Connectors and the interconnecting wire looms deploy bonding and grounding 
technologies and material selection to ensure long term installation availability. 
 
Typical connector lightning protection designs consist of the connector assembly as 
shown in Figure 5-48, including a buildup of a tin or nickel plated copper shield, a 
back shell, a plug, a receptacle; all made of several potential material types and a 
bonding design to the LRU such as a fay surface electrical bond interface. 
 
Example 1 (OEM Part number retained) Stainless Steel, Series III, MIL-C-38999 
connector  
Design: 
• Same panel cutout as most existing connectors 
• Accommodate standard, coax, twinax and quadrax contacts 
• Self-locking with approximately a 360 degree coupling turn  
• Environmentally sealed 
• 200 C maximum operating temperature 
• 300 V Comparative Tracking Index (CTI – determines spacing between pins) 
• Withstand 6.0 KA peak of indirect lightning strike 
• Resistant to potassium formate runway deicing fluid 
• Performance requirements 
• 3 milliohm, shell to shell resistance 
• 10 milliohm, shell to shell resistance 
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Figure 5-48 General purpose stainless steel connector MIL-C-38999 
 
Example 1 Application:  
The example provided below may be used to control an APU Inlet Door Actuator. 
This installation is made up of a circular SS connector and nickel plated composite 
back shell using a pull through shield termination. A typical lightning protection 
scheme is shown in Figure 5-49. The connector has an internal Nickel coated copper 
over braid cable ground lead that is retained with a Stainless Steel (SS) clamp and it 
is terminated at the connector self-locking back shell. The connector is attached to 
the passivated stainless steel (CRES) APU Inlet Door Actuator enclosure secured via 4 
passivated CRES screws, and 2 alodine aluminum self-locking nut plates with primer. 
Screws are to be tightened with torque of between (torque value retained) in-lb.  A 
simulated installation including a LRU and mounting bracket is shown in Figure 5-50. 
 
Example Bonding and Grounding scheme and build-up: 
This device is grounded using a bond jumper that is attached to the APU Inlet Door 
Actuator on one side, and then attached to an anodized aluminum bracket on the 
other side. The APU Inlet Door Actuator has a pre-installed ground stud installed 
below the connector where the bond jumper will attach. The anodized aluminum 
bracket is then attached to a horizontal stiffener of the firewall. The bonding jumper 
terminal on the APU Inlet Door Actuator is installed per OEM installation 
specification (retained). The bonding jumper terminal is attached to the aluminum 
bracket per OEM installation specification (retained) including sealant. 
 
The pre-installed ground stud is made up of the following per OEM electrical 
installation specification (retained): 
1. Passivated CRES screw 
2. Passivated CRES lock washer 
3. Passivated CRES washer 
4. Passivated CRES washer 
5. Passivated CRES nut 
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Figure 5-49 Connector and wire loom bond path to structure (typical) 
 
 
LRU 
Bracket 
Bond Strap 
Connectors 
 
Figure 5-50 Typical LRU installation with connectors, wiring and grounding 
 
Figures 5-51, 5-52 and 5-53 provide typical examples of connector testing results 
when exposing different connectors to a corrosive environment. 
 
 
Figure 5-51 Connector test preparation 
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Figure 5-52 Connector Receptacle Corrosion in test rig 
 
 
Figure 5-53 Connector Fastener Corrosion in test rig 
 
To demonstrate the methodology for lightning protection continued airworthiness 
design against the indirect effects of lightning, one of the case studies examines a 
connector on the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). Indirect lightning effects protection is 
provided to aircraft equipment through the use of shields within wire looms, 
connection to the back shell and through the connector plug to the LRU receptacle 
and finally to the aircraft ground plane through use of an electrical bond between 
the LRU and the aircraft structure. If the aircraft structure is composite, it may be 
necessary to attach the LRU to metal structure on the aircraft through use of a bond 
jumper (wire). In all cases for continued effectiveness of protection against the 
indirect effects of lightning, it is important to make sure that electrical connectivity is 
maintained within all aircraft environments. For this, it is important to understand 
the installed environment and account for conditions within the aircraft operations 
that could cause degradation of the protection. Corrosion is often not considered in 
any detail at the time of original design since the installation of the indirect effect 
protection is tested at the factory before delivery to ensure that the appropriate 
electrical bond is in place. Unfortunately, the continued availability of the electrical 
bond may be degraded by moisture, vibration, chemical exposure or excessive heat 
cycles. In-direct effects protection is a passive feature of the installation that does 
not provide any indication whether the protection is degraded at a later point in 
time. Since the loss of protection can result in a potentially catastrophic or 
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hazardous condition given the occurrence of an untimely lightning strike event, this 
degradation is important to evaluate at or prior to the design conclusion.  
 
With the application of the proposed methodology, past experience is combined 
with a scientific evaluation of the effects of environment on the protection scheme. 
With past experience captured in reports to the manufacturer by airline customers 
technical staff and independent testing conducted through technical lightning 
protection assurance tests, an aircraft manufacturer can collect important 
information to share during the detailed design phase.  Some of the designs that 
may cause concern for the continued airworthiness of in-direct lightning protection 
are as follows: 
1. Tin plated shield wires erosion of tin plating outside the pressure vessel 
2. Cad plated connectors in the landing gear wheel wells 
3. Nickel plated aluminum connectors in areas with moisture and significant 
temperature fluctuations 
4. Tin plated copper braided bond jumpers in moisture prone areas 
5. Bond jumpers of any type deployed in locations where the bond jumper moves 
(bending cycles) in moving control surface applications (wings, stabilizers etc.) 
 
Lightning designs for indirect effects protection are evaluated after the aircraft is 
assembled and the direct drive tests are performed. These tests are accomplished 
after the aircraft is assembled in order to assess whether adequate dielectric 
breakdown is provided by the designs. The data from these ground tests shows that 
the induced lightning protection design for the (aircraft type reference retained) 
reduces induced voltage transients on all critical and essential system wiring to levels 
below which the systems were qualified in the laboratory. In a majority of cases 
where the test results were compared to theoretical values established in the design 
simulations, much larger than required margins were achieved on the final designs 
physical implementation. 
 
During the first OEM test on this aircraft type accomplished after the aircraft was 
assembled, some higher than expected transients were found on the following LRUs: 
(LRU references retained). The major problem was identified at that time to be 
related to non-terminated shields at the equipment end. This design characteristic is 
not expected to be present at the time of the preliminary design phase but rather 
manifest at a much later stage in the development program. The affected equipment 
groups redesigned the appropriate wiring to include proper terminations and a test 
was conducted after the redesign was accomplished. The test aircraft was then 
retrofitted with the re-designed wiring and a re-test was conducted to ensure that 
the redesigned wire shielding was adequate. Peak voltages were collected to 
compare to the designed voltage expected due to a lightning strike. 
 
Some measurements were taken with the external LRUs installed in a production 
configuration. In this configuration, the dielectric strength of the external LRU is used 
to absorb some of the lightning transient energy. In all cases, the known dielectric 
breakdown strength of the external LRU is larger than the measured induced voltage 
across the dielectric generated by the lightning strike. Therefore, the dielectric will 
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not break down during a lightning strike and will be able to withstand that portion of 
the induced transient across the LRU connector interface. Note that the dielectric 
breakdown strength of these external LRUs will require tracking of the protection 
effectiveness in service to ensure the lightning shielding of the aircraft does not 
deteriorate with time. 
 
Two test points had non-conductive connectors at the external LRU. These 
connector LRU designs passed certification testing in this configuration. However, a 6 
inch bond wire was added to each non-conductive connector installation after 
certification testing was complete. These bonding wires “pigtails” are considered an 
extra layer of protection on top of the already certified aircraft shielding design and 
require additional evaluation for the continued effectiveness suggested in this body 
of work. As this case study has demonstrated, the continued design improvement 
and adjustment of in-direct protection requires continuous evaluation for 
airworthiness years after the aircraft is in service. 
5.8.5 Case Study for Indirect Effects Lightning Protection on Electronic 
Equipment  
The following electrical and electronic lightning protection components have been 
selected as case studies for the methodology contained in this work.  
APU (Equipment reference retained) Equipment, Shields and Connectors 
The selection of electronic system equipment protection to aircraft structure listed 
above evaluates typical lightning protection schemes used in the industry. Protection 
of electronic equipment are often accomplished with shielding contained in wire 
looms and electrical bonds of the equipment using the metallic outer case of the 
equipment and bonding this to the aircraft structure by either a mechanical 
fastening system or a bond “jumper” wire that attaches the equipment on one end 
and to the structural ground on the aircraft structure. Different techniques are used 
in different designs that may offer more than a single bonding scheme to evaluate. 
At the initial stages of the design process, it is not adequate to simply know the type 
of connectors, shield wires (also called “shields”) and equipment metallic material. In 
wire installation designs, it is possible to allow equipment to remain ungrounded 
while providing ground paths through wiring interfaces with other connected 
equipment. It is important in this evaluation to consider the final installation design 
early in the design process in order to provide the most effective bonding practices 
and ensure that late design changes that may be recommended from the 
assessment sheet analysis are minimized. The (aircraft type reference retained) 
wiring approach provides sufficient wire shielding to protect the (aircraft type 
reference retained) systems from electromagnetic environments such as HIRF or 
lightning over normal operating frequency ranges. The wire loom shielding exists in 
addition to LRU box protection in most cases as described in this paragraph. The 
(aircraft type reference retained) wire shielding baseline design is to shield all wiring 
external to the pressure vessel with one layer of shielding and terminate both ends 
of the shield with a 2 inch pigtail to the connector back shell. Details of this 
termination and design will be included in the assessment sheets. The only 
exceptions at the time of the design were for wiring in the air conditioning bay and 
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wheel wells that are routed near the bays. For these wires, shielding was added on a 
case by case basis during design discussions that considered the geometry of the 
wire routing. In addition, all wires associated with a critical system and within close 
proximity of the flight deck windows have a single layer of shielding with the shield 
terminated at both ends with a 2 inch pigtail to the connector back shell.  
 
Wire routing has significant effect on the total coupling characteristics of the 
electrical system. Basic principles have been established within the wire route 
designs to reduce the effects of interconnecting wires that cause unwanted coupling 
[5.53].  
 
In general, the closer that a conductor is to a metallic ground plane, the less is the 
flux that can pass between that conductor and the ground plane. Magnetic fields are 
concentrated around protruding structural members and diverge in inside corners. 
Hence, conductors located at the top of protruding members will intercept more 
magnetic flux than conductors place in corners where field intensity is weaker. These 
principles may be used when deciding the most appropriate locations for placing 
wire looms. Fields will be weaker on the interior of a u-shaped member than they 
will be on the edges of that same member. Fields are also lowest inside the closed 
member; however, even a trough shaped member will provide more shielding than 
wires located on the exposed edge. Wiring locations are important to the amount of 
in-direct effects a lightning strike can cause on system operations. Wires should be 
located away from apertures whenever possible.  
Case Study 1 System Protection – APU Electronics Case Study and Assessment 
Sheets 
Following are a series of lightning protection examples from the (aircraft type 
reference retained) aircraft design. The examples used in the assessment sheets 
provide a means to test the methodology proposed by these case studies. Each 
design alternative below represents a unique aspect of lightning protection designs. 
The case studies are performed in order to test the methodology against a set of 
very different lightning protection components. Indirect effects protection and direct 
effects protection are both included in the case studies.
 
Engineering L/HIRF Protective Device Assessment Sheet 
Protection Component Name  
APU (LRU name retained) equipment, shields and connectors 
 
Section 1. Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data 
Assessment Sheet Number SYS001 
(STR=Structures, FUL=Fuel, SYS=Electrical/Electronic Systems, 
ANT=Antenna) 
Engineer Name: Bill Bozemann 
Part Number:   
Connector MS3459LS12S-3P 
(Part numbers and references were either retained or 
revised to imaginary numbers to protect proprietary 
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information) Oil temperature Sensor X1 on the Auxiliary 
Power Unit. The sensor attaches to the YY200 connector 
mounted on the FF1000 bracket. The FF1000 bracket is 
the pressure seal at Station XYZ location. The YY200 
connector on Bracket FF1000 (Stabilizer Trim 
Compartment Bulkhead): 
Connector equipment number(s) on wire loom BB000: 
YY200J (Max Impedance value = 11.0 milliohm) 
Wire diagrams: (reference numbers retained). 
Manufacturer: Tesela Industries (OEM Names retained)  
Lightning Zone Zone 2 
Design Service Life Goal: Design for protection of the APU LRU from the indirect 
effects of lightning strike that may cause lack of proper 
APU speed control and subsequent APU turbine “run 
away”. Loss of over-speed protection and un-commanded 
fuel flow increase could cause uncontained APU failure, 
which compromises pitch control. Inspections and repairs 
are not required after a lightning strike event unless 
lightning strike affected APU operation during flight or the 
lightning strike direct effect evidence shows some 
secondary damage effect to the APU LRU case, wire looms 
or ground jumpers.  
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS (Connector and wiring) 
• Medium to heavy weight cylindrical 
• MS345( ) series inter-mateable with existing MIL-DTL-
5015 solder or crimp versions on existing equipment 
• Captive coupling nut mechanism, utilizes retaining rings 
in combination with “L” washers to prevent inadvertent 
disassembly 
• Multiple interlock systems ensure permanent insert 
retention 
• Positive control of dielectric separation with guaranteed 
ease of contact insertion 
• Positive contact retention provided by a close tolerance 
damage-proof metal retention clip 
• Completely sealed against environmental extremes 
with: 
• individual contact seals (conical risers on pin interface)  
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• interfacial seals between contacts  
• peripheral gasket shell-to-shell seals 
• redundant rear wire seals and insert-to-shell seals 
Date: November 16, 2009  
Section 2. Component Description System Criticality 
System Criticality: Critical 
Description: 
Analysis of the lightning protection for the APU LRU (LRU name retained) will center on the 
shields and connector designs on wire loom between the APU Oil Temperature Sensor mounted 
on the APU and APU fire wall. This engineering assessment will examine the specific design of 
the X1 Connector on the APU which connects to the connector (equipment number YY200) on 
APU firewall disconnect bracket FF1000. The wire loom is attached to the X1 Oil Temperature 
Sensor on one end and to YY200 connector on the other end at the fire wall bulkhead bracket 
FF1000. The X1 connector is an industry standard part number MS3459LS12S-3P. The 
MS3459LS12S-3P (also called Class LS) is a passivated stainless steel connector with a fluid 
resistant insert. The wire loom has a round Nickel-Coated Copper shield that is terminated at the 
Stainless Steel (SS) saddle clamp and secured through SS fasteners. The round SS connector 
back shell is attached to the common industry part number P/N MS3459LS12S-3S SS connector 
plug. The connector plug has a common industry part number P/N M39029-30-217 contact 
pin/socket. The SS connector plug, through a self-locking thread and a guided pin, is mated to 
the common industry part number P/N MS3459LS12S-3P receptacle, which is welded to the SS 
X1 sensor. The SS sensor is attached to the APU housing through a Copper squeeze washer 
and locked in place through a SS lock wire. 
Temperature: 
Class LS connector has a temperature range of –55°C (–75°F) to 200°C (392°F) 
Durability: 
Minimum of 100 mating cycles.  
Section 3. Component Purpose and Operational Theory 
The APU LRU controls the APU operation when the LRU receives a signal from the controls in 
the flight compartment. The LRU is in the aft cargo compartment right side. The LRU is on a 
shelf in the aft cargo compartment near the aft cargo door. The LRU is a line replaceable unit 
(LRU). The circuit cards in the LRU are not individually removable. To get access to the LRU, 
you must open the aft cargo door and remove the panel that protects the LRU front face.  
If you remove the LRU for maintenance, do not remove the data memory module from the APU 
at the same time. Loss of APU memory data will result. 
Connectors associated with the APU LRU are selected by the supplier and installed both on the 
aircraft and on the APU. The LRU controls APU functions. The LRU also contains circuits for 
fault detection and isolation. 
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The LRU uses signals from certain APU and airplane systems for correct operation of the APU. 
Section 4. Component Schematic and Installation Details 
Component Schematic: 
 
Connector detail - MS3459LS12S-3P 
 
Installation Details:  
APU LRU 
Aft Cargo Bay
Pressure Seal 
Station 
APU Firewall 
Disconnect
Bracket 
FF1000
Auxiliary Power Unit
Oil Temp Sensor
Connector X1
Potential speed 
control failure due 
to lightning strike
M1709
Bulkhead 
Connector YY200
Feed through 
control wires
APU LRU 
Connector  
M39029-30-217
Aircraft 
Empannage
Ground Stud
To Equipment control shelf and Pilot Panel
 
 
For installation locations and graphics see case study Figures 5-54 and 5-55. 
Bond Path Providing Protection: 
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1. Wire shield to back shell 
2. Connector back shell to connector plug 
3. Connector plug to connector receptacle 
4. Connector receptacle to X1 Sensor 
5. X1 Sensor to APU housing 
 
 
Section 5. Installation Environmental Threats 
The APU X1 Oil Temperature Sensor is installed outside the pressure vessel and exposed to 
multiple environmental threats.  
Description of installed environment: 
The installation is outside pressure vessel and exposed to severe temperature changes, 
contamination, moisture, and vibration. In general, the installation environment is protected from 
direct contact with environmental threats outside the aircraft since the APU installation is 
contained within the empennage and operated with APU doors closed when in service. 
Flammable Leakage Zone Description and Protection: 
The empennage of the aircraft contains the Auxiliary Power Unit which is serviced with fuel 
through a concentric fuel feed line. This area is considered a fire zone due the presence of 
flammable fluids and is required to contain fire suppression and warning systems. In addition, 
the presence of potential for fire in this area requires that lightning protection components such 
as shields inside wire looms be able to sustain high temperatures in accordance with the wire 
design guides for flammable leakage zones. 
Ratings of environmental threats: 
Location: Nose Radome Exterior 
Threat Type Rating of threat Installation 
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severity in this 
location  
(High, Medium, Low) 
resistance to 
degradation  
(High Medium, Low) 
System Operating Fluids (oil, hydraulic fluid, 
Grease and Lubricants) 
Low High 
Chemicals and Applied Fluids (cleaning 
fluids, fire retardants, de-icing, wing anti-ice 
fluids, liquid cooling) 
Low Medium 
Natural Occurring Fluids (condensation, 
precipitation,  humidity, ice, rain, snow) 
Medium Medium 
Temperature Exposure (swings in 
temperature, and extensive exposure to 
extreme high or low temperatures) 
Medium High 
Vibration (low or high frequency vibration) High Medium 
Fuel (Exposure to fuel) Low High 
Flammable Leakage Zone (Yes/No) Yes High 
 
Section 6. Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment 
The continued airworthiness of associated components within the lightning protection designed 
bond path is expected to perform the function of providing indirect lightning current protection 
during all operating phases of the aircraft flight profile. The need for protection to the X1 
connector and wire loom is due to the potential for a lightning strike event to cause upset to the 
APU LRU. This upset to the LRU could have a subsequent effect on the ability of the LRU to 
avert a potential over speed condition. Over speed logic contained within the APU LRU is 
provided by the LRU software and may be adversely affected if a lightning strike current exceeds 
appropriate voltage “stand-off” requirements of 600 Volts. To provide lower voltage threats 
during a lightning strike event, the connector associated with the X1 Oil Temperature Sensor 
must maintain a low impedance path to the aircraft structure during a lightning strike event. The 
MS3450 connector and shield design must be proven by test or in-service performance to 
maintain low impedance. Material interfaces between the connector components, wire shield 
and sensor must be compatible and resistant to the effects of corrosion over time in this 
moisture-prone environment. The connector exterior shell is passivated stainless steel.  
The passivated stainless steel exterior of the connector body is an excellent choice to reduce 
any corrosion associated with the external environment. Component interface metals associated 
with the protection bond path are found to be compatible. SS connectors and associated 
components have performed "Excellent" in the APU environment based on a history of NO 
galvanic or EMI difficulties with MS3450 series connectors in previous OEM applications. Self-
Locking connectors have no torque requirement and achieve fully locked position when 
ratcheting the connector until visual indicators line up and the connector bottoms out. The 
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performance is expected to be less than optimal based on the lack of a ground spring assembly 
within the connector, which makes shell to shell conductivity sensitive applications with a high 
vibration installed environment. 
Section 7. Test Plan Input 
MS3450 series connectors require specific testing to ensure that the installed environment will 
not degrade the connectors below acceptable bond path resistance limits. These connectors 
have been successfully used in aerospace for many different applications. In the application of 
these connectors on the APU Temperature Sensor (X1), the testing should include an 
appropriate level of vibration to determine continued conductivity across the connector after 
prolonged installation. Temperature and moisture should also be applied during the test to 
simulate actual installation in the moisture prone environment. 
Section 8. Test Data Results 
Tests for this installation have been accomplished by similarity to other past OEM designs. As a 
result, additional testing for this application is not necessary. Qualification testing at the time of 
the part design conformity is adequate. In testing performed on other aircraft applications after a 
period of service experience, OEM Engineering has found that this sensor connector does not 
pass the loop resistance test requirements in the L/HIRF Protection Assurance Validation Test 
Procedures. Assurance test data on the X1 connector shows that after (flight hours retained) two 
loose plugs were found exceeding the factory resistance values between the connector plug and 
receptacle. The task was accomplished three times with two findings. It is estimated that the 
packing material inside the connector relaxes over time and without the advantage of a ground 
spring assembly to ensure continued excellent electrical conductivity that the plug shell to 
receptacle shell on the temperature sensor unit conductivity deteriorates.  
Section 9. Report from Test Engineer Regarding Continued Airworthiness 
Test Engineer Name: B. Billings 
Report: (include significant findings 
and relevance to continued 
airworthiness) 
Lightning strike protection effectiveness:  Qualification 
testing of this connector passed lightning current transfer 
requirements. However, past testing in the field has proven 
that high resistance values may be present after an 
indeterminable service duty. Application of this connector 
design is expected to degrade to an unacceptable degree 
over the life of the connector installation. Testing on aircraft 
in operation has exposed several (actual number of failures 
retained) high resistance failures. Though only a few tests 
have been conducted with high resistance resulting from 
poor electrical conductivity across the connector receptacle 
and the connector plug interface, extrapolation of the few 
high resistances identified in service would imply that many 
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more aircraft suffer from the same deteriorating conductivity 
associated with the connector part number MS3450 type 
connector. This test result directs the design team to 
consider an alternative connector or minimize application of 
this connector within design solutions.  A qualitative and 
destructive test of connectors demonstrating high 
resistance after use in service has not been performed.  
Section 10. Design Revision Request 
The OEM recommends three possible alternatives to application of this connector type on critical 
systems. 1. Perform an evaluation of a degraded connector to determine the root cause of the 
connector degradation with subsequent solution determination based on findings. 2. Perform a 
modification to the wire looms that use the MS3450 type connectors to add an alternative 
electrical bond path across the connector plug and connector receptacle. 3. Use an alternative 
connector (connector part number retained) plug in later designs to avoid loss of electrical 
connectivity caused by lack of spring fingers in the MS3450LS12S-3P connector interior.  
Section 11. Revision accepted by Program 
Yes – The program suggests an investigation of this connector using a destructive test to 
determine cause followed by a resolution plan for application of these connectors. 
Section 12. Description of Final Optimized Design 
Action Taken: OEM recommends replacing this connector with a similar but superior performing 
connector. Use of connector part number (retained) should prove to perform much better in 
continued electrical bonding due to addition of “spring fingers” within the connector. The spring 
finger design is expected to allow the connector to sustain high vibrations and experience minor 
loosening while at the same time, allowing the spring fingers to maintain conductivity.  
Approval: 
Mr. G Sweers, Lightning Protection Analyst Original Signed 
Mr. Keith Smith, Lightning Protection Designer Original SignSigneded 
Mr. Jacob Owen, Bonding and Earthing Engineer Original Signed 
Mr. John Taylor, Chief Engineer Original Signed 
Figures attached to Assessment Sheet for APU Electronics 
The following graphics are collected for use in the assessment of the lightning 
protection. These graphics were used to identify key component attributes 
contained within the assessment sheets. 
 
Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-54 APU LRU location – aft cargo bay right side 
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Proprietary Graphic Retained 
Figure 5-55 Auxiliary Power Unit Location and Oil Temperature Sensor Connector 
5.8.6 Bonding and Grounding (Earthing) for Lightning Protection 
Electrical bonding is the process of joining together by low resistance path(s) two or 
more objects or materials which are conductive or which have conductive surfaces 
so that they become an electrically conductive entity. Most often the processes 
involve the preparation and joining of faying surfaces of the abutting parts. The 
resultant entity may serve as a current return path but more generally, where it is 
the conductive structure of an aircraft or aerospace vehicle, it forms an electrical 
voltage-reference-plane which serves many purposes. 
 
Electrical earthing (grounding) is, in general, the process of intentionally connecting 
an item to an electrical ground path (such as a wire, busbar, or chassis), or to an 
electrical reference-plane (such as earth or the electrically bonded structure of an 
aircraft/vehicle). 
 
However, as used here the term “electrical ground” specifically refers to those 
connections made to an electrical reference-plane which are current return paths for 
power circuits (including the neutrals for three-phase power).  
 
Electrical bonding and grounding are important for they have an effect on all the 
following design considerations: 
• The performance of electrical power systems 
• The control of: electromagnetic interference (EMI), electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP), and electrostatic voltages 
• Protection against lightning effects 
• Prevention of personnel shock and explosion. 
 
An aircraft designer selects the proper means of bonding and grounding. In order to 
create acceptable design solutions, one must understand detail information on 
materials and methods used to achieve good bonds and grounds. 
 
Electrical bonds designed and fabricated in accordance with good design practices 
established be aircraft manufacturers will meet or exceed the performance 
requirements of MIL–B–5087 [5.27]. Detailed exceptions to MIL–B–5087 
requirements may be generated by an aircraft manufacturer to address special cases 
for any preferred design approach associated with the bonding method. 
5.8.7 Definitions of Bonding and Grounding (Earthing) Terms 
In order to organize requirements for bonding, classes for unique bonding 
approaches are defined for each bond type. Each class has an associated “Name” as 
found in Table 5-16 and description that is required for proper implementation of 
the methodology within a design theater. These bonding classes are created by the 
aircraft manufacturer and proposed as a center of excellence for meeting continued 
airworthiness criteria goals. Terms associated with bonding expertise are contained 
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in this chapter Appendix B - Definition of Terms Used in Electrical Bonding and 
should be a required expertise for individuals affecting the design decisions on a new 
aircraft design program. *Class designations have been changed to retain OEM 
designations for bonding classifications. 
 
Table 5-16 describes the bonding classes. 
Class* Name Description 
1 Antenna 
Installation 
Antennas which require a homogeneous counterpoise or 
ground plane need a full faying surface bond to primary 
structure. Antennas with an integral counterpoise, such as 
radar scanners, require a bond between the waveguide or 
coaxial cable connector shell and the counterpoise on the 
equipment. 
2 Current 
Return Path 
Ground 
A ground path is the current return path required to return 
the current of an electrical circuit wire through a bonded wire 
terminal and through primary structure to the power source. 
3 Shock 
Hazard 
To eliminate personnel hazards, all exposed conductive 
housings of equipment containing electrical circuitry must be 
bonded to structure. 
4 Lightning 
Protection 
To prevent the ignition of flammable vapors and structural 
damage, lightning protection must be provided at all possible 
points of lightning entry into the vehicle. This protection must 
be proven adequate by testing. 
5 RF Potential To reduce R.F. radiation and interference effects, equipment 
which is susceptible to or radiates R.F. energy must be 
connected by a low impedance bond to structure. This 
includes wire and cable shield terminations. 
6 Static Drain To eliminate static interference, all isolated conducting items 
(except antennas) which have any linear dimension greater 
than 3 inches and which: 
• are exposed to the external airstream, or 
• carry fluids in motion, or 
• are subject to frictional charging, must have a low 
resistance bond to structure. 
7 Fire/ 
Explosion 
Hazard 
To prevent the ignition of flammable vapors, electrical 
equipment located in explosion hazard flammable leakage 
areas must be bonded to structure by providing a low 
resistance bond from the equipment case to structure. 
 Table 5-16 Bonding classifications for the design of an aircraft 
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For Class 4 lightning protection, bonding paths must be able to conduct up to the 
industry standard 200,000 amperes of current in many locations (locations ampere 
ratings are determined by the lightning zone map created by aircraft lightning threat 
model for design purposes) and must also protect nearby parts by presenting a low 
impedance path to ground path for current to conduct. Desirable characteristics of 
such a bond path are to create the most direct and robust bonding solution. 
Soldered joints in high current lightning bond paths are not acceptable since they do 
not resist damage during the high current event. The lightning protection design 
must also be proven by adequate testing at some point in the lightning protection 
design development. This could be a test that was conducted on the specific 
lightning protection design on a prior aircraft design project or could be conducted 
on a similar design where the design is certified by the regulatory authorities 
through a similarity assessment. 
 
Lightning protection ground paths are designed into aircraft architecture to: 
• Prevent malfunction of flight critical systems 
• Prevent structural damage 
• Avoid electrical breakdown or electrical heating damage to equipment 
• Prevent sparking or arcing in Fire/Explosion Hazard Areas 
• Prevent damage to non-conducting materials caused by generation of heat 
and mechanical forces from lightning discharge. 
 
The design objectives used to create the required current path installations are 
drafted by the design community for use by several design groups. Current 
waveforms and threats from lightning are determined by industry standards such as 
the [5.28] Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practices 
(ARP) 5412 where the lightning environment waveforms are defined. Protection 
objectives can include several combined impacts associated with lightning protection 
function such as: 
• Prevent electrical or electrical heating damage to equipment 
• Control voltage drops within flight vehicles to a acceptable level 
• Prevent sparking or arcing caused by poor conductive path designs 
• Prevent damage to non-conducting materials caused by generation of heat, 
and mechanical forces from lightning discharge. 
 
Flight equipment also requires appropriate lightning protection. This protection is 
provided to ensure that the vehicle flight characteristics and safety, crew visibility, 
and equipment performance take precedence when exposed to a lightning event. To 
ensure that the aircraft continues to operate safely throughout a lightning event, it is 
important that each external, conducting object, excluding antennas, which 
protrudes above the vehicle surface, must have an electrical bond to the vehicle skin, 
structure or designed ground plane on the aircraft. The external surface of each large 
non-conducting projection essential to flight or housing personnel (e.g., vertical 
stabilizer parts, wing tips, astrodomes and canopies) must have a lightning path to 
the vehicle skin. The vehicle skin is an important part of the lightning event 
protection as it provides for the Faraday cage that keeps much of the lightning 
energy on the surface of the aircraft structure. If a high-resistance surface coating is 
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used as the lightning path on a structural component, the path-to-skin voltage at any 
point must be less than the breakdown voltage to any grounded object within the 
protected zone in order to ensure that an arc is not created. 
 
Where protective conductors are shielded by insulating material or metal structure, 
and are not subject to a direct lightning strike, designers must decide on the current 
carrying capacity requirements for these conductors. In many designs, the cross 
sectional area must be equal to or larger than 6,530 circular mils (No. 12 AWG) for 
copper, or 10,380 circular mils (No. 10 AWG) for aluminum in order to meet the 
potential current flow capacity criteria. When protective conductors are installed on 
the external surface of the aircraft and are therefore exposed to a direct lightning 
strike, a minimum of 20,820 circular mils (No. 7 AWG) may be required for copper, or 
33,100 circular mils (No. 5 AWG) for aluminum.  
 
These protective conductors are sometimes called bond jumpers or earthing 
conductors and are discussed in more detail within the case studies. Figure 5-56 
shows the design of a specific bond jumper. These bond jumpers can be either flat 
and braided or round. Some bond jumpers have a protective sleeve and others do 
not. Bond jumpers are typically made of copper with an outer coating such as tin or 
nickel to protect the jumper from oxidation. When designing a bonding scheme, it is 
important to identify these characteristics of the bond jumper in order to ensure 
that materials that interface with the bond jumper terminals are compatible and 
provide for proper sealant where necessary. The engineering assessment sheets are 
designed to address this issue properly during the aircraft design phase. 
 
 
Figure 5-56 Typical Bond Jumper Configuration 
 
For structural construction, close-riveted skin construction which divides lightning 
current among a large number of rivets may be considered an adequate discharge 
path. A minimum number of rivets and rivet size should be determined for locations 
where lightning current is designed to pass through structure. 
 
Flight control surfaces and cables should be bonded to ensure that currents flowing 
through the control surfaces during a lightning event are passed with little or no 
damage to the flight control surface. In many cases it is also important to ensure that 
an alternate designed current path is provided around each bearing or hinge to 
prevent damage from high currents. Where jumpers are shielded from a direct 
lightning strike, exposed movable surfaces having a single hinge must be protected 
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by a minimum number of bond jumper installations. For many designs, it may be 
adequate to protect single hinge moveable surfaces with a minimum of two No. 12 
AWG copper jumpers (or equivalent) installed in immediate proximity to the hinge. 
The provision of bonding jumpers on control surfaces is an important part of the 
lightning protection design. As a result of this importance, these bond jumpers 
require the engineering evaluation presented in these case studies to ensure that 
there is an adequate protection over the life of the installation. Where two or more 
hinges are used additional design criteria may be established to address redundancy 
of lightning path protection. For installations that have multiple hinges, it may be 
determined that each hinge must be protected by a minimum of one jumper to meet 
these requirements. Where the jumpers that protect control surfaces protrude 
outside the vehicle or are otherwise exposed to a direct lightning strike, their size 
may be altered to carry the higher current associated with direct attachment within 
the lightning zone specified. In this case, bond jumpers may be increased to No. 4 
AWG. In order to control the implementation of bonding jumpers within a design, a 
table of the different applications for bond jumpers including various lightning 
threats can be created to demonstrate that the appropriate protection is applied. 
 
Electrically bond mechanical control cables at their outboard ends to prevent high 
potentials from appearing at the control position. It may be impractical to bond the 
cable directly; therefore, apply the jumper to the section or drum where the cable 
terminates may be the best design approach to implement the bond. The jumper 
should be installed to protect the bearing of the control cable pulley. If there is a 
possible lightning discharge path from the control surface through linkages to the 
cable section, then it is good design practice to electrically bond each linkage. 
For tubes that carry combustibles, where lines carrying combustibles are located on 
the exterior of the air vehicle, bonding at extremities is necessary. Practical 
implementation of bonding schemes that protect combustible transport elements 
such as tubing may be grounded at extremities, joints, and at a specified distance 
between ground points when the tubing is greater than a specified length. For 
bonding of these types of transport elements, it may be appropriate to bond every X 
feet along the length of the tube if the distance between joints is greater than X feet 
(design requirement for distance between bonds retained). 
 
Lightning discharge paths must also be provided at all possible points of entry into 
the aircraft. The discharge path must be low inductance for the short rise time initial 
current component, and low resistance for the longer duration DC component. As 
discussed in the bond jumper section of this thesis, these entry points may include 
locations on the aircraft such as: navigation lights, fuel filler caps, fuel gage covers, 
fuel vents, fuel tank access panels, antennas, and exposed connectors that penetrate 
from outside the aircraft to inside the aircraft. 
 
To determine the appropriate method used to create the bonded joint, solder 
connections must not be used on jumpers that are required to carry lightning 
currents. The method of attaching terminals to jumpers must be verified by test to 
be satisfactory for lightning discharge. Such tests must meet the requirements of 
military specification MIL–B–5087 [5.27]. Since much development has occurred 
  
210 
over many years to advance electrical bonding guidelines, MIL-B-5087 was cancelled 
in 1997. Though the military specification MIL-B-5087 provides general guidelines for 
bonding and grounding (earthing) important lightning protected locations, it is also 
acceptable for an aircraft design program to adopt specific internal guidelines and 
requirements to ensure appropriate methods are used. For the aircraft in the case 
studies, the OEM uses an internal requirements specification Aircraft Requirement 
(reference retained) to provide installation design guidance for earthing of 
equipment and aircraft structure [5.29]. The specification, (OEM specification 
number retained) and the dash numbered specifications do not violate MIL-B-5087B, 
MIL-STD-464 [5.30] or the U.S. National Electrical Code. However, MIL-B-5087B, MIL-
STD-464 or the National Electrical Code or any other specification may not be used in 
lieu of the OEM specification and the dash numbered specifications, unless 
specifically approved by a using group. In case of a conflict between the dash 
numbered specifications and the engineering drawing developed by design 
engineers, the provisions of the engineering drawing shall prevail. The dash 
numbered specifications (reference retained) require certified personnel and test 
equipment. The dash numbered detailed specifications are listed in Table 5-17. 
 
Specification 
Number* 
Title 
Temp-1 Electrical Bonding of Receptacles 
Temp-2 MIL-T-83454/4 Preinstalled Ground Stud Installation 
Temp-3 Standard Preinstalled Ground Stud Installation 
Temp-4 Direct Ground Stud Installation 
Temp-5 Terminal Installation on Preinstalled Ground Studs 
Temp-6 Electrical Faying Surface Bonds 
Temp-7 Driven Rivet Electrical Bond 
Temp-8 Electrical Bonding - Ground Block Installation 
Temp-9 Electrical Bonding - Static Discharger Assembly Installation 
Temp-10 Electrical Bonding - Clamp Installation on Tubes/Conduit 
Temp-11 Electrical Bonding - Fitting and Coupling Installations 
Temp-12 Electrical Bonding - Bulkhead Fitting Installation 
Temp-13 Electrical Bonding of Fasteners to Conductive Finishes on Composites 
Temp-14 Electrical Bonding of Composite Panels 
Temp-15 
Preinstalled Ground Stud Installation in Carbon Fiber Reinforced 
Plastic (CFRP) 
Temp-16 Dual Hole Terminal Direct Ground Stud Installation 
Temp-17 Electrical Bonding of Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) Structure 
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Specification 
Number* 
Title 
Temp-18 Electrical Bonding Through Fastener - Clearance Fit Hole 
Temp-19 Electrical Bonding Through Fasteners - Interference Fit 
Temp-20 Electrical Bonding Using Sleeved Bolts 
 *actual specification numbers retained 
Table 5-17 OEM electrical bonding specification family tree 
 
This bonding specification forms a part of each dash numbered specification. When 
no dash number is specified on the Engineering drawing, this specification applies. 
When specified, the dash numbered specification takes precedence over this 
specification. For specific bond applications that require additional protection from 
the effects of moisture that can cause corrosion and degrade the bond, sealant may 
be specified. Different sealants are available that perform differently with regard to 
heat resistance, elasticity and penetration protection. Sealant specifications are 
applied by one of three categories as shown in Table 5-18. 
 
Category Sealant application method 
Cat A1 Not sealed 
Cat A2 Fay seal – Sealed between two surfaces by application of sealant 
spread over the surfaces before assembly and then compressed to 
create an electrical bond between the surfaces. 
Cat A6 Fillet seal – Sealed between two surfaces by application of sealant 
spread at the joint between the two surfaces. 
 *actual Cat numbers retained 
Table 5-18 OEM sealant category nomenclature 
 
In cases where the application of the joint requires electrical connection but the 
surface is not exposed to potential moisture, a joint may be designated without 
sealant. These applications may be found in areas within the aircraft interior or on 
surfaces where excessive heat keeps the joint dry such as that found on an engine 
structural component underneath the engine cowling. Fay surface seals are excellent 
for protection an electrical bond since the sealant is compressed which creates a 
tight seal within the adjoining components. This fay seal type of joint may not be as 
easy to remove in applications where a component is expected to be replaced.  Fillet 
seals are good for eliminating exposure to outside moisture, however, a fillet seal 
may also “trap” moisture if the sealant is compromised. There may also be presence 
of moisture in joints that are fillet sealed due to condensation between the two 
surfaces in the joint. If a fillet seal is compromised by a pin hole in the sealant due to 
improper installation or accidental damage, the fillet seal can actually draw moisture 
into the space between the two surfaces due to the changes in pressure outside the 
seal and inside the seal as the aircraft moves from one altitude to another. Selection 
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of the appropriate sealing approach is determined by use of good engineering 
judgment. Application of the proposed methodology can assist with providing a 
more “scientific” approach to selection of the most effective joint design. 
 
In order to apply a sealed joint properly, the surfaces of the components that are in 
intimate electrical contact should be cleaned. Different cleaning methods are use 
depending on the type of materials that are used to create the electrical connection 
within the joint. Table 5-19 provides an example of how requirements may be 
defined for cleaning surfaces in preparation for sealant. 
 
Bond 
Category* 
Bond Surface Cleaning Method 
Material Finish Designator Description 
A1,A2,A6 Aluminum Anodized CM1 Abrasive Clean 
Bare with or without 
grease, oil or 
compounds, oxide film 
contamination or 
other contaminants 
CM1 Abrasive Clean 
Chemical conversion 
coating (corrosion 
protection) 
CM1 Abrasive Clean 
Paint, primer, or 
enamel 
CM1 Abrasive Clean 
A1, A6 Aluminum Chemical conversion 
coating (corrosion 
protection) with or 
without grease oil or 
compounds, oxide film 
contamination or 
other contaminants 
CM3 Solvent Clean 
 *actual bond category numbers retained 
Table 5-19 Cleaning Methods for aluminum electrical joints 
 
Electrical Bonding for aircraft designs have been controlled by the requirements of 
MIL-B-5087, “Bonding, Electrical, and Lightning Protection, for Aerospace Systems” 
[5.27] on many aircraft development projects. The original issue-date of MIL-B-5087 
was 1949 and addressed the “how-to” requirements. Military services with 
commercial manufacturing assistance have tried on several occasions to revise the 
bonding requirements to address new manufacturing techniques and technologies. 
This adds complexity to the decisions that are required when establishing 
requirements for aircraft design. However, the revisions just added more techniques 
without deleting older techniques. The latest version, Revision B, was issued in 1964 
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and is sometimes referred to for creation of the latest generation requirements. 
Electrical bonding requirements in these Military standards have not kept pace with 
today’s understanding of electrical bonding and its effects on system performance. 
This situation results in the creation of design requirements that are sourced for 
original documents such as MIL-B-5087 with certain departures used to meet special 
needs or more recent understanding of optimal bonding and grounding criteria. 
 
More recently issued guidance for the electromagnetic compatibility design for a 
system is governed by Interface Standard MIL-STD-464, “Electromagnetic 
Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems”, issued March 18, 1997 [5.30]. This 
standard replaces, for the most part, the requirements and the techniques 
recommended within older documents with performance based requirements. One 
of the superseded documents is MIL-B-5087B [5.27]. 
 
Some designers feel that no commercial standard exists that adequately addresses 
the bonding considerations associated with operation in the severe electromagnetic 
environments of military aircraft and missiles. Contrary to this belief, many 
commercial aircraft designers have developed far more advanced guidance internal 
to specific companies. In addition, the committee’s assembled under the auspices of 
the Society of Automotive Engineering have generated guidelines published within 
Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) that further advance the library of known 
design requirements in the 1990’s. In many cases however, many government 
contracts continue to invoke MIL-STD-464, along with companion documents MIL-
STD-461 and 462. For the aircraft in the case studies, this thesis contains specific 
guidance provided in the following paragraphs that may have been sourced originally 
from the military specification, the SAE, ARP and internal OEM design guides. 
 
Many current design and manufacturing processes for electrical bonding are based 
on MIL-B-5087B. The use of modern materials in system structure designs, such as 
conductive and non-conductive composites, conductive form-in-place gasket 
materials, etc., is not addressed by MIL-B-5087B. When using new materials, 
electrical bonding requirements may be left to the manufacturer to establish and 
propose the techniques and quality checks that will be established for the 
manufacturing processes. As an aircraft manufacturer selects sub-contractors that 
are responsible for production of electrical bonding designs, these situations may 
create programmatic issues (some requiring contractual modifications) due to 
differences in interpretations of contract-requirements. 
 
As a result, it is not adequate to simply reference a requirements document for 
implementation of a physical design. Non-consistent contractual interpretations of 
specifications such as MIL-B-5087B, and associated deviation/waiver exceptions, can 
cause the internal bonding manufacturing requirement/procedure to be different for 
each airplane platform design implemented. For example, some manufacturing 
procedures will allow electrical bonding methods on the classic aircraft designs of 
the 1960s that are not permitted for the aircraft in these case studies. This adds 
complexity to an already complex process for manufacturing multi-type, multi-
customer aerospace products in a common facility. In the end, design and 
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manufacture of the aircraft in these case studies requires close attention to specific 
design requirements and deviations from industry standards. 
5.8.8 Bonding for the Aircraft in the Case Studies 
Based on analysis done during the design of the airplane lightning zones for the 
aircraft in the case studies, standard requirements are defined that specify the type 
of protection and current handling capabilities that must be designed for each 
location and application. 
 
Possible impacts of lightning to unprotected aircraft include structural damage, fuel 
ignition, and the generation of electrical transients. Structural or skin damage could 
occur as the result of lightning current flowing through structural or skin 
components where the path impedance could cause overheating. Fuel ignition could 
occur as a result of current flow through joints or fasteners exposed to fuel or fuel 
vapors such as in the fuel tank where poor joint contact could cause arcing or 
heating. Electrical transients could be generated if high lightning currents such as 
from nose to tail of the airplane flow in parallel with wiring and induce a transient 
current in that wiring. These transients can also result by induction from the 
magnetic or electrical fields created by nearby lightning strikes through unshielded 
openings or apertures. Transients can also occur if high current flow through the 
impedance of a path such as a ground plane results in a high voltage drop along the 
path which would create a ground reference voltage difference between different 
points on the ground plane. As discussed in this thesis, effects resulting from the 
transfer of lightning current to a localized location on the aircraft structure are called 
direct effects. Effects resulting from the induced currents caused nearby lightning 
current either on the airplane or nearby are called indirect effects. 
 
Bonding and grounding provides protection from lightning damage by channeling the 
lightning current in a controlled alternative low resistance path to minimize impact 
on structure and equipment. Grounded diverters such as that on the radome and 
some antennas on the exterior of the airplane are designed to direct the strike away 
from vulnerable areas. Grounded conductive surface layers over composites such as 
foil or screens help dissipate the strike current and prevent skin penetration and 
provide a shield to reduce induced effects. Bonding (or earthing) jumpers from 
moveable control surfaces to fixed surfaces prevent damaging current flow through 
hinges and actuators. Proper use of conductive fasteners to insure low resistance 
joints in the skin and structure insures that sparking and heating at the joints does 
not occur in fuel area. The current return network provides a low resistance path 
from nose to tail and to the tips of the wings and empennage to channel much of the 
lightning current in a path alternate to the airplane skin and structure and provide a 
safe path for lightning current from entry to exit. Properly grounded equipment and 
wire shields to the aircraft ground plane reduces electrical transients. 
 
The lightning protection scheme (Class 4 in the Table 5-16) for the airplane depends 
on all of the airframe components, the ground paths designed for lightning current, 
and structures being electrically bonded together to form a common ground plane. 
Current distribution analytical models and threat assessments depend on the ground 
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path architecture. This same architecture enables the responsible design community 
to establish qualification levels for all systems equipment. 
 
Diverter strips, structure, and all components and surfaces shall be electrically 
bonded or protected to control and divert lightning currents, and to minimize the 
direct and indirect effects of lightning.  
 
Figure 5-57 illustrates how the high currents and voltages resulting from lightning 
strike can cause arcing. 
 
 
Figure 5-57 Arcing potential from lightning strike 
5.9The Continued Airworthiness of Lightning Protection  
Airplanes in flight are susceptible to various environmental hazards including 
lightning and high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). Both of these conditions can 
impose sudden, serious damage to critical and essential airplane systems such as 
electronic engine controls, high lift devices, and primary flight controls, and can 
affect safety of flight. Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) ensure the 
availability of the inherent safety and reliability of the system function. This 
requirement is levied against systems whose failures can cause or contribute to a 
Catastrophic or Hazardous/Severe-Major failure condition. This requirement is 
satisfied during the design phase of the project by a release from affected 
Engineering Groups defining all significant protection items and documentation of 
the preferred and optimized design for each component installation.  
 
Aircraft electromagnetic protection has always been focused on the design, test and 
analysis required for certifying aircraft. That focus is now expanding to include the 
continued airworthiness of electromagnetic protection over the entire life of the 
aircraft. A better understanding of the scope and magnitude of maintaining 
assurance is needed for continued electromagnetic protection and safety over the 
lifetime of the aircraft [5.35]. 
 
As discussed, for wiring installations that support critical and essential systems 
operations, protection from these conditions is built into airplanes through shielded 
enclosures and shielded wiring, which are grounded to airplane structure. Airplanes 
also operate under the constant extremes of pressure and temperature while 
exposed to moisture, shock, and vibration. These can degrade the built-in protection 
integrity of shielding systems, bonding installations and structures, requiring 
operators to periodically test the protection schemes unless the protection is proven 
within the design to last the life of the aircraft. If HIRF/Lightning protection 
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components in the ground paths progressively lose their capacity to conduct and 
divert electrical current, then the associated and intended HIRF/Lightning Protection 
function is correspondingly impaired. 
 
Deterioration can occur due to several operational and environmental sources. The 
following are some of the more common causes of deterioration that can affect 
lightning protection continued airworthiness. 
1. Corrosion of components’ conductive elements can be a major problem in this 
respect and is aggravated by exposure to environmental moisture and fluids. One 
direct consequence of corrosion is increased electrical resistance and diminished 
capacity to conduct the electric current arising from exposure to HIRF or 
lightning. 
2. Designed mechanical integrity (faying surface electrical bonds, grounding 
terminations, connector mating, etc.) can degrade, thus increase electrical 
resistance between interfaces and decreasing the effectiveness of the protection 
function being provided for HIRF/Lightning. 
3. Vibration in flight can loosen or separate connections and thereby increase 
electrical resistance. 
4. Internal components of equipment line replaceable units may degrade or fail for 
various reasons, one of which may be exposure to sufficiently potent lightning-
induced voltages. 
 
Categories of lightning protection are discussed in the methodology section of this 
thesis. For each category of lightning protection a plan must be put into place to 
ensure that the protection continues to function during a lightning event over the 
life of the aircraft. Categories of lightning protection can be described as following: 
1. Internal Protection - Components inside the Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) of 
Electrical and Electronic Systems. HIRF/Lightning protection components located 
inside the equipment of Electrical and Electronic Systems include diodes, 
capacitors, filter pins and transient absorber devices (Tranzorb). These 
components located inside equipment are categorized as Internal. During 
service, the integrity of these components typically is verified by testing the host 
Line Replaceable Units (LRU) according to an Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP) 
when they are removed from the airplane for maintenance purposes. 
Components within equipment can also prove continued airworthiness through 
mathematical means by showing the life of the component exceeds the life of 
the equipment. 
2. Mechanical Protection - Mechanical Components are typically non-wiring 
components that are installed to protect against the adverse effects of 
HIRF/Lightning and may include ground straps, isolation devices, ferrite 
suppressors, etc. During service the integrity of these components is typically 
verified by testing during scheduled maintenance. In order for these components 
to be identified to require scheduled maintenance, the design methodology is 
used to show any potential unacceptable deterioration. 
3. Secondary Structural Components - Structural Components include disconnect 
brackets, trays and shelves, etc. Disconnect brackets that are used to mount 
critical connectors at production breaks are a good example of structural 
  
217 
protection. During service the integrity of these components is typically verified 
by testing by testing during scheduled maintenance or upon removal and 
installation of related interfacing components. 
4. Primary Structural Components - Structural Components include skin, walls, 
composite panels, ribs, spars, stringers and beams. During service the integrity of 
these components is typically verified by testing by testing during scheduled 
maintenance. 
 
Protection components listed in this chapter are tested any time a bond path check 
is performed. These bond checks drive current through the mechanical, wiring, 
primary structure and secondary structure in order to determine appropriate 
impedance between these components exists. This is demonstrated in Figure 5-49 
where the bond path is defined through wiring, brackets and aircraft structure. 
 
Compliance to FAR 25.1529 [5.23], as applied to HIRF/Lightning protection 
components, is very much dependent on the type of component under 
consideration. Components associated with electrical or electronic systems are 
generally divided into two broad categories: 1) protection components external to 
line replaceable units, 2) protection component within line replaceable units. 
Components associated with fuel systems and structural installations are also 
categories of lightning protection, though there are more specific regulations written 
by regulatory authorities to address ignition sources due to lightning and other 
potential energy sources such as fault currents and static energy. The criticality of 
each protection feature or component is the associated criticality of the system in 
which the components are associated. If the LRU in Figure 5-58 is considered critical 
or essential equipment, then all components within the bond path are considered 
with the same level of importance to the continued airworthiness of the system.  
 
In Figure 5-58 the bond path associated with lightning protection is from the loom 
shield to the backshell to the bracket and then to structure. Continuing from the 
backshell the ground path for the lightning might also take the path of backshell to 
receptacle on the bracket to the connector plug on the other side of the bracket, 
through the shields in the loom and to the next connector backshell on another 
bracket. In the case of an LRU installation, the bond path in Figure 5-58 is through 
the shields in the loom to the backshell on the aircraft loom then to the plug, 
through the receptacle and into the LRU case. The LRU case may be electrically 
bonded to the aircraft structure through a fay surface bond between the LRU and 
the structure on which it is mounted. If an LRU cannot achieve an adequate bond 
through the interface of the LRU case and the aircraft structure, then a bond strap or 
“earthing wire” may be mounted to the LRU case and the airplane structure to 
achieve the required electrical bond.  
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Figure 5-58 Bond path from equipment and connectors to aircraft structure 
 
Electrical, electronic, and fuel systems installed on commercial airplanes are 
protected by various means against adverse effects caused by exposure to High 
Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) and lightning. These HIRF/Lightning Protection 
Systems are comprised of components that avoid, eliminate, or reduce the 
consequences of a HIRF or lightning event. The means of protection are the airplane 
structure itself, sub-structural components, mechanical components, components of 
the installed wire looms and discrete components that reside within the line 
replaceable units of systems themselves.  
 
The statutory requirement that applies to these various protective components in 
respect of assuring their Continued Airworthiness is defined in FAR 25.1529, 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness [5.23]. In the design of the aircraft used in 
the case studies, the manufacturer has established detailed requirements that are 
intended to ensure compliance with FAR 25.1529 [5.23]. The requirements apply to 
HIRF/Lightning assurance, test plans, procedures, analytical techniques and 
deliverable documents and appropriate maintenance program development. 
 
For wiring protection, adequate bond path is provided by proper shielding, electrical 
interface preparations between line replaceable units and aircraft structure as 
shown in Figure 5-58 for wiring installations. The wire looms that convey signals to 
Critical and Essential airplane systems can also convey current induced by exposure 
to lightning or HIRF that can create upset or failure during critical flight operations. 
The levels of induced current are reduced by incorporating electrically conductive 
shields within and around the wire looms. These shields therefore provide a 
secondary line of defense in respect of HIRF/Lightning protection. In addition, Critical 
and Essential airplane systems commonly possess within them passive protection 
components to “stand-of the effects of large voltages that can be generated at the 
connector interface to the equipment if not properly designed. These work by 
absorbing or diverting residual electric current that impinge upon the system via the 
connected wire looms and the external connectors. These internal components 
provide a third line of defense in respect of HIRF/Lightning protection [5.34]. 
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Wire loom shielding of aircraft wiring harnesses, electrical bonding, and grounding 
are all used to provide electromagnetic protection in aircraft. In earlier design 
periods such as that represented for the aircraft used for these case studies, the 
effectiveness of these protection methods was assumed to be maintained using 
periodic detailed visual inspections and DC bond checks after any replacements or 
repairs. This assumption appears valid because of the low number of catastrophic 
occurrences involving lightning strikes. However, the continued effectiveness of 
electromagnetic protection methods becomes more important as the use of and 
complexity of the Avionics used in the aircraft increases. Continued effectiveness of 
the electromagnetic protection methods is also very important as the amount of 
composite materials used in the manufacture of the aircraft is increased. 
 
Because of the increased importance of electromagnetic protection, the FAA along 
with the industry has developed measurable standards for assuring the continued 
effectiveness of electromagnetic protection. Developing measurable standards 
requires a thorough understanding of the electromagnetic environment and the 
necessary measurement tools. Degradation of lightning protection can result in 
reduction of the bond path or electrical path conductivity. In response to these 
reductions in conductive efficiency, one may use a loop resistance tester on certain 
critical wire looms to determine reduction in conductivity over time. Degradation in 
general is both environmental and time sensitive. Long term behavior of conductive 
elements are affected by factors like temperature, moisture, dynamic service loads, 
accidental damage, foreign object damage (FOD), and system operating fluids such 
as hydraulic fluid either in isolation or in association of more than one of these 
factors. For a required design life of 20 years or more of these materials, it is not 
practical to perform tests on either materials or structures for very long periods to 
cover the design lifetime, especially on a newly developed technology. Therefore, 
there is a strong need for accelerated lifetime characterization methodologies which 
can predict the degradation of components that protect against the adverse effects 
of lightning in order to assure the integrity and safety of lightning protection 
components. Since it is often impractical to expose lightning protection component 
to the multiple degradation threats over an extended period of time representing 
the average 20 year life goals of an aircraft, it is very much essential to understand 
their durability issues before they can be used with confidence in any aircraft design 
application. To assist with this challenge, this work proposes practical application of 
a methodology to converge all known elements of the protection components 
potential degradation modes, known patterns from service experience and 
leveraged use of test data that may be generated for other design evaluations. 
 
Environmental conditions that damage airplane systems include moisture from rain 
and salt air, which continually bathes external wiring, connectors and other 
grounding installations such as bond jumpers. As an example, wide pressure swings 
from altitude changes, in conjunction with extremes of temperature, can force 
moisture into connectors and junctions. Small air cavities in connector back shells 
are susceptible to internal condensation even if completely sealed to outside air. 
Climb out from airports where temperatures reach above 100°F (38°C) to flight at 
40,000 ft., where temperatures can fall below -67°F (-55°C), causes these air pockets 
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to shrink and draw moist outside air inside. Descent from low-pressure altitudes 
through clouds and rain forces moist air into connector cavities when outside 
pressure builds at lower altitudes. This effect can occur even in pressurized areas of 
the airplane. Airframe vibrations and shocks from landings and turbulent flight can 
loosen fasteners and connectors, creating additional paths for moisture to enter. 
 
The inevitable ingress of moisture causes corrosion which is also discussed in depth 
within these case studies. Corrosion degrades electrical ground paths through a 
chemical interaction between metal and another element, usually air (oxygen), 
water, salt, or chemicals such as hydraulic fluid. The shield grounding techniques 
used on airplanes involve metal-to-metal contact at junctions. The presence of 
oxygen or water causes an oxide to form between the contacting surfaces. The oxide 
is an insulator, which limits the flow of electrical current. Gradually the resistance 
across the junction increases and, over time, the electrical junction can be 
completely broken. Degradation of this type results in a higher resistance path to 
ground, which allows greater coupling of lightning or RF currents to internal wiring. 
This degradation is not evident to maintenance personnel, and extreme instances of 
corrosion or loosening of connectors can cause the effectiveness of the lightning 
protection to diminish unacceptably. 
 
The continued airworthiness of the different lightning protection designs relies 
heavily on the location of the equipment and wiring, use of effective wiring, use of 
good grounding or earthing practices, and building equipment to withstand 
transients as well as long term environmental effects. All these tactics must be 
incorporated into the aircraft design and the installed equipment. As an example, a 
new shielded cable properly installed will exhibit a certain amount of resistance in 
the shield circuit. By monitoring this resistance, maintenance personnel can 
determine the ability of the shield to protect internal wiring. Any increase in 
resistance indicates that a problem is occurring in the circuit, such as corrosion at a 
junction or loose hardware. When the resistance reaches a certain level, 
maintenance personnel must take corrective action, usually by cleaning the affected 
junctions, securing loose connections, or replacing the cable. The concept of this 
research is to eliminate the need for maintenance by ensuring that the proper design 
steps are taken during the design phase of the aircraft development. This is 
accomplished using the methodology and is put into practice by use of analysis 
sheets included in the case studies. One consideration for the outcome of the 
assessment in the methodology can be replacement of a different component or 
relocation of the component to reduce potential degradation. 
 
In 2004 the US Department of Transportation sponsored a study to investigate the 
continued airworthiness of aircraft wiring [5.36]. This report presents the results of 
the effects of aircraft wiring harness shield degradation when harnesses and 
connectors are subjected to a variety of environmental, mechanical, and vibration 
test conditions adapted from RTCA/DO-160-D.  Two aircraft manufacturers each 
fabricated six identical test panels. Each panel had two 24″ shielded wire looms with 
back shells and cable end connectors attached to separate termination boxes and 
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center bulkhead brackets that were mechanically mounted and electrically bonded 
to the ground plane test panel. 
 
One panel served as the baseline, and the other five panels were exposed to three 
severity levels for each test. Direct current bond (joint) resistance, shield loop 
resistance at 200 Hz, and network analyzer swept-frequency impedance 
measurements from 10 Hz to 10 MHz were taken of each panel before and after 
each test to record the electrical changes. Careful visual inspections and digital 
photographs were taken to record the visual changes. 
 
Comparisons were made in detecting shield degradation using loop resistance 
measurement techniques, swept-frequency impedance measurements, and visual 
inspection to identify unsafe conditions. The wire loom shield loop resistance 
subjected to degradation increased from 9.7 to 16.3 milliohms, or less than 5 dB. 
Little change in wire loom inductance was observed, except at high levels during the 
mechanical shield degradation tests. It was found that the shield degradation 
increases the resistance of the shield loop much more than its inductance, providing 
evidence that loop resistance measurements are adequate to detect shield 
degradation without taking swept-frequency impedance measurements. 
 
This work revealed that visual inspection can pinpoint the source of shield 
degradation before a significant increase in electrical shield loop resistance is 
measurable. However, visual inspection is only possible if the wiring harness and 
connectors are visually accessible on the aircraft. Otherwise, loop resistance 
measurements on any accessible part of the harness, performed by a trained and 
skilled operator, can detect shield degradation but cannot necessarily pinpoint the 
location or source of the problem without further joint resistance measurements. 
 
Though the results of this test case reflect a small sample of wire harnesses with 
degradation caused by salt spray, vibration, mechanical degradation and in some 
cases a combination of test threats, data gathered on the aircraft in the case studies 
suggests that some degradation is much higher than the 5 dB suggested in this 
report. As part of this research and development it was discovered that the tests 
performed in the reference [5.36] test report are not consistent with known 
degradation experience over time on the aircraft used in the case studies. The 
following is a summary of results observed for each test type: 
 
Temperature and Altitude Test: This test was performed to evaluate the level of 
degradation on aircraft wiring harness shield characteristics when exposed to 
various temperature and pressure extremes that are usually associated with altitude 
change during normal flight operations. The test panels were exposed to low, 
medium, and high levels of variable temperature and pressure conditions in the 
environmental chamber. Visual inspection, loop resistance, and dc resistance 
measurements were recorded initially and after each exposure level. Test panels 
showed no considerable variation in the loop impedance values between the initial 
and final readings. A gradual increase in the resistance values was noticed as the 
severity level changed from low to high, but the increase was within tolerance limits. 
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Neither of the test panels showed signs of visual degradation at any level of 
temperature and altitude testing. 
Salt Spray and Humidity Test: Test panels were exposed to low, medium, and high 
levels of a corrosive environment in a salt spray chamber. A visual inspection and 
loop and dc resistance measurements were recorded initially and after each 
exposure level. Exposure levels were varied from about 30 hours at the low end to 
about 200 hours on the high end (actual exposure times retained). No noticeable 
corrosion was seen on the low spray exposure level. For the medium exposure, a 
visible film was seen on the connectors. Corrosion is clearly visible on the high spray 
exposure level on the shield termination screws and on the screws joining the 
bulkhead to the ground plane test panel. A gradual increase in the resistance values 
was noticed as the severity level changed from low to high, but the increase was 
within standard tolerances established by the test agent. Test panels were found to 
be visually degraded at the low-level test and became heavily corroded at the end of 
the high-level test. Total loop impedance levels rose from a baseline of 
approximately X milliohms for the baseline to Y milliohms at low exposure and Z 
milliohms at medium exposure and finally ZZ milliohms at high salt spray and 
humidity exposure. These values are increased as spray tests exposures are 
increased. Conclusions of this test determined that the degradation was not greater 
than 5 to 6 dB and that the corrosion which was determined to cause the increase in 
the loop resistance value was evident with a visual inspection. 
Vibration Test: The vibration test was performed on the test panels to simulate the 
vibration conditions in an aircraft. Referencing the vibration curve contained in 
RTCS/DO-160D guidelines, the most sever vibration curve was used for the test. Due 
to the small size of the vibration table used in this test, the test was performed on a 
portion of the test panel using special designed fixtures. Vibration was imposed on 
the test specimen in three axes at three different levels from low to medium to high. 
Results of this test showed no loosening of connectors or screws. Moreover, no 
other visual variations were observed at any level of testing. Variations in shield loop 
resistance and dc measurements were within the set tolerances however there was 
a noticed crack in the connectors used on one of the test samples. 
Mechanical Degradation Test: This test studied the effects of mechanical 
degradation on wire shielding. The types of degradation performed on the test 
panels were stretching, loosening and cutting the shield braids. These tests were 
typical examples of possible damage to wire looms in aircraft. For each severity level, 
the degradation was performed on all the shield braids on each side of the center 
connector, and also on the shield braids terminating at each end connector. 
Degradation was injected by cutting shields from a low level to a higher level. At the 
low level, two of six shields were disconnected. For the medium level test, four of 
the six wire shields were severed. And for the high mechanical damage scenario, all 
shields were cut. Mechanical degradation affected the shield impedance more than 
any other environmental test. Shield loop impedance and dc measurements were 
within the manufacturer’s tolerance limits at all degradation levels. 
Combined Degradation Test:  A final test was performed by applying the 
degradations listed above to the same wire loom starting with vibration, then 
temperature, salt spray, and finally the mechanical degradation was applied. The 
final measurements at the end of combined tests showed the overall effects of the 
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worst possible environmental and mechanical degradation. A gradual increase in the 
resistance was noticed for one of the two test panels after each degradation test. 
The other test panel showed no noticeable increase after the temperature and 
altitude test. However, abnormal results were observed during the vibration tests. 
The loop resistance value became unstable during the salt spray and humidity test. 
Therefore, the mechanical degradation test was not performed. Further 
investigation revealed that the vibration tests internally damaged the connectors. 
The variations in the loop resistance for the combined tests were determined to be 
within the acceptable limits after all the degradation tests. Mechanical degradation 
was more sever on the resultant loop resistance as noticed in previous mechanical 
degradations tests. The test reported that no significant change was measured in 
bonding, grounding, and connection resistances after all the degradation tests. 
 
Overall observations from this testing resulted in the following findings as 
determined by the principle investigator [5.36]: 
• The temperature and altitude tests had no effect on the physical or visual 
characteristics of shielding for either test panels type A or B. The loop 
resistance for test panel A increased by 4 milliohms from the baseline to the 
high-level degradation test, and for test panel B, it increased by Z milliohms. 
• The Salt spray and humidity testing corroded the ground plane, center 
bulkhead, screws, and exposed shield braids for both test panels. A slight 
increase was observed in the shield resistance (less than 2 milliohms) after 
the high-level tests of each test panel. 
• Vibration testing did not vary the visual characteristics for both types of test 
panels. The shield loop resistance did not significantly increase at any level of 
degradation for test panel A. However, the connector backshells were broken 
during the testing for test panel type B and the resistance of the shielding 
went to open circuit. Test panel type B was more susceptible to vibration 
testing due to the size of the connector backshells. 
• Mechanical degradation testing affected the physical and visual 
characteristics of shielding for both types of the test panels. The loop 
resistance increased from baseline to high level of testing by X milliohms for 
test panel A, and for test panel B, it increased by ZZZ milliohms. 
• Combination testing affected the physical and visual characteristics for both 
types of test panels. The loop resistance value increased slightly from 
baseline to high level of testing by Y milliohms for test panel A, and it went to 
open circuit for test panel B because the connectors were internally damaged 
during the vibration testing. 
• Physical degradation of shielded wire harnesses was visually observed before 
or at the same time of any significant loop resistance increase. Hence, it is 
recommended that visual and physical inspection be made the primary 
means for detecting shield degradation and shields should be repaired when 
degradation is observed. However, loop resistance measurements are 
advantageous when used to indicate shield degradation of those wire 
harnesses that are not easily accessible for visual inspection, provided the 
measurements are performed by trained and skilled operators. 
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• A further mechanical study appears warranted to investigate the shield 
degradation effects of fully broken and floating grounding wires on various 
shield configurations. That proposed study should involve loop resistance, 
swept-frequency impedance, and shield effectiveness measurements to 
compile the proper maintenance procedures. 
 
Commentary on test results: The tests performed in the reference report [36] are 
one view of test data that should be evaluated against individual OEM experience.  
Individual OEM tests on the aircraft in these case studies performed on aircraft that 
are in service with 10 or more years of aging showed some different results that 
those in the US DOT Study Final Report, “Aircraft Wiring Harness Shield Degradation 
Study”, August 2004 by J.B. O’Loughlin and S.R. Skinner from the National Institute 
for Aviation Research Wichita State University [36]. In that case, the findings of the 
simulations performed as part of the research results from the referenced DOT study 
[36] will not be used to determine appropriate design criteria as proposed in this 
body of work. Use of the results of this test report should be used with caution. The 
inconclusive nature of these tests underlines the position made elsewhere in this 
work that qualification tests (often requiring 500 hours or less of salt spray testing) 
cannot adequately represent performance of protection components installed on an 
aircraft years after the aircraft was produced. This also emphasizes the importance 
of the proposed methodology which brings requirements for continued 
airworthiness into the design process. Consideration of test results, including 
engineering and qualifications tests, are included in the assessment sheets but are 
not expected to be the sole basis for determining the performance of lightning 
protection components. 
 
Airplane designers should preferably base their techniques for protection designs on 
the assumption that presence of moisture is inevitable and that the use of corrosion-
resistant materials and sealants may be an excellent design alternative. However, 
use of corrosion-resistant materials may involve several compromises. An example is 
corrosion-resistant stainless steel (CRES), which is heavy and does not conduct 
electric current easily. Also, CRES is only corrosion resistant and not corrosion proof. 
Consequently, connectors are made of lighter materials such as aluminum, which is a 
good conductor of electricity. Titanium is also a material that has superior qualities 
in some respects. Though titanium is light and high in tensile strength, it also has a 
lower conductivity than aluminum or copper. These characteristics of titanium need 
to be balanced against the alternative material such as CRES which is much heavier 
than titanium or aluminum. Because aluminum corrodes quickly in salt air, it is 
usually plated with nickel and cadmium for additional protection. However, time and 
exposure eventually may cause materials to corrode given the right environmental 
threats and metals involved. The possibility of corrosion within a critical lightning 
protection design is the reason that regulators have mandated specific maintenance 
actions on certain airplane models for monitoring exposed shield paths to keep them 
functioning over the life of the airplane. This conclusion can be augmented with a 
proper design assessment tool such as the methodology proposed by the body of 
work associated with this thesis. 
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5.9.1 Certification of Lightning Protection Designs 
Lightning designs are certified for application on an aircraft through assessment of 
design changes from past designs. In this process an aircraft designer determines 
designs that will require a rigorous evaluation and be declared as “new” for type 
certification. In the route to certification, testing may be required for new designs or 
testing may refer to past tests of similar lightning protection on other aircraft types. 
This approach allows aircraft designers to submit certification plans to the regulatory 
authority in an efficient and productive manner. In order to create a structure from 
which a regulatory agency authority can evaluate aircraft type designs, an aircraft 
designer might create a summary document listing all items that have been new or 
significantly modified from those same designs on other aircraft that have been 
already included in other aircraft type certifications. 
 
For the aircraft in the cases studies, systems and structures that have been modified 
from earlier aircraft designs or considered a “New” design, were summarized for the 
certifying aviation authority. This summary contains a list of the systems and 
structures that have been identified as new or significantly modified for the family of 
airplanes represented in the case studies, or that have been significantly affected by 
a change to regulations or the original certification basis. These systems and 
structures are notable with respect to an asterisk note used in the Type Certification 
Data Sheets which identify those FAR/JAR 25 paragraphs (25.571. 25.607, 25.631, 
25.699, 27.783(f), 25.1309 and 25.1419(c)) for which the OEM proposed showing 
compliance with an amendment level earlier than Amendment 25-77 for aircraft 
under study. For those paragraphs, the intent is to certify those portions of the 
airplane not new, significantly modified, or significantly affected by the change to 
the amendment level of previously certified airplanes. For systems with similar 
installations, the system may be certified by test or suitable service history.  
 
The principal use of supplying a certification document is to establish and record a 
position on those systems that the OEM feels are new, significantly modified, or 
significantly affected by change. Although a qualitative and quantitative assessment 
(for catastrophic and hazardous failure conditions) will be performed on each system 
listed, a new Functional Hazard Assessment and System Safety Assessment (as 
defined in the SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice ARP 4761, “Guidelines and 
Methods for conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems 
and Equipment”, Appendices A and C, respectively) will not necessarily be conducted 
[5.22]. The SAE ARP 4761 document describes guidelines and methods of performing 
the safety assessment for certification of civil aircraft. It is primarily associated with 
showing compliance with FAR/JAR 25.1309. The methods outlined identify a 
systematic means to show compliance. A subset of this material may be applicable to 
non-25.1309 equipment. The concept of Aircraft Level Safety Assessment is 
introduced and the tools to accomplish this task are outlined. The overall aircraft 
operating environment is considered. The FAA has provided a memorandum [5.24] 
to clarify Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) 
certification policy on determination of system development assurance levels, 
hardware design assurance levels, and software levels. 
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When the aircraft in the case studies was certified, certain systems safety 
assessments were conducted that determined system criticality levels. In order to 
show compliance to FAR 25.1309, analysis was conducted to properly categorize 
systems functions and associated equipment. It is important to understand that for 
lightning protection, the results of FAR 25.1309 analysis is used to determine the 
criticality of associated lightning protection. In order to determine qualification 
requirements for equipment where operation of the equipment can have a 
potentially adverse effect on system safety, the OEM created a certification 
document to provide information on electrical/electronic systems equipment having 
a possible “catastrophic”, or “hazardous/major” failure mode due to lightning [5.37]. 
This document contains a list of equipment associated with possible catastrophic or 
hazardous/major failure modes but not necessarily a list of lightning protection 
components. As part of this work, it is suggested that a complete list of protection 
components is created that protect these systems and associated functions as noted 
in the case studies. The table in Appendix C and Appendix D of this thesis contained 
in the OEM certification document, “Aircraft HIRF/Lightning System and Equipment 
Qualification List” [5.37], lists electrical/electronic systems comprised of equipment 
with functions which have possible hazardous or major failure mode(s) due to 
HIRF/Lightning. Equipment that maintain hazardous or major failure modes are 
associated with the “essential”, category 4 definition per D6-16050-4, Rev A [5.33]. 
For the aircraft in the studies, design processes adopted to determine the 
certification impact of systems and equipment criticality utilized previously certified 
determinations to address requirements for this derivative certification program.  
 
5.9.2 Safety Assessments and Determining the Certification Basis 
The methods outlined in SAE ARP4761 [5.22] identify a systematic means, but not 
the only means, to show compliance. The concept of Aircraft Level Safety 
Assessment is introduced in ARP4761 and the tools to accomplish the task of proper 
categorizations and certification compliance is outlined by in ARP4761. The overall 
aircraft operating environment is considered during the exercise to apply proper 
categorization of equipment. When aircraft derivatives or system changes are 
certified the processes are usually applicable only to the new designs or to existing 
designs that are affected by the changes. In the case of the implementation of 
existing designs in a new derivation aircraft design, alternate means such as service 
experience may be used to show compliance. This technique was used extensively in 
the certification of the aircraft equipment contained in the case studies. The OEM 
Document (reference retained) titled, “Aircraft HIRF/Lightning System and 
Equipment Qualification List” [5.37] provides the results of the systems analysis. For 
the lightning and HIRF protection design methodology proposed within this work, 
these determinations would be important to defining the systems that require 
further continued airworthiness evaluation as demonstrated in the assessment 
sheets examples contained in the thesis. 
 
The SAE ARRP4761 presents guidelines for conducting an industry accepted safety 
assessment consisting of Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System 
Safety Assessment (PSSA), and System Safety Assessment (SSA). The ARP also 
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presents information on the safety analysis methods needed to conduct the safety 
assessment. These methods include the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence 
Diagram (DD), Markov Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES) and Common Cause Analysis (CCA). CCA 
is composed of Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risks Analysis (PRA), and 
Common Mode Analysis (CMA). The process for categorization of systems failures 
and the impacts to components that supply functions to support these important 
system operations is a very complicated process and one that is determined through 
key strategic agreements with the regulating authorities during the aircraft design 
process. As such, the outcome of efforts to identify the most critical components 
within a lightning protection scheme is not necessary predicable. 
 
Individual users of the guidance presented in the APR4761 include: airframe 
manufacturers, system integrators, equipment suppliers and certification authorities 
who are involved with the safety assessment of civil aircraft and associated systems 
and equipment. The guidelines and methods are intended to be used in conjunction 
with other applicable guidance materials, including ARP4754 [5.26], RTCNDO-178, 
RTCA Document DO-160, and with the advisory material associated with FAR/JAR 
25.1309. (For engines and propeller applications, reference the applicable FAR/JAR 
advisory material.)  The intent of the ARP4761 document is to identify typical 
activities, methods, and documentation that may be used in the performance of 
safety assessments for civil aircraft and their associated systems and equipment. The 
specific application of such activities needs to be established by the organization 
conducting the assessment and the appropriate recipient. 
 
The APR4761 also provides general guidance in evaluating the safety aspects of a 
design. The primary analytical methods and tools and the relationships of these are 
introduced in the ARP to provide guidance also utilized by lightning protection 
designers. Appendices in ARP4761 provide information on: Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), System Safety 
Assessment (SSA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Dependence Diagram (DD), Markov 
Analysis (MA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Failure Modes and Effects 
Summary (FMES), Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA), Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) and 
Common Modes Analysis (CMA). Appendix L in the ARP4761 provides an example of 
the safety assessment process for a hypothetical system.  
 
As discussed previously, the certification of aircraft systems may generate unique 
results though the guidelines may be constant. This is due to interpretations made 
by the manufacturer that is applying for aviation regulatory approval and associated 
agreements on the adequacy of the interpretations. The example in ARP4761 
illustrates the relationships between the processes and methods in creating the 
overall safety evaluation of an aircraft or system as it develops through the design 
cycle. Examples presented in this ARP4761 document, including documentation 
examples, are intended only as guidance. Though examples are contained in the 
ARP4761, the examples should not be interpreted as an addition to or an 
amplification of any requirement. Reference is made to using the Fault Tree Analyses 
in this document however, for the aircraft in the case studies, an interpretation of 
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the applicability of requirements and appropriate use of Fault Tree Analysis was 
determined at the time of certification and development. It should be understood 
that Dependence Diagrams or Markov Analyses may be selected to accomplish the 
same purpose, depending on the circumstances and the types of data desired. 
Recent developments for certification of equipment use a Markov Analysis to prove 
equipment internal protection is adequate for the life of the aircraft. 
 
Failure analysis and design validation and verification have traditionally been 
accomplished with extensive tests conducted on the system and its components, 
direct inspection, and other direct verification methods capable of correctly 
characterizing the operations of the system. The aircraft used in the case studies was 
developed with much more simplified methods for system criticality and certification 
levels identification. These direct techniques are still appropriate for simple systems 
which perform a limited number of functions and which are not highly integrated 
with other aircraft systems. For complex or integrated systems, adequate testing 
may either be impossible because all of the system states cannot be determined or it 
may be impractical due to the large number of tests which must be accomplished. 
5.9.3 Elements of a Safety Assessment 
The safety assessment process includes requirements generation and verification 
which supports the aircraft development activities [5.22]. For all aircraft 
development programs there is a coordinated process for safety analyses and 
determinations. This safety assessment process provides a methodology to evaluate 
aircraft functions and the design of systems performing these functions to determine 
that the associated hazards have been properly addressed and related systems can 
prove compliance to associated regulations. The safety assessment process is 
qualitative and can be quantitative. These alternative approaches to safety 
assessments are found by the tables generated in the aircraft development program 
document addressing L/HIRF criticality levels [5.37]. 
 
The safety assessment process for the aircraft development program was planned 
and managed to provide the necessary assurance that all relevant failure conditions 
have been identified and that all significant combinations of failures which could 
cause those failure conditions have been considered. The safety assessment process 
for integrated systems should take into account any additional complexities and 
interdependencies which arise due to integration. In all cases involving integrated 
systems, the safety assessment process is of fundamental importance in establishing 
appropriate safety objectives for the system and determining that the 
implementation satisfies these objectives. This design methodology is maintained by 
constant review of design implementations and system failure conditions.  
 
The aircraft design development process is iterative in nature as demonstrated 
earlier in this chapter. As a result, the list of critical and essential components 
contained within lightning protection designs can fluctuate throughout the aircraft 
design process. The safety assessment process is an inherent part of the aircraft 
development and can be quite varied as the design matures. The safety assessment 
process begins with the concept design and derives the safety requirements. As the 
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design evolves, changes are made and the modified design must be reassessed. This 
reassessment may create new derived design requirements and also new design 
approaches that would require reassessment using the assessment sheets proposed 
in this work. These new requirements may necessitate further design changes in an 
iterative manner until all requirements are met. The safety assessment process ends 
with the verification that the design meets the safety requirements. 
5.9.4 Types of Safety Assessments and Applications 
For a broad understanding of the different known safety analysis processes, the 
following brief descriptions relay basic information associated with several known 
safety analysis approaches. 
 
A Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is conducted at the beginning of the aircraft 
system development cycle. It should identify and classify the failure condition(s) 
associated with the aircraft functions and combinations of aircraft functions. These 
failure condition classifications establish the safety objectives. The aircraft level FHA 
is a high level, qualitative assessment of the basic functions of the aircraft as defined 
at the beginning of aircraft development. An aircraft level FHA should identify and 
classify the failure conditions associated with the aircraft level functions. However, if 
separate systems use similar architectures or identical complex components and 
introduce additional aircraft level failure conditions involving multiple functions, 
then the FHA should be modified to identify and classify these new failure 
conditions. The classification of these failure conditions establishes the safety 
requirements that an aircraft must meet. The goal in conducting this FHA is to clearly 
identify each failure condition along with the rationale for its severity classification.  
The system level FHA is also a qualitative assessment which is iterative in nature and 
becomes failures that affect an aircraft function. Assessment of any particular 
hardware or software item is not the goal of the system level FHA. If separate 
systems use similar architectures or identical complex components and introduce 
additional system level failure conditions involving integrated multiple functions, the 
FHA should be modified to identify and classify these new failure conditions.  
 
The Development Assurance Level (DAL) of an aircraft function depends on the 
severity of the effects of failures or development errors of that function on the 
aircraft, crew, or occupants. The Development Assurance Level of each item depends 
on both the system architecture and the resulting failure effects of the item on the 
functions performed by the system. 
 
A Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic, methodical analysis 
performed to identify and document all identifiable failure modes at a prescribed 
level and to specify the resultant effect of the failure mode at various levels of 
assembly. The FMEA is an analytical technique to determine the effect of a low level 
failure in hardware or software on the operation of a hardware item or system. The 
FMEA can establish that no single failure or malfunction, or combinations of failures 
within a system will jeopardize the safe operation of the airplane. To complete a 
FMEA one must generally provide for assumptions and conditions under which the 
system operates and is maintained. Specific faults may be defined for the system as 
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well as how the fault becomes evident. Mechanical and electrical/electronic 
components that perform functions associated with the system operations under 
evaluations are usually also listed as part of the FMEA exercise. Common mode 
failures such any single failure or probable combinations of failures that can affect 
the system operation are be considered, to ensure that the requirement for 
continued safe flight can be met.  
 
A Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a probability technique using failures as top level events 
and lower level failures within a tree relationship. The tree relationship found in the 
FTA is used to determine contributing factors. The FTA can be applied to determine 
which single or combinations of failures can exist at the lower levels that might cause 
each failure condition. The completed FTA facilitates technical and management 
assessments as it identifies only the failure events which could individually or 
collectively lead to the occurrence of the undesired top event. In contrast, an FMEA 
lists only single failures, including some which may be of no concern. 
 
A Common Cause Analysis (CCA) provides the tools to verify independence, or to 
identify specific dependencies. Often discussions occur around the effects of a 
lightning strike event in combination with a common cause failure such as loss of 
multiple lightning shields due to moisture imposed across several separate channels 
that cause a presence of degradation equally across each channel. In particular, the 
CCA identifies failure modes or external events which can lead to a catastrophic or 
hazardous/severe-major condition. Such common cause events must be precluded 
for catastrophic failure conditions and must be within the assigned probability for 
hazardous/severe-major failure conditions. From FAR 25.1309 we see that the safety 
analysis must give special attention to analyzing common-cause faults. 
 
Particular Risk Analysis (PRA) also plays a role in determination of the significance of 
lightning strike protection. Particular risks are defined as those events or influences 
which are outside the system(s) and item(s) concerned, but which may violate failure 
independence claims. Some of the example risks shown require analysis due to 
airworthiness regulations, while others arise from known external threats to the 
aircraft or systems. Typical risks include, but are not limited to the following. 
• Fire 
• High Energy Devices 
• Leaking Fluids 
• Hail, Ice, Snow 
• Bird Strike 
• Tread Separation from Tire 
• Wheel Rim Release 
• Lightning 
• High Intensity Radiated Fields 
• Flailing Shafts 
 
The objective of the PRA is to ensure any safety related effects are either eliminated 
or the risk is shown to be acceptable. Having identified the appropriate risks with 
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respect to the design under consideration, each risk should be the subject of a study 
to examine and document the simultaneous or cascading effect(s) of each risk [5.22]. 
5.9.5 Certifying a Derivative Design Aircraft 
The aircraft type assessed in the case studies is certified as a “Derivative Aircraft” to 
a previously designed aircraft model. When aircraft derivative designs or system 
changes are certified, the processes described herein are usually applicable only to 
the new designs or to existing designs that are affected by the changes. In the case 
of the implementation of existing designs, a new derivation of an already certified 
derivative aircraft, alternate means such as service experience may be used to show 
compliance. Because the aircraft in these studies is a derivative aircraft of the earlier 
era aircraft, most of the components of the aircraft have been previously certified 
for direct lightning attachments. The OEM has re-certified existing components with 
similar installations by test or suitable service history justification. Any new or 
significantly modified component will use test and or analysis for verification 
 
Failure analysis and design validation and verification have traditionally been 
accomplished with extensive tests conducted on the system and its components, 
direct inspection, and other direct verification methods capable of correctly 
characterizing the operations of the system. These direct techniques are still 
appropriate for simple systems which perform a limited number of functions and 
which are not highly integrated with other aircraft systems. For more complex or 
integrated systems, adequate testing may either be impossible because all of the 
system states cannot be determined or it may be impractical due to the large 
number of tests which must be accomplished. 
The integration between hardware criticality determination processes and the 
software contained within certain hardware has created the need for clear guidance 
on criticality determinations. Guidelines for the development of airborne systems, 
software, and electronic hardware components, are contained in SAE ARP4754, 
RTCA DO-178B, and RTCA DO-254, respectively. Because these documents were not 
developed simultaneously, they contain different guidance and terminology. For 
ease and readability, the Development Assurance Level (DAL), Design Assurance 
Level (DAL), and Software Level (SL) are used synonymously. 
 
A significant difference between the SAE ARP4754 and RTCA DO-178B is the 
guidance provided on the use of system architecture for determining the 
appropriate DALs for hardware and software. The FAA recognizes that consideration 
of system architecture for the purpose of establishing DALs is appropriate. A 
seamless transition between these guidelines has not been clearly established to 
guide the determination of system, software, and hardware DALs. Until such time, 
the policy below provides a standardized approach to the use and application of 
these guidelines and industry practices. 
1. As the development assurance level determination is inherently a key process 
step in airplane and system safety assessment, the Aircraft Certification Office 
(ACO) Aviation Safety Engineer (ASE) (or authorized designee) should confirm 
that the airplane level functional hazard assessment (FHA), the system level FHA, 
and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA) are correctly performed 
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(effects of loss of function as well as malfunction should be evaluated), and that 
the PSSA contains proposals for DALs for the system and each of its software and 
hardware items. Applicants should submit these safety assessments to the FAA 
for approval early in the program in order to minimize certification risks. 
2. System, hardware, and software DALs may be assigned based on a direct 
relationship to the worst-case failure condition; namely, Catastrophic 
corresponds to Level A, Hazardous/Severe-Major to Level B, Major to Level C, 
Minor to Level D, and No Safety Effect to Level E. This method, particularly when 
applied to system architecture with redundant elements, may result in a more 
conservative assignment of the DALs to the redundant elements than is 
necessary to comply with FAR 25.1301 and FAR 25.1309. However, any reduction 
in DAL from the levels determined by this method should be presented, with 
justification, to the ACO ASE early in the program for approval. 
3. If a design contains common mode design errors that could be catastrophic, the 
applicable software and hardware should be assigned Level A. The software and 
hardware DALs could be reduced as justified by the safety assessment if the 
system architecture is revised to mitigate the potential catastrophic condition. 
4. The guidance of SAE ARP4754 may be used to assign DALs for a system and its 
hardware and software components. When application of this guidance leads to 
assignments of DALs lower than those determined using the direct assignment of 
policy 2 above, the applicant should obtain concurrence of the cognizant FAA 
ACO with the results of the proposed PSSA as early as possible in the program in 
order to minimize certification risks. If the criteria of the SAE ARP4754 are not 
satisfied, the DALs may need to be assigned a higher level using the direct 
assignments of policy 2 above or using the guidance of RTCA DO-178B. 
5. The guidance of RTCA DO-178B has traditionally been used and may continue to 
be used in the PSSA, as appropriate, to determine software levels. Where 
apparent differences exist between RTCA DO-178B and SAE ARP4754 on 
software level determination, the guidance contained in Appendix D of SAE 
ARP4754 can be used if additional credit is requested for system architecture and 
justification is provided to the responsible FAA representative in the Aircraft 
Certification Office for concurrence. 
6. For transport category airplanes, RTCA DO-254 is applicable to all electrical and 
electronic devices whose correct operation cannot be verified by test and/or 
deterministic analysis if they could cause Major, Severe Major/Hazardous, and 
Catastrophic failure conditions. 
 
The general policy stated in the six guidelines above does not constitute a new 
regulation or create what might legally be referred to as a "binding norm". The office 
that implements policy should follow this policy when applicable to the specific 
project. Whenever an applicant's proposed method of compliance is outside this 
established policy, it must be coordinated with the policy issuing office, e.g., through 
the issue paper process or equivalent. Similarly, although this policy is not binding on 
the regulatory authority, if the implementing office becomes aware of reasons that 
an applicant’s proposal that meet this policy should not be approved, the office must 
coordinate its response with the policy issuing office.  Applicants should expect that 
the certificating officials will consider this information when making findings of 
  
233 
compliance relevant to new certificate actions. Also, as with all advisory material, 
this policy statement identifies one means, but not the only means, of compliance. 
5.9.6 Equipment Criticality for the Case Studies  
The applicability of HIRF and Lightning requirements to specific equipment is 
determined by a functional criticality analysis process. The result of this process is 
the aircraft HIRF - Lightning Criticality List which is submitted to the FAA and JAA. 
Criticality of failure modes is determined by the engineering group responsible for 
each system in a safety and functional performance assessment. Final agreement on 
appropriate lightning certification of systems is created when the assessment is 
complete and the FAA has approved a HIRF Lightning criticality list for the aircraft.   
 
The Reference Tables in Appendix C for Critical Systems and Appendix D for Essential 
Systems contains a list of systems on the aircraft in these case studies whose failure 
would cause or contribute to a failure or function that would prevent continued safe 
flight and landing (catastrophic effects) or whose failure would reduce the capability 
of the airplane or ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions 
(hazardous - severe/major effects).  
 
The Reference Appendix F contains a list of new or significantly modified systems. 
For the aircraft certification, the OEM will perform verification tests only on those 
systems that are new or significantly modified. Existing systems with similar 
installation will be re-certified by test or suitable service history justification. 
 
5.9.7 Maintenance Program Development 
In order for a design to be certified, compliance to FAR 25.1529 is required [5.23]. 
Development of a minimum required scheduled maintenance program provides 
aircraft designers compliance in part to this requirement. The method used to 
determine appropriate scheduled maintenance for lightning protection components 
is contained in the ATA MSG-3 Guidelines Document [5.38]. In order to create an 
effective design, this body of work proposes that a process is necessary to bridge 
gaps between aircraft lightning protection design development and the development 
of effective scheduled maintenance programs. In order to achieve the best 
optimized designs, one needs to consider a process by which design alternatives are 
measured against constraints established by compliance to Instructions for 
Continued Airworthiness. In order to achieve a functioning design process that 
interfaces effectively with other already established design disciplines while also 
achieving effective evaluations of airworthiness over the life of the lightning 
protection installed on the aircraft, one must embrace a process similar to the one 
proposed in this body of work that methodically evaluates designs and seeks 
approval for meeting the continued airworthiness requirements from all design 
inputs. Some of the design expertise that may offer input to this process may be: 
• Wire installation design engineering 
• Electromagnetic design engineering 
• Earthing and electrical bonding engineering 
• Maintenance engineering 
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• Connector design standards engineering 
• Material processes applications and corrosion prevention engineering 
• Structural design engineering 
• Qualification test engineering 
• Service design assurance engineering 
• Safety engineering 
 
For safety related lightning protection maintenance, maintenance requirements may 
be created through MSG-3 analysis or certification requirements. In the case where 
the safety analysis requires certain maintenance tasks to be completed in order to 
maintain the safety probabilities required from the SSA, a Certification Maintenance 
Requirement (CMR) may be developed by the design community and imposed on 
the scheduled maintenance program. Another avenue for determination of safety 
related maintenance is through the use of MSG-3 analysis. Airworthiness limitations 
may also call out specific lightning protection tasks identified as part of Certification 
to FAR 25.981 [5.44] and documented in the Maintenance Program Data document 
as an Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI).  
 
For the CMR task, the calculation of event probability associated with a failure 
condition must take into account the time during which a latent failure can persist 
without being detected. In many cases, the failures are detected by normal flight 
crew observation or during periodic power-up or self-test routines. The latent period 
for these failures is short. In some cases, however, the exposure time for latent 
failures is associated with equipment shop tests or specific aircraft maintenance 
tasks. In these cases the latent period can be a considerable amount of time. 
 
Maintenance tasks and time intervals which are identified during the safety analysis 
processes may become Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements (CCMR). 
These requirements are discussed among design engineers and reviewed to ensure 
that alternate design approach can eliminate the requirement for a maintenance 
task to uncover latent failures. Where detection is accomplished by an aircraft 
maintenance task, the time interval required to meet the safety objective must be 
transferred to the appropriate maintenance department at the manufacturer for 
implementation of required maintenance procedures and time intervals into the 
initial minimum scheduled maintenance program.  
 
The maintenance checks associated with safety requirements compliance are 
designated Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR). A CMR is a mandatory 
periodic task, required to maintain the safety of the aircraft, established during the 
design certification of the airplane as an operating limitation of the type certificate. 
These checks are established in accordance with AC 25-19 “Certification 
Maintenance Requirements” [5.25] and are not adjustable at any time during the life 
of the aircraft unless a revised design is proposed along with a modified safety 
analysis. A CMR is required to be accomplished without consideration for aircraft 
operator’s convenience to complete the task since the CMR establishes the 
certification basis of the aircraft. 
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It is important to note that a CMR is derived from a fundamentally different analysis 
process than the maintenance tasks and intervals that result from the Maintenance 
Steering Group (MSG-3) analysis associated with Maintenance Review Board (MRB) 
activities. MSG-3 analysis activity produces maintenance tasks that are performed 
for safety, operational or economic reasons, involving preventive maintenance tasks, 
which are performed before failure occurs (and are intended to prevent failures), as 
well as failure-finding tasks. A CMR maintenance task on the other hand, is 
accomplished as a failure finding task only, and exist solely to limit the exposure to 
otherwise hidden failures. Lightning protection components are rarely identified as a 
CMR in the design process. A CMR maintenance task is also designed to verify that a 
certain failure has or has not occurred, and does not provide any preventive 
maintenance function. 
 
The MSG-3 process examines failure conditions by using the “Next Failure’’ criteria. 
(e.g., what is the next worst thing that can happen, given the first failure has 
occurred?)  Once the MSG-3 process is complete, the minimum maintenance 
required is established in the Maintenance Review Board Report document, or 
MRBR. Before becoming a CMR, a potential CMR, known as a Candidate CMR 
(CCMR), is reviewed by a Certification Maintenance Coordination Committee 
(CMCC), which will decide if the candidate will become a CMR. Details of this process 
are delineated in AC 25-19 [5.25]. 
 
Once established, a CMR task must be accomplished by the operator at the 
prescribed intervals, derived from the safety analysis, to maintain the airworthiness 
certificate of the aircraft. Where the detection method is identified to be provided 
by test, assurance must be provided that the test procedures in fact detect the latent 
failures of concern. The underlying goal of any system design safety assessment 
should be to generate an absolute minimum number of CMRs. 
 
The aircraft designers determined the criticality of electrical/electronic equipment 
along with the rationale and/or supporting documentation for each critical and 
essential piece of equipment in EMC Category 4. This equipment identification is 
used to determine associated wiring and connectors that provide key lightning 
mitigation functions and may require maintenance. Using this list of equipment, the 
designer can begin the design evaluation required to establish an applicable and 
effective maintenance program. For the aircraft, documentation was usually 
supplied in the form of a certification plan, a system safety assessment, a FMEA, or a 
FHA. In a few cases where the OEM documents were not generated for certification 
plans, the appropriate FAA letters were referenced to identify appropriate 
accounting for the equipment in these categories. Also, equipment tested to critical 
levels are referenced to the aircraft System Safety Assessment document (reference 
retained) where appropriate to prove compliance to the certification requirements. 
 
All critical functions causing catastrophic failure modes due to HIRF or Lightning have 
been identified by this list and by the document (reference number retained). Since 
it was not within the scope of (reference number retained), to capture all essential 
functions (and associated hazardous/major failure modes), the method used to 
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capture essential functions in this list was an ATA sort of all equipment. The 
"Rationale and/or Supporting Documentation" information was not acquired for 
nonessential and electromechanical equipment since HIRF and Lightning compliance 
is not necessary for this equipment (note general phrases "Non-Essential (or Minor) 
Equipment Classification" and "Electromechanical Device”. 
 
As the aircraft design is created and equipment designs details are determined, the 
use of the methodology may assist with avoiding unnecessary maintenance through 
application of a detailed continued airworthiness evaluation. Key to this evaluation is 
the identification of the components, systems, and degradation modes. More will be 
discussed in the conclusions section of this thesis regarding the integration of the 
design methodology and the maintenance program development methodology 
contained in the MSG-3 document. 
Maintenance Program Development Source Data 
HIRF/Lightning requirements have been applied to various certification programs for 
at least 10 years. At the onset of application of these requirements, the terminology 
used was not HIRF, but rather “Protection from RF Fields.”  The early issue papers 
and special conditions evolved from RF Fields to High Energy Fields (HERF) to what 
we have today, High Intensity Radiated Fields or HIRF. This caused the regulators 
within the industry to develop special conditions to address HIRF issues not 
adequately addressed by formal regulations. These issue papers were provided to 
aircraft manufacturers in the form of “special conditions” written in letter format to 
clearly provide guidance in the absence of FAR/JAR or Advisory Circulars. Lightning 
protection requirements took a parallel path of evolution, with those requirements 
also changing along the way.  
 
Today, for transport airplanes, the lightning certification falls under FARs 25.581 
(structure protection) [5.42], 25.954 (fuel system protection) [5.43], 25.981 (ignition 
prevention - also SFAR 88 for aircraft certified prior to ratification of 25.981) [5.44], 
and 25.1316 (electrical and electronic system protection). Since the HIRF rule was 
not in place until 2007, HIRF certification continued to be based on special 
conditions. Prior to approval of FAR 25.1317 (HIRF protection requirements) [5.56], 
FAA notice N8110.71 spelled out the interim policy that FAA used as the basis for the 
special conditions. Under FAR 25.1316 [5.54] (electrical and electronic system 
lightning protection) critical and essential systems (Level A and B) must be protected 
and certified. Under the HIRF special conditions and now the FAR 25.1317 [5.56], 
only critical (Level A) electronic systems must be protected and certified. 
 
Continued airworthiness of HIRF and lightning protection falls under FAR 25.1529, 
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness [5.23]. Advisory circular AC 20-136 gives 
acceptable means of compliance for electronic system lightning protection. Within 
this AC, Section 7 provides guidance on maintenance of lightning protection 
components and systems. This section states that lightning protection maintenance 
actions should be identified, and may include periodic inspections and tests. Section 
7 recommends engineering evaluation and validation of these maintenance actions. 
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The FAA interim HIRF policy N8110.71 also contains similar guidance for the 
maintenance of critical system HIRF protection. 
 
In the late 1990’s the FAA agreed with the need for a HIRF and lightning 
maintenance program to be developed. At that time, instructions for the 
development of a HIRF protection maintenance program was not included in the 
MSG-3 analysis guidelines. As a result of this shortcoming in regulations and 
maintenance program development guidelines, regulators created an Airworthiness 
Directive (AD) related to the HIRF and lightning protection on several aircraft types. 
The OEM aircraft (aircraft reference retained) is the first aircraft design to be 
subjected to the requirement to develop a HIRF/lightning protection maintenance 
program. The FAA AD resulted from data gathered during the OEM engineering 
validation of the aircraft HIRF/lightning maintenance programs. The AD has 
illustrated the need for maintenance actions for HIRF and lightning protection.  
 
Since the aircraft mentioned above (aircraft reference retained) was the first 
integrated aircraft to experience this demand for a lightning and HIRF maintenance 
program, it is relevant to this body of work to describe some of the specific aircraft 
history associated with the evolution. All critical and essential equipment installed 
on the airplane were designed to Radiated Frequency (RF) Susceptibility test levels. 
The airplane uses many necessary and known types of HIRF protection. Flight control 
systems, displays, engine control systems, and any other critical systems that are 
susceptible to L/HIRF were analyzed using MSG-3 Analysis for aircraft systems with 
loss of HIRF protection/shielding considered as a failure cause. This approach, 
though effective in providing a format to create the maintenance program, was not 
very well suited to evaluate HIRF and lightning components. Since many HIRF and 
lightning protection components are designed with redundancy, the maintenance 
program methodology at the time would conclude that maintenance is not 
necessary similar to conclusions of those functions that have redundant systems 
where a single system can fail and not affect the function availability. Unfortunately, 
a lightning event may not rely on system redundancy since common mode 
degradation of lightning and HIRF protection components such as corrosion of cable 
(loom) lightning shields for example, can occur on all shields simultaneously without 
any reporting to the flight crew of the impending protection failure. For a system 
that has redundant avionics units, loss of a single unit would be evident to the flight 
crew through the system health monitoring. An additional complication in lightning 
and HIRF protection is the possibility that a single lightning or HIRF event can cause 
system upset across multiple systems or components that may have unknowingly 
degraded. Therefore, lightning and HIRF protection maintenance is not the same as 
many system Specific Scheduled Maintenance Tasks based on maintaining adequate 
L/HIRF protection. 
 
Prior to the MSG-3 methodology revision in 2007, the MSG-3 (Maintenance Steering 
Group) analysis process was not wholly adequate to address maintenance of 
lightning and HIRF protection. MSG-3 analysis does not address common-cause 
failures, especially common-cause latent failures. For example, corrosion on HIRF 
and lightning shields over flight-critical wiring may degrade the shield’s protection 
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effectiveness. This corrosion may occur on all three wire looms of a triple-redundant 
system. In this case, system redundancy does not provide protection against this 
kind of common event. A lightning strike to the airplane could induce transients on 
all three channels of this triple-redundant system. Consequently, common-cause 
degradation, such as this example shows, can allow lightning strikes to cause a 
complete loss of function, even though the system had triple redundancy. 
Unfortunately, since the MSG-3 analysis did not address this type of common failure 
mechanism, excessive maintenance resulted through the use of engineering 
judgment; not a very robust or technical approach. 
 
At the beginning of the lightning/HIRF maintenance program development, it was 
determined that all critical system wiring should be inspected with a General Visual 
Inspection. This proposal was considered adequate at that time. Arguments against 
this approach pointed out that the standard general visual inspections used in the 
past may not detect the protection degradation, because the degradation may occur 
within connectors, or under the protective jacket of shielded wires. Therefore, the 
maintenance actions for HIRF and lightning must consider these issues but were ill 
equipped with the current systems approaches used on other avionics systems to 
determine appropriate and effective maintenance. 
 
Without a scientific method to address the latent degradation over multiple system 
redundancies, the OEM created specific HIRF and lightning maintenance programs 
for the several aircraft under development at that time (specific aircraft reference 
retained). These programs used modifications to the MSG-3 analysis to identify 
appropriate maintenance tasks. The OEM is also performing engineering evaluations 
of the HIRF and lightning protection on airplanes that have been in service, to ensure 
that the maintenance tasks are detecting and correcting protection degradation. For 
more recent designed aircraft however, this approach would be unmanageable due 
to the highly integrated nature of the control electronics on the aircraft. 
 
In an effort to provide a better understanding of the HIRF & Lightning continuing 
airworthiness issues, the Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group 
(EEHWG) efforts developed the HIRF (and Lightning) “User’s Manual.”  This user 
manual addresses the maintenance, surveillance, repair and modifications of aircraft 
systems to ensure that HIRF & Lightning protection is not degraded. The user 
manuals have been used to provide guidance in determining appropriate 
maintenance but did not offer a revised scientific approach to determining 
maintenance associated with lightning and HIRF protection component degradation. 
The guidance within the user’s manual provided general theoretical guidance that 
could be applied by aircraft manufacturers in part. This led to many approaches and 
sometimes applications of guidance out of context with the document.  
 
The Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group User’s Manuals 
incorporated significant inputs from the regulatory FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group 
(FAA-AEG), and AEG counterparts from Transport Canada and the JAA, who continue 
to work with the FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG) to ensure that HIRF & 
Lightning certification requirements are implemented into a maintenance program. 
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As a result of continuing debates regarding a reasonable approach to determining 
HIRF and lightning protection maintenance, and industry committee was assembled 
in 2005 to create a new methodology specific to lightning and HIRF protection. This 
task force was assembled under the leadership of the Airline Transport Association 
(ATA) who own the rights to the MSG-3 document publication. Widespread support 
was provided by many major aircraft manufacturers to this task force resulting in a 
new methodology agreement in 2007. A more detailed description of the current 
lightning and HIRF MSG-3 guidelines is contained in the methodology section. 
 
In conclusion, maintenance of HIRF & Lightning protection elements is necessary to 
ensure that aircraft meet the requirements for continuing airworthiness. Use of the 
methodology discussed in these case studies will leverage the use of the MSG-3 
methodology for lightning and HIRF protection created in 2007. 
5.9.8 Lightning Protection Certification Summary 
Lightning protection certification relies on submittal of a certification plan to the 
regulating authority that addresses both direct effects of lightning and indirect 
effects. For the aircraft under study, the certification for Lightning Direct Effects has 
been submitted is in accordance with FAA AC 20-53A [5.1]. This submittal is critical 
to the methodology exercised in these case studies, since declaration of the 
important elements of the direct effects protection is included in the certification 
plan. For the aircraft in this case studies, the certification for Lightning Indirect 
Effects is in accordance with FAA AC20-136 [5.2]. This certification plan is also critical 
to use of the methodology in the case studies since it provides the important 
elements of lightning protection indirect effects. 
 
Both the indirect effects and direct effects certification plan are included in a single 
certification report supplied to the FAA [5.32]. This is supplied to comply with the 
FAA and JAA requirements for indirect effects lightning protection (FAR 25.1316 and 
CRI F-03) [5.54], airplane systems that perform critical and essential functions must 
be demonstrated to operate safely in the defined lightning environment. It is also 
supplied to the FAA to comply with FAA and JAA requirements for direct effects 
lightning (FAR 25.581, 25.954 and JAR 25.581, 25.954, 25.899) and P-Static 
protection, confirming that aircraft structure exposed to lightning and P-Static is 
shown to be immune to the defined environment. 
 
The aircraft level lightning waveforms of AC20-136 are used to derive the indirect 
effects or induced transient levels coupled into equipment circuits and wiring. The 
induced transient levels for equipment are in the OEM document (Document 
reference retained) [5.33] and applied to equipment analysis, design and test. This 
document contains the electromagnetic compatibility requirements of 
electrical/electronic equipment selected for installation on the OEM commercial 
transport airplanes. Transient, audio frequency, and radio frequency limits of 
emissions and susceptibility are specified for the equipment. Test procedures, typical 
test set-ups, approved measuring equipment and test provisions are included along 
with designer's notes to assist in proper interpretation of design and test 
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requirements. EMC Test Procedure and Test Report data requirements are also 
specified. Various test procedures in this document [5.33] have been updated and 
clarified, with additional attention given to requirements for supporting 
documentation. Several requirements have been revised to be consistent with 
RTCA/DO-160 (latest revision and change notice). The term “electromagnetic 
compatibility” or its abbreviation “EMC” is used to refer to the process and discipline 
for addressing all electromagnetic effects, including transient, audio frequency, and 
radio frequency emissions and susceptibility. The term encompasses 
electromagnetic effects resulting from lightning, high intensity radiated fields, 
electrostatic discharges, or airplane equipment operation. This clarification is 
necessary since many design engineers refer to EMC as the protection of equipment 
from emissions caused by other equipment. For the aircraft design, the term EMC is 
used to represent several electromagnetic threats. 
 
Electromagnetic compatibility requires that each airplane system perform its 
intended function in the airplane electromagnetic environment, and that the 
operation of a given system does not degrade the performance of other airplane 
systems. Airplane electromagnetic compatibility requires appropriate airplane 
structural design, equipment installation, wiring installation, and equipment 
qualification. The limits of emissions and susceptibility thresholds contained in the 
EMC Test Procedure [5.33] document are a means of assuring that the design 
objectives will be achieved when compliant equipment is installed on an airplane. 
The methodology used in the case studies is proposed to ensure that this protection 
provides a way to ensure that the compliant equipment is meeting its design 
objectives throughout the life of the aircraft. 
 
The EMC Test document [5.33] contains the electromagnetic compatibility 
qualification and documentation requirements for electrical/electronic equipment 
that will be installed on the OEM commercial transport airplanes. Transient, audio 
frequency and radio frequency limits of emissions and susceptibility are specified for 
the equipment. Test procedures, typical test set-ups, approved measuring 
equipment and test provisions are included along with designer's notes to assist in 
proper interpretation of design and test requirements. EMC Test Procedure and Test 
Report data requirements are also specified. 
 
Failure Condition Classifications: The failure condition classifications listed below are 
derived from FAA/JAA regulations and advisory material (e.g., FAR/JAR 25.1309) and 
are included to assist in understanding the source of protection component 
identifications needed by the case studies methodology. These classifications are 
also shown in SAE Document ARP5413 [5.20]. 
 
Catastrophic: Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and 
landing. 
Hazardous / Severe – Major: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of 
the aircraft or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to 
the extent that there would be: 
• A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities. 
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• Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew could not be 
relied on to perform their tasks accurately or completely, or 
• Serious (or fatal (JAA only)) injury to a relatively small number of the 
occupants.  
Major: Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the 
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there 
would be, for example, a significant reduction in safety margins or functional 
capabilities, a significant increase in crew work load or in conditions impairing crew 
efficiency, or discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries. 
Minor: Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety, and 
which involve crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure 
conditions may include, for example, a slight reduction in safety margins or 
functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew work load, such as routine flight plan 
changes, or some inconvenience to occupants. 
No Effects: Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the 
aircraft or increase crew workload. 
Development Assurance Levels 
The following Development Assurance Levels relate to the failure condition 
classifications listed above. These levels are also in SAE Document ARP5413 [5.20]. 
Level A: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to 
a failure of function resulting in a catastrophic failure condition for the aircraft. 
Level B: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to 
a failure of function resulting in a hazardous / severe-major failure condition. 
Level C: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to 
a failure of function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft. 
Level D: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to 
a failure of function resulting in a minor failure condition for the aircraft. 
Level E: Electrical and electronic systems whose failure would cause or contribute to 
a failure of function resulting in no effect on aircraft operational capability or crew 
workload. 
 
For the test of equipment to meet EMC requirements, the following elements are 
included in the EMC Test Report. It is recommended by this work that the EMC Test 
Report and design criteria be amended from this original list of test report criteria to 
include the continued airworthiness protection assurance. (The additional design 
data required is listed in item 13 below.) 
1. A table summarizing the tests performed, stating whether or not the test results 
successfully met the requirements of this document, and providing page 
numbers pointing to or referencing the supporting data. 
2. A description of the quality assurance used during the test, with the report 
signed by the supplier quality assurance representative. 
3. Copies of completed FAA conformity forms 8130-9 and 8100-1 for the equipment 
under test and for the test setup. 
4. Any changes to test procedure, layout or test parameters previously authorized. 
5. Nomenclature and serial numbers of test equipment used, together with most 
recent calibration dates of interference measurement equipment. 
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6. Photographs (with labels) of each test setup. Written description may be used to 
supplement the photographs. 
7. Equipment under test identification, including complete nomenclature, 
manufacturer, part numbers, and serial numbers, together with a description of 
the equipment function, its intended use and installation. 
8. Where applicable, test results in graphical (X-Y) form with units as specified 
herein for each test. Plotter outputs, photographs, or hand-plotted data should 
accompany tabulated test data to facilitate review. All critical parameters used to 
record data (bandwidth, scan rate, etc.) shall accompany data. Thresholds of 
susceptibility shall be recorded. 
9. Test limits shown such that compliance or noncompliance is evident. 
Photographs from a spectrum analyzer are acceptable provided that the 
applicable test limits are clearly legible. 
10. A description of modifications to equipment incorporated during test.  
11. A list of antenna correction factors, current probe transfer impedance, and other 
correction factors used for data reduction. 
12. Similarity rationale and analyses shall be included in the report. 
13. Completion of continued airworthiness assessment forms and submittal 
including protection design change recommendations where appropriate. 
Equipment Categories for EMC  
Electrical and electronic equipment shall be classified by category for purposes of 
assigning applicable electromagnetic tests and may generally be characterized by 
one of the four EMC categories given below. Note, however, that unless otherwise 
explicitly defined by the applicable procurement specification, Category 4 shall 
apply. Certain tests (e.g., RF susceptibility and lightning) detailed herein will utilize 
test levels determined by equipment location and criticality level. For equipment 
having requirements for these tests, the applicable procurement specification should 
provide the required test level(s). The interpretation of criticality for equipment that 
requires EMC protection is in the Table 5-20. 
1. Category 1 - Non-electronic equipment or systems which may exhibit non-
repetitive transient emissions, and which do not require susceptibility testing. 
Generally equipment of this category is passive in nature and capable of utilizing 
airplane power directly without the requirement for further conditioning. 
Examples of items in this category include DC relays, DC solenoids, and brushless 
induction motors. 
2. Category 2 - Non-electronic equipment or systems which may exhibit emissions, 
and which do not require susceptibility testing. This equipment generally 
contains components for conversion of power which utilize brushes, diodes, etc. 
Examples of this category include AC operated relays and solenoids, AC operated 
valves, motors (with brushes), generators and fluorescent lamps. 
3. Category 3 - Electrical/electronic equipment, generally classified as Non-
Essential, and which may exhibit susceptibility to wire-coupled and/or radiated 
electromagnetic interference. 
4. Category 4 - Electrical/electronic equipment, generally classified as either Critical 
or Essential, which may exhibit susceptibility to wire-coupled and/or radiated 
electromagnetic interference. 
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EMC 
Category 
Criticality Failure Condition 
Classification 
Development 
Assurance Level 
4 Critical Catastrophic A 
4 Essential Hazardous / Severe – Major B 
4 Essential Major C 
3 Non-Essential Minor D 
2 N/A No Effect E 
1 N/A No Effect E 
Table 5-20 System Criticality & Development Assurance Levels 
 
Identification of critical and essential functions establish the Electromagnetic 
Compatibility (EMC) categories, lightning design and test levels, and pass/fail criteria 
which are consistent with allocated shielding in internal and external areas of the 
aircraft considering equipment location, shielding, transient protection, and effects 
on safety of flight. Critical systems are defined with Design Assurance Level of “A” 
and are systems whose failure would cause or contribute to a failure or function that 
would prevent continued safe flight and landing. Essential systems are defined with 
Design Assurance Level of “B” and are systems whose failure reduces the capability 
of the airplane or ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions 
 
Structures and systems installation similar to those on certified, in-service aircraft 
developed by the OEM and located in equivalent areas have been verified for direct 
effects lightning certification by similarity. Non-metallic structures covering flight 
critical control components and cabling have been verified by analysis and/or 
engineering tests to prevent puncture by lightning. Engineering tests will use 
waveforms of Appendix 3 of AC 20-53A [5.1] applicable to the location of the non-
metallic structure. The identification of the Development Assurance Levels for 
equipment on the aircraft in the case studies are used to define the appropriate 
components for wiring and equipment to be evaluated during the design phase using 
the methodology developed within this body of work. 
5.9.9 Equipment Qualification Requirements and System Protection Design 
Critical and essential equipment installed on the airplane are designed to 
electromagnetic requirements as indicated in the aircraft HIRF/Lightning 
Certification Plans for lightning [5.40] [5.32], the General Technical Requirements 
(GTR) for the specific aircraft type [5.41] and the individual equipment specifications 
distributed throughout the design development program experts. This equipment 
will be compliance tested in accordance with D6-16050-4 [5.33], which is consistent 
with the intent of RTCA DO-160C document [5.3]. The Lightning requirements for 
equipment were established to be consistent with the protection provided by 
airplane structure and wire shielding. Test levels for equipment qualification will be 
shown by analysis and test to be equivalent to the levels induced by external HIRF or 
lightning on, or at the equipment, as installed in the airplane. 
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Electromagnetic compatibility requires that each airplane system perform its 
intended function in the airplane electromagnetic environment, and that the 
operation of a given system does not degrade the performance of other airplane 
systems. Airplane electromagnetic compatibility requires appropriate airplane 
structural design, equipment installation, wiring installation, and equipment 
qualification. These protection systems may require additional design development 
if they are determined to be inadequate over the life of the aircraft. The limits of 
emissions and susceptibility thresholds contained in the OEM requirements are a 
means of assuring that the design objectives will be achieved when compliant 
equipment is installed on an airplane. The specific OEM requirements document 
[5.33] is drafted using the industry standards from RTCA DO-160 [5.3] as an initial 
requirement baseline. The OEM document, “Electromagnetic Interference Control 
Requirements” [5.33] contains the electromagnetic compatibility qualification and 
documentation requirements for electrical/electronic equipment that will be 
installed on the OEM commercial transport airplanes.  
 
Each supplier to the OEM has full responsibility for the EMC design, construction and 
testing of furnished equipment. This effort shall be in accordance with the applicable 
procurement specification and this document. This shall include the responsibility to 
design into all circuitry and associated packaging proven and effective techniques for 
control of emissions and susceptibilities. Although the test procedures and methods 
detailed standardized, each supplier has the responsibility of demonstrating that the 
performance of each unit is tested and exercised with the hardware, interfaces, 
software, and modes of operation representative of the actual in-service installation. 
Test equipment and load simulation units shall be designed for RF immunity and 
susceptibility-free monitoring to ensure accuracy of measurements. 
 
Qualification of system components and electronics are governed by the design 
leaders for the aircraft development project. The typical guidance for component 
development qualification is the FAA Advisor Circular AC20-136 [5.2]. Within this 
guidance, the Equipment Transient Design Levels (ETDL) defines the equipment 
immunity thresholds and is used as qualification design and test levels for the OEM 
aircraft equipment suppliers. The ETDLs and test procedure are described in the 
OEM document (reference retained) [5.33] to complete the required qualifications. 
The test levels for aircraft equipment in the case studies are established by the 
project leaders and provided to the equipment manufacturers to ensure that 
appropriate lightning protection capabilities have been designed into the system 
equipment. The test levels adopted by the aircraft design team are provided in Table 
5-21 and reference the locations where wiring may be external to the pressure 
vessel or internal to the pressure vessel. The use of requirements for testing 
equipment is important to the functioning and continuous operation of the 
equipment, both during and after a lightning strike event. The transients that are 
generated by lightning strikes can threaten continued safe operation of the mission 
equipment and the aircraft. Qualification testing of the equipment is a measure to 
ensure that the identified equipment is proven to be able to withstand lightning 
strike transients while operating on the aircraft.  This testing does not ensure that an 
aircraft system is immune from lightning strike damage or system interruption, but 
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does provide a means to define the lightning protection installed on the aircraft as 
the requirements for these qualification procedures are distributed to equipment 
manufacturers. The requirements generated by the OEM and distributed to 
equipment suppliers contain the electromagnetic compatibility standard for 
electrical/electronic equipment selected for installation on the OEM commercial 
transport airplanes. Transient, audio frequency, and radio frequency limits of 
emissions and susceptibility are specified for the equipment as well. Test 
procedures, typical test set-ups, approved measuring equipment and test provisions 
are included along with designer's notes to assist in proper interpretation of design 
and test requirements. 
 
EMC Test Procedure and Test Report data requirements are specified by the OEM for 
development and submittal to the regulatory authorities at the time of certification.  
 
Test Requirement External Wiring Internal Wiring 
Ground Injected 600V/120A N/A 
Pin Injected 600V/120A N/A 
Cable Injected 600V/120A N/A 
Multiple Burst 300V/60A 125V/25A 
60V/12A 
Table 5-21 Aircraft Lightning Transient Design Test Levels 
 
To manage the design of lightning protection across all avionic and electrical 
systems, an EMC Assurance Plan is required from each OEM. 
 
The equipment design proposal from suppliers includes an EMC Assurance Plan 
which details the overall approach, design procedures and techniques that will be 
used by the supplier to meet the EMC requirements.  
 
The information that is important to the design of lightning protection for systems is 
delivered prior to the preliminary design review and addresses, as a minimum, the 
following items: 
a. Organizational responsibilities with respect to EMC. This should include 
information as to responsible EMC design, analysis and test engineering contacts, 
and names of individuals responsible for support of design reviews and EMC 
documentation. A schedule of EMC events or milestones shall be included, along 
with a detailing of known contractual EMC requirements for the unit(s), and a 
summary of EMC requirements passed to or levied upon subcontractors by the 
supplier. All applicable EMC documentation shall be identified, together with all 
EMC specifications (and versions thereof) which are to be used in design. 
b. A concise description of operational parameters of the system and its intended 
installation. Identify, for example, which portions of the system are contained 
within the various component units, which are external, estimated separation 
distances, and mounting considerations. 
c. A summary of mechanical design as related to EMC. Materials should be 
described, as well as procedures and methods to be used for purposes of 
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attenuating electromagnetic emissions and/or reducing susceptibilities of 
equipment to the specified electromagnetic threats. A description should be 
given of internal shielding and filtering methods used to achieve compliance. 
Mechanical drawings may be used to identify the locations and physical 
characteristics of possible apertures, electrical connectors and panel mounted 
components, and design details of RFI gaskets (if used) should be given. Filter 
characteristics and/or component values of power line filters should be provided, 
if used. If filter pins are to be employed in design, the attenuation and/or peak 
limiting characteristics should be included. A description of construction 
materials employed in design should be given. Bonding surfaces should be 
identified, together with what, if any, surface treatment is used for purposes of 
achieving compliance with applicable bonding specifications. 
d. Diagrams or descriptions of all supplier-provided wiring and/or cable design 
required to minimize emissions and susceptibilities. Choice of wire type and wire 
treatment (twisted, twisted-pair, shielding, etc.) and wire routing methodology 
should be provided. Wire separations or special treatment of wires identified as 
being either susceptible to EMI or capable of being a source of interference, and 
isolation or other method(s) used to achieve compliance should be given. 
Technical criteria should be provided to justify usage of cable shields or filter 
pins. 
e. A description of grounding methods. A grounding diagram may be used to show 
the methods by which overall grounding, treatment of power and signal returns, 
and power distribution within or between individual units of system is achieved. 
f. Potential sources of interference or susceptibility. A summary of clock 
frequencies, data rates, intermediate frequencies, and frequencies of RF carriers 
utilized in the design should be provided as applicable. 
g. Known or anticipated lightning, HIRF and/or EMC problems. Both a description of 
procedures to be used for analyses and a summary of proposed solutions to 
interference problems should be given. 
 
Engineering requirements for the connectors used in system shielded wiring for the 
aircraft in the case studies are expressed in terms of maximum transfer impedance 
(as a function of frequency) which should not be exceeded during an airplane's 
service life.  The assurance that the ‘end of life’ values for impedance on protective 
wire shielding is valid can be provided more effectively by use of the methodology. 
The transfer impedance associated with a particular wire loom design relates the 
induced voltage on the core wires to the current flowing on the shield. At low 
frequencies, below about 1 kHz, the transfer impedance or the transfer resistance is 
equal to the resistance measured from shield through the connector to the airplane 
structure where the receptacle is mounted. At higher frequencies the transfer 
impedance is complex and is related to how the core wires are exposed to the 
magnetic fields which leak through small apertures and openings in the shield 
surrounding the core wires of the wire loom. The higher frequency transfer 
impedance (often described by a transfer inductance value) is mainly controlled by 
connector and braid geometry and style. Using values for transfer impedance known 
to exist on other aircraft produced by the OEM in these case studies, the design 
group responsible for determining the shielded required calculates impedance and 
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translates this impedance to a specific shield design for critical wire looms. These 
wire looms that contain protective features such as shield wires, connector bonds, 
system LRU conductive attachments to the airplane structure and sometime bonding 
jumpers, all must remain effective over the life of the installations. 
 
For a lightning strike protection on wire looms to be effective, the wire loom design 
must include appropriate transfer impedance across all the system connections to 
the aircraft structure. This also includes required “stand-off” impedance at the 
system electronics interface to the wire looms. The aircraft in the case studies wiring 
approach provides sufficient wire shielding to protect the aircraft systems from 
electromagnetic environments by a combination of wire loom protection and 
internal protection within affected electronic system line replaceable units over 
normal lightning frequency ranges. The cable shield exists in addition to LRU box 
protection in most cases. The aircraft wire shielding baseline design is to shield all 
wiring external to the pressure vessel with one layer of shielding and terminate both 
ends of the shield with a 2 inch bond wire to the connector back-shell. The only 
exceptions were for wires routed near the top of the bays in the air-conditioning bay 
and wheel wells. For these wires, shielding was added on a case by case basis 
depending on the geometry of the wire routing. In addition, all wires associated with 
critical systems and within 1 foot of the flight deck windows have a single layer of 
shielding with the shield terminated at both ends with a 2 inch bond wire to the 
connector back-shell. 
 
As with most design processes, the lightning protection implemented on the aircraft 
in the case studies have some improvements from lightning protection on past 
aircraft produced by this OEM. The most significant design process improvement 
that was made for the aircraft wiring studied in this case was the incorporation of 
many electrical bond checks upon installation of the bond for certain critical wiring. 
These bonds are referred to as “designated” bonds on the aircraft drawings. Upon 
final installation, all connectors and wiring that contain lightning protection elements 
are checked for appropriate resistance between receptacle and aircraft structures in 
which they are mounted. This was not required on previous models. In addition, the 
following improvements are incorporated on the aircraft in the case studies and are 
deemed significant: 
1. Key bonding locations are tested upon installation to ensure that the bond is 
present. These are called “designated bonds”. All shield termination connectors 
where receptacles are used to ground shields have designated bonds. Special 
notes have been included in the wiring production digital data base which 
identifies shield grounding for each wire loom. Verification procedures are 
included in the OEM design specifications for bonding and grounding. 
2. All critical lightning protected connectors contain spring fingers within the design 
to improve conductivity. Spring fingers have been incorporated into the plug 
connector to make the electrical connection through the "spring fingers" and not 
rely on the connection made via threads in the connector. In-service testing of an 
aircraft developed by this OEM concluded that the connectors measuring the 
highest resistances and in most cases above resistance limits, were the threaded 
connectors, without spring fingers. 
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3. Bond wires are used to terminate shields to the connector back-shells. All shields 
are terminated by a 2 inch bond wire to the connector back-shell. This eliminates 
the zero length back-shell used on a different aircraft developed by this same 
OEM which caused some maintenance problems. 
4. Back-shell mating viewports were added in the back-shell to allow visual check of 
connector connection. This is a significant improvement over existing designs as 
it allows the technician to assess and judge the connections on the connectors 
immediately after installation without a bond meter. Proper electrical 
connections between the teeth of the connector which interlock the connector 
and back-shell may be difficult to determine. The viewport allows the assemblers 
to verify their work. The viewport makes people aware that the proper 
connection of the mating connectors is an important step in the assembly. 
 
Incorporation of these design improvements and features is one way to ensure that 
the aircraft is protected from the potentially hazardous effects of a lightning strike. 
The continued assurance of these protection features can only be measured after 
many performance cycles. During the design of an aircraft, the protection is tested to 
ensure that it will meet the requirements to protection critical systems on the 
aircraft in flight. These tests are usually performed with the initial protection 
function in mind and do not seek to ensure the long lasting effectiveness once a 
protection system is out into service. The purpose of this body of work is to create a 
new aircraft design methodology in order to address the cited design concerns. In 
addition to reliance on initial design practices, the OEM has instituted an Assurance 
Plan [5.49] to address the long term effectiveness of lightning protection. 
5.9.10 Lightning Protection Design Assurance  
Designers of lightning protection may choose to establish assurance plans for 
evaluating the long term effectiveness of lightning protection design features built 
into the aircraft in the case studies. An assurance plan can consist of planned testing 
in the factory and in operation at airline facilities. The benefits of such a plan may 
manifest in improved rationale for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance 
activities defined and implemented by the aircraft Maintenance review Board (MRB) 
Report and related Maintenance Manuals. Results of on-going testing within an 
assurance program can be collected and used in future design processes as part of 
the assessment sheets proposed by this body of work.  
 
The assurance plan defines techniques and requirements for assuring that the 
specific aircraft protection is adequate at the time of installation and remains 
effective as the aircraft ages. The plan addresses the approach to preserving HIRF 
and lightning protection integrity of the specific airplane. A document with details 
regarding the Assurance Plan [5.49] is submitted to the FAA as part of the aircraft 
type certification to show compliance with Issue Paper M-2 and FAR/JAR 25.1529, 
"Instructions for Continued Airworthiness", as applied to FAA Issue Papers E- 1, FAR 
25.1316 and JAA CAI 05-11. It is the intent of the assurance document to work in 
conjunction with the specific aircraft Maintenance Review Board Report [5.52] 
document which details scheduled maintenance of the HIRF/Lightning protection 
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designs. The scheduled maintenance outlined in the MRB report is supplemented by 
the Assurance Plan. The two programs substantiate and complement each other. 
 
An Engineering Validation Program is outlined in the Assurance Plan document [5.49] 
which provides a description of both pre-delivery testing and in-service protection 
validations. The "Aircraft (type retained) HIRF/Lightning Protection Assurance and 
Validation Test Plan" [5.50] contains detailed test plans and procedures for factory, 
flight test and in-service validation tests including final wire loom selection and test 
methods. The intent for testing aircraft in the factory and in service is to follow the 
same aircraft from the start of assembly in the wire shop, to factory testing of wire 
looms, and finally to an in-service validation testing program of specific aircraft. The 
purpose of these inspections is to: 
1) verify assembly processes are under control and produce a quality product 
2) capture/minimize infant mortality 
3) establish a performance baseline for eventual in-service sampling 
4) assess the health of the wiring and shielding characteristics during the life of the 
specific aircraft type and the adequacy of the scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance of those lightning protection features 
 
The inspections consist of measurements of shielding performance parameters, such 
as shield resistances, in the wire shop where cable looms are assembled and the 
factory where looms are installed. The data will be tracked in a database containing 
information such as: shop and factory resistances per loom assembly, system 
categorization for each loom, type of termination, nearest LRU, nearest disconnect 
bracket, nearest structure access panel, etc. This data is necessary to establish 
degradation trends and to ultimately establish reliability information. 
 
Consistent with the regulatory requirements, systems covered by the Assurance Plan 
[5.49] include critical and essential systems that could be affected or influenced by 
lightning or HIRF effects. Engine control system protection features incorporated by 
engine manufacturers to meet HIRF and lightning requirements, are not addressed 
by this plan, however engine control wiring from the engine strut disconnect to the 
electrical equipment bay will be sampled as part of this validation program. Both 
airline maintenance and any validation efforts for on-engine protection are 
separately addressed by the engine manufacturers. 
5.10 Purpose of the Case Studies 
The primary purpose of the case studies is to exercise the methodology contained in 
this body of work using actual aircraft data. In order to adequately exercise the 
methodology, the case studies address both direct effects lightning protection and 
indirect effects lightning protection. 
 
The goal is to assess alternatives and determine the validity of the methodology, 
practical application of the methodology and potential improvements to the 
approach. Although created for lightning design engineering, this methodology could 
apply to other design functionality assessments. For example, the choices for any 
design alternative can be evaluated using this methodology to examine functions, 
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designs, support concepts, manufacturing approaches and type certification 
decisions. The task undertaken by performing these case studies is to collect and 
create the data required to make design decisions while integrating and balancing a 
variety of considerations such as feasibility, performance, producability, testability, 
compatibility, reliability, system safety, maintainability, and supportability.  
5.10.1 Other Application of the Methodology 
The methodology can be used to evaluate costs, though this was not an initial 
consideration. Important objectives for this process are clarification of options, 
problem structure, and available trade-offs; improved communication of ideas and 
professional judgment; improved communication of rationale for action to external 
stakeholders; confidence that all available information has been accounted for; clear 
documentation of the results and recommendations; and integration of 
multidisciplinary inputs.  
5.10.2 Demonstrated Capability 
With this methodology in place, the case studies demonstrate that designs can be 
optimized if the methodology is implemented. Key to successful implementation of 
the methodology is the ability to improve decision making when determining the 
best alternative for lightning protection designs. Another outcome of the case 
studies is to prove through the exercise that sustaining an appropriate safety margin 
and safety commitment established by the design team can be one outcome of the 
lightning protection assessments proposed by the methodology. Once the 
assessment is in an acceptable configuration, then appropriate maintenance 
decisions can be made depending on the design assessment conclusion. And finally, 
the case studies are also intended to show that effective type certification can be 
achieved by use of the methodology within a lightning design program. 
5.11 Case Studies Approach 
The case studies within the sections of the thesis included a variety of lightning 
protection to exercise the methodology. The case studies documents a standard 
methodology and exercises the methodology through use of actual aircraft lightning 
protection data for assessing alternatives and deciding on a preferred approach 
concerning lightning protection deployment at different locations on the aircraft. 
These case studies also address both direct effects lightning protection and in-direct 
effects lightning protection. Four different lightning protection designs were 
evaluated with assessment sheets to exercise the methodology. 
 
In order to acquire the information needed for the case studies, access to installation 
drawings, wire diagrams, specification documents and certification documents is 
necessary. With access to this information, key lightning protection details are 
collected and included in the assessment sheets. During a design development 
program, data can be collected as design decisions are contemplated and a feedback 
can be provided to improve the final design configuration. 
 
To perform a well-functioning design evaluation system, the case studies included a 
plan for assessments; purpose statement, identification of decision authority for 
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acting on the recommendations, description of key assumptions, list of evaluation 
criteria, alternatives selected for the evaluation, and evaluation methodology.  
 
Also included in the case studies is a reflection on design systems, association of the 
design decision making to the methodology and also evidence through literature 
research that poor design decisions associated with lightning protection can cause 
unwanted events. The case studies identify the method (s) for performing the design 
evaluations which includes the use of a design assessment sheet. Four different 
lightning protection designs were included in the case studies. Repeated 
demonstration of the methodology beyond these four assessments was not deemed 
necessary as a repeat of the process would demonstrate similar findings. The case 
studies also established success criteria to characterize how to evaluate lightning 
protection designs, categorize the protection types and provide meaningful 
recommendations. The approach will use insightful evaluation methods such as 
rating tables for area environmental threats, hardware specifications, and aircraft 
location design requirements for temperature, vibration and moisture, etc. The 
method and measures most appropriate to the main objective of the case studies 
are collected within the assessment sheets. These measures included drawings, 
bond path definitions for each lightning protection element selected for the studies 
and galvanic tables to define the potential of each design to degrade within the 
environment of its installed location. The evaluation criteria for the case studies are 
included in the assessment sheets. These case studies demonstrate the ability to 
analyze information that is readily available to a designer. It was not intended to 
create new data but rather prove that already existing data can be used to perform 
the design evaluations. Though the case studies are intended to perform a 
“performance-focused” evaluation, further expansion of the studies could be 
developed by inclusion of cost, availability and weight associated with any lightning 
protection component. The case studies exercised design decisions based on the 
evaluation of data including key points for selection or rejection of alternatives. 
 
The case studies start with the discussion on aircraft design processes. In order to 
understand how the new aircraft design methodology can be implemented a 
discussion about the design phases and topics are included in the case studies. 
Lightning strike probability and location is defined in order to understand some of 
the key areas where lightning strike protection is necessary. Specific discussion 
about the design zones of the aircraft and threats imposed on systems within each 
zone is discussed. Lightning protection of many types are included in the case 
studies. Categories of different protection are developed to help organize the case 
studies. Data for each detailed analysis of lightning protection is included after the 
assessment sheets. Each lightning protection component that is incorporated in the 
assessment sheet is also described in detail along with a description of the 
installation associated with the lightning protection. Much of the data gathered 
within these case studies are found in the figures after the assessment sheet.  
 
From the completion of the assessment sheets in this case studies, it was 
determined that a single integrating entity within the design community might be 
the best choice for leading the design assessments. Skills in understanding materials 
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test and performance of components in a multitude of environments is needed to 
perform the assessments. It is best to create a tool for conducting the assessments 
and organizing the interfaces with the other design team members. For this, a 
database may be helpful to create a more efficient and integrated solution. Within 
the design assessment conclusions, a committee may be formed to address cases 
where multiple disciplines will be required to make input to the final design solution. 
5.12 Case Studies Data Discussion 
For this research, the analysis of the design performance associated with the 
proposed methodology is restricted to theoretical studies for a potential design 
approach. Actual evidence of the effectiveness of the methodology and its 
associated tool are theoretical and do not reflect any known design methodology. 
 
List of Critical and Essential Systems (See Appendix C and Appendix D): 
As the methodology presented in the case studies requires certain qualification data, 
the method for qualification of equipment installed on an aircraft is relevant to 
understanding the source of the necessary data to support regulatory approval. For 
the aircraft in these case studies, there are several different approaches to 
qualification of the systems which causes the methodology to acquire the needed 
data from several sources.  
 
A description of each critical and essential systems is provided in the Appendices for 
ease of review (these appendices are proprietary). The first column provides the ATA 
chapter associated with the System. The ATA chapter is needed only for performing 
searches of the OEM customer data bases needed to develop the service history of 
existing equipment. 
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The categories of data contained in the “Qualification Method” qualification are as follows and are found in Table 5-22 with the aircraft type 
references retained (Aircraft A = 3, Aircraft B = 7, Aircraft D = 4, Aircraft E = 5, Aircraft F = 6): 
 
Qualification 
Method 
Aircraft 
Type 
Approach Used Reasoning 
Certification A Original previous 
model aircraft 
certification 
results 
Indicates existing equipment currently installed on specific airplanes. A service history 
discussion to certify that the equipment for the Aircraft “A” was provided to the 
regulatory authority for substantiation of those items on the list. 
Qualification B Use aircraft B 
qualification data 
for systems that 
are similar on this 
aircraft 
Aircraft “B” Systems and Equipment qualified as part of the Aircraft “B” development 
program. Aircraft “B” qualification data is used to qualify these systems/equipment on 
the aircraft after verification that the wire shielding configuration used in the Aircraft 
“B” qualification test is equivalent (or worse) than the aircraft installations in these 
case studies. 
Multiple aircraft 
certifications 
B, D, E, F Use of data from 
several past 
certifications of 
aircraft 
development 
programs 
This qualification method applies only to the ADF Active Antennas. These active 
antennas are proposed to be certified by service history. The only difference between 
the antennas on the aircraft in the case study that addresses antenna installations and 
the antennas on the above aircraft is the fastener type. The antenna made by one 
antenna OEM has 19.4 million flight hours on the above aircraft; the antenna made by 
another OEM has 12.1 million flight hours. There are no known upsets in service due to 
HIRF or Induced Lightning on these active antennas. As for direct effects lightning, per 
an OEM study that acquired strike history back to 1985, the aircraft fleet (aircraft type 
retained) has not taken a lightning strike to the ADF antennas. 
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Qualification 
Method 
Aircraft 
Type 
Approach Used Reasoning 
Analysis N/A Use of analysis of 
system 
architectures. 
This qualification method applies only to electrical panels containing the Universal 
Master Caution (UMC) card. 
Test A Test systems and 
components 
The category of “Test” indicates that a full qualification test was performed on the 
systems/equipment for the aircraft in the case studies. 
Table 5-22-Systems with possible catastrophic failure mode(s) due to HIRF/Lightning certification methods 
 
Note that only two "Qualification Methods" are used for systems/equipment with catastrophic failure modes:  Qualification and Test. That is, 
there are no systems with possible catastrophic failure modes that are qualified by service history or by analysis. 
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There are 6 pieces of systems/equipment using Aircraft B qualification data: one 
Display Unit, two Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), and three Low Range Radio 
Altimeters (LRRA). Aircraft B qualification data is used in conjunction with the 
airplane data in the case studies to show compliance to HIRF and Lightning external 
environments for JAA certification. Aircraft B qualification data is used directly to 
show compliance to HIRF and Lightning for FAA certification. There are 9 pieces of 
systems/equipment where a full qualification test is performed for the aircraft in 
these case studies.  
 
All systems with possible catastrophic failure modes due to HIRF/Lightning events 
were tested per the intent of a system-level test: an integrated test rig with all 
support equipment that exercised all system-level functions while monitoring for any 
system-level failure modes. 
 
Note that all five qualification methods are used for this type of equipment: Aircraft 
A Certification and Aircraft B Certification, Aircraft B Qualification, Airplane 
Certification Airplane Test and Airplane Analysis of the aircraft under study. 
Equipment Qualified by Aircraft A Service History (Aircraft A Cert) 
Explanation of qualification methods: 
There are 29 pieces of equipment utilizing “Aircraft A Service History”, as a 
qualification method. This equipment is proposed to be qualified for installation on 
the aircraft in these case studies due to at least 3 years of installation on an Aircraft 
A without a HIRF/Lightning incident causing a hazardous/major failure mode. 
Three years was chosen as the minimum acceptable time for adequate service 
history based on the following rationale. The number of Aircraft A airplanes 
delivered from March 1994 to March 1997 was 277.  
 
From airline reports to the OEM, the Aircraft A fleet averages for the total number of  
flight hours from March 1994 to March 1997 was found to be 1,284,641(1.28 E6). 
 
The total number of equivalent airplanes in service during this three year period is 
found from the total number of flight hours: 
 
(1.28 E6 airplane hours)        = 448 airplanes 
------------------------------ 
(365 days)(7.83 hours/day) 
 
Lightning Strike Flight Statistics 
Lightning flight statistics can be related to the number of flight hours. From standard 
literature provided earlier in this body of work during the discussion of the lightning 
phenomenon (reference Chapter 2), an airplane lightning strike occurs once every 
2.5 E3 hours and a worst case, 200 KA lightning strikes occur about 1 % of the time. 
Thus, in the last three years: 
 
1.28 E6 total airplane hours / 2.5 E3 hours/strike  
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= 512 airplane lightning strikes (or 5 worst case lightning strikes in the proposed 
three year period) 
 
For the certification of the aircraft used in the case studies, the exposure to over 5 
hundred strikes and 5 worst case strikes is considered an adequate threat for 
modeling protection for essential equipment. It is clear from the lightning strike 
probability and the number of aircraft that are in service, that the use of real events 
which may result in catastrophic or hazardous conditions are the central argument of 
the certification proposal. The main concern with this approach is that an assumed 
continued airworthiness condition cannot be used to make long-term decisions 
regarding selection of protective equipment since the absence of a major event is 
only proof that from a probabilistic perspective, the worst case lightning strike has 
not occurred on an aircraft that has the worst case degradation of its lightning 
protection. Maintenance on the aircraft can sustain some of the design standards as 
protection components are replaced or possibly tested as part of equipment 
replacements. This body of work proposes that an approach to design where past 
experience is the only factor in determining the adequacy of protection is not an 
optimal approach to creating the best performing designs.  
The Service History Approach 
To determine what existing equipment had at least 3 years of acceptable service 
history on the certification exercise for the aircraft used in the case studies, the 
following describes the approach that was used. After developing the list of existing 
equipment, the equipment's function and possible failure mode of the function due 
to a HIRF/Lightning event was acquired from equipment managers and designated 
engineering representatives. Keywords from the data in the "possible failure mode" 
column and the words "HIRF", "Lightning", and "EMI" were used as search criteria for 
OEM customer data bases: the Schedule Interruption Data System (SIDS); the 
Significant Item Reporting System (SIRS); and the Airline Maintenance Log Data Base. 
Searches were then performed by ATA chapter and were limited to the last five years 
of data base information.  
 
Use of data from known equipment performance databases within the aircraft 
designer organizations is a strategic approach to minimizing the retesting of critical 
equipment to prove integrity of designs during a new aircraft development program. 
This approach minimizes expensive testing and creates a more effective way to 
certification for certain equipment that has known robust performance. The 
challenge with this approach which is addressed by the postulated methodology 
within this body of work is that specific protections against the potentially adverse 
effects of lightning often fail in a latent manner and do not result in functional 
effects on the equipment unless the protection is severely degraded and a lightning 
strike of high intensity attaches to the aircraft in flight. The ability to prove that 
service experience is a determining factor for design adequacy is overlooked in this 
case. Instead, an assumption of the adequacy of the protection designs is loosely 
correlated to the performance of the critical and essential equipment from an 
operational perspective. A brief description of these data bases follow:  
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Schedule Interruption Data System 
SIDS contains data for events which cause schedule interruptions (delays, 
cancellations, air turnbacks, diversions) for the entire OEM in-production fleet and 
includes all operators. SIDS data sources are Airline Reports and Telexes or 
communications from operators of OEM aircraft. 
Significant Item Reporting System 
SIRS contains data for airplane events and items deemed "significant" for all OEM 
aircraft. Incoming daily correspondence from the customer service representatives 
are the primary SIRS data source; however, Airline Reports and Service Deficiency 
Reports (SDR) from the FAA may also be included. This data source is limited to 
safety or extended twin operation performance events after March 1993. 
Airline Maintenance (Log Books) 
Log Books contain detailed records of all pilot reports and line maintenance actions 
(unscheduled line maintenance events) performed on the aircraft from a sample of 
airlines. The equipment manager or designated engineering representative then 
reviewed all findings from these data bases, determined if any findings were due to 
HIRF/Lightning, and confirmed that no HIRF/Lightning findings were associated with 
possible hazardous or major safety concerns. Thus, the set of existing equipment has 
acceptable performance to HIRF/Lightning in the last five years. What still needed to 
be determined was whether recent equipment installations had voided five years of 
acceptable performance for particular equipment's installation record. Therefore, 
the equipment manager or engineering representative provides the date of 
installation for the last significant change of their piece of existing equipment.  
 
Based on the rationale presented above, the OEM established an argument that 
existing equipment for the aircraft in the case studies has adequate service history 
with respect to HIRF and Lightning for certain certification exercises. Therefore, no 
re-qualification tests are necessary for equipment where the OEM has determined 
that past experience is an adequate demonstration of the expected equipment 
performance. As aircraft designs become more advanced and complex, the use of an 
argument regarding service experience will be more challenging. To declare 
equipment as effective in meeting the intended purpose, this work suggests that 
previous experience may need to be augmented with a more robust evaluation using 
known degradation modes and equipment installation details during the aircraft 
design phase. The analysis sheets demonstrated in the case studies provide one way 
to deploy the evaluation. 
 
Equipment Qualified with Aircraft B Data are referenced in the table with the 
notation, “Aircraft B Qualification”. These are equipment on the aircraft in the case 
studies that were qualified using the Aircraft B qualification data as noted in the 
tables in Appendix C and Appendix D. During the development of an aircraft 
program, it is important to know what qualifications will be used to represent the 
design contemplated in order to make appropriate investigation into previous 
qualification test results. As these qualification test strategies are created, the 
engineer utilizing this methodology for design evaluation will be required to assess 
whether the previous qualifications considered a similar installed environment for 
the equipment and associated lightning protection. For the case studies, there is 
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equipment that may have multiple suppliers which have not been included in the 
tables in Appendix C and Appendix D since the demonstration of the processes 
supporting the methodology is the main goal of the case studies and including that 
additional detail would not add significant value to the case studies. Thus the 
additional details regarding similar equipment from several different suppliers will 
not add to the learning intended. In this respect, some of the assessments require 
retrospective investigations. This may result in successful elimination of some 
planned equipment lightning protection installations that may not perform well over 
time and result in a revision to the certification basis in the process. 
 
Equipment qualified by multi-airplane service history is noted in the Appendix C and 
Appendix D tables by the Qualification Method, “A/P Service History”. The service 
history rationale was given above for the ADF Active Antennas from two 
independent equipment suppliers. Equipment qualified by analysis used a similarity 
assessment such as the equipment panels and flight deck panels (panel numbers 
retained). This equipment consists of seven X panels, the Y panel, and the Z panel 
(Panel numbers retained), all of which were changed only by the installation of the 
new Universal Master Caution (UMC) card. These panel housings remain unchanged 
from the first installation of the Aircraft A and are similar to the X and Y panel 
housings (Panel numbers retained). The X and Y were the panels chosen to be tested 
since these two pieces of equipment were being changed by installing additional 
new cards besides the UMC. 
 
Equipment qualified by test requires a full qualification test be performed for the 
aircraft in the case studies. Included in the list are: (Equipment names retained). 
 
As can be determined by the various techniques used to establish the way forward 
to certification, testing of equipment is not always used to qualify equipment. In case 
of lightning protection, certain equipment protection schemes may have been used 
on past designs for protecting wiring and electronic equipment that are selected for 
the new designed aircraft without a reaffirmation from a qualification test. In that 
case, components that are subjected to the assessment sheets must not be limited 
to only those equipment designs that go through a qualification test. This 
intelligence should be used to ensure that no component performance is “assumed” 
to be adequate for the life of the airplane due to the long history of that particular 
components application on other aircraft designs. 
5.13 Results of Case Studies 
The analysis sheets work well to understand the potential performance of a lightning 
protection component. To subsidize the analysis, one must be able to identify the 
designed lightning current path in order to perform an evaluation of the entire 
lightning protection solution. Results of the assessments will be generated and 
distributed to the design team leaders that are affected. A cross analysis of the 
assessment findings may be necessary when specific findings are recommending a 
change in the design. It is important to understand from the case studies that many 
designs are adopted from past aircraft programs. This is sometimes the right way 
forward as it may result in lower costs to develop the new aircraft. However, as the 
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case studies demonstrate, past designs may not be robust enough to meet the new 
aircraft performance expectations defined at the beginning of the aircraft 
development program. For this reason, it has been demonstrated in the case studies 
that accumulation of design goals for lightning protection performance is critical to 
achieving the expected optimized design outcome. 
 
During development of the case studies, several findings surfaced that caused 
changes to the format of the assessment implementation. Some of the 
improvements made to the case studies are listed as follows: 
1. Assessment sheets revised to include maintenance recommendations 
2. Inclusion of a detailed environmental design guide into the process 
3. Added dates and sign-off blocks to the assessment sheets 
4. Added certification plan data and relevant details regarding lightning protection 
5. Included a Pareto chart to clarify different effects lightning has on aircraft 
6. Incorporated a detailed table of regulations related to lightning protection design 
and how the regulation affect the design decisions 
7. Enhanced the discussion regarding system safety and regulations associated with 
electromagnetic protection design assurance levels 
8. Included SAE design criteria from SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) 
9. Included practice for relocation for protection components in cases where the 
assessment concludes an option for the protection location 
10. Included additional information relevant to the OEM Design Manual for lightning 
protection design. Identified opportunity to improve the manual 
11. Included both composite materials and metallic materials in the case studies 
12. Included information on evolutionary lightning protection from past early aircraft 
designs (aircraft types retained). 
13. Incorporated concepts from the aircraft design handbooks titled, “Aircraft 
Design: A Conceptual Approach” [5.7], and a text book titled, “The Aerospace 
Engineers Handbook of Lightning Protection” and an aircraft design text titled, 
“Introduction to Aircraft Design” by J.P Fielding [5.6]. 
14. Lightning Strike Zones reference was added to the assessment sheets to provide 
a frame-work for the analysis 
15. Determined that certification levels should be referenced in the analysis sheets. 
 
From the results of the analysis sheets that demonstrate one way to implement the 
methodology, the conclusions for each lightning strike protection design have 
proven to be useful in improving the design. The analysis sheet approach is adequate 
to demonstrate the integration of design issues presented in the methodology. In 
one case an improved design was determined that would be implemented on the 
aircraft before the aircraft was type certified. A cross examination of the results 
could be performed by assembling the analysis sheets for each design within a single 
team and initiating a system for the review by system design team leaders. This 
practice of developing integrated system design methodologies has been successful 
on many aircraft and aerospace vehicle design projects. The results of these case 
studies however, bring an integration solution to the design of lightning protection 
that result in better performing products and optimized designs when considering 
the installed threats. 
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5.14 Limitations of Case Studies 
One of the major limitations of the case studies is the accessibility of the data 
required for proving the methodology. Data gathering for these case studies can be 
tedious if the data sought is not expected to be used in the fashion presented by the 
case studies. In real-life application of this methodology, the aircraft design team 
would establish a data-gathering plan and capability to ensure that the design 
evaluations are performed in a timely and efficient manner. The nature of this 
limitation is likely a direct correlation to an aircraft that is already designed. 
 
Another limitation of the case studies is the proprietary nature of the data used in 
the analysis. Certain data from aircraft derivative development programs may rely 
on past designs that did not collect the required data in a fashion that is convenient 
to performing the proposed methodology. Data exchange may also be challenging if 
proper proprietary data agreements are not in place. In order to perform the case 
studies, a contract between the university and the aircraft manufacturer was 
implemented. This limitation should not be present if the aircraft design was created 
and developed by the same manufacturer. In cases where the designs are 
outsourced to partners of suppliers, agreements between the manufacturer and 
partners like the one between the university and aircraft manufacturer to support 
this body of work is necessary. This is especially true for the mining of past 
experience with certain specific designs that adds to the analysis within the work 
sheets of each case study. This creates a sometimes awkward reference system 
within the case studies to hide the source of the information or the aircraft types 
referred to in the certification similarity arguments. 
 
The case studies demonstrate the need for historical information and service 
experience gathered in a single convenient database. With the industry trends 
towards partnerships between corporations, the access to specific customer 
experience regarding lightning protection components is limited to the ability of the 
integrating company to collect the required experience and make it easily available 
to its partner supplier base. For instance, the specific experience with composite 
structure interfacing with lightning protection that conducts lightning currents may 
not be present within the composite structure supplier support department. This 
type of data can be generated only in cases where the prime contracting company 
shares support responsibility. From the business perspective, the supplier may only 
require that serious issues with the components in question be brought to the 
attention of the supplier support engineering department. At the same time, the 
design of certain protection components such as the metallic lightning protection 
frames on the rudder tip may be managed closely by the prime integrator of designs 
and checked against the criteria presented in the assessment sheets. 
 
As for the case studies presented in this thesis, the selection of case study designs 
exercised several different protection components types offering diversity in the 
case studies that proves the approach can work with structural, systems and 
interconnecting protection designs. Additional analyses of similar types of lightning 
protections were not included to eliminate redundancies in the case studies. 
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Another limitation of the case studies was the use of data from an already designed 
and produced aircraft. Though the case studies evaluated certification 
documentation, data from tests performed on the aircraft at the time of the design 
development, and similarities of past designs even back to aircraft built in the 1960s, 
the case studies proved that this limitation would not be a hindrance to exercising 
the methodology proposed by the author. On the contrary, the use of the 
methodology during an aircraft development program offers more freedom to revise 
assumptions and designs based on the findings of the associated assessment sheets. 
 
A final limitation is the ability to demonstrate through a series of case studies that 
the application of this methodology to new and novel designs is valid. Since the case 
studies were performed on an aircraft developed as a derivative of an earlier design 
in 1997, advances in materials, equipment integration and new lightning protection 
techniques may bring certain unknown problems in performing the assessments. In 
general, the flexibility built into the design assessment sheets provide for expansion 
of this methodology to include evaluations of new or novel designs. 
5.15 Lessons Learned and Knowledge Produced 
As the methodology was exercised in several case studies contained within this 
section of the thesis, it was determined that the integration for this new design 
approach was very important. Evidence was presented within the case studies that 
showed a practice of using old design approaches to lightning protection since no 
performance issues are known at the time of the design decision. Using past designs 
has the advantage of reducing costs associated with the battery of tests required 
when a new system is certified. The issue with the approach to adopt past designs 
discovered in the case studies is the lack of associated investigations into the 
continued airworthiness of the parts that have been previously certified. The case 
studies demonstrated that an assessment for continued airworthiness can be 
applied for parts that implement new designs and parts that use previous designs. 
For lightning protection components that are certified by similarity, the retesting of 
the parts is not necessary in order to complete the design assessments proposed by 
the case studies. These previously used designs can use real-world experience with 
the continued airworthiness in place of certification testing to help properly assess 
the components. This was actually demonstrated by the case studies since the 
components within the studies have already been certified to be incorporated into 
the aircraft used as an example in the case studies. 
 
The case studies investigated the possibility that data would be available to perform 
a wide-spread evaluation of the lightning protection continued airworthiness on an 
aircraft development program. Within the case studies, it was determined through 
practical application that new technologies can also be evaluated with the 
methodology. The reason that the methodology easily addresses new technology is 
in the design of the assessment sheets and the inclusion of an electrical bond path 
definition for each protection component. Once a bond path is determined and 
agreed within the design process, then new technologies can be assessed by 
determining the main features of the technology that allow for current to flow 
during a lightning strike event. This was proven by the examination of a composite 
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rudder structure where a metallic picture frame is used to reduce damage due to 
lightning strike by directing the current along the more conductive metallic strips. 
Without the metallic strips the higher resistance composite structure will cause the 
current to increase and result in more severe damage to the attached location on 
the rudder. The methodology was exercised by examining the installation features of 
the metallic strip against the expected environmental threats present during flight 
and a life-long operation of the aircraft with this particular installation in place. The 
methodology is not intended to determine if the installed protection performs its 
function, but rather the methodology is in place to ensure that the lightning 
protection continues to perform its function over a long period of time. For this 
analysis, the purpose of the installed lightning protection must be understood and 
the detailed description of the intended operation of the protection during the 
lightning strike is also necessary. 
 
Another lesson learned comes from the nature of performing the analysis after the 
design is in place versus performing the analysis during the design development 
phase of the aircraft development project. The methodology is perfectly situated to 
perform analysis both after the design is in place and during the design development 
process. The revelation however, in performing the case studies on an aircraft design 
that is already in service was the opportunity to involve the examinations within the 
actual design development process as a way to improve the design at the time of its 
creation.  By performing the analysis after the design is fixed, the opportunity for 
improvements to the design is diminished. Findings for recommendations of 
improvements that can be made may be compromised by the expense of replacing 
all the applicable protection components after the aircraft is in service. To assist with 
this situation, it was discovered that maintenance recommendations should also be 
part of the examination process contained in the methodology. A change to the 
assessment sheets was made to address this concern. Another benefit of this 
methodology during the design process is the potential that the analysis may find a 
better way to transfer the current during a lightning strike event and offer a more 
robust solution to the protection design determined by both evaluations of test 
results and of service experience associated with previous aircraft configurations. 
 
The nature of this methodology to address long term performance issues generated 
a discovery of the importance of design goals. In lightning protection certification, 
design goals are established by industry standards that ensure the design meets the 
intended threat while performing its intended function of passing the current safely 
through the aircraft without system or fight upsets. The nature of these 
specifications is not to determine performance margin associated with the long term 
survivability of the protection components. Use of this methodology brought 
attention to the importance of meeting design goals not just for performance, but 
also for the long term availability of the lightning protection. Incorporation of the 
methodology within the design process enhances the lightning protection designs. 
 
Another discovery as a result of the case studies is the need within a design process 
to integrate knowledge and purpose. For lightning direct effects protection, use of 
metallic strips on the outside of an aircraft structure can affect the aerodynamic 
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performance of the aircraft. Transition of the metal to the composite should be 
smooth while also providing protection from the potential for the metal to corrode. 
Composite fiber structure and aluminum metallic strips are not compatible materials 
in the presence of moisture. Corrosion of the metal can reduce the current carrying 
performance of the metal. Also, holes drilled into the composite structure for the 
purpose of mounting the metal strip can provide a means for moisture to enter the 
composite structure and cause the composite material to delaminate. This single 
environmental threat may be reduced by addition of sealants or primers called 
corrosion inhibiting compounds. It is important however to compare the need for a 
good current path with the requirement to avoid the negative effects of moisture 
since some corrosion inhibiting techniques can reduce the electrically conductive 
nature of the design. This demonstrated the need for engineers and designers within 
different disciplines to collaborate the design alternatives across the systems and 
structures boundaries. A central organization may be best suited to lead this design 
function to remove any potential adoption of lightning designs based on familiarity 
or affinity to certain design approaches. Since the design solutions of some goals 
may actually be counterproductive to other design solutions in the composite 
structure and metallic strip example, it was discovered that use of this methodology 
will increase awareness of the importance for design integrations to be performed 
across disciplines. This is also highlighted through experience with designing aircraft 
across a multiple supplier base. Aircraft development programs that include large 
scale partnerships must have a robust integration solution for the design 
development in order for this methodology to be performed with ease. 
 
The use of the assessment sheets to implement the methodology demonstrated the 
importance of leveraging service experience. In research of the certification process, 
it was discovered that systems that have been certified on past aircraft designs may 
not be evaluated for certification since the use of similarity may regard the 
configuration as “already certified” resulting in lowering the cost of a potential re-
certification for the same design. The discovery here was that previously certified 
systems may have performance issues that could be improved by application of this 
methodology but would not otherwise be evaluated if the design process selects to 
incorporate the same design based on the cost of re-certification. Within the case 
studies, it was discovered that the very early aircraft designed in the 1960s was 
referenced within the certification documentation to eliminate the need to pass the 
design through the regulatory evaluation process and cause further expense to the 
program. The interesting result however, was the incorporation of bond jumpers 
that are known to degrade in service but have been certified for use on a past 
aircraft design. Since this methodology can evaluate already existing designs as well 
as newly developed designs, it offers the flexibility to evaluate these bond jumpers 
without having to pass the design through a re-certification process and then allow 
for the informed decision to incorporate the bond jumpers used on past aircrafts or 
revise the design and accept the re-certification as an improvement provides more 
benefit than avoiding the certification costs for a new design. Designs that are 
adopted from past certification programs may be acceptable for certification i.e. low 
risk, but may not be examined for potential optimization unless a technique is used 
like the one presented in this body of work. Certification strategies that adopt past 
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designs to ease in the expense and developmental costs may not be the best way to 
determine an appropriate design alternative. 
 
The use of analysis work sheets proved useful in deploying the methodology. As the 
case studies were conducted, it was determined that the analysis sheets should be 
revised to include additional features of the analysis that were not known at the 
time they were originally created. The flexibility of the design analysis sheets was 
discovered to be very useful in adopting additional needed steps such as the 
inclusion of the environmental threat tables. These tables were created to ensure 
that the environmental threat assessments within the analysis would be done in a 
similar manner so as to provide a design methodology that is transparent to the 
individual performing the analysis. Further development of the analysis sheets is 
expected as the concept is improved and the analysis process is further developed. 
 
Repeatability of the analysis was demonstrated by inclusion of four unique 
protection designs across both direct and indirect effects protection components. 
The flexibility of performing the analysis on both direct lightning effects and indirect 
lightning effects was also proven through actual case studies of both protection type 
designs. This successful analysis is a good indication that such a design methodology 
can be applied across different components and is a repeatable and robust process. 
5.16 Conclusion 
The case studies proved the practicality of the proposed methodology. In the earlier 
part of the case studies development, an assessment sheet was created to exercise 
the methodology. Several changes were made to the assessment sheets to improve 
the process as the case studies progressed. The following is a list of the changes that 
were made to improve the assessment process and apply real-world requirements 
sourced from the case studies data. 
Assessment Sheet Section Changes Resulting from Research 
Section 1 - Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data 
• Added an assessment sheet number to distinguish each assessment sheet. 
The numbering system incorporated a code in the numbering system that 
identified the particular type of lightning protection and a serial number.  
o Structure lightning protection - STR001, STR002 etc.  
o Fuel ignition lightning protection – FUL001, FUL002 etc. 
o System lightning protection – SYS001, SYS002, etc. 
o Antenna lightning protection – ANT001, ANT002 etc. 
• Added the engineers name performing the assessment 
• Added the lightning Zone in which the protection is installed, e.g. Zone 1, 
Zone 2, or Zone 3 
• Added the date in which the assessment was performed. This is to ensure 
that any revisions to the assessment are not confused with earlier versions. 
Section 2 - Component Description 
• Added system criticality. 
Section 3 - Component Purpose and Operational Theory 
• No Change 
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Section 4 - Component Schematic and Installation Details 
• Added lightning electrical current path and interfacing component 
description 
Section 5 - Installation Environmental Threats 
• Added a description of the installed environment 
• Added Flammable leakage zone description and protection information 
• Added an environmental threats rating table 
• Added environmental threat severity for each threat 
• Added installation resistance to the environmental threats 
Section 6 - Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment 
• No change 
Section 7 - Test Plan Input 
• No change 
Section 8 - Test Data Results 
• Added qualification test pan steps 
Section 9 - Report from Test Engineer Regarding on Continued Airworthiness 
• Added conclusion section for assessment of the item 
Section 10 - Design Revision Request 
• No change 
Section 11 - Revision accepted by Program 
• No change 
Section 12 - Description of Final Optimized Design 
• Added an “action taken” section 
• Added Approval signature block 
 
The proposed analysis process used in the validation section of this thesis was 
revised by experience gained in the case studies. Additional drawings information 
and details on the certification basis for the lightning protection component are also 
included in the case studies but were not included in the validation section of the 
thesis. Improvements were made to the process by including more scientific 
examination of the lightning protection components such as the galvanic table to be 
used in determining whether appropriate steps are taken when materials are not 
compatible in the presence of moisture. The case studies also demonstrated that 
some designs are not optimal at the time once they are approved if they are not 
subjected to an analysis such as the one proposed within this work. The designs that 
were examined were found to have some shortcomings such as the example of the 
tin plated copper bond wire in the harsh environments. The case studies included 
two different aircraft crash reports due to lightning. In one case, the lightning strike 
was not well managed by the installed lightning ground paths die to missing ground 
jumpers in the horizontal tail assembly. These missing ground wires resulted in the 
lightning moving down an alternative path that was not designed to safely pass the 
high current generated by a lightning strike. With the ground wires missing, the 
alternate path included some hinges in the horizontal stabilizer flight controls 
components that were subsequently welded together and rendered ineffective in 
controlling the safe landing of the aircraft. The case studies demonstrated that 
installations such as the bond jumpers noted in the referenced crash investigation 
would have been recognized for the significance to the entire design and potentially, 
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could have been maintained or the design revised due to possible failure to pass the 
current through these bond jumpers caused an aircraft incident. 
 
Through the development of the case studies, elements were explored that caused 
better understanding and improvements to the use of the methodology such as: 
1. Aircraft environmental threats 
2. Incorporation of corrosion discussion, a galvanic table and explanation of the 
association between galvanic deterioration and continued availability of good 
electrical contact. 
3. The significance of a development program and development program phases  
4. Criteria demonstrating safety on aircraft systems installations 
5. The importance of test data and relationship between testing and design 
improvements as an iterative process 
6. Impacts of previous certification retaining old designs and inhibiting an 
improvement to the new designs 
7. Classification of analysis  and different protection schemes 
8. Examination of the certification process that leads to design creation 
9. Detailed explanations of different lightning protection designs and associated key 
features of those designs. 
10. How lightning affects operations including an examination of a typical lightning 
strike inspection to assist in understanding what is considered “at risk” for 
damage from lightning strike. 
11. Exploration of sealants, the process for sealing lightning protective interfaces and 
associated design issues when improper sealant applications are present 
12. A summary of two different crash investigations and subsequent 
recommendations provided by the regulatory agencies that highlight issues that 
can be caused by either poor designs or poor evaluations of the designs at the 
time of the final approved protection system implementations 
13. Detailed information on lightning zones, the process for determining lightning 
zones and the associated electrical threats presented within each zone. This 
exercise resulted in revision to the assessment sheets to include a reference in 
which lightning zone the components on the assessment sheets are installed. The 
determination of lightning zones is also an iterative process that may result in 
design changes as each design improvement is completed. These iterations will 
also derive the design assessment revision and resulting assessment sheet 
modifications. 
14. Details associated with connector designs 
15. Elements of a safety analysis and selection of lightning protection designs 
16. Maintenance program development and support for better performing designs 
resulting from the design assessment methodology 
17. Lightning protection certification and the need to evaluate some designs even if 
they have been previously certified and included within the new design to be 
certified by similarity. 
18. Multiple case studies were explored that covered a variety of lightning protection 
types and resulted in a wider understanding of the value an assessment can 
provide to the final designs across multiple protection types 
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The following examples demonstrate how the case studies evolved and list examples 
of the benefits that were generated by performing the case studies. 
• In the earliest version of this chapter, a description of interacting aircraft 
lightning protection design processes. The case studies started with very little 
data or literature searches to provide the data necessary for the exercise. Further 
development created multiple paths through the design process and descriptions 
of details associated with the different paths through design phases. Also 
included in the early part of the case studies were some rudimentary 
descriptions of lightning protection designs features. 
• Several months later in the case studies more detailed evaluations of regulatory 
guidelines were added to the case studies that represented many more literature 
searches. Additional information of federal regulations and industry standards 
were described. Many more details gathered from literature search for 
protection schemes and components including antenna issues, information on 
degradation of installations, and known design shortcomings. 
• As the case studies were developed and continuous reviews with the PhD 
supervisor were conducted, many comments modified the case studies with 
regard to scope, addition of test cases, and selection of cases with composite and 
metallic features in order to demonstrate potential real-world differences in 
materials. Also added to the case studies through guidance from the PhD 
supervisor were discussions on improving an existing design vs. evaluation of 
new designs. Additional information on how to deal with revolutionary designs 
was also added to the case studies. At this point, it was determined that the 
certification process has an impact on the design process. As a result, it was 
necessary to investigate and describe the certification process, especially its 
quirks regarding the use of similarity as a way to determine design 
implementation. More research was conducted at that time to expand on the 
certification and development interactions. This required additional literature 
searches in aircraft design handbooks such as the AIAA “Aircraft Design: A 
Conceptual Approach”, book and, “The Aerospace Engineers Handbook of 
Lightning Protection” design book. The results of the literature search on this 
subject introduced the concept of revolutionary designs and further 
development of the meaning of design stages (Conceptual, Preliminary, and 
Detailed). The differences between the stages and application of the proposed 
design methodology generated a detailed discussion with the PhD supervisor and 
generated further understanding of the aircraft design processes. The outcome 
was the examination and incorporation of details which helped define how the 
methodology will fit into a typical aircraft development program.  
• Further development of the case studies expanded on the aircraft design process 
and the subject of incorporating continued airworthiness into the process. This 
generated research on aircraft design phases and discovered the importance of 
early goals for lightning protection.  
• In order to establish a baseline for the case studies, assumptions were included 
in the description of the case studies. The subject of known lightning 
phenomenon and lightning impacts on aircraft operations was also expanded 
through literature searches and include in the case studies. Part of this additional 
information included more specifics on the attachment of lightning to the aircraft 
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in the case studies, probabilities of lightning strike locations from literature 
searches, and lightning zone design processes and definitions. At this point in the 
case studies development, aircraft lightning protection was listed for both direct 
and indirect lightning protection. This list is instrumental in determining the 
scope for practical application of the methodology. Lightning protection drawings 
also were included in the case studies and more detailed research of lightning 
protection components was performed resulting in more data that was 
subsequently included the studies.  
• The use of an assessment sheet was also introduced by the case studies. The 
early version of the validation did not include an assessment sheet concept, 
though the idea of including the continued airworthiness review remained 
central to the assessment. Analysis sheets were developed and revised several 
times over the course of the case studies exercises. Additions and revisions to 
the assessment sheets are described at the beginning of the case studies 
conclusion section. The design of the assessment sheets was discussed with the 
supervisor to ensure that a reasonable representation of the intent of the 
methodology could be demonstrated.    
• Continuing literature searches increased the amount of data included in the case 
studies. These literature searches created more details of specific lightning 
protection designs on the aircraft in the case studies and descriptions of the 
protection components that were added to the case studies. At this stage, details 
regarding the aircraft environment, aircraft environmental threats data, and 
associated details of the wire installations criteria in vibration, temperature and 
moisture-prone areas were determined. An explanation of the lightning threat to 
aircraft systems through faradays laws was created and a discussion surrounding 
the effects of lightning current on transport elements such as hydraulic tubes 
was also incorporated into the case studies.  
• More examples of different electrical bond paths were provided as the case 
studies developed with detailed explanations regarding the varied sources of 
information on an aircraft development program. The source of continued 
airworthiness requirements was explored. This led to an observation that there 
may not be a central location in the design team for coordinating and 
consolidating requirements. A centralized design function would help ensure the 
designs meet the requirements from the multiple design perspectives.  
• In earlier development of the case studies, the inclusion of maintenance 
requirements was not considered germane to the methodology. After 
discussions on this issue with the supervising professor, the case studies were 
modified to incorporate potential maintenance as an alternative to redesign of a 
lightning protection components where findings in the assessment may have 
recommended redesign as an alternative. This new understanding resulted in 
revised assessment sheets and will also impart a revision to the methodology.  
• It was also determined that instructions for inspection of lightning protection 
after a lightning strike attachment to an aircraft would provide a good 
understanding of the things within the design that most aircraft manufacturers 
consider important. For this, current maintenance manuals were explored. 
Research into the maintenance manual and across several different aircraft 
manuals including the structural repair manual provided information that was 
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included in the case studies to highlight the general principles associated with 
aircraft lightning protection inspections. For lightning protection designers, this 
knowledge greatly enhances understanding continued airworthiness issues 
associated with potential damage to the aircraft after a lightning strike.  
• At mid-stage in the case studies development, two aircraft crash reports from 
legitimate regulatory investigations that were found to be due to lightning strike 
events were included as part of the case studies. These investigations led to 
understanding not only how lightning can affect the continued safe flight and 
landing of an aircraft, but also provide information on the importance of 
maintaining lightning protection as the aircraft ages. In one case the evidence of 
missing or improperly installed bond jumpers (earthing wires) was found to be a 
cause of the aircraft loss of stability after it was struck by lightning. This can be 
also correlated to understanding the effects of poor designs. The conclusion was 
that continued airworthiness of lightning protection is a key design specialty and 
if done poorly, can have hazardous effects on the aircraft operation and impact 
the safety of passengers and flight crews. In the case of one of the crashes, 
passengers and flight crew were harmed by a hard landing due to reduced 
controllability of the aircraft after the lightning strike causing subsequent 
collapse of the landing gear upon touch down. In the other case, lightning was 
suspected to have caused a complete electrical failure. Revision to the aircraft 
flight manual has been recommended to include instructions to thoroughly 
inspect the aircraft after lightning strike when loss of electrical power or 
interrupted power results from the strike. All nineteen passengers and two crew 
members were killed in this crash. 
• Further development of the case studies investigated the importance of 
electrical bonding within aircraft designs. Literature searches resulted in 
discovery of an electrical bonding design guide developed by the OEM that was 
in need of update to bring the bonding practices developed for the new aircraft 
design processes into the forefront. Reference to this design guide was included 
in the case studies. The aircraft that was the subject of the case studies was not 
designed to the new standards found in this bonding and grounding design 
guide. The importance of an electrical earthing design guide was highlighted and 
inclusion of the design guide into applications of the methodology resulted. For 
early aircraft designs, it was thought that sealant may not be necessary within 
electrical bond joints, especially in applications where a bond jumper or earthing 
wire was attached to a piece of equipment that may be removed for 
maintenance or overhaul.  
• Bond paths for electrical installations were described in detail. During a lightning 
strike event, lightning current travels along the structure of the aircraft. Wire 
installations will also carry current to the attached equipment. It was determined 
in the case studies that wire installations rely on brackets attachment to 
structure, equipment attachment to aircraft structure, installed shield wires 
within the wire looms and bond jumpers that may attach between the brackets 
and structure or the equipment and structure. For each of these interfaces, a 
specific impedance is required as part of the design to ensure that voltages 
generated by the lightning current are kept to acceptable levels. For an aircraft 
development program, the expected “standoff” voltage that any control 
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equipment would experience at the junction from outside the equipment to the 
internal equipment control electronics is established by the design team. 
Working with this requirement, designers for aircraft equipment establish 
appropriate electrical bonding schemes to ensure that the required voltages are 
within the specified levels. These bonding schemes are important to remain 
effective throughout the life of the aircraft. The conclusion from the case studies 
is that more specialize and concentrated effort to provide design solutions for 
electrical bonds that will perform as intended over the life of the aircraft would 
provide is benefit to an aircraft design team. 
• Through research within the case studies, it was discovered that sealant 
applications are an important part of lightning protection continued 
airworthiness. Sealants may be applied after the terminal joint is assembled or as 
part of the assembly process in-between the fastener parts (washers, nuts, 
terminals etc.). When a sealant is applied at the gaps between two interfacing 
parts after an electrical joint is assembled, this is called a fillet seal. Fillet seals 
have been identified to increase the possibility of trapping moisture in cases 
where the installation is outside the pressure vessel. For applications inside the 
pressure vessel, this bonding technique may be perfectly acceptable to meet 
continued airworthiness expectations. The degradation of a fillet seal outside the 
pressure vessel is brought about by imperfect fillet seal application that may 
include a small unseen void in the sealant. In this case, the void would act like a 
siphon when the aircraft is cycled from standard ground atmosphere to a much 
greater altitude pressures. This would cause moisture to be drawn in and out of 
the joint causing potential corrosion in cases where the materials in the fastener 
“stack-up” do not demonstrate galvanic compatibility. Understanding 
appropriate applications of sealants, appropriate types of sealants and the 
relationship to the continued airworthiness of the installation was achieved 
through exploration of information surrounding this topic. As a result of this 
learning, the analysis sheets that drive the assessments for continued 
airworthiness were revised to include the sealant application and type.  In a 
similar manner, cleaning methods associated with preparation of electrical 
bonding installations were explored and included within the analysis. Specific 
electrical bonding information regarding the aircraft in the case studies was 
acquired through literature search and is included within the case studies. 
• The concept of primary structure lightning strike protection and secondary 
structure lightning strike protection was examined and its impact on the case 
studies as a way to organize the design process.  The application of the case 
studies concludes that structural installations where lightning current is expected 
to pass through the structure must be examined by the lightning protection 
continued airworthiness team to ensure the dual purpose of structural integrity 
and lightning protection function are both met by the structural design. 
• The concept of systems equipment criticality was explored. The difference 
between the criticality as determined by the FAR 25.1309 safety analysis and the 
safety determinations through the Design Assurance Level (DAL) process 
associated with AC20-136 guidance were clarified. Findings were provided that 
demonstrated how a system considered non-critical by the safety analysis 
performed under guidance from FAR/JAR 25.1309 could be elevated to a 
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hazardous or catastrophic level failure when evaluated by the lightning in-direct 
effects process in AC20-136. This observation emphasized the need for 
understanding the electromagnetic perspective for lightning protection safety 
determination and also highlights that direct application of the systems safety 
analysis results may cause an incorrect classification of lightning protection 
components. This incorrect determination of the lightning protection significance 
could drive incorrect protection applications. The subject of new or significantly 
modified systems was explained along with its potential impact to the proposed 
methodology. Safety assessments for 25.1309 failure hazard assessments may 
require additional assessment and integration from the Design Assurance Level 
(DAL) analysis to identify lightning protection component significance.  
• It was discovered that the lightning certification process has a large impact on 
the lightning protection design development. Further research about the 
certification process and its impact on the methodology was included in the case 
studies. In cases where components were certified on past designs and previous 
aircraft development programs, additional design assessment may not be 
performed by the design community. This approach to adopt early design 
solutions based on past certification on previous aircraft could lead to sub-
optimal designs and perpetuate design features into new aircraft development 
programs that could be improved for continued airworthiness if the 
methodology is applied. The case studies concluded that the methodology could 
be used for new and reconfigured or derivative aircraft development programs. 
• Research done within the case studies identified a report by the National 
Institute of Aviation Research that evaluated aircraft with and aircraft without 
lightning protection. The studies determined that aircraft that are fully protected 
from lightning adverse effects had a significantly lower percentage of electrical 
failures. This discovery validates the proposition that the demonstrated 
methodology would bring a significant value to the aircraft design process. 
• Lightning protection maintenance can be optimized with the use of the design 
assessment methodology. Changes to designs may be recommended and 
subsequently evaluated for practicality by use of a feedback system added to the 
early version of the methodology. This feedback loop was proposed after 
discussions with the supervising professor and revised in the methodology 
definition prior to completion of the case studies. 
• The association of design details contained in the case studies and specific 
lightning protection component installation information yielded some 
conclusions within the assessment sheets that require further design engineering 
guidance. This is a good indicator that the design process would benefit from the 
assessment techniques exercised by the case studies. Inserting more information 
from service experience can improve the proposed methodology. 
• Incorporation of a materials chart describing the galvanic characteristics of 
differing metals may be an improvement to the methodology. 
• A revision of the methodology to directly tie the environmental threats design 
criteria and the approved parts list process into the methodology and 
assessment sheets should be explored more deeply. Indications from the case 
studies pointed to processes internal to design communities for selecting 
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acceptable components within t certain operating environments that may 
perform well initially, but not over time. 
• Aircraft lightning zones identify the severity of the electrical current and the 
probability of a lightning strike in that aircraft location. The assessment model for 
lightning protection components may benefit from including the zone in the 
assessment sheets. These sheets were revised during the case studies exercise to 
accommodate this feature. Further exploration of the significance of lightning 
strike zones to the lightning strike protection may be beneficial. 
• The case studies demonstrated that both direct and indirect lightning strike 
threats can be practically addressed by the methodology. 
• Information gathering of aircraft components for the case studies was very 
tedious and demonstrated that an integrated process for including the lightning 
protection design continued airworthiness into the development phase of an 
aircraft design program would be more effective.  
• Some of the required details for the assessment sheets are contained in the 
installation and parts list drawings on several sheets. The case studies 
demonstrated that this information is not collected in a single location. Further 
evidence on the importance of integration within the design project was 
gathered by exercising the effort to gather different design details across 
multiple drawings. The assessment sheet used in the case studies assisted with 
the effort of integrating information and design details. 
• Improvement to the methodology can be achieved with further development on 
new design approaches. The design assessments contained in the case studies 
were performed to determine if a design is expected to last the life of the aircraft 
given certain inputs from multiple sources. Several sources of information will 
require integration from individual groups such as electrical designers, fuel 
ignition prevention designers, wiring designers, material sciences experts, 
composites experts.  
• The methodology exercised in the case studies would result in benefit if it were 
developed further to increase the integration during the design development 
phase. The practical application of the analysis through use of the assessment 
sheets in the case studies can be developed further to include a design 
assessment committee rather than just an assessment sheet completion. This 
would have the benefit of tying the design improvement to the design 
assessment committee. The assessment sheets can identify problems, but do not 
include the potential solutions other than a simple recommendation. Further 
work on this concept is needed. 
• The case studies identified the association of electrical bonding and grounding 
knowledge to lightning protection continued airworthiness. Since the 
electromagnetic compatibilities and electrical bonding and grounding skills are 
departmentalized, the assessment sheets provided evidence that cross 
examination between these two skill sets benefit the final design outcome. 
• The model aircraft in this case studies is not highly integrated. For highly 
integrated aircraft, the importance of designing the continued airworthiness into 
the lightning protection expands to include many more systems. The analysis 
sheets are designed to address this more highly integrated design and assist with 
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the cross-organizational support that is necessary to succeed at designing highly 
integrated systems. 
• The aircraft design process is iterative in nature. The use of the assessment 
sheets in the case studies demonstrated that feedback from design assessments 
is important especially when a system is found to be inadequate for the life of 
the aircraft. An example of this was included in the case where a connector 
design was found to be inadequate for the application outside the pressure 
vessel and feedback to the design community was generated by the assessment. 
• The case studies demonstrated that the use of a failure hazard assessment is not 
enough to address the lightning protection design robustness over the life of the 
aircraft. The concept of design assurance levels was introduced within the case 
studies that assisted with the necessary categorizing of lightning protection 
systems. An entire section of the case studies was dedicated to the concept of 
safety and the different processes associate with design assurance where the 
effects of these processes differentiates the input to the methodology. 
• Later in the development of the case studies, the concept of maintenance 
program development and impact was introduced as part of the design 
development. This is not a normal industry standard approach as the 
maintenance program is generally determined after the designs have been 
completed. This early incorporation of the maintenance program requirements 
incorporates more advantage to the design methodology as it can further 
optimize the design not just for the continued airworthiness but also for the 
mitigation of maintenance costs later in the life of the aircraft. 
• The case studies demonstrated that the earlier design approach used to develop 
the aircraft under study did not incorporate the best design solutions. This can be 
correlated to the lack of an integrated design process such as the one 
hypothesized within these works and demonstrated by the case studies. 
• After review of the EMC test reports generated at the time of the aircraft 
examined in this body of work, it was noted that the continued airworthiness of 
the EMC protection under test was not included as a category within the report 
structure. This issue would result in fewer components reviewed with the 
assessment sheets. However, if assessment sheets were used at the time the 
aircraft was in its design phase, this issue would have surfaced through the 
assessment methodology and resolved by a proper disposition. 
• As a benefit to of the assessment sheets identified by the case studies, the 
requirement to test the component resistance at time of installation may be 
helpful to add to the assessment sheet. These specific electrical bonds are 
important to be installed properly, but through findings from the case studies, a 
systematic approach at the time of the aircraft development did not include the 
examination of the installation process or design to ensure that the continued 
airworthiness of the installation is maintained. 
• During development of the case studies, the lightning protection continued 
airworthiness design handbook developed by the OEM was discovered. This 
handbook is out of date with today’s design practices. Development and 
improvement to the manufacturers own internal design handbook would be a 
great improvement to assist the next design community on the next 
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development program to design the aircraft according to the best known 
practices for lightning protection continued airworthiness. 
 
These findings and the new discoveries provided by the research listed above 
summarize the important outcome of the case studies. Overall, the case studies 
proved that the methodology could be applied to an aircraft design and also 
generates a positive outcome to the design. 
Chapter 6 Lessons from the Case Studies and Revised Methodology 
6.1 Methodology Success and Updates Made to the Methodology? 
The methodology as applied to an aircraft development program worked very well in 
meeting the goal to optimize the lightning protection designs. The proposed 
methodology revises current aircraft design processes for creation of Lightning/HIRF 
protection designs. Supporting this design methodology revision is the integration 
with the newly adopted MSG-3 maintenance program development methodology. 
Adoption of the proposed aircraft design methodology as indicated by test through 
this body of work can result in more efficient Lightning/HIRF protection designs 
which require less scheduled maintenance. Cases where designs were assessed using 
the methodology provided design revision recommendations that were not known 
at the time the original design was created. This finding resulted in a better design 
and could also have improved the design when it was originally created. With the 
recommended changes made to the lightning protection designs coming from the 
use of the methodology, the resultant design would improve costly redesign later in 
the aircraft life while also eliminating the need for scheduled maintenance. Findings 
using the methodology include improved material compatibility for lightning 
protection components in long term applications. Since these material 
compatibilities are not evident when new, some designs may not find these 
compatibilities an issue at the beginning of the design process. The methodology 
takes care to identify design issues such as material incompatibility through careful 
and deliberate examinations of compatibility within the applied environments over 
long term utilization. In evaluating the nature of the methodology without 
consideration for the application to lightning protection, it was discovered that the 
methodology could be easily adapted to other disciplines. This has the potential to 
provide long term availability of certain specified performance criteria over the life 
of the aircraft in other design disciplines. In the case of lightning protection, this 
performance criterion is the continuous availability of an adequate low-resistance 
electrical bond path. 
 
As the methodology was tested through application of the design data, the 
methodology was revised to improve and mature the concept. Through the data 
applications in the analysis sheets and literature search of design data, revisions to 
the methodology were determined appropriate. As these decisions were made while 
conducting the case studies, revisions were made to the methodology in Chapter 3.  
The original methodology was created with the idea that design data would be 
transitioned to the MSG-3 analysis process to determine appropriate scheduled 
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maintenance.  This is pointed out in Figure 6-1 below where it is noted that the 
methodology completes at the delivery of design data to MSG-3 analysis.  
 
1. Establish Design Service
Life Goals
2. Identify Critical/Essential
lightning components
installations and
environmental threats
3. Establish critical
characteristics for each
component
4. Identify potential
degradation within installed
environments of key
characteristics
5. Provide input to test plan
and aging test criteria
7. Feedback test results to
engineering for potential
design revision or design
decision validation
8. Assess continued
airworthiness against goals
9. Perform design revision
study
10. Complete final
configuration
11. Pass design and test
details on to MSG-3
process
6. Collect test data
 
Figure 6-1-Original methodology proposed at beginning of the literature search 
 
The methodology as it is presented in this final thesis documentation of the body of 
work is the culmination of several improvements.  In the original methodology 
concept the MSG-3 analysis was stated as the final step in the methodology. Later 
versions shown in Figure 6-2 incorporated the concept of incorporating in-service 
and developmental flying performance data into the methodology in two locations. 
The first was to incorporate the in-service data into the design revision studies. The 
second input was to supply the same data into the MSG-3 maintenance program 
development process.   
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Figure 6-2 Revised methodology after validation and case studies completed 
 
Review of progress in developing the case studies pointed out the importance of the 
path to certification since many certification documents were reviewed that 
impacted the case studies. As a result of this learning opportunity, the initial portion 
of the case studies chapter captured more details on the interacting aircraft lightning 
protection design processes. A single graphic of the participating engineering 
organizations was developed and included in the case studies, which was used to 
explain the potential unique paths to certification that exist at the time of an aircraft 
development program. Further development of the case studies then generated 
multiple paths through certification in an iterative manner. Descriptions of the 
details associated with the different paths through design translated into different 
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inputs to the case studies which translated into a more robust methodology 
exercise. This exploration into the literature also provided details on some of the 
lightning protection designs features that would be included in the methodology 
exercise. This demonstrated the need for the engineering community that leads the 
exercising of this methodology to ensure that they are closely associated with the 
certification plans in order to identify the necessary design details to conduct the 
continued airworthiness design evaluation. 
 
Another area where knowledge was gained in this exercise that has an impact on the 
methodology design was the inclusion of the Design Assurance Levels into the 
equipment criticality discussion. It was discovered that “system” criticality 
determined through the FAR/JAR 25.1309 process is the starting point for 
determining lightning protection criticality. A derived criticality for lightning 
protection is determined by understanding both the system criticality and the 
individual component criticality as determined by the electromagnetic compatibility 
evaluation of lightning protection electrical wiring components. The literature search 
performed as part of the case studies allowed for the discovery of these two 
differently derived criticalities to converge under one determination for the purpose 
of the lightning protection evaluations. The methodology may require further 
development in this area to include involvement in the lightning protection 
component electromagnetic Design Assurance Level determinations. 
 
As the methodology was exercised through development of the case studies, system 
electrical ground paths were examined on several different lightning protection 
designs. As these electrical ground paths associated with wire looms and critical 
equipment were discovered, additional details were gathered from the design data 
sources where some of the sources were found to be certification documents. The 
confluence of the data gathering led to the understanding that these critical 
electrical ground paths require deeper examination during the early design phase of 
the aircraft development program and a more integrated view of the ground path 
determinations. This discovery also had an impact on the assessment forms. The first 
analysis sheet shown in Figure 6-3 design contained basic data and what was 
considered the most relevant information in one data sheet. 
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Figure 6-3 First version of assessment sheet 
 
During analysis, literature search and data gathering, it was noticed that the 
assessment sheets needed additional information to be more effective.  The revised 
assessment sheet in Figure 6-4 provided for a more effective assessment.  Graphic 
and schematic inputs were included to give them better usability and greater impact 
to the design operations. Inclusion of the lightning zone was determined necessary 
to connect the protection component more closely to the lightning threat as is done 
during the design of the protection components.  Incorporation of the electrical 
bond path provided better highlights of the significant design features.  The 
environmental threats were developed further to include a threat rating and 
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whether the protection was within a flammable zone on the aircraft.  A signature 
block was also added to provide the appropriate integration and authorization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Describe the component that contains the lightning protection, the physical makeup of the component and the installation detail that allows 
the lightning protection to operate properly.
Section 2.  Component Description
November 12 2009Date: 
Design for life of aircraft.  20 years / 60,000 Flight Hours.  No overhaul required.Design Service Life Goal:
Zone 1Lightning Zone
Name of component manufacturerManufacturer:
P/N XXXXPart Number:
Bill BoeingEngineer Name:
Serial Number of Component under assessment 
(STR=Structures, FUL=Fuel, SYS=Systems, ANT=Antenna)
Assessment Sheet Number
Section 1.  Lightning/HIRF Protection Component Data
Describe the function of the component that is protected by lightning.  Provide how the function of the component is protected from the 
effects of lightning and describe the details associated with the lightning protection scheme. 
Section 3.  Component Purpose and Operational Theory
Supply schematics, drawings, and illustrations of the parts that provide the electrical bond path and lightning protection.
Installation Details: 
Describe the installation including mating surface materials, repair requirement details, physical characteristics of the installation and a 
description of the electrical bond path including the parts associated with each interface within the bond path.  This should include the 
assembly requirements for each part that defines the bond path.
Bond Path Providing Protection:
1. Part A detailed assembly description
2. Part B detailed assembly description 
3. Part C detailed assembly description 
Section 4.  Component Schematic and Installation Details
Describe where the part is installed relative to the pressure vessel (inside, outside, protected or not protected from direct environmental 
threats).  Describe each environmental threat and the significance of the threat to the established component life goals.
Description of installed environment:
Describe specific threat gradients, extremes and sustained threats.  Provide a description of the long term exposures on the component.
Flammable Leakage Zone Description and Protection:
Describe whether location as flammable vapor or liquid threats and relation to the controlled lightning protection.
Ratings of environmental threats:
Section 5.  Installation Environmental Threats
HighN/AFlammable Leakage Zone (Yes/No)
HighN/AFuel (Exposure to fuel)
HighMediumVibration (low or high frequency vibration)
HighHighTemperature Exposure (swings in temperature, and extensive exposure to 
extreme high or low temperatures)
HighHighNatural Occurring Fluids (condensation, precipitation,  humidity, ice, 
rain, snow)
HighMediumChemicals and Applied Fluids (cleaning fluids, fire retardants, de-icing, 
wing anti-ice fluids, liquid cooling)
HighLowSystem Operating Fluids (oil, hydraulic fluid, Grease and Lubricants)
Installation resistance to 
degradation 
(High Medium, Low)
Rating of threat severity in this 
location 
(High, Medium, Low)
Threat Type
Location: Nose Radome Exterior
HighN/AFlammable Leakage Zone (Yes/No)
HighN/AFuel (Exposure to fuel)
HighMediumVibration (low or high frequency vibration)
HighHighTemperature Exposure (swings in temperature, and extensive exposure to 
extreme high or low temperatures)
HighHighNatural Occurring Fluids (condensation, precipitation,  humidity, ice, 
rain, snow)
HighMediumChemicals and Applied Fluids (cleaning fluids, fire retardants, de-icing, 
wing anti-ice fluids, liquid cooling)
HighLowSystem Operating Fluids (oil, hydraulic fluid, Grease and Lubricants)
Installation resistance to 
degradation 
(High Medium, Low)
Rating of threat severity in this 
location 
(High, Medium, Low)
Threat Type
Location: Nose Radome Exterior
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Figure 6-4 Revised assessment sheet consisting of Nine Sections 
 
The case studies exercise also identified that the assessment sheets can be improved 
from several vantage points listed in the following:  
a. Include performance goals in each component assessment and also include the 
historical performance for each component.  
b. Include any risks by correlating past performance to new applications on the new 
airplane development program within installed environments.  
c. Include comments on environment differences such as applications of lightning 
protection components in dry and hot environments that may be proposed to be 
deployed into moist environments. 
d. The correlation to the FAR 25.1309 systems safety analysis process could be 
created. This could also include the equipment Design Assurance Level 
conclusions for electromagnetic compatibility. 
e. Use of particular risk in determining the environmental threats assessments may 
also be considered. 
f. Include ground path determinations within the assessment sheets particularly on 
the schematics. (Electrical ground paths were not found in any of the literature 
searches as a deliverable for the design program.) 
 
More details associated with bond path elements and bond techniques were also 
updated in the methodology chapter of the thesis where the original assessment 
sheets were proposed. The general layout of the final proposed methodology and 
the initially proposed methodology were also affected by the case studies exercise 
with regard to electrical bond path descriptions. A return loop was added to the 
methodology to address data that may be available from the aircraft designs that are 
already in service. This information can further refine the outputs from the 
methodology if included in the assessment sheet for comparison to the newly 
proposed designs. 
 
As literature searches were conducted in the case studies on the design processes 
through investigations of test and certification documents, more detailed 
Describe the continued airworthiness of associated components within the lightning protection designed bond path and affects on the 
protection caused be prolonged exposure to the environment.  Identify potential failure modes due to degradation.
Section 6.  Assessment of Critical Characteristics in the Installed Environment
Describe any environmental deterioration concerns determined by the examination of the part design, the installation techniques, and the 
environmental threats.  Provide guidance for specific testing of conditions identified considering design goals.
Section 7.  Test Plan Input
Identify specific tests performed and relevance to the installed environmental threats. If tests are forgone due to similarity of past designs, 
identify testing for previously certified part and perform same examination. Describe the expected continued performance of the lightning 
protection in light of the testing results presented.
Section 8.  Test Data Results
Lightning strike diversion effectiveness:  Describe how the protection will continue to 
perform within it installed environment over the expected installation period.  Also 
describe how the component that is protected will perform in light of the tests that have 
been conducted.
Provide any known results of past component failures in service and associated reasons 
for the lighting protection failure.  Comment on whether the proposed design along with 
both known in-service performance and laboratory test results will meet the expected 
installed performance goals.
Report: (include significant findings and 
relevance to continued airworthiness)
Tom BillingTest Engineer Name:
Section 9.  Report from Test Engineer Regarding Continued Airworthiness
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examination was conducted of an aircraft program development process. One key 
finding was the use of similarity in the development of certification proposals. This 
technique is often applied to minimize design costs and accelerate the development 
program. When design similarity is used to claim that a design certification is 
completed by reference to a previous aircraft development program, it was 
discovered that past design techniques may be repeated without any more detailed 
examination of the continued airworthiness performance; such as that which is 
proposed in this body of work. Early designs were not as cognizant of the importance 
of electrical bond paths to electrical and avionics systems because there were simply 
less of these types of systems. As a result more detail was added to the case studies 
regarding design processes. The case studies examined design stages more deeply 
than the original methodology section anticipated was necessary. 
 
The methodology as exercised through the case studies highlighted the value and 
importance of an engineering design integrator. The methodology was revised to 
include a signature/approval process integrating different disciplines through 
assessment sheet approvals. Early development of the methodology had not 
identified this approval process as important to successful deployment of the 
methodology. Additional data and details sourced from several different disciplines 
raised awareness that the integration of design constraints is very important to 
successful design optimization. The case studies gathered data from initial 
certification documents which were singularly focused within the sourced discipline. 
During the preliminary design phase, an integration function is important to create 
and manage in order to assess each design from multiple discipline perspectives as 
the implementation is determined. After completion of the case studies, it was 
determined that not enough emphasis was put on this integration detail and revision 
to the methodology chapter was needed to include this finding. A process was 
included to pass design decisions back through a design revision studies which 
includes reviews from multiple design disciplines. The final methodology included in 
this thesis contains steps that were added to the initial prescribed design process to 
address the design review requirements. Completion of the case studies to 
demonstrate the new methodology, allowed for the design methodology to be 
improved. These improvements include more actively incorporating the engineers 
who are aware of design performance issues within the preliminary design phase.  
 
Additionally, an update to the methodology was created to pass the design, test, and 
service details on to the MSG-3 analysis process for a required maintenance 
evaluation. This process will assess the design robustness against the deterioration 
of the electrical bond path effectiveness. If designs are found to be less than robust 
for long term in-service application, the MSG-3 process will define appropriate 
maintenance. It is important to note that the design revision study included in the 
methodology feeds into the design optimization process and not directly into the 
MSG-3 analysis process. This is an improvement to past practices where non-
optimized designs were completed and sent to MSG-3 with subsequent maintenance 
declared necessary.  The design revision studies within the methodology are 
intended to evaluate the impact of any installed application to the long term 
performance established by the design goals and could potentially avoid 
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maintenance if the design is revised. The design issues that may be identified at that 
point are worked within the design process and not provided prematurely to the 
maintenance determination process.   
 
The methodology was proven to work when applied to an aircraft development 
program. The case studies provided improvements and understanding of the 
methodology. 
6.2 Challenges to the Arguments 
On a new airplane development program, one must appreciate the importance of 
decision making with regard to electrical bond paths. Often, electrical bond paths are 
determined by individuals responsible for a singular piece of equipment. This 
methodology challenges the present systematic design process for lightning 
protection electrical bonds. In future aircraft development programs, the importance 
of deploying such a methodology as proposed by this work only increases as the 
aircraft of the future become less metallic and equipment more highly integrated. 
   
The aircraft examined in these case studies do not contain highly integrated systems. 
For highly integrated aircraft, the importance of designing the continued 
airworthiness into the lightning protection expands to include many more systems 
that may share electrical bond paths. The analysis sheets are designed to address 
this more highly integrated design and assist with the cross-organizational support 
that is necessary to succeed at designing highly integrated systems 
6.2.1 How can this Methodology Success be Proven? 
The success of the methodology is proven by considering the outcomes. When real 
design data was applied to the methodology, improvements to the design process 
and specific installations were identified. The case studies applied actual “real world” 
design data for assessment. Results of the review identified potential improved 
design solutions for some components such as system connectors and lightning 
strike metallic strips mounted to non-metallic surfaces. 
 
Bond paths do not maintain the same resistance over the life of the aircraft. Testing 
has proven that application of salt spray does degrade electrical bonds that are not 
appropriately designed to defend against the resulting deterioration. Bond paths for 
electrical installations were described in detail. During a lightning strike event, 
lightning current travels along the structure of the aircraft. Wire installations will also 
carry current to the attached equipment. It was determined in the case studies that 
wire installations rely on bracket attachments to structure, equipment attachment 
to aircraft structure, installed shield wires to carry the additional current during the 
lightning strike event within the wire looms, and bonding jumpers that may attach 
between the brackets and structure or the equipment and structure. For each of 
these electrical interfaces, a specific impedance is required as part of the design to 
ensure that voltages generated by the lightning current are kept to acceptable levels. 
For an aircraft development program, the expected “standoff” voltage that any 
control equipment would experience at the junction from outside the equipment to 
the internal equipment control electronics is established by the design team. 
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Working with this requirement, designers for aircraft equipment establish 
appropriate electrical bonding schemes to ensure that the required voltages are 
within the specified levels. These designed impedances are measured at the time of 
aircraft production to ensure that they are within acceptable parameters 
determined by the design evaluation. The impedance however, will increase over 
time as the electrical bonds deteriorate. It is these deteriorated electrical bonds that 
require more attention at the time that the design is developed. Unfortunately, 
electrical bond degradation curves do not exist to assist in these design decisions. 
The relationship of corrosion that causes electrical bond degradation to the 
impedance of the electrical bond is difficult to produce.  This is an area that may be 
explored to enhance the application of the methodology.  Experts in the lightning 
protection discipline maintain that the prediction of the deterioration of an electrical 
bond is not possible since the exposures to the elements that cause the 
deterioration are variable. In design of aircraft structure, degradation such as fatigue 
and corrosion are modeled to assist in the design development process.  In the case 
of aircraft structural design, measures are taken to address the real problem of 
corrosion and fatigue. A similar measure must be taken for lightning protection by 
first identifying the real problem as attempted in this thesis and then creating 
techniques and tools to address lightning protection continued airworthiness.  The 
methodology proposes a way to address electrical bond deterioration through use of 
test information but may be served by further investigation into electrical bond 
degradation modeling. 
6.2.2 How Important is Data Gathering to the Success of the Methodology? 
Data gathering is critical successful application of the methodology. The case studies 
proved that data gathering is critical to the success of the methodology. Though the 
methodology was exercised by several case studies using an already designed 
aircraft, the availability of design data was challenging. To some degree, the exercise 
could be improved by proactive incorporation of the methodology into a design 
program so that decisions can be made before the design is settled. The data 
gathered in the case studies also proves that past decisions can be evaluated for 
effectiveness on new aircraft designs. It is a matter of intent and desire to create a 
better performing design that will drive the interest in use of this methodology. One 
advantage however in performing the case studies on an aircraft that is already 
designed in a retrospect is the identification of the documents that will be affected 
for a new aircraft design. Understanding what certification documents will provide 
with regard to the design details, was achieved through the case studies exercise. 
Integration 
Some of the required data details for the assessment sheets are contained deep 
within the drawings on several sheets and do not converge in a single location. The 
case studies demonstrated the importance of integration within the design and also 
the importance of a data delivery system that supports the operation of the 
methodology. The assessment sheets assisted the effort of integrating information 
and design details but cannot be the only factor that drives the need for the data. A 
proposal comes from these case studies that suggest a design document should be 
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created that collects the relevant to electrical bond path data which describes the 
designed path and its components in detail. 
Equipment Criticality Associated with Data Gathering  
The concept of equipment criticality was explored in the case studies in greater 
depth once the data was gathered. The difference between the criticality as 
determined by the FAR 25.1309 safety analysis and the safety determinations 
through the Design Assurance Level process associated with AC20-136 process were 
clarified. Findings were provided that demonstrated how a system considered non-
critical by the safety analysis performed under guidance from FAR 25.1309 could be 
elevated to a hazardous or catastrophic level failure when evaluated by the lightning 
in-direct effects process in AC20-136. This observation emphasized the need for 
understanding the electromagnetic perspective for lightning protection safety 
determination and also highlights that direct application of the systems safety 
analysis results may produce an incorrect classification of lightning protection 
components. This incorrect determination of the lightning protection significance 
could drive incorrect protection applications. Data gathered in the case studies 
resulted in additional attention to these criticality determinations. The application of 
new or significantly modified systems as categories used during certification was also 
explained along with its potential impact to the proposed methodology. 
Gathering Test Data 
Test data from qualification tests were utilized in this methodology. Service 
experience with the bonding methods and component designs were also leveraged 
to produce the desired outcome of improve designs. Findings associated with 
connectors that perform poorly in service over some period of time were interjected 
into the methodology at the appropriate point in the assessment sheet. These 
findings need to be corroborated with test data and design determination processes 
to ensure that the best performing designs can be deployed in the appropriate 
locations. For application of these and other potentially unknown inputs, the analysis 
work sheets need to remain flexible to account for potential expansion of the 
analysis process.  
Electrical Bonding Data 
Further development of the case studies through data gathering investigated the 
importance of electrical bonding on aircraft. Literature searches resulted in discovery 
of an electrical bonding design guide developed by the OEM that was in need of 
update to bring the bonding practices developed for the new aircraft design 
processes into the forefront. In a real development scenario, the methodology may 
rely more heavily on such a design guide to perform in-the-moment design decisions 
regarding the electrical bonds. Reference to this design guide was included in the 
case studies. The importance of an electrical earthing design guide was highlighted 
and inclusion of the design guide into applications of the methodology resulted. For 
early aircraft designs, it was thought that sealant may not be necessary, especially in 
applications where a bond jumper or earthing wire was attached to a piece of 
equipment that may require removal for maintenance or overhaul.  
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Use of Sealants for Installation of Electrical Bonds 
Through research of the data gathered in the case studies, it was discovered that 
sealant applications are an important part of lightning protection continued 
airworthiness. Sealants may be applied after the terminal joint is assembled. In the 
industry, this is referred to as a fillet seal. Fillet seals have been identified in service 
to increase the possibility of trapping moisture when used in sealing applications 
outside the pressure vessel. The phenomenon is brought on by an imperfect fillet 
seal application that may include a small unseen void in the sealant. In this case, the 
void would act like a siphon when the aircraft is cycled from standard ground 
atmosphere to a much greater altitude pressure. Data gathered for the case studies 
uncovered this issue. Understanding appropriate applications of sealants, 
appropriate types of sealants, and the relationship to the continued airworthiness of 
the installation was achieved through the case studies information surrounding this 
topic. As a result of this learning, the analysis sheets that drive the assessments for 
continued airworthiness were revised to include the sealant application and type.  In 
a similar manner, cleaning methods associated with preparation of electrical bonding 
installations were explored and included within the analysis. Specific electrical 
bonding information regarding the aircraft in the case studies was acquired through 
literature search and is included within the case studies. 
 
Data gathering that was accomplished during the case study exercises enhanced the 
methodology and enhanced the understanding of its application on an aircraft 
development program. 
6.2.3 Does the Validation Substantiate the Case Studies Findings? 
The validation was accomplished on a simple lightning protection design for nose 
cone lightning diverters. As part of the case studies, the nose cone lightning 
protection on the aircraft under study was also evaluated. This evaluation was more 
detailed than the validation exercise. Some additional details gathered for the case 
studies resulted in a better understanding of the methodology such as the 
information gathered on the certification of the nose cone. In investigating the nose 
cone certification, the topic of component criticality was raised and researched. 
Lightning protection is categorized by different certification processes resulting in a 
need for corroboration of the certification basis for lightning protection components.   
Determining the Significance of Criticality 
The classification of the lightning protection as “critical” was not mentioned in the 
validation. The inclusion of design goals stresses that every protection device or 
design must be determined to be critical or not critical in order to properly assess 
the design. Debates can take place on aircraft development programs regarding this 
criticality determination, however, the final declaration of criticality in the 
certification documentation must be included in the methodology assessment 
sheets. At a later point in the development of the case studies this criticality 
determination was included in the assessment sheet formally. 
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Indirect Lightning Effects 
In the case of the lightning diverters evaluated in the validation, the protection was 
provided for the direct effects of lightning. This validation was not able to address 
whether the indirect effects of lightning could also be evaluated using the proposed 
methodology. The case studies section of the thesis addressed this issue by including 
several case studies of both direct and indirect effects lightning protection. 
Validation of the need for an integrated design organization was also not possible 
with the validation. This may be due to the limited scope of the validation. 
Integration of design solutions is a key to success. The near seamless ability to share 
data among aircraft designers was identified in the case studies. The development of 
how this new concept is integrated into a design group is a good candidate for the 
continued development of the methodology and future work. 
Design Integration Function 
As the methodology was repeatable across multiple lightning protection design 
components in the case studies, it became apparent that an integration function was 
necessary to be made part of the methodology. The importance of an integration 
function was not discovered in the validation. The validation was adequate to test 
the use of assessment sheets but did not provide the depth needed to understand 
the importance of design specifications, design manuals, and the innovative use of 
these design guides. Certification was also not discussed in the Validation of the 
methodology. Research of certification processes in the case studies uncovered 
certain issues such as similarity of components certified on previous aircraft 
certification programs. The use of “similarity” to past designs in the certification 
process will reduce the amount of engineering activity required to complete a 
design. This reduction may result in fewer design assessments as the assumption of 
similarity is that the fit form and function are unaffected when similarity is used as a 
way to certification. The case studies found that even for components that are 
similar to past designs; it would be highly valuable to establish the assessment 
sheets since certification status for components is not a guarantee of long term 
component performance. 
Different Classes of Case Studies 
Input from the Cranfield University supervisor (Professor Fielding) requested 
additional test cases. Comments regarding scope, number of test cases, and which 
cases were appropriate to fully exercise the methodology, led to specific choices 
made to include the most diverse set of case studies. In one case, the lightning 
protection components on both composite and metallic materials were chosen to 
demonstrate the differences and guide the case studies toward a more successful 
exercise. Additional comments were provided from the PhD supervisor regarding the 
improvement of an existing design vs. a new design. This led to a section in the 
Chapter 5 of this thesis that describes more thoroughly, how to deal with 
revolutionary designs. From these discussions, the investigation was expanded to 
describe the certification processes, especially the use of design similarity in 
reducing certification testing requirements. The case studies introduced the concept 
of revolutionary designs and further development of the meaning of design stages 
(Conceptual Stage, Preliminary Stage, and Detailed Stage). This investigation 
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increased the amount of data included in the case studies generated by literature 
searches on the subject of design phases by researching further into the 
development process.  
 
The case studies included more details of specific lightning protection designs on the 
aircraft and descriptions of the protection components than was possible with the 
validation. As such, the case studies expanded the validation to test the 
methodology even further. At this earlier stage in the development of the case 
studies details regarding the aircraft environment, aircraft environmental threat 
data, and associated details of the wire installations criteria regarding vibration, 
temperature, and moisture-prone areas were added to the case studies. The 
validation did not perform such a detailed assessment as it was determined to be 
very impractical with such insufficient data. Further development in the case studies 
that were not included in the validation was in the area of lightning impacts on 
aircraft systems. Explanation of a lightning threat, faradays law, and the discussion 
surrounding the effects of lightning on aircraft transport elements such as hydraulic 
tubes were incorporated into the case studies. More examples of the different paths 
through the design process was provided with detailed explanations regarding the 
varied sources of information on an aircraft development program that lead to 
lightning protection continued airworthiness and maintenance requirements.  
Maintenance Requirements 
In earlier versions of the case studies, and within the validation, the inclusion of 
maintenance requirements was not considered germane to the methodology. At 
later stages of the case studies development, the incorporation of maintenance as 
an alternative to the redesign of a lightning protection component was included as 
part of the methodology and was also included in a revision to the design 
assessment sheets. In this stage of the case studies work it was also determined that 
instructions for lightning protection inspections performed on the aircraft after a 
lightning strike attachment would provide a good understanding of the things within 
the design that most aircraft manufacturers consider important. These things were 
listed in the unscheduled lightning strike inspection and were included in the thesis. 
Research into the aircraft maintenance manual and across several different aircraft 
support manuals provided information that was included in the case studies defining 
the general principles associated with aircraft lightning protection inspections. For 
lightning protection designers, this knowledge is a great enhancement to 
understanding continued airworthiness issues associated with the potential damage 
to the aircraft after a lightning strike.  
Incident and Accident Reports Impact Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
Also within development of the case studies, a few aircraft incident reports were 
included to form legitimacy to the potential outcome of poorly designed or poorly 
maintained lightning protection designs. This data is sourced from legitimate 
regulatory investigations. These investigations lead the reader to understand not 
only how lightning can affect the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft, but 
also provide information on the importance of maintaining lightning protection. In 
one case the evidence of missing or improperly installed bond jumpers (earthing 
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wires) was found to be very important information for understanding the 
significance of continued airworthiness. The design failure in this particular incident 
highlighted a key design specialty to assess continued airworthiness as postulated 
and if done properly; can have positive effects on the aircraft operation and impact 
the safety of passengers and flight crews. In the same case, both passengers and 
flight crew were harmed by a hard landing due to the reduced controllability of the 
aircraft after the lightning strike and subsequent collapse of the landing gear. In 
another case, lightning was suspected to have caused a complete electrical failure 
which resulted in the loss of all the lives of those on board the flight. Revision to the 
aircraft flight manual has been recommended requiring inspection of the aircraft 
after lightning strike where loss of electrical power results from the strike among 
other specific recommendations such as specific positioning of the cockpit torch. 
Component Similarity Strengths and Weaknesses 
Another lesson from the case studies work is that further investigation of component 
similarity as a way to define acceptable design is needed. In an aircraft development 
program, similarity can be useful to reduce development costs; however it was 
determined during the development of the case studies that some of the 
assumptions regarding the lightning protection performance were based on aircraft 
designs that were developed over forty years ago. This confirmed the idea that the 
methodology can examine assumptions without the requirement to actually design 
and test new alternatives that would replace the designs if using similarity as an 
argument for acceptable certification was not an option.  In one way of describing 
the advantage of this methodology, the use of the assessment sheets and the 
methodology can offer a simulation of the outcome without committing precious 
certification funds to determine the new design viability. Because of this issue raised 
by the research associated with the case studies work which was not evident in the 
validation, more research in aircraft design handbooks was conducted and also 
included in the Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
6.2.4 Are there any Industry Opinions on the Theory? 
Research conducted during development of the case studies identified a study by the 
National Institute of Aviation Research (NIAR) which determined that aircraft that 
are fully protected from lightning adverse effects had a significantly lower 
percentage of electrical failures. This discovery leads to the conclusion that the 
methodology demonstrated in these case studies would bring a significant value to 
the aircraft design process and reduce maintenance costs. Examination for 
continued airworthiness of lightning protection is critical since lightning protection is 
not an active system that is able to provide indication of protection degradation. 
Some more advanced systems installed on aircraft are incorporating a messaging 
system that would indicate a lightning strike has occurred on certain structural 
components. This is accomplished through application of a “smart” layer of material 
on the outer exterior of a particular piece of structure. When lightning strikes, the 
layer is damaged and small circuits within the layer send a signal to the aircraft 
avionics system that a strike has occurred. These type of systems may be 
incorporated more extensively in future designs as the value of the indications are 
analyzed and understood. Similar exploration is taking place with the advent of 
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Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) systems and devices.  Inclusion of 
active lightning protection device systems may be a future IVHM development. 
 
In a paper presented to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) [6.1], Jean-Patrick 
Moreau from Dassault Aviation states that the intent of the L/HIRF protection 
maintenance tasks is to reduce the possibility that a single failure cause (such as a 
lightning strike), and the occurrence of a common failure cause (such as ED or AD) 
across redundant channels of L/HIRF protection, could impact aircraft airworthiness. 
In order to determine appropriate maintenance, Moreau suggests that a system be 
developed to grade aircraft characteristics such as:  
• Inspectability of protection 
• Susceptibility to accidental damage 
• Environmental assessment 
• Criticality of the lightning protection 
 
This validates that in order to assure continued airworthiness, an evaluation similar 
to that defined by Moreau is required. The main departure in the hypothesis within 
this thesis is that this type of evaluation can be performed as part of the design 
development to leverage even greater benefit to the design before the design is 
fixed and unable to change without great impact to the development program. 
 
In a paper written by C.C. Goodloe at the Marshal Space Flight Center in Alabama 
USA, guidelines for protecting aerospace vehicles from lightning strike related 
incidents were considered [6.2]. In this paper Goodloe describes the basic steps in 
designing to withstand lightning as: 
• Determine lightning critical Systems 
• Determine lightning strike zones 
• Define the direct effects protection 
• Define the Indirect effects protection 
• Lightning protection measures 
• Successful lightning protection design and certification 
• Electromagnetic effects control plan 
• Pass-fail Criterion 
 
Goodloe contends that these steps provide a methodology that is proven to work on 
prior aerospace vehicle projects. The method is valuable for design engineers to 
follow but omits the additional step to ensure that the designs chosen are able to 
withstand the installation threats that lead to protection degradation. Goodloe 
recognizes that early participation in the design process is relevant, similar to the 
conclusions of the methodology in this body of work. Goodloe however, declares 
that following the methodology he has outlined in this technical paper for the US 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will produce an adequate 
lightning protection design. This may be true in a limited sense in that it may 
produce an adequate design at the beginning of the aircraft life, but he does not 
address the continued airworthiness of the lightning protection designs. 
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Keith Armstrong from Annex A Aerospace has developed a methodology for 
electromagnetic hazard protection design and clearance [6.3]. The framework 
described in this Annex paper to the IEE organization electromagnetic compatibility 
guidance document describes modeling of the lightning threat, reference to design 
guides for installation performance in electromagnetic environment, development of 
the equipment, qualification testing and finally on to clearance. Though this model 
has some resemblance to the methodology presented in this work, Armstrong does 
not address the continued airworthiness of lightning protection designs. This 
demonstrates that the subject of continued airworthiness included as a design 
criteria for creation of a robust aircraft vehicle design, is overlooked by most experts 
in the field of electromagnetic aircraft protection design. 
 
In summary, challenges to the arguments presented in the thesis and evidence that 
the methodology addressed the challenges are as follows: 
• The methodology success was proven by positive design revision outcomes 
provided by the assessment sheets and validated by aircraft service data 
• Data gathering, integration, and corroboration including test data and 
certification criticality data is key to the success of the methodology 
• Establishment of lightning protection criticality is necessary and may require 
determinations that cut across present aircraft systems safety assessment 
processes requiring integration of the protection assurance way forward 
• The validation provided an indication that the methodology was reasonable 
while the case studies further developed the methodology and realized benefit 
to the designs 
• Industry opinions on the theory do not consider the continued airworthiness as 
part of an integrated design process demonstrating a need for the proposed 
methodology 
6.2.5 Why Haven’t Aerospace Manufacturers Done This Already? 
Cost to recertify already certified systems and legacy certification practices are two 
reasons why this methodology has not been implemented to any great degree by 
manufacturers. It was discovered only recently with the emergence of highly 
integrated and electrically driven aircraft systems that the lightning certification 
process has a large impact on the lightning protection design development. Further 
research about the certification process and its impact on the methodology was 
included in Chapter 5. In cases where components were certified on past designs and 
previous aircraft development programs, additional design assessment may not be 
deemed necessary by the engineering leaders. Since no further evaluation is 
conducted on these previously certified designs, this could lead to sub-optimal 
designs and the perpetuation of design features that could be improved for 
continued airworthiness if the methodology proposed with these case studies is 
used. The case studies work also led to understanding that the methodology could 
be used for both new and reconfigured or derivative aircraft. Designs that are 
adopted from past certification programs may be acceptable for certification i.e. low 
risk, but may not be examined for potential optimization unless a technique is used 
leveraging the advantages of the methodology proposed in this research. 
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From the case studies development, it was concluded through review of all the 
certification and design documents that maintenance is not the focus of lightning 
protection development. In fact, research of the design documentation showed that 
maintenance is simply a secondary process that is performed after the design is 
complete. After conducting the case studies on several lightning protection designs it 
was determined that both the design and maintenance can be optimized with the 
use of the design assessment methodology. Changes to designs may be 
recommended and subsequently evaluated for practicality by use of a feedback 
methodology added to the early version of the methodology. 
 
Another reason that manufacturers have not included this approach in their design 
processes is simply because they did not think of it!  This methodology is truly an 
innovation brought to the aircraft design process and is Patent Pending with the US 
Patent Office.  
 
This type of collaboration between maintenance and design disciplines has not been 
previously part of design decision making such as proposed by this methodology. 
Later in the development of the case studies the concept of maintenance program 
development was introduced as part of the design development. This is not a normal 
industry standard approach as the maintenance program is generally determined 
after the designs have been completed. This early incorporation of the maintenance 
program requirements incorporates more advantage to the design methodology as it 
can further optimize the design not just for the continued airworthiness but also for 
the mitigation of maintenance costs later in the life of the aircraft. 
 
The important points made in these lessons from the case studies are as follows: 
• The methodology evolved in a favorable way during the 5 year study to include 
feedback loops from engineering departments and outside data sources such as 
test data from airlines, qualification testing or developmental testing 
• Literature searches contributed to the revision of the methodology and 
identification of advantages the methodology can bring towards advancing 
regulations from initial article to end of life performance. 
• Engineering design integration teams were identified as essential to enable the 
methodology potential and maximize its effectiveness 
• The MSG-3 analysis process will benefit in reducing maintenance from the 
receipt of more mature long-term design solutions due to this methodology 
• With application of actual design data as provided in this body of work, design 
improvements were identified that were not included in the original design 
drawing the conclusion from real data that the methodology can work if applied 
to an actual aircraft development program 
• The application using multiple case studies for direct and indirect lightning 
protection, proved that effective data gathering is essential to the success of the 
methodology 
• The validation of the methodology provided an early indication that the 
methodology had potential value  
• Component similarity to past certification programs may not investigate 
continued airworthiness to the degree proposed by this methodology 
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• Legacy certification practices do not include a methodology such as the one 
proposed by this body of work 
• Industry opinion as drawn from literature searches does not place emphasis on 
continued airworthiness within the lightning protection design process 
suggesting that this proposed methodology is innovative 
• Highly integrated aircraft systems need more sophisticated means to address 
lightning protection continued airworthiness such as that proposed by the 
methodology 
• Maintenance is not the focus of lightning protection design nor has 
collaboration between maintenance engineers and lightning protection design 
engineers been identified in the literature searches as a standard design 
approach 
Chapter 7 Discussions 
7.1 Introduction 
The focus of this research was in the development of a design methodology for 
aircraft lightning protection continued airworthiness. The methodology provided a 
solution to a need in the aircraft design process for incorporation of a continued 
airworthiness constraint. The objective of this work was to solve the design problem 
to ensure continued airworthiness of lightning components after design and aircraft 
type certification is complete and the aircraft is put into service. All objectives 
defined in the thesis objectives were met. In the early efforts to conduct the case 
studies, the objective to use data from several OEMs was not met due to 
complications with the proprietary nature of the information and the resources 
needed by the OEM. In the most current approach, the author sought out OEM data 
from one manufacturer and created a contract to successfully conduct the analysis. 
Providing for the continued airworthiness of lightning components is particularly 
important since most of these components operate passively and fail in a latent 
manner. Evidence that lightning protection components can fail fairly soon after the 
certification of a new aircraft type have been identified in this research.   
 
Different areas of investigation were conducted. Case studies were performed to 
investigate the potential application of the methodology in the following areas: 
1. Design methodology for continued airworthiness of lightning protection 
components 
2. Direct effects structural lightning protection  
a. Nose Radome Diverter  
b. Antenna Cap Diverter 
c. Rudder Tip Diverter 
3. Indirect effects lightning protection  
a. Auxiliary Power Unit control equipment, wiring and connectors 
 
This chapter discusses the objectives of the research and methodology, how they 
were met, what gaps in current design methodology are filled with this proposal and 
how the methodology is deployed within an aircraft design theater. Details on how 
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this research advances the design of an aircraft will be collected in this chapter. 
Reflection on advances in aircraft design methods will be provided in light of this 
work as well as potential limitations and advantages given application of the 
methodology within an aircraft design program. 
7.2 The Design Methodology Application and Limitation 
The design methodology developed in these studies center on the concept of 
utilizing known elements of lightning protection component performance in the 
development of new designs. This fundamental thought is simple in principle, but 
also has been found through research contained in this body of work may not to be 
practiced in fact. From the research, the practices identified for development of 
lightning protection components rely heavily on the use of past practices and 
previously certified designs. The reason that this current practice has been found to 
be sub-optimal is that the continued airworthiness of past designs is not considered 
a design constraint in the initial design of a lightning protection component. Rather, 
current practices consider lightning protection components to be either adequate 
for the life of the aircraft or adequate until failure requires a repair or replacement 
of the component. The principle that a lightning protection component can fail in-
service and will subsequently be repaired or replaced thus reinstalling the previous 
certified level of availability is acceptable if one can rely on the component failure to 
be evident to the operating crew. Since most lightning protection components are 
passive, this design principle needs further development such as that presented in 
these studies. This body of work challenges the practice of developing lightning 
protection designs without continued airworthiness in mind by using an example of a 
previously certified aircraft.  
 
The methodology proposed in this thesis can be adapted in other design disciplines 
as well, though that possibility has not been part of this investigation.  
 
The results of several of the case studies in this thesis lead to improvements in the 
resultant designs which demonstrate the value that is gained through the 
implementation of this methodology.  
 
Finally, a comment on the implementation of the methodology is necessary. The 
methodology uses an interactive and iterative technique where several disciplines 
within a design community interface in a way that is not currently required. For 
instance, test engineers would normally test a component, revise inputs to the test 
and provide the design community a set of data (results) that can be used to prove 
that the component can be successfully deployed into the aircraft design. This data is 
sometimes used to qualify a component or in other cases may be used to perfect a 
design. The test report is referenced in a certification plan as a way to prove the 
design is worthy of the required duty. Once the certification plan is accepted, the 
aircraft design can be fixed and an aircraft can be built using this design, which then 
meets the intent of the design objectives and regulations listed in the certification 
plan. The uniqueness of this methodology is the inclusion of continued airworthiness 
design criteria equally with other design criteria early in the design development. 
The alternative to this methodology deployed in most aircraft designs today is the 
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development of instructions for continued airworthiness after that aircraft designs 
are finalized.  
 
The objective of the research to find a way to improve lightning protection design 
practices leading to better continued airworthiness performance was reached 
through the development of a new design methodology. Engineers that use this 
methodology will learn through implementation of the methodology that past 
practices are not necessarily the primary tool for selecting design solutions. 
Additionally, the engineers will learn that continued airworthiness is a design 
constraint that should be integrated into the front end of the design process rather 
than being left to chance after the aircraft receives type certification. This was 
learned after completion of the case studies where new and better long-term 
performing alternatives were determined to be applicable, through the completion 
of the design assessments. 
 
Though this design methodology has not been applied in practice, similar analyses 
have taken place within the maintenance program development MSG-3 analysis.  
The problem with relying on MSG-3 analysis to assess the design continued 
airworthiness is the late point in which MSG-3 analysis is conducted in an aircraft 
development program and lack of integration of MSG-3 analysis with the design 
methodology. Since MSG-3 analysis is performed on completed designs, issues that 
may be identified by MSG-3 analysis are difficulty to resolve at this late point in the 
program.  In this case, either scheduled maintenance is recommended or costly 
design changes are recommended that could impact the certification plan.  It is 
recommended that this methodology be applied on aircraft design programs in order 
to avoid the identification of design issues after the design program is completed 
and submitted for certification.   
 
In order to make the methodology operate effectively in practice, the research 
determined that design engineers should consider the importance of a robust data 
gathering method. This methodology relies on test data, performance data, and 
experience with certain lightning protection component design implementations, as 
well as familiarity with the operating environments. To create the most effective 
design practices within the aircraft design community, performance data must be 
shared, discussed, evaluated and final design dispositions created.  
 
The limitation in the thesis was the use of design data from an aircraft design 
program that had concluded over ten years ago. The way this limitation was 
addressed was by research into the certification documents used at the time of the 
original design completions. Since the original certification documents could be 
accessed, the decisions and reasoning for certain design implementations could be 
included in the methodology. This approach simulated a new aircraft development 
program, looking at past design decisions and evaluating the potential 
recommended options going forward even in spite of the final design implemented 
at the time. These alternatives were developed by use of a Lightning Protection 
Design Assessment Sheet developed by the author to simulate a design community 
activity necessary to demonstrate potential outcomes of the case studies. As 
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anticipated, some of the case studies recommended different design solutions than 
what was selected at the time of the original design development. This idea to use 
cross-discipline assessments will require process changes for data collection, 
distribution, and application. 
 
Another limitation is in how one would deal with the use of “hind-sight” as a way to 
prove that a better solution could be obtained using this methodology if the 
methodology were deployed at the time of the aircraft development. One argument 
to this limitation, may be that translational thinking is the real genius in the 
methodology. Using what is known about certain design performance such as how a 
particular material conductivity degrades given certain environmental operational 
threats, is one way to overcome unknown performance details of a particular 
lightning protection component. In this case, measurements could be gathered from 
mechanical systems that do not require continued electrical conductivity in the 
makeup of the installation and applied to the lightning protection component 
designs as a way to assess the continued airworthiness without having specific data 
for that particular component in hand.  If this approach is used, the question about 
whether the case studies provided the required test of the methodology can be 
answered positively. 
7.3 Discussion on Methodology Process, Utilization, Implementation and Validity 
The case studies identified the association of electrical bonding and grounding 
(earthing) knowledge to the lightning protection continued airworthiness. The 
validation exercise gave an indication that further development of the thesis had the 
potential for discovery. Electrical bonds that are important to securing proper 
lightning protection were examined. This examination was accomplished by 
application of the methodology to direct lightning protection components and 
indirect lightning protection components. This was done to test the adaptability of 
the methodology. In evaluation of the results, the methodology is very adaptable to 
both direct and indirect lightning protection. This is proven in the case studies be 
definition of the component characteristics to express the different component 
features that may be relevant to continued airworthiness. In many cases the 
characteristics under review were the physical elements of the protection 
component that allow for safe passage of the lightning current. These characteristics 
became the focus of the methodology more than the actual protection components 
themselves. Remember that all the protection components in these studies were 
passive protection devices that do not make failure of the lightning protection 
evident. Further work can be done, and should be done, in the area of developing 
active lightning protection systems. This may affect the work in this thesis but will in 
all likelihood not affect it negatively; rather this kind of exploration is highly likely to 
compliment this work and lead to additional new knowledge. In the different case 
studies it was determined that protection of the lightning protection characteristics 
is most important that the protection of the lightning protection components 
themselves. Since it is the characteristic of transferring electrical energy that is most 
important, then it followed that the evaluation within this methodology should be 
directed at those environmental conditions that effect on the characteristics long 
term robustness and availability. 
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7.3.1Data Distribution and Assessment Sheets 
After the assessment sheets were developed, they were tested by the validation 
exercise. The validation exercise was not able to test the need for robust controls 
over the distribution and utilization of the assessment sheets due to its simple 
singular nature. Information gathering needed for development the case studies 
were tedious and demonstrated that an integrated process for including the 
lightning protection design continued airworthiness requirements would be 
recommended. Use of these integrated assessment sheets would be appropriate 
during the development phase of an aircraft design program. Also, it was noted that 
implementing the methodology in real time as an aircraft is designed would remove 
some of the tedious “discovery” of data since the design team would arrange for the 
transfer of the required information; more directly that the anthropological exercise 
used in the test cases. Use of assessment sheets was appropriate to demonstrate the 
methodology within the case studies; however, a database would be much more 
useful and effective in dealing with large amounts of data distributed over many 
specialist engineering groups and suppliers. The association of the design threats 
contained in the case studies and specific lightning protection components 
information regarding the installation techniques, yielded conclusions within the 
assessment sheets that provide further design engineering guidance. Combining this 
assessment with service experience can be even more impactful to improving the 
design. This result taken from the outcome of the design assessment sheets 
evaluations was evidence of the value of the methodology. 
 
Implementation of this methodology can be accomplished by use of the assessment 
sheets design to implement this methodology and an integrated design team. 
Challenges to the implementation may exist in the engineering team organization 
and the existence of departmentalized skill sets. Since the electromagnetic design 
and electrical bonding and grounding skills are departmentalized, the assessment 
sheets provided evidence that cross examination between these two skill sets would 
benefit the final design outcome. The aircraft design process is iterative in nature. 
The use of the assessment sheets in the case studies definitively demonstrated that 
feedback from design assessments is a superior approach especially when a lightning 
protection component is found to be inadequate for the life of the aircraft. An 
example of this was included in the case where a connector design was found to be 
inadequate for the application outside the pressure vessel and a change was 
recommended to the connector type to be selected for this design application. 
7.3.2 Detailed Discoveries 
The case study exercises provided a few discoveries that should be considered 
valuable if the methodology were adopted on a new aircraft development program.  
1. Continued airworthiness after the design is fixed. The first discovery was that 
the attempt to drive continued airworthiness requirements backwards into the 
original design of the aircraft components through the maintenance 
development process is not effective. Use of the methodology would drive out 
less maintenance through optimization of the designs to consider continued 
airworthiness at the beginning of the protection component design process. In 
fact, the maintenance program development program cannot synchronize 
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effectively with the design development phases since adequate design details are 
not available early in the program; nor is the MSG-3 process equipped to 
evaluate and drive ‘backwards’ requirements for design revisions as is proposed 
in this design methodology. Maintenance program development using the MSG-
3 methodology occurs after the designs are fixed which is too late in the aircraft 
development program to manage effective implementation of continued 
airworthiness requirements. MSG-3 is not an appropriate tool to determine 
optimized designs. 
2. Early adoption of long term solutions is required. The second significant 
discovery was that lightning protection characteristics need to be determined 
early in the design phase and need to be considered for long term viability given 
a defined installed environment. Thus, given the application of this proposed 
design methodology, lightning protection component critical characteristics can 
be determined earlier in the design process. From observations in the data 
collected for the case studies, there does not seem to be enough attention given 
to the determination of materials and finishes for long term electrical conduction 
early in the development processes. As an example, the proposed methodology 
has the establishment of critical characteristics for each component at the 
beginning of the detailed design stage. Step three within the methodology is 
where the critical characteristics such as the lightning shield material and finish 
are determined. This is proposed in the thesis to be the same as it is today, 
however further consideration should be provided to the possibility that the 
critical characteristics in step three be moved to step two at the preliminary 
design stage where identification of critical and essential lightning protection 
components in the installed environments are provided by the design team. This 
may provide benefit to the methodology further by providing visibility of the 
importance of the materials and finishes conductive property robustness earlier 
in the program. An example of this may be use of a tin plated copper shield on a 
wire loom outside the pressure vessel. The resistance of the indirect protection 
provided by tin plated shields is well established in the industry; however, there 
have been findings of degraded tin shields outside the pressure vessel due to the 
inability of these shields to resist corrosion. If a tin plated copper shield is chosen 
at the beginning of detailed design as proposed in the new methodology, it may 
be too late to revise the shield without major impact to the connector back shell 
in which the shield interfaces to provide protection to the loom. Changes in 
wiring designs at the detailed design phase of a program can have negative 
impacts on the suppliers and component manufactures. A significant finding of 
the case studies is that certification and past design development practices do 
not support an outcome of optimized lightning protection designs. 
3. Using similarity to past designs as a certification strategy forgoes opportunities 
to improve continued airworthiness designs. The next discovery was the 
application of certification practices that are currently in place leads to the 
adoption of past designs without necessarily evaluating the designs against in-
service performance data or even against potentially new testing techniques and 
standards.  
4. Current test practices do not consider detailed continued airworthiness design 
criteria. After review of the EMC test reports generated at the time of the 
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aircraft design program, it was noted that the continued airworthiness of the 
EMC protection under test was not included as a category within the report. 
Avoiding testing parts or components that are already installed on other certified 
aircraft may be done to avoid new testing costs. The lightning protection 
certification strategy impacts how a component is assessed for use on new 
aircraft applications. The use of ‘similarity’ to past designs may be a cost saving 
proposal but will not require any additional testing that may have a great impact 
on the understanding of the component continued airworthiness capabilities.  
5. The methodology is flexible and can apply to new designs or already completed 
designs. The methodology proposed in this thesis can be adopted whether new 
certification procedures are used or even if the components are certified by 
similarity to past applications. Past processes evaluated lightning threats in 
aircraft lightning zones and determined the appropriate designs that will protect 
the aircraft.  
6. Through case studies it was determined that design changes can be made to 
improve the design using this methodology. After performing the case studies, it 
was discovered that the selection of lightning protection schemes may be altered 
if consideration for FAA FAR 25.1529 (Instructions for Continued Airworthiness) 
is included in the protection design selection criteria. Consideration of this 
regulatory requirement leveraged by the methodology developed within this 
body of work will impact lightning protection designs in a way that was not 
performed on past aircraft design programs. Requirements for sealants, 
composite structure assembly, electrically conductive bond paths, and the 
protection of these components has been proven by these case studies to 
generate differences in the design outcome than those produced using past 
methodologies. 
7.3.3 Inadequacy of Failure Hazard Assessments 
During the case studies exercise, the relevance of the failure assessment process 
became of interest since lightning protection failure can affect aircraft safety levels. 
Investigation into the lightning protection component relationship to the failure 
modes and effects analysis revealed that the lightning event may be used as a top 
level event however, lightning protection component failures are not included in 
that analysis. This resulted in further research into the techniques used to assess 
lightning protection component safety and a large amount of material was gathered 
in the case studies from the findings. The case studies demonstrated that the use of 
a failure hazard assessment is not enough to address the lightning protection design 
robustness over the life of the aircraft. The concept of design assurance levels was 
introduced within the case studies that assisted with the necessary categorizing of 
lightning protection systems. However lightning protection components seem to be 
in the shadows of other higher order systems analysis and not a focus for the aircraft 
level safety analysis. An entire section of the case studies was dedicated to the 
concept of safety and the different processes associate with design assurance for 
lightning protection. The use of this methodology brings focus to the lightning 
protection component certification resulting in further evolution of the certification 
process for lightning protection components. This may be an area of future work.  
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7.4 Way Forward and Future Work Required 
The future work that is most relevant to contributing to this body of work is 
advancing the understanding of electrical bonding capabilities at the end of life of an 
installation on an aircraft. This modeling has not been made available to the 
industry. There are certainly issues with such modeling as the effects of aging on 
lightning protection components may not be linear nor may not be simple. Electrical 
bond degradation modeling is an area of study that would propel the acquisition of 
knowledge in this area of aircraft design to new levels. In addition to gaining 
understanding of this aging effect, further work can be done to incorporate the 
known SAE design criteria directly into the assessment sheets by reference. This area 
of development raises another area of development to include requirements for 
continued airworthiness into the SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP). 
Since SAE ARP guidelines are used for component and aircraft lightning protection 
design, it is prudent to work towards updates on these ARP documents to include 
more guidance for continued airworthiness. With the advances of aircraft systems 
architectures, another are to include in future work is the protection of components 
from EMC and EMI especially with regard to wireless control of aircraft systems. 
Although there are quite extensive design requirements for addressing negative 
effects of EMC and EMI, there is little to no work being done on the continued 
airworthiness of EMI and EMC protection. 
 
Further development of the assessment method can also be an area for future work.  
1. One improvement to the assessment process may be incorporation of a 
materials chart in the assessment sheets. This will bring attention to the 
significance of material compatibility to the designers supplying the data.  
2. Another future work idea is creation of a risk index to ensure that certain 
lightning protection designs get the proper attention for continued 
airworthiness. With the large integration of systems on future high-technology 
aircraft, the sheer amount of systems data may make this methodology difficult 
to move quickly. A risk index may be a good solution to ensuring that the most 
important lightning protection schemes are evaluated with the right priority.  
3. Along these same lines, a concept for determining zonal safety and threats to 
safety may be pursued. The development of zonal safety analysis for systems in 
particular zones will help sharpen the analysis when certain zones that contain 
particular lightning protection are evaluated. Some zones may not have high 
system safety ratings since the failure or degradation of systems within that 
zone does not impact catastrophic safety events.  
4. Another addition to the assessment is the evaluation of component location. If a 
component is determined to be low in robustness when installed within a 
specified environment, the methodology may be revised to include a 
component relocation proposal.  
5. Included in this future development might be ratings for environmental threats. 
After evaluation of the process used to create the criticality matrix produced by 
the FAR 25.1309 (System safety assessment process) one may create a parallel 
method that can be used for the threats evaluation. In consideration for future 
work, the revision of the methodology to directly tie the environmental threats 
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design criteria and the approved parts list process into the methodology and 
assessment sheets requires serious consideration. 
6. Similar to rating criticality of zones, another area for future development is 
potential consideration of the FMECA failure mode effects and criticality 
determinations to be directly integrated into the analysis sheets. Ranking in 
terms of more critical designs to less critical designs may provide efficient 
application of the methodology. Using a System Safety Assessment (SSA) 
output, a matrix of severity and probability (Catastrophic, Major, Minor FAR 
25.1309) may also be incorporated into the assessment sheets. These design 
outputs will assist the lightning protection design engineers in applying 
appropriate focus to the tests required of lightning protection components and 
ensure that the more critical systems are prioritized within the methodology 
appropriately. Safety assessments can be conducted after 25.1309 failure 
hazard assessments are complete and then additional assessment from the 
Design Assurance Level (DAL) found in the EMC design process to identify the 
lightning protection component significance within the assessment.  
7. Lightning zones may also be better integrated into this proposed design 
methodology. Lightning zones on the aircraft identify the severity of the current 
and probability of the strike to attach in that zone. The assessment model for 
lightning protection components may benefit from including of the zone in the 
assessment sheets. These sheets were revised during the case studies exercises 
to accommodate this feature but may need further development to combine 
lightning zone severity with environmental threat severity in order to derive a 
proper zone rating.  
8. In general, further work on the format and content of the assessment sheets is 
needed. Included in this work should be consideration for a database to manage 
the assessments. As part of the assessment sheet enhancements, the 
requirement to test the component resistance at time of installation may be 
helpful to add to the assessment sheet. These bonds are important to be 
installed properly but current systematic approaches do not include the 
examination of the installation process or design to ensure continued 
airworthiness of the installation is maintained. 
7.4.1Methodology Improvements 
As this methodology relies on data to make it work properly, there are many data-
related improvements that can be developed in future work. Expansion of the Step 9 
“Perform Design Revision Study” of the methodology in Figure 3-2 can make the 
revolutionary designs even more advanced before an aircraft design project begins. 
Figure 7.1 describes the inclusion of revolutionary designs within the methodology. 
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Figure 7-1 Revolutionary design evaluation modification to methodology 
 
Certification tests are not generally performed to test which design will work or test 
alternatives for design implementations. This is simply too expensive. For Step 9 
“Perform Design Revision Study” in the methodology, the chief engineer needs to 
consider an organizational structure that can utilize exploratory testing as a way to 
determine design solutions. Usually, this type of testing is called engineering tests or 
developmental testing and is not used as a qualification test. For these exploratory 
test scenarios, the organization may be required to assemble exploratory test 
“development” even before the preliminary design stage of the project. This kind of 
ingenuity integration is needed to avoid design delays, progress interruptions and 
retests for designs that were imagined but not produced. It is perhaps not a 
revolutionary idea and costs are usually the reason that many tests are not 
conducted, but with the advent of a test data repository and incorporation of the 
reusable data concept, better design data can be made available to many aircraft 
design programs. These data are simply under leveraged in the current format. Focus 
on the benefits of such a system is likely to produce a new plateau of knowledge 
from which further designs can leverage more advanced implementations. 
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7.4.2 Improvement in Methodology from Literature Search and Case Studies 
Improvement of Step 8 “Assess Continued Airworthiness Against Goals”, in the 
methodology shown in Figure 7.2 could be provided by inputs from a continued 
airworthiness advisory board. Creation of a board would require further 
development as to the authority of the boards and charter.  
 
 
Figure 7-2 Inputs to methodology from Continued Airworthiness Advisory Board 
 
On this board specific expertise should be represented such as:  
• Maintenance engineering 
• Reliability engineering 
• Production test engineering 
• Electromagnetic engineering 
• Certification engineering 
• Developmental test engineering 
• Wire design engineering 
• Electrical bonding and Grounding (Earthing) engineering 
• Material processes and technology engineering   
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A description of the board responsibilities and functions of each board member 
mentioned in this list would also be required. 
7.4.3 Corrosion Impacts to Continued Airworthiness 
Corrosion was determined to be a significant factor in the continued airworthiness of 
many lightning protection components. A method for determining corrosion severity 
and the relationship between corrosion in a conductive joint and its relation to the 
conductivity is an area of required future work. For this, work is required to establish 
the most common materials in the conductive interface such as aluminum interfaced 
with titanium and then applying a controlled amount of salt spray to the joint while 
recording resistance of the joint as the corrosion increases. Tables can be generated 
with this information and a family of exposure levels can also be determined as a 
variable and recorded for each scenario. These tables should be tested with multiple 
test cases of the same material and moisture exposures to evaluate reproducibility 
of the results. Once tables of this nature are established, the information can be 
used in determining the expected outcome of certain electrically conductive 
interfaces within specific environments. These tables can also represent the impact 
to long term conductivity for different sealant methods and sealant types. With this 
additional development, it would be helpful to determine if patterns of degradation 
due to corrosion can be identified and a whether a predictive methodology can be 
developed for corrosion effects on electrical bonding characteristics. 
 
Step 12 in the methodology “In service and developmental flying performance data” 
shown in Figure 7.3 calls for a report from the test engineer on the continued 
airworthiness expectations for the tested components. This is a very difficult task as 
test engineers may not be privy to the actual performance of similar parts already in 
service on other aircraft. A means for assessing the design is required in Step 10 
“Establish Final Optimized Design”, also shown in Figure 7.3 of the proposed 
methodology. This is an area of future work required to ensure that appropriate 
balance is achieved in making the decisions regarding the significance of a particular 
test result. A gathering of data associated with continued airworthiness of lightning 
protection collaborated with the test engineer’s conclusions would be helpful in 
supporting this expansion. For many aircraft development programs reliability data is 
used to determine where certain systems should concentrate efforts for 
improvements. In the case of lightning protection, reliability data is most likely not 
collected through this reliability system. Since lightning protection is mostly passive, 
indications of lightning protection failures are difficult to isolate. Operational impacts 
to airlines related to lightning strikes that cause dispatch delays is an area of 
development that will assist in creating a more effective design revision studies.  
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Figure 7-3 Other future expansions to the methodology 
Design Guides 
After completion of the case studies, it was determined that incorporation for some 
of the highlighted design considerations would be helpful additions to the OEM 
design guides. Further improvement to the methodology can be explored in 
development of improved design approaches that may be included in these guides. 
Part of the assessment performed within the methodology is to determine if a design 
is expected to last the life of the aircraft. This analysis can be developed further to 
include a design assessment committee to go beyond the evaluation of the design 
and tie into a design improvement and development committee. The assessment 
sheets can identify problems but do not include the potential solutions at this time. 
Further work on the concept of integrating the outcome of the methodology to 
already established aircraft design review processes is needed. 
Dissemination of Lightning/HIRF Continued Airworthiness Knowledge 
Finally, further work to incorporate continued airworthiness into standard aircraft 
design manuals, classroom text books, and industry design guides is required. This 
work expanded on designing an aircraft with the continued airworthiness of lightning 
protection designs as a focus in the process. Literature searches did not provide the 
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kind of detailed design knowledge as presented in this body of work. The 
understanding of aircraft design phases and the proper place for incorporation of 
continued airworthiness design constraints is critical information to provide in state-
of-the-art aircraft design teachings. Discovery of the importance of early goals and 
the effect of ignoring continued airworthiness concerns requires further 
transmission of the subject to the aircraft design community.  
Integration of Test Data Development 
Integration of test data for the design optimization of lightning protection continued 
airworthiness requires future development. Early establishment of the lightning 
protection components of choice should be evaluated based on testing. Test results 
may not provide the required information if the engineer in charge of lightning 
protection selection does not consider an organized process to input criteria into the 
test plan for continued airworthiness consideration. The engineer must inventory 
the known test results and categorize the tests to ensure that similar environmental 
threats are proposed for the test where known test results cannot be compared to 
the real installed environmental threats for the proposed application of the lightning 
protection. In some cases where the environmental threats are few, the degradation 
may be more readily predicted. In cases where multiple environmental threats exist 
simultaneously, more information may be required from the field. If the protection is 
exotic and never used before in the proposed application, more serious attention 
must be paid to the environment in which the new component will be installed. In 
this case, testing to failure may be a required alternative and certification testing 
may need supplemental test data. 
7.4.4 Summary of Future Development Areas Identified by Case Studies and 
Research 
Several areas of future development are identified through the research, validation 
and case studies. The following is a summary of some areas of study that require 
further work: 
a. Further work on the format and content of the assessment sheets. Included in 
this work should be consideration for a database to manage the assessments. 
b. Future work can be planned to determine if patterns of electrical bond 
degradation due to corrosion can be identified and a predictive methodology 
can be developed for corrosion effects on bonding characteristics. 
c. Electrical bond degradation modeling can be investigated further. For the 
purpose of application of this methodology, electrical bond degradation 
models could not be found through literature searches in this industry. There 
may be electrical bond degradation models used for other purposes, but the 
author was unable to identify such a tool. 
d. SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) guidelines can be revised to 
include this thesis work and utilized more effectively within the proposed 
methodology. The SAE ARP documents that address lightning protection 
include a section on surveillance and maintenance of lightning protection. The 
author found these guidelines to be of little relevance to the concept of 
designing for continued airworthiness. Further development of these 
guidelines may be beneficial to create new knowledge and further the 
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emphasis of this methodology. Once revised, the SAE guidance can be 
referenced in the assessment sheets to tie the design criteria more closely to 
the SAE requirements.  
e. The subjects of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) or Electromagnetic 
Compatibility (EMC) protection were not included in this thesis. Investigation of 
the application of this methodology for the effects of EMI/EMC protection 
degradation is a development area; especially for future work in wireless 
control. 
f. Lightning protection component assessment can be developed further. Work 
can be done on refinement of the assessment sheets and refinement of the 
application of the assessments. This thesis proposes one possible way to 
implement the assessment associated with the methodology. There are 
potentially more assessment ideas and other assessment procedures that can 
be developed to improve on the thesis proposal. One area of development may 
be in the creation of an assessment database. Also, the assessment sheets 
could consider the development of a risk index for lightning protection 
components installed within severe environments. 
g. Lightning protection component installation zones do not exist as a design 
concept for aircraft development. This area of study could conceptualize a 
zonal system safety analysis for integrated systems that contain lightning 
protection. Current Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedures (EZAP) performed to 
create maintenance and inspection instructions for Electrical Wiring 
Interconnection Systems (EWIS) mitigate smoke/fire events throughout all 
zones. However, lightning protection continued airworthiness is not part of 
that analysis process. 
h. Relocation of a lightning protection component can be added as a possible 
outcome to the assessment. Further research into incorporation of component 
relocation into the methodology can be conducted. 
i. Systems that are protected by lightning have associated criticality established 
by the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Lightning 
protection components do not have specific criticality ratings. Investigation 
into whether the FMECA criticality can be integrated into the analysis sheets 
can be performed as future work. Perhaps ranking in terms of more critical 
designs could enhance the methodology. System Safety Analysis (SSA) 
procedures use a matrix of severity and probability (Catastrophic, Major, Minor 
FAR 1309). Safety assessments for 25.1309 failure hazard assessments also 
require additional assessment from the Design Assurance Level (DAL) to 
identify lightning protection component significance within the assessment. A 
convergence of these “safety” concepts may be investigated for applicability to 
the methodology. 
j. Severity ratings for environments can be developed for lightning protection. 
Location, environmental threats and criticality of the installed components may 
be developed leading to a “Severity Rating” included on the assessment sheet. 
k. Aircraft lightning protection is selected based on the electrical threat modeled 
for the location. Lightning zones on the aircraft identify the severity of the 
current/voltage and the probability of the strike to attach in that zone. The 
assessment model for lightning protection components may benefit from 
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including the lightning zone in the assessment sheets. These sheets were 
revised during the case studies exercise to accommodate this feature. Further 
work on better use of this “electrical” threat rating in combination with the 
environmental ratings may produce a matrix that could improve the 
assessment outcomes. 
l. Improvement of the methodology Step 7 titled, “Feedback test results to 
engineering for potential design revision or design decision validation” could be 
provided by inputs from a continued airworthiness advisory board. This 
concept was not proposed in the thesis. Further development of this process is 
needed. On this board specific expertise should be represented such as:  
1. Maintenance engineering 
2. Reliability engineering 
3. Production test engineering 
4. Electromagnetic engineering 
5. Certification engineering 
6. Developmental test engineering 
7. Wire design engineering 
8. Electrical bonding and Grounding (Earthing) engineering 
9. Material processes and technology engineering  
The board is responsible to the chief engineer for determining the most 
optimal solutions including cost, performance, and long term effectiveness of 
the designs. 
m. Expansion of Step 9 in the methodology titled, “Perform design revision study” 
can more effectively assess revolutionary designs. Test data can include similar 
designs, simulated models, and developmental testing. This thesis discovered 
that past certified designs are sometimes selected for use on more advanced 
integrated aircraft without further testing or performance simulation 
completed. For this step in the methodology, the chief engineer needs to 
consider an organizational structure that can utilize exploratory testing as a 
way to determine design solutions even if the designed part has been 
successfully incorporated into past aircraft. Usually, this type of testing is called 
engineering tests or developmental testing. If the component has passed 
qualification testing for a previous aircraft application, further testing may not 
be required. For these exploratory test scenarios, the organization may be 
required to assemble exploratory test “development” even before the 
preliminary design stage of the project. This kind of innovation is needed to 
avoid design delays, progress interruptions and retests for designs that were 
imagined but not produced. Further study of this idea should be completed.  
n. Creation of a means for assessing the design is required in Step 9 of the 
proposed methodology. This is an area of future work required to ensure that 
appropriate balance is achieved in making the decisions. A gathering of data 
associated with continued airworthiness of lightning protection would be 
helpful in supporting this expansion. For many aircraft development programs 
reliability data is used to determine where certain systems should concentrate 
efforts for improvements. In the case of lightning protection, reliability data is 
most likely not collected through this reliability system. Since lightning 
protection is mostly passive, indications of lightning protection failures are 
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difficult to isolate. Operational impacts to airlines related to lightning strikes 
that cause dispatch delays is an area of development that will assist in creating 
a more effective design revision study. 
o. One simple modification to the assessment sheet is the incorporation of a 
materials chart. Further research should be performed on creation of an active 
assessment system that can reject certain combinations of design and 
environment given the materials and environmental threats.  
p. A method for determining corrosion severity and the relationship between 
corrosion in a conductive joint and its relation to the conductivity is required 
future work. For this, work is required to establish the most common materials 
in the conductive interface such as aluminum interface with titanium and then 
applying a controlled amount of salt spray to the joint while recording 
resistance of the joint as the corrosion increases. Tables can be generated with 
this information and a family of exposure levels can also be determined as a 
variable and recorded for each scenario. These tables should be tested with 
multiple test cases of the same material and moisture exposures to evaluate 
reproducibility of the results. Once tables of this nature are established, the 
information can be used in determining the expected outcome of certain 
electrically conductive interfaces within specific environments. These tables 
can also represent the impact to long term conductivity for different sealant 
methods and sealant types. 
q. The manufacturers preferred parts list needs to interface with this 
methodology. A revision of the methodology to directly tie the environmental 
threat design criteria and the approved parts list process into assessment 
sheets could provide an improvement to the methodology. 
r. Additions to OEM Design Manual are necessary using the findings of this thesis. 
s. The methodology can be improved by expanding the nature of the assessment 
to also include the revised design recommendations. In that case the review 
committee envisaged in this methodology would be tasked to go beyond the 
evaluation of the design and be made directly responsible for design 
improvement and development. Currently, the assessment sheets can identify 
problems, but do not include the potential solutions. Further work on this 
concept is needed. 
t. An improvement to the assessment sheets may be to test the component 
resistance at time of installation to establish an “as installed” value for use in 
future evolution of the methodology and document these values in the 
assessment sheets (or future database). It is important to install the lightning 
protection bonds properly. The current systematic approach proposed in this 
thesis does not include the examination of the installation process to ensure 
continued airworthiness of the installation is secured. This deeper involvement 
in the design engineering of components can be future work associated with 
this thesis. 
u. More future work can be performed on the expansion of design processes to 
include continued airworthiness of lightning protection. This concept may also 
be adaptable to other disciplines. The importance of establishing early goals 
was highlighted for lightning protection in this thesis. The inclusion of 
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continued airworthiness within these early goals should be investigated for 
potential advantages to other disciplines.  
7.5 Contributions to Knowledge 
A significant contribution to knowledge created through this work is the potential for 
the methodology to be applicable to other design approaches. This expands the 
impact of the methodology to other disciplines such as flight controls, avionics and 
structural design processes. The expansion of the methodology creates a 
translational relationship of the learning to applications beyond the objectives of this 
work.  
 
Specific knowledge contributions in the area of lightning protection design include 
revision of the way aircraft designers approach lightning protection design data 
gathering. The performance of lightning protection on an aircraft is not simply a 
certification requirement, but the contribution to knowledge on this subject 
highlights that lightning protection designs also require a continued airworthiness 
robustness that cannot be left to chance any longer. Instead, incorporation of the 
continued airworthiness design constraint will revise permanently, the way lightning 
protection is designed. 
 
In order to make this design methodology attainable, process changes are required 
for data collection, distribution, and utilization. The assessment sheets that were 
designed to demonstrate the methodology can be revised, enhanced, or even 
replaced with an interactive computing system. Use of assessment sheets was 
appropriate to demonstrate the methodology within the case studies; however, a 
database may be much more useful and effective in dealing with large amounts of 
data distributed over many specialist engineering groups and suppliers. 
 
The contribution to knowledge in demonstrating the methodology with the case 
studies were the association of electrical bonding and grounding knowledge to the 
lightning protection continued airworthiness. Most bonding and grounding 
requirements ensure that an electrical bond is attained at the time of the aircraft 
assembly. This approach does not concern itself with continued availability of the 
bond over the life of the aircraft. Since the electromagnetic compatibilities and 
electrical bonding and grounding skills are departmentalized, the assessment sheets 
provided evidence that cross examination between these skill sets would benefit the 
final design outcome. Given an understanding of the continued airworthiness design 
criteria and combining this understanding with a design methodology change; the 
outcome has been proven by the case studies to be greatly beneficial to aircraft 
design robustness. Another contribution to knowledge was the differences between 
lightning protection design time phase in a development program and the 
maintenance program development time phase. These two design processes are not 
interfaced at a point in the design development to appropriately revise poor long 
term performing designs. Timing of the MSG-3 analysis that is used to create the 
initial minimum scheduled maintenance program is much too late in the design 
process to be an appropriate tool for optimizing designs. 
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In order to leverage the knowledge gained by this body of work, one must revise the 
aircraft design process to consider lightning protection continued airworthiness early 
in the development phase. Lightning protection failure and its consequences in the 
case of a lightning event may be included within the particular risk assessments of 
FAR/JAR 25.1309 as a way to capture the aircraft operational impact of the failure.  
This however may not provide all the lightning protection schemes needed to 
process through the methodology since the process is event and system centric. 
Lightning protection component critical characteristics can be determined earlier in 
the design process if a system is created to account for this revision. Current design 
processes do not seem to apply enough attention to the determination of materials 
and finishes ability to maintain good long-term electrical bonds early in the 
development process. As an example, the proposed methodology has the 
establishment of critical characteristics for each component at the beginning of the 
detailed design stage. Step three in the methodology is where the critical 
characteristics such as the material and finish of lightning shield within looms are 
determined. This is proposed to be the same as it is today, however further 
consideration should be provided to the possibility that the critical characteristics in 
step three be moved to step two at the preliminary design stage where identification 
of critical and essential lightning protection components in the installed 
environments are provided by the design team. This may benefit the methodology 
further to provide visibility of the importance of the materials and finishes selected 
earlier in the program. An example of this may be use of a tin shield on a wire loom 
outside the pressure vessel. The resistance of the indirect protection provided by tin 
shields is well established in the industry; however, there have been findings of 
degraded tin shields outside the pressure vessel. If this tin shield is chosen at the 
beginning of detailed design as proposed in the new methodology, it may be too late 
to revise the shield without major impact to the connector back shell in which the 
shield interfaces to provide protection to the loom. Changes in wiring designs at the 
detailed design phase of a program can have negative impacts on the suppliers and 
component manufactures. 
Certification Aspects 
Consideration of the lightning protection way forward to certification brought to 
light new challenges for what is required to develop better performing designs. Past 
processes evaluated lightning threats in aircraft lightning zones and determined the 
appropriate protection to protect the aircraft at the time of initial flight of the 
aircraft. While completing the case studies, it was discovered that the selection of 
lightning protection schemes may be altered if consideration for FAA FAR 25.1529 
(Instructions for Continued Airworthiness) is included in the protection design 
selection criteria at the start of the design development. Consideration of this 
regulatory requirement will impact lightning protection designs in a way that was 
not performed on past aircraft design programs. Requirement for sealants, 
composite structure assemblies, electrical bond paths and long term availability of 
these lightning protection components as installed on the aircraft will generate 
differences in the design outcome, different than those produced using past 
methodologies. Early establishment of the lightning protection components of 
choice should be evaluated based on testing beyond the qualification testing that is 
  
311 
already in place. Tests for the aging effects of environment are extremely useful to 
determining good long-term performing components. Test results may not provide 
the required information if the engineer in charge of lightning protection selection 
does not consider an organized process to input criteria into the test plan to ensure 
adequate test data results that are needed for optimum implementation of the 
methodology. The engineer must inventory the known test results and categorize 
the tests to ensure that similar environmental threats are proposed for the test that 
would be expected on the aircraft for an extended period of time. Some parts are 
exposed to salt spray for 50 hours. These tests are to qualify the part for initial 
installation on the aircraft. Other qualification tests may take 500 hours of salt spray. 
It is the choice of the test plan manager to determine applications of parts and 
propose appropriate tests for the parts with an understanding of the ultimate 
application and location of the part. These decisions are not currently tied to a 
closed-loop assessment process like that proposed in this body of work. Without the 
application of a methodology such as the one proposed here, known test results 
cannot be compared to the real installed environmental threats for the proposed 
application early in the design phase of the development program. In some cases 
where the environmental threats are few, the degradation may be more readily 
predicted and test results may not be as significant to the final outcome. In cases 
where multiple environmental threats exist simultaneously, more information may 
be required from other components that are already installed on existing aircraft 
after a long period of duty. If the protection is exotic and has never been used before 
in the proposed application, more serious attention must be paid to the 
environment where the new component will be installed. In this case, testing to 
failure may be a required alternative and certification testing may not be adequate. 
These understandings are contributions to knowledge that drive this improved 
design approach. The association of the design threats contained in the case studies 
and specific lightning protection components information regarding the installation 
techniques yielded conclusions within the assessment sheets that provide further 
design engineering guidance. Combining this assessment with service experience is 
even more impactful to improving the design. 
Data Gathering 
Further contribution to knowledge relates to the tedious nature of the data 
gathering. For this methodology to run smoothly, a data gathering process needs to 
be integrated into the design development activities. Information gathering for the 
case studies was very tedious and demonstrated that an integrated process for 
including the lightning protection design continued airworthiness into the 
development phase of an aircraft design program would be less tedious. Gathering 
data at the beginning of the development program would allow the committee 
performing the assessment to influence the design at a more effective point in the 
program development phase. The aircraft design process is iterative in nature. The 
use of the assessment sheets in the case studies demonstrated that feedback from 
design assessments is important especially when a system is found to be inadequate 
for the life of the aircraft. An example of this was included in the case where a 
connector design was found to be inadequate for the application outside the 
pressure vessel. 
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Inadequacy of FHA 
The case studies demonstrated that the use of a failure hazard assessment to 
determine appropriate lightning protection schema is not enough to address the 
lightning protection design robustness over the life of the aircraft. The concept of 
design assurance levels was introduced within the case studies that assisted with the 
necessary categorizing of lightning protection systems. An entire section of the 
Chapter 5 was dedicated to the concept of safety and the different processes 
associate with design assurance. This may be an area where further development 
can be conducted to further rationalize which lightning components are the most 
critical and should be taken through the design methodology.  After review of the 
EMC test reports generated at the time the aircraft was designed, it was noted that 
the continued airworthiness of the EMC protection under test was not included as a 
category within the EMC test report. 
 
Final conclusions determined that the early development of the aircraft used in the 
case studies would have benefited from this methodology. The design approach 
used to develop the aircraft evaluated in the case studies produced designs that 
require scheduled maintenance since the design robustness was not found to be 
adequate enough to perform its intended function adequately over the life of the 
aircraft. To some degree this can be written off as “hind-sight” but the knowledge 
gained in this body of work suggests that a different design solution may have been 
chosen given the advantages of the methodology in identifying performance issues 
at an early stage in the design cycle.  This can also be correlated to the lack of an 
integrated design process such as the one hypothesized by this work. 
Contribution to Knowledge High Points 
This endeavor of work led to the collection of information under one idea that has 
never been assembled before outside this thesis. The years of literature searches has 
not produced any evidence that this idea is part of any established current 
knowledge base. Evidence to the innovation of this design methodology is the patent 
application of the methodology to protect the value of the idea.  With this new 
knowledge established as valid and effective by several case studies presented 
within this thesis; implementation of the methodology on a future development 
program is likely. The thesis discovered issues with certification methods that need 
understanding, and generated efficiencies given certain practices recommended in 
the thesis that can be leveraged to produce more superior results on an aircraft 
development program. Some of the many contributions to knowledge are as follows: 
1. Revision of design practices and organizational structure of a design program. 
2. Contributions to general aviation knowledge base through production of 
technical papers on the subject during the five years of thesis development. 
3. Brought better understanding of test data relevance and collection process 
improvements for information gathered by test including expanding test results 
reviews within the methodology to accept input from other projects and 
exploratory initiatives 
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4. Discovered that performance goals must be more effectively tied to continued 
airworthiness. Most current aircraft certifications rely on past practices that may 
result in failure of performance goals in the long term.  
5. Discovered the benefits of considering alternative components early in the 
program. Implementation of components used on past programs may not 
perform as well as the new program goals desire. 
6. Discovered a way forward to avoid late findings impacting the program and 
potentially causing development schedule delays. The methodology suggests 
that early assembly of operational performance data for lightning protection 
components should be performed and used in design decision making. 
 
The case studies demonstrated that the earlier design approach used to develop the 
aircraft in the case studies could be optimized with a different approach to 
continued airworthiness. This can be correlated to implementation of an integrated 
design process such as the one hypothesized by this thesis. 
 
Improvements to the methodology can be performed as future development for 
improving aircraft designs. Key to the future work is assessment to determine if a 
design is expected to last the life of the aircraft leveraging performance data. Further 
work on implementing the concept is needed. 
Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Further Work Summary 
The following is a condensed list of findings, discoveries and further work associated 
with this body of work. These points address the highlights of the work and provide 
quick reference to the accomplished work and the proposed follow-on work. 
8.1 Conclusions 
Effectiveness of the Methodology 
1. The aim of this body of work was to determine a way to include continued 
airworthiness into the design of lightning protection. The methodology proved to 
work effectively to include continued airworthiness into the design process.   
2. The versatility of the methodology was proven by use of several case studies.  
The case studies proved applicability of the methodology on substantially 
different lightning protection components. The proposed methodology proposed 
is adaptable to multiple lightning protection design component types. 
3. The methodology provides a way to assess improving an existing design vs. 
developing a new design. The addition of multiple test cases produced more 
effective results in this thesis. Cases were selected with composite and metallic 
designs to demonstrated differences.  
4. Further technical work on lightning zone correlation to the continued 
airworthiness of lightning protection components can enhance the methodology. 
Severity indexes can be created including lightning strike zone severity and 
environmental conditions. Details regarding the aircraft lightning environment, 
aircraft environmental threats, and associated details of the wire installations 
criteria in vibration, temperature, and moisture can generate better analysis 
resulting in more effective long lasting designs. 
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5. The case studies concluded that the methodology can be effectively applied to 
new technologies. 
6. Equipment criticality was explored. The methodology was revised to include the 
Design Assurance Levels for the lightning equipment. The difference between the 
criticality determined by the FAR 25.1309 safety analysis and the safety 
determinations through the AC20-136 Design Assurance Level process were 
clarified. Findings were provided that demonstrated how a system considered 
non-critical by the FAR 25.1309 safety analysis could be elevated to a hazardous 
or catastrophic level failure by AC20-136. This observation emphasized the need 
for understanding the electromagnetic perspective for lightning protection safety 
determination Also, direct application of the systems safety analysis may 
produce an incorrect lightning protection components classification. This could 
drive incorrect protection applications. The subject of new or significantly 
modified systems and its impact to the methodology was described. 
7. Design assurance levels were introduced within the case studies that assisted 
with the necessary categorizing of lightning protection systems in the application 
of the methodology. The case studies demonstrated that the failure hazard 
assessment is not enough to address the lightning protection design long-term 
robustness. An entire section of the case studies was dedicated to the concept of 
safety and the different processes associate with design assurance. 
8. Design solutions for the expected “standoff” voltage that control equipment 
experience at the junction from outside the equipment to the internal 
equipment control electronics are required as an input to the methodology.  
Working with this requirement, designers establish electrical bonding schemes to 
ensure that the required voltages are within the specified levels.  
9. Current paths were added to the methodology procedure. Electrical bond paths 
for lightning protection installations were described in detail. During a lightning 
strike event, lightning current travels along the aircraft structure inducing current 
on wire installations to the attached equipment.   
10. The case studies proved that both direct and indirect lightning strike threats can 
be addressed by the methodology. 
Methodology Improvement 
1. A revision of the methodology to directly tie the environmental threats design 
criteria and the approved parts list process into the methodology and 
assessment sheets is also a suggested improvement. 
2. Incorporation of a materials chart is a suggested methodology improvement. 
3. An assessment committee procedure would improve the methodology. Part of 
the design assessment is to determine the design long-term viability. The 
methodology can be developed further to include a design assessment 
committee. Further work on this concept is needed. 
4. A predictive methodology to model the corrosion effects on electrical bonding 
characteristics degradation should be investigated. This could be a further 
expansion of this area of research and development work. 
Design benefits 
1. Design methods for continued airworthiness can produce better performing 
designs if a proactive design technique such as the one proposed by this thesis is 
applied for lightning component continued airworthiness.  
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2. Design goals must incorporate effective recognition of continued airworthiness 
criteria and leverage performance data.  
3. The ability to share data, exchange ideas, and apply test results leads to better 
designs. Design group integration of diverse design disciplines is an effective way 
to implement the methodology. 
4. Designs that are adopted from past certification programs may be an acceptably 
low risk alternative to creating new designs but may also produce sub-optimal 
designs if not evaluated in a manner consistent with the methodology proposed. 
5. The concept of primary and secondary structure protection benefited the design 
assessment and was used in the case studies to organize the design process.  
6.  Research identified that a study by the National Institute of Aviation Research 
determined that aircraft which are fully protected from lightning adverse effects 
had a significantly lower percentage of electrical failures. This discovery leads to 
the conclusion that the methodology demonstrated in this case studies would 
bring a significant value to the aircraft design process. 
7. The association of the design threats to the lightning protection components and 
installation techniques yielded further design engineering guidance. Combining 
the assessment with service experience improved the design outcome. 
Design Method Improvements 
1. More research is required to adjust aircraft design handbooks. Knowledge gained 
from this thesis must be included in relevant design manuals. The AIAA lightning 
protection design book can benefit from this knowledge. 
2. The criticality of electrical bonding on aircraft was evaluated by this work. 
Literature searches resulted in discovery of an electrical bonding design guide 
developed by the OEM. Incorporation of the results of this thesis could be 
provided as a revision to enhance the bonding requirements practices developed 
for the new aircraft design processes discussed in this thesis. Reference to this 
design guide is included in the case studies. The importance of an electrical 
earthing design guide was highlighted and principles of the design guide were 
included in the case studies exercise.  
3. For early aircraft designs, sealant was not deemed necessary, especially in 
applications where equipment may require removal for maintenance or 
overhaul. Through research of the case studies, it was discovered that sealant 
applications are an important part of lightning protection continued 
airworthiness. Understanding appropriate applications of sealants, appropriate 
types of sealants and the relationship to the continued airworthiness of the 
installation was achieved through the case studies exploration of information 
gathered through a literature search. As a result of this learning, the analysis 
sheets that drive the assessments for continued airworthiness were revised to 
include a category for the sealant application and type.  
4. Cleaning methods associated with preparation of electrical bonding installations 
were explored and included within the analysis. Specific electrical bonding 
information regarding the aircraft in the case studies was acquired through 
literature searches and is included within the case studies. 
5. Information gathering for the case studies demonstrated that an integrated 
process for including the lightning protection design continued airworthiness into 
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the development phase of an aircraft design program would be far more efficient 
than gathering the required data later in the development program. 
6. The case studies demonstrated that the earlier design approach used to develop 
the aircraft can be improved if this methodology is applied. This can be 
accomplished using an integrated design process such as the one demonstrated 
by this body of work. 
7. Inclusion of EMC test reports is an improvement to the design methods used in 
current practice. After review of the EMC test reports generated at the time of 
the aircraft design it was noted that the continued airworthiness of the EMC 
protection under test was not included as a category within the report structure.  
Maintenance Program Benefits 
1. Lightning protection maintenance programs can be optimized if the designs are 
influenced by continued airworthiness data before they are final. 
Service Data Enhances Designs 
1. Gathering and leveraging service experience within a design community requires 
a formal methodology and embrace from the design community leadership. This 
service data is valuable information if used in a design methodology such as the 
one proposed in this thesis. 
2. Lightning protection degradation issues must be captured in a database and used 
for future designs consistent with the findings in this thesis. 
Certification Impacts 
1. The methodology modifies past certification practices. For lightning protection 
design, multiple paths through to certification were demonstrated by this thesis. 
2. Certification practices that use similarity of components on other certified 
aircraft configurations must be checked for service performance. Similarity may 
be used to adopt the design however, long-term effectiveness cannot be 
assumed if the components are not tested on an active aircraft before similarity 
is used as a reason to adopt the design. Caution should be applied here since 
many lightning protection components operate passively.  
3. It was discovered that the lightning certification process has a large impact on 
the lightning protection design development. Certification process research on 
the methodology impact was included in the case studies. In cases where 
components were certified on previous aircraft development programs, 
additional design assessment may not be necessary. This could lead to sub-
optimal designs and perpetuation of a lightning design feature that could be 
improved for continued airworthiness if the methodology proposed in this body 
of work was used. The methodology can be used for both new and reconfigured 
or derivative aircraft. 
Maintenance Requirements Integration 
1. Inclusion of maintenance requirements can be added to the methodology to 
create optimized designs. This was not considered in the early version of this 
work but was learned as the work matured. At later stages of the case studies 
development, the incorporation of maintenance as an alternative to the redesign 
of a lightning protection component was included as part of the methodology 
and part of the design assessment sheets. The maintenance program is generally 
determined after the designs have been completed.  
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2. Early incorporation of the maintenance program requirements during the design 
phase can further optimize the design for continued airworthiness and can 
mitigate maintenance costs later in the life of the aircraft.  
3. It was also determined that lightning inspection instructions provide a good 
summary of the design features that an OEM consider important. Research into 
the OEM maintenance manual and across several different aircraft maintenance 
manuals provided information that was included in the case studies to define the 
general principles associated with aircraft lightning protection inspections. This 
knowledge is a great enhancement to understanding continued airworthiness 
issues associated with damage after a lightning strike. 
4. Lightning protection maintenance can be improved with this design assessment 
methodology. Changes to designs may be recommended and subsequently 
evaluated for practicality by use of a feedback methodology added to the early 
version of the methodology proposed prior to completion of the case studies.  
Accidents and Incidents Due to Lightning Enhances Understanding 
1. Aircraft crash reports from legitimate regulatory investigations related to 
lightning events were included in the case studies. These investigations led to 
understanding how lightning can affect the continued safe flight and landing of 
an aircraft and also provide information on the importance of maintaining 
lightning protection. In one case the evidence of missing or improperly installed 
bond jumpers (earthing wires) led to understanding that continued airworthiness 
of aircraft against the effects of poor designs, is a key design specialty. In the 
lightning strike examples, both passengers and flight crew were harmed by a 
hard landing due to reduced controllability of the aircraft after the lightning 
strike and subsequent collapse of the landing gear. In another case, lightning was 
suspected to have caused a complete electrical failure. Revision to the aircraft 
flight manual has been recommended to inspect the aircraft after lightning strike 
when loss of electrical power results from the strike. 
Assessment Sheet Improvements and Benefits 
1. Analysis work sheets are a way to implement integration of the methodology 
into a design community. These analysis sheets need to remain flexible to 
account for potential expansion of the analysis process and incorporation of 
other design concerns not identified in this thesis. 
2. The lightning protection components assessment model was improved by 
including the lightning zone in the assessment sheets. Lightning zones on the 
aircraft identify the severity of the current and probability of the strike. The 
sheets were revised during the case study exercises to add this feature. 
3. The assessment sheets assisted with the effort of integrating information and 
design details. Some of the required details for the assessment sheets are in the 
drawings on several sheets. The case studies demonstrated the importance of 
data integration within the design process. 
4. The assessment sheets can identify problems but do not include the potential 
solutions. This should be developed further.  
5. The analysis sheets are designed to address both federate designs and highly 
integrated designs. They can assist with the cross-organizational support 
necessary to succeed at designing highly integrated systems. 
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6. The use of the assessment sheets in the case studies demonstrated that 
feedback from design assessments is important, especially when a system is 
found to be inadequate for the life of the aircraft. An example of this was 
included in the case where a connector design was found to be inadequate for 
the application outside the pressure vessel. 
7. Testing the component resistance at the time of installation may be helpful to 
add to the assessment sheet. These bonds are important to be installed properly 
at the time of aircraft assembly. Current systematic approaches must include the 
examination of the installation process or design to ensure continued 
airworthiness of the installation is maintained. 
Important Case Study Findings 
1. The case studies identified the association of electrical bonding and grounding 
knowledge to the lightning protection continued airworthiness. Since the 
electromagnetic compatibilities and electrical bonding and grounding skills are 
departmentalized, the assessment sheets provided evidence that cross 
examination between these two skill sets would benefit the final design. 
2. For highly integrated aircraft, the lightning protection continued airworthiness 
includes many more systems for which the assessments can be applied. 
 
8.2 Recommendations and Further Work  
The following recommendations are the top items of most impact for future work: 
• Develop an automated analysis tool for assessing lightning protection continued 
airworthiness. Automate the assessment criteria such as the galvanic tables and 
electrical bond degradation models due to corrosion. 
• Design a database tool with algorithms to combine design data with 
environmental threat information and establish robustness ratings based on the 
models. 
• Design a tool to incorporate all known evidence of lightning protection 
degradation and location on the aircraft. Use this tool to validate application of 
known components in alternative locations and as a predictive tool for 
optimizing bond design placements on the aircraft. 
• Develop a trade study for evaluating the lightning protection components and 
provide a design team integration solution for the trade study conclusions to be 
applied to new designs or design improvements. 
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Appendix A – Terms Used in Certification of Systems 
Term Description 
Airworthiness The condition of an item (aircraft, aircraft system, or part) in 
which that item operates in a safe manner to accomplish its 
intended function. 
Analysis An evaluation based on decomposition into simple elements. 
Approval The act of formal sanction of an implementation by a certification 
authority. 
Approved Accepted by the certification authority as suitable for a particular 
purpose. (CAO) 
Assessment An evaluation based upon engineering judgment. 
Assumptions Statements, principles and/or premises offered without proof. 
Assurance The planned and systematic actions necessary to provide 
adequate confidence that a product or process satisfies given 
requirements. (RTCA DO 178B) 
“At Risk” Time The period of time during which an item must fail in order to 
cause the failure effect in question. This is usually associated with 
the final fault in a fault sequence leading to a specific failure 
condition. 
Authority The organization or person responsible within the State (Country) 
concerned with the certification of compliance with applicable 
requirements. 
Availability Probability that an item is in a functioning state at a given point in 
time. 
Certification The legal recognition that a product, service, organization, or 
person complies with the applicable requirements. Such 
certification comprises the activity of technically checking the 
product, service, organization or person, and the formal 
recognition of compliance with the applicable requirements by 
issue of a certificate, license, approval, or other documents as 
required by national laws and procedures. 
Certification 
Authority 
Organization or person responsible for granting approval on 
behalf of the nation of manufacture. 
Common Cause Event or failure which bypasses or invalidates redundancy or 
independence. 
Common Cause 
Analysis 
Generic term encompassing Zonal Analysis, Particular Risks 
Analysis and Common Mode Analysis. 
Common Mode 
Failure 
An event which affects a number of elements otherwise 
considered to be independent. 
Complexity An attribute of systems or items which makes their operation 
difficult to comprehend. Increased system complexity is often 
caused by such items as sophisticated components and multiple 
interrelationships. 
Compliance Successful performance of all mandatory activities; agreement 
between the expected or specified result and the actual result. 
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Term Description 
Component Any self-contained part, combination of parts, subassemblies or 
units, which perform a distinct function necessary to the 
operation of the system. 
Conformity Agreement of physical realization of the item with the defining 
document. 
Criticality Indication of the hazard level associated with a function, 
hardware, software, etc., considering abnormal behavior (of this 
function, hardware, software, etc.) alone, in combination or in 
combination with external events. 
Defect State of an item consisting of the non-performance of specified 
requirements by a characteristic of the item. A defect may, but 
need not, lead to a failure. 
Demonstration A method of proof of performance by observation. 
Derived 
Requirements 
Additional requirements resulting from design or implementation 
decisions during the development process. Derived requirements 
are not directly traceable to higher level requirements; though 
derived requirements can influence higher level requirements. 
Design The result of the design process. 
Design Process The process of creating a system or an item from a set of 
requirements. 
Development 
Assurance 
All those planned and systematic actions used to substantiate, to 
an adequate level of confidence, that development errors have 
been identified and corrected such that the system satisfies the 
applicable certification basis. 
Development 
Error 
A mistake in requirements determination or design. 
Error (1) An occurrence arising as a result of an incorrect action or 
decision by personnel operating or maintaining a system. (JAA 
AMJ 25.1309) (2) A mistake in specification, design, or 
implementation. 
Event An occurrence which has its origin distinct from the aircraft, such 
as atmospheric conditions (e.g., wind gusts, temperature 
variations, icing, lightning strikes), runway conditions, cabin and 
baggage fires. The term is not intended to cover sabotage. (JAA 
AMJ 25.1 309) Note: This definition, as it is stated here, describes 
an “External Event”. There are other uses of “event” that cover 
other aspects (e.g., FTA events). 
Exchanged 
Function 
Refers to interdependencies between functions. 
Exposure Time The period of time between when an item was last known to be 
operating properly and when it will be known to be operating 
properly again. 
Failure A loss of function or a malfunction of a system or a part thereof. 
Note: This differs from the ARP 4754 definition and conforms to 
the AC/AMJ 25.1309 definition. 
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Term Description 
Failure 
Condition 
A condition with an effect on the aircraft and its occupants, both 
direct and consequential, caused or contributed to by one or 
more failures, considering relevant adverse operation or 
environmental conditions. A Failure Condition is classified in 
accordance to the severity of its effects as defined in FAA AC 
25.1309-1A or JAA AMJ 25.1309. 
Failure Effect 
(FE) 
A description of the operation of a system or an item as the result 
of a failure; ¡.e., the consequence(s) a failure mode has on the 
operation, function or status of a system or an item. 
Failure Mode 
(FM) 
The way in which the failure of an item occurs. 
Failure Rate The gradient of the failure distribution function divided by the 
reliability distribution function at time t. If the failure distribution 
function is exponential, the failure rate is constant and the failure 
rate can be approximately calculated by dividing the number of 
failures within a hardware item population, by the total unit 
operating hours. Note: Failure rate could also be expressed in 
terms of failures per flight hour or per cycle. 
Fault An undesired anomaly in an item or system. 
Functional 
Hazard 
Assessment 
(FHA) 
A systematic, comprehensive examination of functions to identify 
and classify Failure Conditions of those functions according to 
their severity. 
Guidelines Recommended procedures for complying with regulations. 
Hardware 
 
An object that has physical being. Generally refers to LRUs, circuit 
cards, power supplies, etc. 
Hazard A potentially unsafe condition resulting from failures, 
malfunctions, external events, errors or a combination thereof. 
Implementation The act of creating a physical reality from a specification. 
Independence (1) A design concept which ensures that the failure of one item 
does not cause a failure of another item. (Derived from JAA AMJ 
25.1309) (2) Separation of responsibilities that assures the 
accomplishment of objective evaluation. 
Inspection An examination of an item against a specific standard. 
Integration (1) The act of causing elements of an item to function together. 
(2) The act of gathering a number of separate functions within a 
single implementation. 
Item One or more hardware and/or software elements treated as a 
unit. 
Latent Failure A failure which is not detected and/or annunciated when it 
occurs. 
Malfunction The occurrence of a condition whereby the operation is outside 
specified limits. 
  
322 
Term Description 
Novelty Applicable to systems using new technology and to systems using 
a conventional technology not previously used in connection with 
the particular function in question. 
Preliminary 
System Safety 
Assessment 
(PSSA) 
A systematic evaluation of a proposed system architecture and 
implementation based on the Functional Hazard Assessment and 
failure condition classification to determine safety requirements 
for all items. 
Product An item generated in response to a defined set of requirements. 
Redundancy Multiple independent means incorporated to accomplish a given 
function. 
Reliability The probability that an item will perform a required function 
under specified conditions, without failure, for a specified period 
of time. 
Requirement An identifiable element of a specification that can be validated 
and against which an implementation can be verified. 
Risk The frequency (probability) of occurrence and the associated level 
of hazard. 
Segregation The maintenance of independence by means of a physical barrier 
between two hardware components. 
Separation The maintenance of independence by means of physical distance 
between two hardware components. 
Similarity Applicable to systems similar in characteristics and usage to 
systems used on previously certified aircraft. In principle, there 
are no parts of the subject system more at risk (due to 
environment or installation) and that operational stresses are no 
more severe than on the previously certified system. 
Software Computer programs, procedures, rules, and any associated 
documentation pertaining to the operation of a computer system. 
Specification A collection of requirements which, when taken together, 
constitute the criteria which define the functions and attributes of 
a system, or an item.  
System A combination of inter-related items arranged to perform a 
specific function(s). 
System Safety 
Assessment 
(SSA) 
A systematic, comprehensive evaluation of the implemented 
system to show that the relevant safety requirements are met. 
System Safety 
Assessment 
Process 
The complete process applied during the design of the system to 
establish safety objectives and to demonstrate compliance with 
FAWJAA 25.1309 and other safety related requirements. 
Validation The determination that the requirements for a product are 
sufficiently correct and complete. 
Verification The evaluation of an implementation to determine that applicable 
requirements are met. 
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Appendix B – Terms Used in Electrical Bonding 
Term Description 
Case Ground Current return path through equipment mounting surface. 
Chassis Ground A bond wire connection from an equipment case through the 
electrical connector to structure. 
Current Return 
Ground 
A current-carrying path established between the “ground side” of 
the circuit of an electric or electronic device and the primary 
structure. 
Designated 
Bond 
Electrical bond of such importance that its maximum allowable 
resistance and design requirements must be specified on 
engineering drawings and verified after each assembly of the 
bond by measurement. 
Designated 
Ground 
An electrical ground of such importance that the maximum 
allowable resistance and other requirements are specified in 
engineering drawing. All designated grounds are checked 100 
percent during production. 
Discontinuity A lack of electrical continuity between joined conductive objects. 
Driven Rivet 
Bond 
A bond formed between non-conductive finished pieces of metal 
structure by three or more driven rivets without faying surface 
preparation. 
Dual Ground Connection technique which provides two attachments of a 
current return to structure. 
Dual 
Terminated 
Ground 
See dual ground. 
Electrical Bond A fixed union between two objects that result in electrical 
conductivity between the objects. 
Electrical 
Bonding 
The process of connecting together electrically two or more 
conductive objects. 
Electrical 
Ground 
An electrically conductive return path from equipment to 
structure. 
Electromagnetic 
Compatibility 
(EMC) 
The capability of equipment or systems to be operated in their 
intended operational environment at designed levels of efficiency 
without causing or receiving degradation owing to unintentional 
electromagnetic compatibility. 
Electromagnetic 
Interference 
(EMI) 
Conducted induced or radiated electrical energy that creates an 
undesirable response in the operation of electrical or electronic 
equipment. 
Electromagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) 
An extremely short, intense burst of radio frequency energy from 
a nuclear explosion. 
Fault An undesired electrical occurrence. A reduction of or complete 
loss of isolation between circuits at different potentials. 
Fault Current A higher than normal current which flows in a circuit due to an 
electrical fault brought on by material, equipment or personnel 
failure. 
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Term Description 
Faying Surface A conductive surface prepared to fit against a second conductive 
surface such that an electrical bond results from the physical 
contact. 
Fire/Explosion 
Hazard Area 
An equipment location or work area that may contain be 
contaminated with a combustible material or vapor. 
Flammable 
Leakage Zone 
An area where flammable liquid or vapor can be expected to 
occur due to single failure or leakage during operation. 
Ground Fault An inadvertent connection of a power circuit to structure, due to 
wiring or equipment failure. 
Grounding 
(Earthing) 
The process of providing an electrical circuit return path to 
primary structure. Also, the process of providing an electrical 
connection from the structure or airframe to earth. 
Inherent Bond Conductive metallic parts which are permanently assembled such 
that a low resistance junction occurs. Examples include parts 
joined by welding, brazing, sweating, swaging, soldering etc., and 
major metal fusion such as metallic structural members secured 
by large numbers of fasteners. 
Interface The surface area where two parts are joined. 
Jumper (bond 
jumper or earth 
wire) 
A short wire assembly, metal braid or metal strap used to provide 
electrical continuity between two conductive objects. 
Lightning Strike 
Attachment 
Being contacted by a lightning current discharge to vehicle. 
Non-designated 
Bond 
Electrical bond whose requirements are not specified on 
engineering drawings. For such a bond the electrical conductivity 
requirements are not critical. 
Precipitation 
Static (P-Static) 
Electrical interference caused by static electricity leaking off a 
vehicle. The source of the interference is corona discharge which 
occurs at sharp edges, points and tips of the vehicle structure due 
to the large charge density at these points. 
Primary 
Structure 
The major metallic portion of the vehicle which carries primary 
structural loads. Members secured by less than twelve structural-
type fasteners are not normally considered as such a structure. 
Secondary 
Structure 
That portion of the vehicle which does not contribute to structural 
strength. Examples include accessory mounting brackets, panels, 
panel supports, equipment racks and seat tracks. 
Static Bond A bond between an otherwise isolated conductive object and the 
primary structure to prevent accumulation of electrostatic 
charge(s) caused by gases or fluids in motion. 
Static Ground An electrically conductive path from the vehicle to earth to 
dissipate electrostatic charges accumulated and to prevent 
accumulation of electrostatic charge while the vehicle is at rest. 
Transient A short-duration voltage or current pulse. 
Voltage 
Reference Plane 
The primary structural current return path for electrical power 
sources. 
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Appendix C - Critical Lightning/HIRF Protected Systems Qualification 
Methods 
Proprietary data retained.  Contact Author 
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Appendix D – Essential Lightning/HIRF Protected Systems Qualification 
Methods 
Proprietary data retained.  Contact Author 
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Appendix E – Definition of terms used in the Development of Lightning 
Direct Effects Protection 
Term Description 
Attachment Point A point of contact of the lightning flash with the aircraft. 
Breakdown The production of a conductive ionized channel in a dielectric 
medium resulting in the collapse of a high electric field. 
Dwell Point A lightning attachment point. 
Dwell Time The time that the lightning channel remains attached to a 
single spot on the aircraft. 
External 
Environment 
Characterization of the natural lightning environment for 
design and certification purposes. 
First Return Stroke The high current surge that occurs when the leader completes 
the connection between the two charge centers. The current 
surge has a high peak current, high rate of change of current 
with respect to time (di/dt) and a high action integral. 
Flashover This term is used when the arc produced by a gap breakdown 
passes over or close to a dielectric surface without puncture. 
Leader The low luminosity, low current precursor of a lightning return 
stroke, accompanied by an intense electric field. 
Lightning Channel The ionized path through the air along which the lightning 
current pulse passes. 
Lightning Flash The total lightning event. It may occur within a cloud, between 
clouds or between a cloud and ground. It can consist of one or 
more return strokes, plus intermediate or continuing currents. 
Lightning Strike Any attachment of the lightning flash to the aircraft. 
Lightning Strike 
Zones 
Aircraft surface areas and structures classified according to 
the possibility of lightning attachment dwell time and current 
conduction. 
Reattachment The establishment of new attachment points on the surface of 
an aircraft due to the sweeping of the flash across the surface 
of the aircraft by the motion of the aircraft. 
Restrike A subsequent high current surge attachment, which has a 
lower peak current, a lower action integral, but a higher di/dt 
than the first return stroke. This usually follows the same path 
as the first return stroke, but may reattach to a new location. 
Stepped Leader See leader. 
Swept Leader A lightning leader that has moved its position relative to an 
aircraft, subsequent to initial leader attachment, and prior to 
the first return stroke arrival, by virtue of aircraft movement. 
Swept Channel The lightning channel relative to the aircraft, which results in a 
series of successive attachments due to sweeping of the flash 
across the aircraft by the motion of the aircraft. 
Zoning The process (or the end result of the process) of determining 
the location on an aircraft to which the components of the 
external environment are applied. 
  
328 
Appendix F – New, Significantly Modified, and Affected Systems  
Proprietary data retained.  Contact Author 
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Appendix G – Proprietary Case Studies 
Proprietary data retained.  Contact Author 
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Appendix H - Glossary of Acronyms 
Acronym Description 
AC Airworthiness Circular 
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practice 
ATA Air Transport Association 
ATL Actual Transient Level 
ED/AD Environmental Deterioration/Accidental Damage 
EDTL Equipment Transient Design Level 
EME Electromagnetic Effects 
ETSL Equipment Transient Susceptibility Level 
EUT Equipment Under Test 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
GVI General Visual Inspection 
HIRF High Intensity Radiated Fields 
LRU Line Replaceable Unit 
RF Radio Frequency 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
TCL Transient Control Level 
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